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ABSTRACT

This report covers countries in transition--the 27 nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States--that embarked on market and democratic reforms after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. The theme is a generation in transition--65 million young people aged 15-24. Are these youths better off? Are they healthier or safer? More or less educated? How do they participate in the economic, social, and political life of their countries? What about family life? What do they think and how do they feel about their changing societies? This report addresses the answers to these questions. It identifies a number of significant gaps between the views and capacities of youth in the region on the one hand and their realities and achievements on the other. The analysis also finds growing similarities between youth in transition and those in other industrialized countries, especially those in Western Europe. It also discusses how youth can be empowered to seize new opportunities while avoiding greater hazards. Issues that should be considered when developing youth-friendly policies are suggested as well as ways to help these policies be more effective. (Contains a statistical annex, glossary, bibliographic notes, and an extensive bibliography.) (MKA)

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REGIONAL MONITORING REPORT

No. 7 2000

YOUNG PEOPLE IN CHANGING SOCIETIES



The MONEE Project

CEE/CIS/Baltics

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Young People in Changing Societies

The MONEE Project
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Florence, Italy

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This Regional Monitoring Report is the seventh in a series produced by the MONEE project, which has formed part of the activities of UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre since 1992. The project analyses social conditions and public policy affecting children and their families in Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic republics.

Earlier Regional Monitoring Reports are as follows:

1. *Public Policy and Social Conditions*, 1993.
2. *Crisis in Mortality, Health and Nutrition*, 1994.
3. *Poverty, Children and Policy: Responses for a Brighter Future*, 1995.
4. *Children at Risk in Central and Eastern Europe: Perils and Promises*, 1997.
5. *Education for All?*, 1998.
6. *Women in Transition*, 1999.

Russian as well as English versions of the Reports are available.

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

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Foreword

The 65 million young people of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are the "transition generation". They were children when their countries took their first steps towards political and economic reform and have witnessed an era of unprecedented change. This is the first generation since the collapse of communism to leave education, enter the job market, or make decisions about raising families. As such, it is putting the reforms of the last decade to the test.

This Report from the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre focuses on the situation of young people who have emerged into a world that bears little relation to the world in which their parents grew up.

One thing is certain: progress for young people and progress in the transition are mutually supportive. The opportunities offered by a new economic climate favour the initiative, creativity and flexibility that are so often the hallmark of youth. But there are risks, including challenges almost unknown to earlier generations: unemployment, drugs, greater inequality, and exclusion. The environments that previously kept young people cocooned from danger have gone, for better or worse, and young people must now play a more active role in protecting themselves. That means involving them, talking to them, listening to them.

Under communism, youth participation was often about conforming. In these new societies, participation must be about making a difference. Young people themselves take a positive view of the changes that have taken place in their countries. This willingness to embrace change could help to maintain and build on the reforms of recent years.

Carol Bellamy
Executive Director, UNICEF

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Contributions to the Report have been made by Robert Thomson (Box 1.2, Section 2.4 and Box 6.7), Kenneth Legins (Section 2.4), Kitty Stewart (Section 3.3), Roberto Laurenti (Box 4.2), Serena Giusti (Section 6.2), and Bertrand Bainvel (Box 6.5). Andrew Newell and Gyula Nagy have provided econometric analyses and data on youth labour markets. Namazie Ceema Zahra and Detelin Gantchev have supplied further technical assistance. Tibor Gazsó has arranged a study and interviews on youth policies in Hungary. Sheila Marnie and Expert Centre, Tashkent, carried out interviews and focus-group discussions in Uzbekistan.

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Introduction and Overview

This Report, like earlier Regional Monitoring Reports of the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, covers countries in transition – the 27 nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States which embarked on market and democratic reforms after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Its theme is a generation in transition – 65 million young people aged 15-24.

Young people have an increasing presence and visibility globally: they are star athletes, technology wizards, entrepreneurs, advocates of peace, crusaders against child labour, pop idols, environmentalists, consumers, and leaders in their own right; in short, they are an economic, political and social force. Young people in the transition region are part of this international youth community, but they also have their own unique history, their own present and future.

Youth in the transition region has many faces. They come from widely ranging socio-economic backgrounds, and they live in many different countries. At the same time they often belong to nationalities and ethnic groups which dwell beyond state borders. From one angle, they still look like children; from another, they are already adults. In fact, they are both – and neither. It is increasingly recognized that youth are a distinct segment of society, and this Report aims to give voice to this younger generation who have grown up during the economic and political transformation of their countries.

These young people are their parents' children, but, in many ways, they have not and cannot inherit their parents' legacy. Their parents grew up in the stable, if oppressive, conditions of state socialism. The high degree of social control which saw young people move quickly and surely from school to work and marriage is gone. With transition, the institutions, processes and social norms which facilitated that smooth passage from one generation to the next are weakened, dismantled, under construction, or in the process of fundamental transformation.

This younger generation – children in the late 1980s when the historical changes started in Eastern Europe – are often portrayed as the natural winners of the transition. True, the market and democracy-oriented transformation offers increasing opportunities to the peoples of the region, and young people may be particularly receptive and responsive to new ideas and new conditions. However, they are also pioneers in these reborn societies, and this role, especially at a tender age, makes young people vulnerable to risks – risks which were largely unknown to the parents, educators and other adult authorities in their lives. Young people would appear then to be in a pivotal position: the transition is exposing them to both opportunities and hazards.

How have the post-communist transformations affected the lives of adolescents and young people? Are they better off? Are they healthier? Safer? More or less educated? How do they participate in the economic, social and political life of their countries? What about family life? And what do they think, and how do they feel about their changing societies?

The Report is not shy about addressing the sometimes hard answers to these questions. It uses both quantitative data and qualitative research in its analysis, although information is sometimes constrained to a limited number of countries, cases, or studies. Differences were quite marked across the region before the transition began, and these differences have since grown. However, the transnational nature of youth issues becomes visible through relevant and sometimes striking findings which demand dialogue and action.

The Report identifies a number of significant gaps between the views and capacities of youth in the region on the one hand and their realities and achievements on the other. It finds that young people in the region:

- are more supportive of market and democratic reforms than older people, but they vote less
- are interested in the social and political life of their countries, but are critical of and even sceptical about the work of the new democratic institutions
- are exposed to higher health risks in terms of reproductive and sexual health, including the threat of HIV-AIDS, while having limited access to relevant information and services
- show often surprisingly tolerant views towards unlawful behaviour and are found in conflict with the law more frequently than were youth before the transition
- attach greater importance to education than did youth before the transition, but tend to start school later and drop out more frequently and, in most countries, are less likely to pursue studies at upper secondary levels
- appear to value family, but are much less likely to marry and have children than people their age did before the transition
- show an impressive degree of flexibility and a wide range of coping strategies in terms of economic welfare, yet still exhibit significantly higher unemployment rates than older adults.

The analysis also finds growing similarities between youth in transition countries and those in other industrialized countries, especially those in Western Europe. This reflects the greater opportunities and choices available to youth in the region, particularly in Eastern Europe, and is clearly a positive outcome of the reforms. However, it also appears that youth in the region now face problems and risks similar to their Western peers, though they often have much weaker support networks.

The Report finds that young people in the region:

- do relatively well or very well in international surveys in terms of achievements in basic education, but, overall, show less convincing accomplishments in upper secondary education

- enjoy greater participation in tertiary education, at times approaching that in Western countries, but this trend appears to exclude youth in disadvantaged groups
- face similar or significantly higher risk of accident than youth in Western countries, although they have relatively less access to motorized vehicles and recreation facilities
- have considerably lower teen pregnancy rates than did youth before the transition, but, in most countries, the rates are still significantly higher than they are in Western countries
- display an incidence of substance use similar to their Western peers and are less likely in general to describe themselves as healthy and happy
- are, for the most part, less likely to get into conflict with the law than their peers in other industrialized regions, but, when they do, they face a greater chance of being sentenced to deprivation of liberty, often with long terms and under harsh conditions
- exhibit greater unemployment rates than older adults, like their Western peers do, and in several transition countries youth jobless rates appear strikingly high
- show an average wage gap with adults that is similar to or even smaller than that of their peers in Western Europe and North America, though average real wages remain, for the most part, lower than they were pre-transition
- are particularly exposed to exploitation and abuse by older adults and employers operating in the booming informal grey economy and illegal black markets
- do not necessarily participate less in the political and social life of their countries than is the case in Western democracies, though the differences may be bigger at the grassroots
- participate in youth exchanges and contribute to global youth culture despite relatively limited access to travel and the Internet.

These findings confirm that the period when repressive environments could keep youth away from risk-taking, whether for better or worse, are over. How can young people in the region be empowered to seize new opportunities and avoid greater hazards? International conventions now accept that all people, including children and youth, have the right to participate in decisions affecting their lives. International research and experience show that having positive goals in life and living in supportive environments help adolescent health and development far more effectively than do oppressive methods. Fresh approaches to youth are particularly needed in the transition region, where economic growth depends greatly on human resources and where social progress often has few solid foundations in terms of civil society and democratic traditions upon which to build.

Indeed, in reviewing the status of various countries, the Report often finds a positive association between progress in the transition agenda and greater opportunities for young people; meanwhile, there is little evidence that slow reform entails fewer risks for youth. It appears, therefore, that progress in youth participation and progress in the transition are mutually supportive. The analysis also finds substantial evidence, however, that youth face greater risks now than before even in countries leading in reform. Although the transition may be youth friendly, it demands particular attention towards young people through public policies, as well as private initiatives.

The Report proposes that youth-friendly policies give priority to the following issues regionwide:

- broader and more equitable education opportunities
- greater use of active labour market measures for youth
- reducing accidents and violence
- greater care related to reproductive and sexual health
- prevention related to substance abuse, including tobacco, alcohol and drugs
- implementation of international standards in the treatment of youth in conflict with the law
- promotion of youth participation in civil society.

The Report suggests that in order to be effective youth policies need to:

- recognize youth as a distinct population group, with particular needs and capacities which stem from their formative age
- build on and work in accord with child-related policies
- advance a common approach and terminology for youth issues
- open a meaningful dialogue with youth on questions that affect their lives
- be open to a dialogue on sensitive areas such as sexual and reproductive health
- be multifaceted and supported by detailed research and political will
- better recognize the psychosocial factors in youth development
- develop intersectoral approaches to issues like youth health or employment
- foster trust between youth and service providers and policy-makers
- address factors which hinder access to services such as poor information, lack of confidentiality, and unaffordability
- pay particular attention to youth from disadvantaged backgrounds
- involve youth in service planning and provision
- target the promotion of youth as valuable assets and able partners.

A decade of transition has eroded many doctrines once closely held in the region, and this dissolution can be liberating. In particular, it may change the belief that young people are passive recipients of social values, public services, economic goods, and political priorities. It may promote the understanding that, in mind, body and spirit, the 65 million members of the "youth nation" in the region form an immense asset to their 27 countries and beyond in this time of rapid economic and social transformation.

Gáspár Fajth
MONEE Project

20 facts about young people and the transition

1. The region now consists of 27 countries, including 22 newly independent nations born out of the former Czechoslovakia, SFR Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – at times peacefully, at times through ethnic tensions and wars.
2. Most countries now participate in European institutions such as the Council of Europe, and 10 states have officially applied for EU membership – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
3. By 1999 economic growth had brought national income above the 1989 level only in Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia; most countries still fell short of 1989 output, and many fell a long way short. Still, 1999 was a landmark year, as economic recession finally bottomed out in the region as a whole: economic growth averaged 2 percent that year.
4. In 1999 there were 65 million young people aged 15-24 in the region, six million more than in 1989. Of the total youth population, 26 million (41 percent) were enrolled in education; 21 million (32 percent) were employed, and 18 million (27 percent) were neither in education, nor in employment.
5. Within this last group, eight million youth were unemployed, while another 10 million were neither in education, nor in the labour force. More girls than boys were in education, but fewer females than males held jobs.
6. The average youth unemployment rate for 18 countries where data are available stood at 30 percent, double the overall unemployment rate. In 11 of these countries both the youth unemployment rate and the ratio of youth unemployment to overall unemployment were higher than the European Union averages.
7. Youth unemployment rates are particularly high in Southeastern Europe (71 percent in FYR Macedonia, 61 percent in FR Yugoslavia, 35 percent in Bulgaria), in the Caucasus (46 percent in Azerbaijan, 27 percent in Georgia) and in Central Asia (37 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 33 percent in Tajikistan).
8. Through migration during 10 years of transition, over a million members of the generation aged 5-14 in 1989 (and who are now 15-24) have left the region altogether. Only five countries show a positive balance in migration over the decade of change. Russia has absorbed most of the large-scale movement of a Slavic homecoming which followed the breakup of the former Soviet Union.
9. Within the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina registered the biggest negative change in population, while hundreds of thousands of people were also uprooted in Croatia and FR Yugoslavia during the 1990s.
10. Between 1989 and 1998 the number of marriages among young women fell by more than 40 percent and the number of births by more than a third. Overall, two-thirds of marriages and half of childbirths are still occurring among women under 25.
11. The 41 percent education enrolment rate among 15-24 year-olds in the region is significantly lower than the rate in the EU (58 percent). Overall, in the 23 countries for which data are available, youth participation in educational or training programmes has declined in 14 countries, including Russia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, and all the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia. A survey in the mid-1990s found that the dropout rate was over 10 percent in vocational education in Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and Latvia and about 17 percent in both vocational and general secondary schools in Albania.
12. In 1998 about one-third of 15-18 year-olds were not in school, numbering nine million individuals altogether. This is three million more than in 1989. Adolescents from ethnic minorities, poor families and rural areas are overrepresented among out-of-school youth.
13. Among the 27 million youth aged under 18 in the region, there are about a half-million cases of conflict with the law annually, though only a few thousand young people commit major violent crimes.
14. In 16 countries youth mortality rates stood at lower levels in 1998 than in 1989, including the Baltic States and all the countries of Central Europe. In 11 countries, youth mortality rates were higher – largely in CIS countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
15. Overall, about 30 percent more young people aged 15-24 died in the region in 1998 than in 1989 – about 15,000 more young men and 4,000 more young women.
16. Suicide rates in 1998 were higher than in 1989 in 16 of the 24 countries for which data are available. Male suicide rates were particularly high, and rising, in Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Among countries with relatively lower incidence in 1989, the rates more than doubled in Belarus and Turkmenistan.
17. Tobacco use is increasing: a 1993-94 international survey found 10 percent of females and 18 percent of males smoking among 15 year-olds in seven transition countries. Four years later the figures were 22 and 29 percent, respectively. On average, in the 15 Western countries surveyed, 20 percent more girls reported smoking daily or weekly in 1997-98 than four years earlier; in the seven transition countries surveyed the ratio of girls who smoke almost doubled.
18. By the mid-1990s about 10 percent of the secondary school-age population had used cannabis in various countries in the region – up from near zero in 1989. In 1994 a survey in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, found that 2 percent of secondary school students experimented with psychoactive substances; the share jumped to 12 percent over the next two years. A 1999 survey found that 25 percent of 16 year-olds in Hungary had used drugs, with the use of injected drugs three times more frequent than it had been in 1995.
19. In 1998 there were a half-million newly registered cases of syphilis in the region, with 15-17 year-olds accounting for an estimated 40,000 cases and 18-24 year-olds another 200,000. Doctors also found about 3,000 cases of syphilis among 10-14 year-olds. In Russia, almost one in 100 young women aged 18-19 is infected with syphilis annually.
20. More and more young people are living with HIV and dying from AIDS in the region. Altogether, an estimated 360,000 persons had been affected by late 1999, with infections heavily concentrated in Ukraine and Russia, and rising rapidly. Only a small portion of those who are infected are registered and treated. Among the people known to be infected, from one-third in Latvia and the Czech Republic to two-thirds in Belarus are aged under 25.

1 Youth in Transition

This Report is the seventh in the series of Regional Monitoring Reports from the MONEE project of the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. Its theme is a generation in transition – 65 million young people aged 15-24 who live in the 27 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

When people in the region embraced democratic change and rejected communism a decade ago, they made a choice for a future that would be very different from what they had known. For many, it was a decision to change their own circumstances, but also their children's futures. This Report explores what has happened with the children of 1989 as they have grown into teenagers and young adults over the past decade. The state of this transition generation is important not only because one day they will be running their countries, but because they have a major role to play in building these nations today – in sustaining families and in advancing the progress towards market economies, democratic governments and civil societies.

The youngest of this generation were born in the mid-1980s when "perestroika" first raised hopes of a new future for the region. They started school in the early 1990s when their countries were already carrying out major economic, political and social reforms. Today they are leaving basic education behind, and the questions arise: Are they better or worse off in terms of a good start in life? Has the transition brought about improvements in their health? Do they have enriched choices in terms of education, jobs and family?

And what has happened to the oldest members of this transition generation, those who were already in their mid-teens when the transition began? How have they fared in the emerging labour markets? Have they found a place of their own in the new democracies? How has the changing social environment meshed with the questing nature of youth?

This Report aims to answer these questions. In doing so, it recognizes an important coincidence: young people in the region are going through their own individual transformation from childhood to adulthood at the same time that their countries are negotiating the passage from authoritarianism to democracy. It is therefore a crucial time of growth for nations and their young people alike. And, in many ways, the ups and downs, the gains and losses and the missed opportunities of the transition nations are amplified and played out in the lives of their young people.

This first chapter introduces different dimensions of the transition youth make in their own lives and places youth against the background of the transition their countries are making. It looks at the young people who are moving from school into the world of work – an aspect of life where the larger economic transformation is radically altering the stakes. It describes how the family life of young people shifts from one centred around parents to one with more autonomy and responsibility for youth. It is this area where the behaviour of youth has contributed most directly to the accelerated demographic change that has occurred in the region since 1989, a change with longer term implications for both individuals and societies.

Each of the following five chapters focuses on a particular aspect of young people's lives. Chapter 2 examines the health of youth, including life style choices and their immediate and longer term implications. Chapter 3 explores what has happened to youth in the changing education systems in the region. Chapter 4 analyses how young people have been faring in the job market, a critical issue also in many established market economies. Chapter 5 sheds light on the social and economic stress experienced by the younger generation by focusing on a particular high-risk population – young people in conflict with the law. Chapter 6 considers how young people in the region are taking up their right and responsibility to participate in and contribute to their changing societies. Not only is participation one of the great themes of the transition in the region, but, as Box 1.1 describes, it is a growing concern for youth around the world.

This Report, like earlier Regional Monitoring Reports, makes its observations through the lens of quantitative information collected through statistical offices in the 27 countries of the region and from various international surveys and studies. These data, often little known and used outside the countries in which they have been collected, are an essential element in any attempt to describe what has happened in the lives of young people in the region.

However, quantitative data of this sort do not paint a full picture. In particular, they do not reveal how young people feel about what is happening to them and the countries in which they live. The Report, therefore, also makes use of qualitative information which records young people's own views of their lives. This information comes in various forms, including opinion polls and surveys conducted by other organizations.

One element is provided by the responses of some 200 young people gathered in focus-group discussions and

Box 1.1

The new international focus on youth: rights and participation

Participation is one of the great themes of the transition: pursuing and creating opportunities in a market economy, voting and exercising choice in political life, being active and involved in civil society, shaping daily and national life by taking part in decision-making at all levels and in all areas of endeavour.

This focus on participation in the transition region coincides with a growing focus in the international community on youth participation in society. Young people are increasingly recognized as an economic, political and social force and as a distinct segment of society in which individuals are entitled to the full set of human rights. This rights-based approach to youth participation is, in many ways, an evolution of progress on the rights of children, captured in the landmark 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child presented in Table 1.1

There are four primary settings in which the participation of children and young adults takes place: at home, at school, at work, and in the community – and participation in each arena is a positive reinforcement for being active in the others.

The family is usually the young person's first experience of participation. The family's basic role is to provide a protective and caring environment for children and youth, ensuring that they grow up healthy and with adequate life skills. It also plays a role in how young people feel about expressing their opinions and shaping decisions which affect their lives.

School can offer formal instruction in civics, but can also promote the development of life skills which foster participation – critical thinking, informed decision-making, negotiation skills, conflict resolution. Participation can be developed through teachers who listen to students, through opportunities and venues where students can express their views and through involvement in school decision-making processes.

Work permits young people to participate in the economic life of their country both as producers and as consumers. There is even a trend in market economies towards more participation by employees in decision-making in the workplace. This emphasis on initiative and responsibility on the job can positively influence a young person's participation in other aspects of his or her life.

Civil society offers many opportunities for productive participation: leisure and cultural groups, volunteer social services, hobby and interest groups, environmental and other social issue associations, religious and political organizations. This type of participation is often at the local level where it has a direct impact on the lives of youth in the community. It also provides experience and training for young leaders who want to make the voices of youth heard at national and international levels.

Any discussion on participation evokes the "mirror" problem of social exclusion and marginalization among some youth. Targeted "outreach" measures are needed to promote positive participation by these youth in society and to counteract the conditions which have led to the exclusion.

In the transition region, these settings are all undergoing change, and ensuring that the changes do not leave youth behind is vital. In the communist societies of the past, participation by youth was all about conforming; in the new transition societies, guided by human rights and democratic values, participation is all about making a difference.

Table 1.1

The Convention on the Rights of the Child

The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1989. This international human rights treaty covers every person under the age of 18 in the world, some two billion individuals.

The Convention, an extraordinary consensus by the world's governments, establishes new ethical principles and international norms of behaviour towards children. It ensures children in all situations their civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and it calls on governments, even those with scarce resources, to take action to protect children's rights – rights to survival, health and education, to a caring family environment, play and culture, to protection from exploitation and abuse of all kinds.

The Convention has four general principles:

- Children have a right to survival and development in all aspects of their lives, including the physical, emotional, psychosocial, cognitive, social, and cultural.
- Children must not suffer discrimination "irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status."
- The best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all decisions or actions that affect the child or children as a group. This holds true whether decisions are made by governmental, administrative, or judicial authorities, or by families themselves.
- Children must be allowed as active participants in all matters affecting their lives and be free to express their opinions. They have the right to have their views heard and taken seriously.

individual interviews carried out for this Report in six transition countries. The results of this exercise are reported in a series of panels, Voices of Youth, which appear throughout the Report. The responses are also referred to at various points in the main text. These "voices" are not intended to be representative of all young people in the countries concerned, but their messages provide vital insight into the situation of youth in the region and complement the picture drawn from other sources. ■

1.1 Youth Enter a Changing World

Young people in the region have been growing up in an unsettled time: the rigid structures of the past are in disarray, sometimes ruins; the promised future is not yet fully realized and sometimes barely envisioned. They are their parents' children, but, in many ways, they have not and cannot inherit their parents' legacy: the "generation gap" between this transition generation and the adults in their lives is therefore unique.

The relationship between the younger and older generations is described in the words of young people from the region in the panel Voices of Youth 1.

The measure of youth

The 65 million people aged 15-24 who lived in the transition region in 1999 represent a large enough population to constitute their own nation, and in many ways they do, as the "youth nation". However, they also represent the diversity and richness of the many countries and cultures in the region. Despite its size and richness, this youth nation has not been well recognized as a distinct population, a cohort which is as different from children as it is from adults. In this regard, youth are a new nation and part of an international youth community which is receiving growing attention worldwide.

Young people, on the one hand, share many characteristics with children – needing and deserving care and protection, support and guidance. They are still at a stage of life, like children, where they often live in the parental home and remain in full-time education, a period of important personal and social development. On the other hand, they are also moving into adulthood. They are becoming independent from the family home and increasingly part of their own social set. They are exposed to and make decisions about risk-taking behaviour. They are preparing for entry into the labour market and for setting up their own homes and families.

The balancing act required to straddle these two stages of life is often crudely declared: young people under age 18 are considered children and enjoy all the protections and benefits of children. But, crossing the threshold of a single birthday, usually age 18, young people find themselves entrusted with – or have thrust upon them – all the legal rights and responsibilities of adulthood. In fact, the issue of who is a child, a juvenile, or a youth and who is an adult is very much a live one in many countries and, certainly, within the international community (Box 1.2).

Voices of Youth 1

Young people talk about the generation gap

The generation gap that typically exists between young people and adults has particular dimensions in the transition region. Many institutions and processes, including social norms, that facilitate a smooth transition from one generation to the next in any society are, in the transition region, weakened, dismantled, simply absent, under construction, or being fundamentally reformed. The voices below belong to young employees and entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic and young people doing volunteer work in Latvia.

- "Our parents lived under a regime which suppressed individuality. This is not the case with young people." (Ilona, 23)
- "In my opinion, there is something to learn from older people. Their lives were much more difficult than ours; they have a lot of experience to share. At the same time, the problems they faced and solved are very different from the ones we come across today." (Ansis, 15)
- "Young people are more aggressive [in the workplace], older people are more accommodating." (Ivana, 24)
- "I suppose older people in our country are influenced by communism." (Ivo, 24)
- "I have found that older people have difficulties in accepting a better paid young person." (Petra, 21)
- "I have no problem with older subordinates. I want them to perform at the same level as young colleagues, and they do." (Ladislav, 24)
- "Today there are much more opportunities than before 1989. This is not only the question of opportunity to travel. Also career opportunities are bigger. Young people can sell their abilities in the labour market, what was not possible before. But it is not only a matter of change in regime. The whole society is unfolding very rapidly. For those who are not able to adapt quickly, there could be difficulties. . . . [Older generations] have different values and opinions than young people." (Daniel, 30)
- "In my opinion, old and young people are moving in different directions." (Ilse, 21)
- "I think it would be better to get closer." (Kaspars, 24)

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Figure 1.1 shows the geographical distribution of the youth nation among the 27 countries of the region in 1999. The 22 million youth in Russia represent one-third of the total, while, at the other end of the spectrum,

Box 1.2

Age concepts and the developmental stages of children and youth

The concepts of "child" and "youth" should recognize and build upon the developmental stages of life. It is increasingly understood that human needs and capacities differ significantly at the various stages of life and that these distinct periods of life build upon and reinforce each other. Unfortunately, however, there is no strong consensus in national and international practices on how to classify human life into different "age slices". Often, for example, youth are not identified as a separate group in statistics.

Typically, national concepts used for children and youth reflect the ages prescribed by law for males and for females with regard to:

- compulsory education
- employment and child labour
- consent to sexual acts
- legal majority and political enfranchisement
- first marriage
- access to certain services without parental consent
- entitlements to certain public benefits and programmes

To a large degree, prescribed ages reflect how "youth" is understood as a social concept and as a target of public policies. Statistics can positively or negatively reinforce this understanding. When, for example, health data are collected for 15-45 year-olds (a category often used for HIV/AIDS reporting), this renders adolescents invisible. Similarly, when pregnancy statistics refer to 15-19 year-olds as a group, the data are dominated by the higher rates for 18-19 year-olds, masking those for 15-17 year-olds.

UN terminology and practices include the following main concepts for children and youth:

- children: those people under 18 years of age
- adolescents: those people aged 10-19 (including early, middle and late adolescence)
- youth: those people aged 15-24
- young people: all those aged 10-24 (a concept which directly recognizes that many interventions for youth are too late at age 15)

The central concept of this Report is youth as defined by the UN terminology. However, the Report also uses more detailed age breakdowns (at times reflecting the practices of national statistical services) or other definitions as appropriate or convenient. These include terms such as puberty, teenagers and young adults (the latter used here for both 18-24 and 20-24 year-olds). The term "young people" is used in the Report as a general term for the younger cohorts of the population. At times it is used interchangeably with "youth"; hence "young people" as used in the Report does not necessarily imply the inclusion of those aged 10-14.

Estonia and Slovenia each have fewer than 300,000 young people aged 15-24, less than half of 1 percent of the region's total. About one youth in 10 in the region is in Ukraine, and another one-tenth are in Poland. The fourth largest concentration is in Uzbekistan, with 7 percent. Overall, the five Central Asian states (including Kazakhstan) have over 10 million youth, 16 percent of the region's total.

Figure 1.2 describes the size of the youth nation in a different way, showing the share youth represents within the population as a whole. The diagram combines the countries into the seven geographic groupings used in the Regional Monitoring Reports: Central Europe, former Yugoslavia, the other countries of Southeastern Europe, the Baltic States, the western CIS, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (including Kazakhstan). The 15-24 population has a rather uniform share among the country groups. For the region as a whole, just under one in six persons (16 percent) is of this age, with the figure ranging from one in seven in the Baltics to nearly one in five in Central Asia.

The diagram also shows the population shares for people aged 0-14, 25-59 and 60 and over. Taken together, the age groups 0-14 and 15-24 make up 38 percent of the region's population, ranging from 55 percent in Central Asia down to 33 percent in the Baltics. At the individual country level, the extremes are Tajikistan and Bulgaria; it will not be quite the same experience being a young person in these two countries, in one of which 61 percent of the population is below age 25 and in the other 31 percent.

The shares shown in Figure 1.2 have been affected by significant changes right across the region in fertility and in the size of the child cohorts born since 1989, points discussed later in the chapter. However, the size (as opposed to the share) of the youth population reflects fertility pre-transition, including the pronatalist policies and the demographic waves after the Second World War which affected the size of their parents' generation.

Political change, death and migration

The generation of children aged 5-14 at the outset of the transition in 1989 are today's young people aged 15-24, meaning that this generation has made its transition from childhood to youth during the decade of political, economic and social transition that has occurred in the region. What have been the key changes of the societal transition

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and how have they been played out in this transition generation?

In terms of political change, one of the big promises of the transition was the restoration of the independence and sovereignty of nations. The political map of eight nations which existed in 1989 has been redrawn to include five of the original countries, plus 22 newly independent nations born out of the former Czechoslovakia, SFR Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Sovereignty, independence and parliamentary systems were established or reestablished quickly. Box 1.3 looks at how young people in the region view these changes and underlines that their opinions tend to be more favourable than those of older people.

What happened to the size of the transition generation between 1989 and 1999? Table 1.2 shows the numbers of persons who were children aged 5-14 in 1989 and youth aged 15-24 in 1999, together with estimated numbers for deaths and migration. The cohort became slightly smaller over that time. In 1989, there were 67 million children aged 5-14; in 1999 there were 65.5 million youth aged 15-24; the difference is 1.5 million. The generation has also changed in terms of its distribution among the countries of the region.

About a half-million members of this generation are estimated by the MONEE project to have died between 1989 and 1999. (The figures for deaths in Table 1.2 are only estimates, as the project does not have available the number of deaths for each individual birth cohort; the estimates are made on the basis of mortality rates for several age ranges.) Death comes all too early in life for some members of any generation in every country.

Figure 1.1



Youth aged 15-24, 1 January 1999
(1,000s)
Source: Statistical Annex, Table 1.3

Figure 1.2



Age structure of the total population, 1 January 1999
(percent)
Sources: Statistical Annex, Tables 1.2, 1.3; MONEE project database

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Box 1.3

Young people's views of change

How do young people in the transition region view the changes occurring in their countries? Figure 1.3 reports results from opinion polls organized on behalf of the European Union in 19 countries in the region during 1995-97. Information was collected from representative samples of the population on a variety of topics. The diagram shows the answers of youth and of older people (all persons aged 25 and over) to two questions: how "democracy is developing" and about "developments in general" in the respondent's country.

How these aspects of the transition are viewed appears to vary sharply across the region. Less than one in 10 persons in Russia appeared satisfied with the way democracy was developing in their country compared to nearly 50 percent or more in Poland and other countries. Some of the percentages seem surprisingly low and, in one or two cases, high. However, the differences among countries need to be treated with caution because there are no doubt differences in the way the questions translate into national languages (for example, the meaning of "fairly satisfied").

The differences among age groups within each country should not suffer from this problem. The diagrams show that young people typically have a more favourable view: on average youth satisfaction with both democracy and general developments is ahead by over six percentage points. The more optimistic view taken by young people should be seen as a positive force for change.

Figure 1.3



Young and older people's views

Source: Eurobarometer microdata.

Note: Annual samples have been pooled for 1995-97. Average national pooled sample sizes are 469 for youth 15-24 and 2,177 for persons aged 25 and over for the question on general developments and 423 and 1,956 for development of democracy.

even those at the highest level of economic development. However, a small part of the deaths among the transition generation reflects increases in mortality which, as earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have underlined, have been one of the unexpected companions of the transition. (Life expectancy at birth deteriorated at some point during the 1990s in 22 of 23 countries for which time series are available, although in many cases it then recovered.) The lives of many young men, in particular, have been claimed by violence and armed conflicts, a heavy cost associated with changing the political map in areas of the region.

A sizeable portion of the transition generation appears to have moved out of the region – another one million young people. It should be noted that this number, the total of the last column in Table 1.2, is calculated as a residual by subtracting deaths from the total size of the generation (which itself may be measured less well in 1999 than in 1989 due to the length of time since the last population census in many countries). Nevertheless, the pattern of numbers appears to make sense.

With increased freedom and mobility among people, greater international migration has been an expected outcome of the transition. Often this is a positive choice on the part of individuals to take advantage of new opportunities, including study and work abroad.

"The most important thing is to decide to be successful and then to do everything to make this happen – get an education, study visit abroad," said Kamila, 23, in an interview for this Report in the Czech Republic.

However, for some young people leaving the country is an alternative to study.

"[I]t's not worth spending time studying," said Gheorghe, 19, in the focus-group discussion in Romania, "after all, all we want is money. . . . I'm going to go abroad." Often, young people are victims of human trafficking, associated with illegal work and the sex trade. Still others are displaced or refugee populations, a large share of which are children and young people.

Many young people have migrated among countries within the region. As the table makes clear, in most countries more young people have left than have arrived; only five countries show a positive balance. Russia has absorbed most of a large-scale movement of people back to Slavic countries that followed the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Within the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina registered the biggest negative balance, obviously linked to the bloody war that took place in that country during 1993-95. Similarly, hundreds of thousands of people were uprooted during the hostilities in Croatia in 1992-95. Since the data refer to early 1999, the impact of the fighting in Kosovo, which took place later in the year and which caused the additional movement of thousands of people, is not shown in the figures for FR Yugoslavia.

It would be revealing to follow through on other aspects of what happened to the transition generation through data over time. Unfortunately, for reasons of data availability, the statistical analysis in the Report is largely confined to a comparison of the situation of those who were 15-24 year-olds in the late 1990s with the generation who were that age in the late 1980s or early 90s. Taking the region as a whole, this "current" youth population has grown by about 10 percent since 1989, as Figure 1.4 indicates.

The economy, education and the labour market

The overall impact of the transition on the economic capacity of nations in the region is illustrated by the large changes in the most basic economic indicator – national income. To understand the changes in GDP and the realities in which young people have grown up, it is also important to look at the institutional reforms that have been a fundamental part of the economic changes. As Box 1.4 makes clear, the degree to which national income has been affected and to which economies have been marketized has ranged widely among the transition countries. The result has been a sharp increase in diversity across the region.

Economic reforms often demand sacrifice in the short term, but are intended to create new opportunities and growth in the longer term. Many of the benefits should therefore work for the future advantage of younger generations. Moreover, the market-oriented transition in the region is not just about stabilization and economic restructuring. It cancels a world in which older generations grew up. As Irina, aged 17 from Latvia, put it in one of the Report's focus-group discussions: "Their experience dates back to the previous life. . . . It is very difficult for them to find a place in this new life."

Although radical change may clear the way for the new generation, its effects are not necessarily always positive for youth: members of the older generation are also parents

Table 1.2

Accounting for a generation: children in 1989 and youth in 1999
(1,000s)

	5-14 population, 1 January 1989	15-24 population, 1 January 1999	Deaths, 1989-98	Net external migration
Czech Republic	1,653	1,643	7	-3
Slovakia	935	928	4	-3
Poland	6,527	6,456	29	-43
Hungary	1,581	1,568	6	-7
Slovenia	296	293	1	-1
Croatia	660	645	3	-12
FYR Macedonia	338	330	1	-7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	740	530	19	-191
FR Yugoslavia	1,641	1,605	6	-30
Albania	677	608	4	-65
Bulgaria	1,298	1,214	7	-77
Romania	3,765	3,727	22	-16
Estonia	227	209	2	-16
Latvia	363	338	3	-22
Lithuania	537	525	4	-8
Belarus	1,518	1,535	10	28
Moldova	772	637	5	-130
Russia	21,953	22,162	224	433
Ukraine	7,311	7,314	55	58
Armenia	663	665	3	5
Azerbaijan	1,439	1,369	11	-58
Georgia	873	836	3	-34
Kazakhstan	3,281	2,679	29	-573
Kyrgyzstan	976	899	7	-70
Tajikistan	1,286	1,208	11	-66
Turkmenistan	871	926	8	63
Uzbekistan	4,840	4,696	35	-109
Total	67,019	65,545	519	-954

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: Number of deaths estimated based on data on deaths by 5-year age groups. (Five-year age group deaths in Bosnia-Herzegovina for 1992-98, Albania for 1997-98, Georgia 1993, and Tajikistan 1996-98 are also estimates.) Net external migration was obtained as a residual between the number of population and the number of deaths over the period.

Figure 1.4



Population by age group, 1989-98
(1989=100)
Sources: MONEE project database; US Census Bureau (1999) for Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania.

Note: 1998 data for FR Yugoslavia and Kazakhstan are MONEE project estimates.

Box 1.4

Economic transition: GDP and institutional change

Figure 1.5 describes the cumulative changes in real GDP since 1989 using official data on measured output. The diagram illustrates both the large falls that took place after 1989 and the current status of economic recovery. The large black dots below the horizontal axis indicate the maximum extent of economic contraction. They show that all the countries underwent a considerable regression in measured output, ranging from 15 percent in the Czech Republic to 75 percent in Georgia.

Figure 1.5



GDP in 1999 and at its lowest level during the transition (1989=100)

Source: Statistical Annex, Table 9.1.

Note: Data for FR Yugoslavia refer to 1998.

Figure 1.6



Progress in economic transition, 1999

Source: EBRD (1999), Table 2.1.

Note: The values of the transition index are MONEE project calculations and are unweighted averages of the EBRD scores for eight dimensions of the transition (for example, privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, and banking reform).

The blue columns indicate the current status of economic recovery – how much GDP in 1999 fell short of or exceeded its level 10 years earlier. By this time, growth had brought national income above pre-transition levels only in the economies of Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia; most countries still fell short of 1989 levels, and many fell a long way short. Still, 1999 was a landmark year when economic recession finally bottomed out in the region as a whole: economic growth was 2 percent on average in 1999, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), with a rate of 3.6 percent forecast for 2000 (estimates do not include FR Yugoslavia).

The data in Figure 1.5 measure changes in the formal economy and may therefore overestimate the extent of the contraction in total GDP given the growth in informal activity. (Estimates of the size of the informal economy in 1995 ranged from 7 percent of GDP in Uzbekistan to 61 percent in Azerbaijan, with Hungary, FR Yugoslavia, Russia, and several other countries at around 30-40 percent.) The growth of the informal sector can be considered one part of the region's "institutional change", broadly defined. It has reflected, among other things, the coping strategies of households facing the collapse of formal structures. However, the effect on household welfare has not necessarily been positive. For example, informal employment provides no access to social security entitlements, has no limits on working hours, is free of safety and other protective regulations, and at times is associated with illegal activities. Nor, by definition, does it yield tax revenue that the state can devote to spending on "public goods".

Institutional change in the transition context is more commonly associated in most people's minds with private sector growth and marketization. Figure 1.6 measures the estimated share of the private sector in GDP, as well as a score which is a composite average of indicators developed by the EBRD to measure economic transition. (A score greater than 4 indicates full marketization.)

According to these estimates, the share of the private sector in GDP has reached 70 percent or more in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia, while, at the other end of the range, it rests below 40 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Central European and Baltic countries score the highest in institutional reforms. Overall, the chart confirms the link between private-sector development and market-oriented reforms.

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of today's young people and the breadwinners of families in which these young people are growing up. Recession makes it hard for youth leaving school to enter the labour market and may also affect the quality of the schooling and training they receive, with negative consequences for their labour market prospects. Finally, deep and long-lasting economic decay could lead to situations where all generations lose in absolute terms.

How have these immense changes affected the transition generation? They have undoubtedly affected the numbers of young people staying on in full-time education and young people's entry into the world of work. Figure 1.7 illustrates the shift between school and work with survey data from 1992 and 1998 for the largest transition country, Russia, showing the percentages of youth at each age, 15 to 24, who are in full-time education or in employment. (Ideally one would have data for 1989 for the first year, rather than 1992, but the survey in question was not in operation at that time.)

Figure 1.7



Young people in education and work, Russia, 1992 and 1998
(percent of each age group)

Source: RLMS, Rounds I and VIII.

Note: Data on enrolments for 15-16 year-olds are not available for 1992.

The diagram shows that at age 15, almost all young Russians were still in school in 1998. By age 18, one-third were no longer in full-time education, and, by age 19, almost two-thirds were out of school, with enrolment dropping to one in 20 by age 23-24. Conversely, the share of young people with jobs increases with age: among 18 year-olds, about one in 10 was employed in 1998, and this was true of as many as 72 percent of 24 year-olds. The great majority of young Russians in their early 20s, therefore, do have jobs of some sort. The graph clearly shows that six years earlier, in 1992, already in the period of reform, the percentages of teenagers in education were slightly lower, and the percentages in work were significantly higher up to age 20.

Figure 1.8



Youth and total unemployment rates in 18 transition economies, 1998
(percent)

Source: Household survey microdata.

Note: The definition of unemployment is that of the ILO/OECD based on job search status (or self-classification). For information on the microdata, see Table 4.2.

Some young people, however, are neither in work, nor in education. Even at age 15 the percentages shown in the graph do not quite add up to 100, and at older ages the deficit is much greater, peaking at around age 20. In 1998, one-third of Russians aged 19-20 and a quarter of those aged 23-24 were either unemployed, or were outside the labour force for some reason other than education. For young men, the numbers were broadly similar in both groups, while, for young women, unemployment accounted for the minority – about one young woman in five aged 19 and over was neither in the labour force, nor in education.

Unemployment was virtually non-existent in most countries in the region before the transition. Figure 1.8 shows the unemployment rate for 15-24 year-olds in 1998 for 18 countries, together with the rate for all persons. (These figures show the number of unemployed as a percentage of those working or unemployed; those outside the labour force are excluded from the calculation.) The graph makes clear that unemployment is particularly severe among young people in the region, the youth unemployment rate exceeding 20 percent in 13 countries and 30 percent in seven and always exceeding the overall rate by a substantial margin.

The transition from childhood to adulthood involves much more than completing one's education and trying to find work. The other significant bridge to be crossed is the one that leads to household and family formation. Decisions and experiences related to education, work, partnerships, and family all interact and, taken together, fill up much of a young person's life. The next section looks at how the transition has affected young people and family formation.

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1.2 Youth Decisions on Family Formation

Family formation for young people involves three big decisions: when to leave the parental home, whether and when to partner with another person, possibly involving marriage, and whether and when to have children. All three decisions are fundamental steps in the transition from childhood to adulthood, and they are often closely linked. Marriage and childbearing are widely regarded as a declaration of adulthood by the individual and the recognition of that status by society. What happened to this social contract during the transition years of the 1990s?

Under communism the support and control of the state during this crucial phase of life were strong and firmly imposed. For example, marriage increased the chances of securing housing, though housing shortages meant many young married couples lived with one partner's parents. Moreover, decisions on education and work are also often linked to those on family formation. One strategy for coping with the financial hardship of unemployment may well be to stay living with one's parents. Despite these links, for practical reasons the analysis in this section looks at each of the three areas of family formation on their own.

Leaving home

The great majority of 15-19 year-olds in the region still live in the parental home. For the 10 countries for which the MONEE project has data (which include examples from six of the project's seven subregions), at least five in every six young people of this age are still in the parental home, and, on average, nine in every 10, as Figure 1.9 shows. (The true figures may be higher since the definition of "parental home" in the countries with the lowest rates is quite restrictive.) Among 20-24 year-olds, the figure is much lower, but the average is still almost two-thirds (64 percent). In only one country, Estonia, is it less than half, while in Bulgaria four of every five youth of this age are still living with their parents (or other close relatives). Even among those people aged 25-29, the proportion still at home is around half or more in four countries.

These data, like some others in this chapter, underline the transitory nature of the years between the ages of 15 and 24. Many young people leave the parental home as they move through this stage of life, but many also stay. The numbers staying presumably reflect a mix of cultural and economic factors which differ among the countries. The variation, it should be noted, does not seem out of line with that in other industrialized nations. For example, among European Union countries the proportion of 20-24 year-olds still in the parental home in 1995 ranged from 29 percent in Finland to 87 percent in Italy and 89 percent in Spain, with the average for 13 member states at 64 percent, the same as the average for the transition countries in Figure 1.9. The data for Spain and Italy reflect not only high youth unemployment rates, but a strong family tradition, both factors that also vary among the transition countries.

Are more young people still living with their parents now than at the end of the 1980s? The MONEE project does not have the necessary data to answer this question, but it is likely that the answer is "yes". Nearly the same share of young people in the region as a whole are remaining in education. But the emergence of high rates of youth

Figure 1.9



Youth living with parents in 10 countries, mid- to late 1990s

(percent of age group)

Sources: Estonian, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Bulgarian living standards surveys; RLMS; Latvian, Hungarian and Polish labour force surveys.

Note: Categories are child of household head (Estonia, Armenia), living with parent or grandparent (Russia, Latvia), living with parent (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan), child of household head or head at least 16 years older (Hungary, Poland), and living with parent, grandparent or uncle/aunt (Bulgaria). The averages for the three age groups for the 10 countries are 90, 64 and 41 percent.

unemployment shown in Figure 1.8 are likely to have delayed young people's departure from the parental home.

Less marriage and more cohabitation: a longer transition?

Earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have noted that marriage and fertility rates turned sharply downward in the early 1990s. This trend has, in fact, been one of the most uniform and consistent social changes during the transition, and, as shown below, it is largely the decisions of young people that have been driving this change.

Before the transition, people in the region tended to marry young and have their first child at an early age. Marriage was a popular institution among youth, partly because the state offered incentives such as better access to housing, in-kind services and cash benefits. Moreover, divorce was typically very straightforward, so marriage was not necessarily seen as a binding tie. The average age of first marriage for women was lowest in the Czech half of former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Ukraine (21-21.5 years), and in these countries the ratios of divorces to marriages in any year (the "general divorce rate") were also among the highest in the region. Only in Georgia was the average age of first marriage above 24 years. The age difference between brides and grooms was around two years in Central Europe, the Baltic States and western CIS, a small gender gap by international standards, while it was around four years along the southern belt of the region.

Table 1.3

Marriages: all women and women aged under 25

	Total marriages (absolute number)		Marriages to women under 25 (absolute number)		Change among young women over total change (%)
	1998	Change, 1998-1989	1998	Change, 1998-1989	
Czech Republic	55,027	-26,235	31,897	-26,359	100.5
Slovakia	27,494	-9,031	19,312	-9,114	100.9
Poland	204,850	-50,793	144,087	-39,032	76.8
Hungary	44,915	-22,034	25,989	-21,597	98.0
Slovenia	7,528	-2,248	3,085	-3,370	149.9
FR Yugoslavia	42,956	-26,482	22,950	-21,952	82.9
Bulgaria	35,582	-27,681	23,677	-24,889	89.9
Estonia	5,430	-7,214	2,438	-5,094	70.6
Latvia	9,641	-14,855	4,571	-10,024	67.5
Lithuania	18,486	-16,144	11,761	-11,213	69.5
Belarus	71,354	-26,575	46,272	-19,866	74.8
Moldova	21,814	-18,114	15,974	-12,980	71.7
Russia	848,691	-471,237	530,381	-321,129	68.1
Ukraine	310,504	-178,826	205,458	-124,195	69.5
Armenia	11,365	-15,892	8,784	-11,677	73.5
Azerbaijan	40,856	-31,018	29,436	-21,416	69.0
Georgia	15,343	-22,945	10,110	-15,129	65.9
Kazakhstan	96,048	-68,748	66,218	-48,799	71.0
Turkmenistan	26,361	-8,529	19,272	-7,048	82.6
Uzbekistan	170,525	-30,156	149,808	-19,379	64.3

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: The data show new marriages occurring in each year. First year is 1990 for Russia. Last year is 1997 for Poland and 1995 for Tajikistan.

The 1990s saw an enormous plunge in marriage rates among 16-24 year-olds, something that has apparently occurred right across the region. Figure 1.10 shows the changes for young women in the 20 countries for which data are available for both 1989 and 1998. On average, marriage rates halved. In Estonia and Latvia they declined by two-thirds. Even in Uzbekistan and in Belarus and Poland, where the changes were smallest, they dropped by one-quarter and one-third, respectively. Table 1.3 shows the decrease in the total number of marriages between the two years and the amount of that change accounted for by falling marriage rates among young

Figure 1.10



Changes in marriage rates for women aged 16-24 (new marriages per 1,000 women in the age group)

Source: Statistical Annex, Table 4.2

Note: The first year for Russia is 1990. The last year for Poland is 1997.

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women aged 16-24. The data show clearly that it is mainly the decisions of young people that have resulted in the huge downswing in marriage since 1989.

What is behind these huge declines? The falling marriage rate may reflect a number of factors. It may involve positive choices among those young people who are able to pursue education or employment opportunities. Others may be benefiting from a social climate that is more tolerant of cohabitation, although this presumably varies greatly across the region. On the other hand, the lower marriage rate may reflect a lack of access to jobs, income, or housing that makes it hard for marriage plans to materialize, while at the same time there may be little change in attitudes towards cohabitation outside of wedlock.

Changes in the age of first marriage may throw light on which scenario is closer to reality. Data presented in Table 1.4 show that the average age at first marriage for women in 1998 was higher in 16 of the 23 countries for which data are available over time. The rise in the age at first marriage has been significant in countries in the western parts of the region. However, it is striking that in many CIS countries, despite a big fall in youth marriage rates (similar to that seen in Central and Eastern Europe), the average age of marriage has not changed much (or in several cases has even declined), suggesting that there has been little change in marriage patterns among those who can afford marriage.

Table 1.4

Average age of women at first marriage, 1989 and 1998

	1989	1998	Difference (1998-1989)
Czech Republic	21.2	23.6	2.4
Poland	21.7	23.1	1.4
Hungary	21.4	23.8	2.4
Slovenia	23.5	25.6	2.1
Croatia	23.5	25.2	1.7
FYR Macedonia	22.6	23.2	0.6
FR Yugoslavia	23.2	24.6	1.4
Bulgaria	21.5	23.5	2.0
Romania	22.1	23.2	1.1
Estonia	22.5	24.3	1.9
Latvia	22.2	24.0	1.8
Lithuania	22.2	22.7	0.5
Belarus	22.3	22.1	-0.2
Moldova	22.0	22.0	0.0
Russia	22.9	22.7	-0.2
Armenia	22.3	22.4	0.1
Azerbaijan	22.8	22.6	-0.2
Georgia	24.5	24.1	-0.4
Kazakhstan	22.4	23.3	0.9
Kyrgyzstan	21.9	22.0	0.1
Tajikistan	21.5	21.1	-0.4
Turkmenistan	22.6	23.0	0.4
Uzbekistan	22.3	21.0	-1.3

Source: Statistical Annex, Table [illegible]

Note: The first year is 1993 for Lithuania. The second year is 1996 for Russia and 1995 for Tajikistan.

In some countries lower marriage rates may also reflect new social values, with young people choosing to remain single or to form partnerships outside of marriage. These decisions, as will be seen later, can also contribute to postponements of first childbirth and to changes in the numbers of children born outside marriage. For many young people, this means spending more years being sexually active outside marriage. For some, this may mean more partners, with the attendant risks of unplanned pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. For others, particularly in social and cultural environments restrictive to sex outside marriage, it means more years of sexual abstinence. There is some evidence from parts of the region suggesting that, while young people are marrying later, some may be becoming sexually active earlier, as Box 1.5 presents.

Voices of Youth 2

Views on sexual health and support

Despite a pressing need for information and education about sexual and reproductive health, young people still often have a tough time talking about sex, especially with parents and other adults. Youth in the transition region are no different, as these voices from focus-group research carried out for this Report in Romania, Russia and Uzbekistan illustrate.

- "I prefer not to talk about this." (Tuca, 22)
- "When my mother says something, she imposes it, and at our age, if something is imposed on you, you object as much as you can." (Natalia, 15)
- "Some parents have antiquated views about sexuality." (Dorinel, 22)
- "Some girls are too embarrassed to tell their mothers, and they turn to their girl friends if they feel ill. . . ." (Nilufar, 19)
- "I could never talk to my mother about such a thing. I'd rather take advice from a good friend." (Diana, 17)
- "My mother is my psychologist." (Elena, 19)
- "At our age, it is normal that parents do not understand us." (Petre, 24)
- "I do not know about those who are 15-16 now, but I have never received any type of information or counselling on this matter. All the information I have, I get from my friends or the mass media." (Ksenia, 22, infected with gonorrhoea)
- "They should give more information on healthy life styles and produce proper publicity." (Tatiana, 22)

Sexual behaviour and reproductive health are sensitive issues for youth and adults alike – issues fraught with social taboos and personal inhibitions. Voices of Youth 2 illustrates how difficult it can be for young people to talk about sexual and reproductive health with their parents, other adults and even their peers.

Teenage fertility and pregnancy

In line with the pattern of early marriages, women started childbearing at relatively young ages before the transition. Births to teenage mothers were socially accepted, but most occurred within marriage. Still, a significant share of pregnancies among teens and young women ended up in abortion or the placement of a child in public care, for which the rates have been high in the region, as earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have shown. With marriage sharply

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Box 1.5

Patterns of partnership formation and sexual behaviours

Were the age of sexual initiation falling among adolescents in the transition countries, this change would fit with a longer term trend in both Eastern and Western Europe. International fertility and family surveys among adults, carried out between 1988 and 1998 and including several transition countries, have found a decline in the age of sexual initiation. In Poland, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania, women aged 25-29 reported having had their first sexual intercourse on average almost one year earlier than did women aged 40-44. The median age ranged from 18.4 in Hungary to 20.6 in Poland, that is, the number of respondents having their first sexual intercourse below this age equaled the number having their first intercourse above it.

Figure 1.11 shows the findings of a 1996 survey in Romania concerning the share of women and men aged 15-24 reporting sexual experience. As age increases, more adolescents have had a first sexual experience: among girls, before or after marriage, for boys, almost exclusively before.

A 1997-98 "narrative" survey carried out in Romania, in which young participants projected their own experiences on to imaginary couples, found that, among 18-19 year-olds, 24 percent of girls and 53 percent of boys had had sex by the age of 17. These figures are far higher than in the more conventional data from the 1996 survey shown in Figure 1.11. Older participants, aged 20-24, projected consistently lower rates of sexual activity at age 17 than did those aged 18-19, suggesting that the age of first sexual activity is falling. Sexual activity at a very young age boosts the probability of multiple sexual partners and the attendant risks of sexually transmitted disease and unplanned pregnancy.

Figure 1.11



Age and marital status at the time of first intercourse, Romania, 1996 (percent of all respondents of relevant age)

Source: Serbanescu and Morris (1998a)

down in the 1990s, what has happened to teenage fertility and pregnancy?

Pregnancy and childbirth among adolescents are not necessarily unhappy events, as eloquently expressed by two young mothers in the focus-group research for this Report.

"My values have changed in many ways, after giving birth to my son," says Lessi, 21, of Ukraine. "I decided to enter university, and I have. I am growing together with my son. I have a lot to learn from him. I have changed a lot, thanks to my son. My life plans have changed. I need to think of his education, his future . . . . these values are different. I do not think only for myself any more."

Or as Cristina, 21, of Romania, declares: "The children motivate us to fight: to get a better job, to build a house, to create better conditions."

However, it is also well established by research in many industrialized countries that early childbirth, especially where partner and family support may be limited, inhibits a young women's ability to acquire and progress through education and employment, with lifelong implications for earnings.

"A child limits the possibility of getting education and finding a job," said Luda, 20, a young Ukrainian mother, in one of the Report's focus groups, although she went on to state that, in her opinion, "if you are well motivated, you will manage somehow."

Figure 1.12 shows teen birth rates in the region for 1989 and 1998. It is striking how high the rate was across the region at the end of the 1980s: on average about 45 births per 1,000 females aged 15-19, compared to an average of 12 for the European Union countries in 1995. Only Albania, Slovenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan had rates that came close to even the highest found in the EU (20 births per 1,000 in Portugal and 29 in the UK). In most countries, there was a rise in teenage fertility a few years into transition. In Tajikistan, as the figure shows, the latest data available are from 1995, and the rate at that time was considerably higher than it had been in 1989.

It is also clear from the graph that by 1998, teen birth rates had fallen across the region and that the fall was often substantial, leaving only eight countries with rates over 40

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Figure 1.12



Adolescent birth rates, 1989 and 1998 (live births to women under 20 per 1,000 women aged 15-19)

Source: Statistical Annex, Table 2.2

Note: First year is 1991 for Croatia and FYR Macedonia. Last year is 1995 for Tajikistan and 1997 for Albania and Uzbekistan.

births per 1,000 women aged 15-19. The current regional average is about 30 births per 1,000.

The overall decline in teen births should be seen as good news. However, it needs to be placed against a backdrop of significantly declining fertility during the transition: the number of births per 1,000 for all women aged 15-49 decreased from 78 in 1990 to 48 in 1998. It is also unclear whether and how much the drop in teen births is linked to positive changes in female education and employment patterns during the transition and whether the trend will endure.

Moreover, the general fall in birth rates for those aged under 20 hides some important shifts within the 15-19 age group. In Russia, for example, despite a slight reduction in their population, girls aged 16 and under gave birth to 2,600 more children in 1998 than in 1989, an increase of 20 percent. Girls aged 17 or under also gave birth to more children in Belarus, Ukraine and all the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Figure 1.13 further qualifies the overall picture by highlighting a marked trend in the region: the rises in births outside marriage. Before the transition, most teen births were occurring within marriage, though studies in Russia and the Czech Republic showed that the majority of newborns had been conceived before the marriages took place. The graph shows that, while overall teen fertility rates declined between 1989 and 1998, births to unwed teenage mothers increased in 20 of 24 countries. In other words, marriages in these countries have fallen more rapidly than births.

Births outside marriage accounted for three of every four teenage births in Slovenia and Estonia in

Figure 1.13



Births to unmarried women under 20, 1989 and 1998 (live births to unmarried women under 20 per 1,000 women 15-19)

Source: MONEE project database

Note: First year is 1990 for Ukraine, 1991 for FYR Macedonia and 1993 for Romania. Last year is 1995 for Tajikistan and 1997 for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Births in Georgia for 1998 exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

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1998 and for half or more of the births in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. (In the region as a whole, on average, 43 percent of teenage births were to unmarried girls in 1998 compared to 23 percent in 1989.) As studies have pointed out, cohabitation is clearly a factor in many countries, but accounts for only a part of these births. In Russia, for example, half of all the births outside marriage are registered only to one parent; in Slovenia in 1996, less than one-third of all births outside marriage involved cohabitation.

Demographic change, child and youth cohorts

The decisions young people make about family formation have impacts on children, who will eventually replace the current youth cohorts. Even though fertility rates have fallen, these links remain very important. The share of births to young mothers stayed high throughout the 1990s: in both 1989 and 1998 about half of all births occurred among women aged 24 or less.

The decision to postpone having children, which many young people are now making in the region, may be well founded and may even promote the welfare of the children these persons will eventually raise. However, because these youth decisions are occurring in parallel with similar decisions by older adults, they are contributing to the accelerating decline in the size of the child population shown in Figure 1.4. Between 1989 and 1998, the total fertility rate shrank by a third or more in most countries, including Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; it dropped by around an eighth in Croatia, a fourth in Kyrgyzstan and a half in Latvia and Armenia.

The sharp decrease in the number of children being born – an unexpected outcome of the transition – leads to questions about the future size of youth cohorts. This is an issue for society and also for young people, because changes in youth populations have implications for the access to services, jobs and social benefits and, in general, for youth-related policies. Will the transition countries have much smaller youth populations within 10 or 15 years?

Part of the knowledge necessary to answer this question – the information on child cohorts – is shown in Table 1.5. The table compares the population numbers for 15-24 year-olds (youth) and for 5-14 year-olds, as well as for the 0-9 year-olds who within the next 10 to 15 years will replace the current youth population.

The table suggests that, overall, during the next 10 years the youth nation of the region will remain as strong as it is now, but that countries in various parts of the region will experience different trends. For example, Central European countries will have, on average, about 15 percent fewer youth, while the Central Asian countries will possess about a third more. However, as the earlier sections make clear, the eventual size of the youth population is also influenced by mortality and migration. This implies that, as the child population becomes the future youth nation, their numbers will be trimmed across the region, from Central Europe to Central Asia.

Table 1.5

Child and youth cohorts, 1 January 1999

	Youth, 15-24 (1,000)	Children, 5-14 (1,000)	Children, 0-9 (1,000)	Children, 5-14 (as % of youth)	Children, 0-9 (as % of youth)
Czech Republic	1,643.3	1,279.7	1,095.2	77.9	66.6
Slovakia	928.4	800.3	679.9	86.2	73.2
Poland	6,456.2	5,737.0	4,738.6	88.9	73.4
Hungary	1,568.1	1,220.0	1,129.2	77.8	72.0
Slovenia	293.2	235.0	200.8	80.1	68.5
Croatia	645.0	547.9	501.9	84.9	77.8
FYR Macedonia	330.1	317.2	307.8	96.1	93.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	529.7	457.8	335.7	86.4	63.4
FR Yugoslavia	1,604.9	1,502.8	1,390.3	93.6	86.6
Albania	607.8	753.2	729.6	123.9	120.0
Bulgaria	1,213.7	992.8	806.0	81.8	66.4
Romania	3,726.6	3,103.7	2,537.6	83.3	68.1
Estonia	209.1	204.2	157.3	97.7	75.2
Latvia	337.5	351.2	259.2	104.1	76.8
Lithuania	524.9	557.7	460.1	106.2	87.7
Belarus	1,535.2	1,521.8	1,163.9	99.1	75.8
Moldova	637.3	671.1	533.4	105.3	83.7
Russia	22,162.4	21,200.8	15,617.0	95.7	70.5
Ukraine	7,313.9	6,933.8	5,405.1	94.8	73.9
Armenia	664.6	747.6	580.1	112.5	87.3
Azerbaijan	1,369.1	1,735.2	1,774.4	126.7	129.6
Georgia	835.9	842.4	656.2	100.8	78.5
Kazakhstan	2,679.2	3,116.5	2,686.1	116.3	100.3
Kyrgyzstan	899.2	1,172.4	1,112.7	130.4	123.7
Tajikistan	1,208.5	1,753.9	1,679.0	145.1	138.9
Turkmenistan	925.6	1,255.7	1,248.2	135.7	134.9
Uzbekistan	4,695.8	6,397.4	6,312.8	136.2	134.4
Total	65,545.1	65,409.2	54,098.1	99.8	82.5

Sources: Statistical Annex, Table 1.1; MONEE project database

Given the smaller size of the child cohorts born in the last 10 years (entirely during the transition), most countries will have significantly smaller youth populations over the next decade and a half. So far, there are few signs of trends that could reverse or even moderate these reductions. If the current trends hold, within the next 20 years about a third fewer youth will be living in Central Europe, while the number in Central Asia will be about the same as today. ■

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1.3 Conclusions

The decade of the economic and social transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States has been a perilous and also a promising time for growing up. The "transition generation" were children when communism began to fall in the region; today they are teenagers and young adults. They have come of age during a period of rapid and profound change: democratic political systems have been established; economies have been marketized and privatized; national and cultural sovereignty has been asserted, sometimes with bloody consequences, and civil society has been reborn. These have been years both of hard shocks and of new opportunities.

This introductory chapter has provided some of the key economic, social and demographic background relevant to a better understanding of the life of the transition generation. The analysis finds substantial changes in the most intimate spheres of the lives of young people – the formation of households and families – with wide-ranging implications for public policies. The clearly defined patterns of the past have been replaced by greater diversity, a consequence of both changed circumstances and new choices. The trend towards fewer or later marriages and the concurrent trends revolving around the entry to employment suggest that the transition paths to adult life are becoming longer and more complex. The decisions now being made by young people have important repercussions not only for their own lives, but also for the lives of their children, the broader society and, indeed, for the transition itself.

The chapters which follow attempt to map out five major dimensions of these youth transitions: growing up healthy, acquiring education, finding work, avoiding conflict with the law, and participating in the social and political life of the country – together, many of the key experiences, whether positive, or negative, in the lives of youth.

One aim of this Report is to call greater attention to youth as a resource; the evidence reviewed above suggests that in the future this resource is going to be more scarce. The analysis finds a contrasting trend in demographics: while the 65-million-strong youth nation is almost 10 percent bigger now than it was in 1989, the number of children has declined. Accordingly, the youth population is going to decrease in many countries as the children born during the transition reach adolescence and young adulthood.

But it is less the sheer numbers of youth and more the health, energy, skills, and values which young individuals feel and develop that are going to make a difference. These ought to be appreciated and nurtured. Each of the following chapters will therefore attempt to gain insights into the needs of youth, as well as the policies that appear to be the most responsive to these needs in the region's changing societies. ■

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2 Growing up Healthy

Youth are often portrayed as the very emblem of health: vital, robust and sparkling with natural resilience. Adolescence is indeed a time rich with opportunities for building a healthy life, but it is also a time of risk. This critical passage from childhood to adulthood has both immediate and long-term consequences for physical, mental and social well-being.

The health of young people is shaped to a large degree by the same constellation of determinants that shapes the health of children and adults: proper nutrition, good personal hygiene, cohesive social networks, and a supportive environment, including access to basic health care services.

However, forward-looking approaches to health are increasingly embracing the belief that adolescents are a unique population – as distinct as children and adults – with specific health concerns and needs that spring from their rapidly growing and changing bodies and the social, sexual and personal challenges that accompany the process of maturation. Research in industrialized and developing countries repeatedly finds that ensuring access to youth-friendly health and development interventions is cost-effective and contributes to lower morbidity and mortality in later life.

This new philosophy recognizes adolescence as an essential and formative stage of the life cycle. It also recognizes that young people have to be treated as persons in their own right and that their individual needs have to be considered case-by-case. It stresses that psychosocial determinants play as important a role in adolescent and youth health as do biomedical factors. In other words, youth health is strongly linked to youth development. However, like many youth issues, adolescent health is a relatively new field of practice, and this is most certainly so in the transition region of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

There are reasons to assume that young people in this region have been endowed with particular chances for growing up healthy. Before the transition, there was widespread access to basic maternal health services, paediatric health services and nutrition programmes in nurseries and schools. Families lived in a social environment that offered few opportunities, but where basic needs were broadly met. So, the transition generation of today – those aged 15-24 – had good access to basic health services and rarely lived in poverty as children. The erosion of authoritarianism and the introduction of greater rights and responsibilities among individuals that have been associated with the transition have also presented youth with greater opportunities related to personal development and health. For example, problems that contributed to poor adult health before the transition, such as widespread ignorance about the role and responsibility of individuals in promoting their own health, are being challenged and changed.

The transition generation is, however, also facing notable risks.

Poverty, inequality, weakening social cohesion, tensions around ethnicity and family and gender roles, discrimination, and rapid social change – conditions that have accompanied the transition to varying degrees in different countries – are widely recognized as root causes of health and development problems among youth. These problems are being manifested in poor nutrition, substance abuse, early and unprotected sexual activity, infections, depression and anxiety, suicide, and injury due to accidents and violence.

The staggering rise in adult mortality during the 1990s in many transition countries that is noted in earlier Regional Monitoring Reports underscores the huge social impact of the transition, as well as the widespread frailty of individual life styles, coping skills and social networks. Indeed, with hindsight, the individual and public health assets inherited from communist times appear to be less robust than once thought, with negative implications for today's youth. Surveys carried out in the early transition years found evidence of stunting among children aged 0-5 in Romania and problems both of stunted growth and excessive weight in Russia. More recent surveys have explored evidence of wasting from malnutrition among these same cohorts in Central Asia, even in countries relatively less affected by the transition. Studies have also pointed to the high incidence of childhood injuries throughout the region.

Chapter 1 discusses youth in the context of family formation and sexual partnerships, behavioural patterns within which young people have inherited a mixed legacy. There have been some positive, or at least adequate, changes during the transition, such as declines in the high numbers of teenage births. However, analysis also finds evidence that youth are becoming sexually active earlier than they were a few years ago and that they are spending longer periods with a series of stable partners or without committed partnerships, situations which tend to raise health risks.

Certainly, young people have shown considerable resilience, and some health indicators did improve in many parts of the region over the 1990s. At times, however, progress has been less reassuring among youth than it has been among adults. The majority of the data reviewed in this chapter reveals a stark picture of a young generation whose health has been compromised. Young people have not been sheltered from higher levels of stress, neglect, or violence in many transition societies: in 1998 about 85,000 young people died in the region, almost 20,000 more than nine years earlier. The open environment of the transition has exposed youth to new and greater risks related to sexually transmitted infections, dependence on illicit drugs and rising levels of tobacco use, which some experts regard as the most deadly trend in the long run.

These facts underline the need to understand and address the health needs of youth more effectively. While the link between health and social factors is well established in the international literature, the impact of the transition on the health of young people has been little researched, discussed or understood. Inherited health care philosophies in the region have remained concentrated largely on the treatment of physical complaints. Despite the many health care workers and facilities, there are few services aimed at youth. A dialogue on youth health, including the perspectives of young people, could bring both a broader understanding and a particular focus to the issues.

In this chapter, Section 2.1 looks at how youth in the region view their own health and explores the incidence of mortality and illness among adolescents. Section 2.2 examines risky behaviours through the lens of substance abuse. Section 2.3 outlines the health aspects of sexual and reproductive behaviour, including the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies among youth. Section 2.4 presents the case for developing better responses to adolescent health by building on existing strengths in the region and adopting new approaches to support growing up healthy.

■

2.1 The Basic Parameters of Youth Health

The concept of good health promoted by the World Health Organization is defined as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". In focus-group research conducted for this Report, young people aged 15-24 in Romania, Russia and Uzbekistan were asked how they would define "good health". Not surprisingly, they tended to see good health as a lack of impairment or complaint, or as the physical ability to be able to act and perform as they desire.

The notions that young people have about health are important because they influence how youth behave in regard to their health, with very real consequences – positive and negative. Interviewing young people about their knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and practices is now an accepted research method for understanding youth issues and developing youth-friendly policies. And international experience shows that young people can be able partners in addressing their own health needs.

The sampling presented in Voices of Youth 3 illustrates how differently young people can think about health. For example, youth in Uzbekistan often positioned their health in the context of building family and community, while young Russians and Romanians defined health in a more personal way. A number of them identified health as a sort of capital, but some, like Stefan, thought of it as a resource to be spent rather than carefully managed. His comment strikes a chord in what Natalia, age 15, of Russia, said in the focus-group discussions: "Good health is when you can do something without thinking of the consequences".

Indeed, surveys show that a remarkably high number of young people in the transition region actually lack good health and engage in behaviour which has negative, even fatal, consequences. As Chapter 1 recounts, of the generation which was aged 5-14 in 1989 when the transition began, more than a half-million boys and girls did not survive to become part of the 15-24 generation of 1999. This means that almost one person in every 100 of the generation of Natalia, Stefan and the others has been lost along the way.

Higher youth mortality in many countries

Adolescent health as a distinct health concern is barely on the policy radar in the region; accordingly, there is a dearth of research and evidence available on the broader aspects of youth health in many countries. However, regionwide data are available on the bluntest measure of adolescent health: the deaths of young people.

Figure 2.1 shows the mortality rates of the 15-24 populations in the 27 countries both at the beginning of the transition and in 1998 (or the latest available year). The diagram offers a comparison among countries and over time.

Overall, in 11 countries, youth mortality rates were higher in 1998 than they had been in 1989 – largely in CIS countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. (The most recent data for Albania are from 1997 and indicate a rise in youth mortality; no data have been available for Bosnia-Herzegovina since the 1992-95 war, but it is unlikely that death rates have gone down since 1989.) More positively, youth mortality rates have declined in 16 countries, notably including the Baltic States and all of Central Europe.

Although the number of countries registering improvement was greater than the number showing deterioration, youth mortality regionwide was higher in 1998 than it had been at the beginning of the transition, meaning the improvement was minor and was occurring mostly in smaller countries, while the deterioration was more substantial and was taking place in countries with larger youth populations. On balance, about 30 percent more young people aged 15-24 died in the region in 1998 than in 1989 – about 15,000 more young men and 4,000 more young women. Only one-third of this increase was due to population growth, while two-thirds was accounted for by the higher mortality risks.

A geographical reading of Figure 2.1 reveals considerable differences in youth mortality rates among the 27 countries of the region. Three subregions stand out with high death rates among youth: the Baltic States, the western CIS and Central Asia, accounting for most of the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Caucasus subregion is the only area of the former Soviet Union where youth mortality rates are similar to those in Central and Southeastern Europe. And, although youth mortality rates have fallen in the Baltic States, they are still almost double those in Central Europe. Across the entire region, differences in rates have become greater, so that in 1998 young people in Russia and Kazakhstan were three times more likely to die than were youth in Slovakia or Hungary.

Figure 2.2 shows the pattern of change in youth mortality rates in eight countries since 1985. It also includes the average rate in the European Union (EU) for comparison.

The figure makes clear that, in the mid-1980s, youth mortality rates in Central Europe, parts of Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus were comparable to EU rates, while rates in Russia and other parts of the USSR were significantly higher. During the transition years of the 1990s, the rates in Central and Eastern European countries (left panel) experienced some initial increases, but then subsided to levels lower than pre-transition and close to the flat line of the EU rates. (The spikes in Croatia's trend-line reflect the impact of war.) The rates in most countries of the former USSR (right panel) reveal relatively higher starting points in the mid-1980s, peaks in the mid-1990s and mostly levels that were higher in 1998 than in 1989, even in the absence of armed conflict.

War and armed conflict have taken many young lives during the upheavals of the transition – in the Balkans, in

Voices of Youth 3

How do you define "good health"?

Concepts of health influence how health is defined, managed and evaluated. In focus groups organized for this Report, young Romanians, Russians and Uzbeks aged 15-24 were asked to describe what "good health" meant to them personally.

- "Good health lets you physically do what you want . . . being able to go to a three-day drinking party, to run 10 kilometres, to dance in the rain." (Dorinel, 22)
- "Good health means that your health doesn't limit your ability to work." (Elena, 19)
- "Good health means that you have no business with the doctor, no need for medication." (Cerasela, 16)
- "That is what healthy means – it is prestige, male pride, a healthy generation." (Rustam, 18)
- "We are all girls. For us the main thing is to be healthy for the family." (Nargiza, 20)
- "Health is not only about being healthy, but it is about the future. And this future is not only ours, but the next generation's, and health is the foundation for our successors. We should always try to lead a healthy life; then both we and our children will be healthy." (Said, 18)
- "If you take care of your health when you are 15 or 16, you will enjoy good health in the future. Otherwise in 10 years you will be sick and will start blaming yourself for having ignored health issues before." (Raisa, 15)
- "You are in good health when you can afford not to think about good health." (Stefan, 20)

Figure 2.1



Mortality rates among 15-24 year-olds, 1989 and 1998 (per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: First year is 1991 for Croatia. FYR Macedonia, 1989 is estimated. Last year is 1991 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 for Tajikistan and 1997 for Albania.

Figure 2.2



Trends in youth mortality, 1985-98 (per 100,000 relevant population)

Sources: WHO (1999a); MONEE project database

Note: 1985-96 data are from the WHO Health for All database, which uses standardized rates. For missing data for 1997 and 1998, rates have been estimated using chain indices of non-standardized national figures.

the Caucasus (including parts of Russia) and in areas of Central Asia, and certainly some portion of these deaths has gone unrecorded and is missing from the statistics. Using official data from the first year of the hostilities in former Yugoslavia, Box 2.1 highlights the particular vulnerability of youth to ethnic tensions and conflict.

Box 2.1

Young people as the first war casualties in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

There are no reliable accounts of how many young lives have been lost during the bloody breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the most devastating war in Europe since the Second World War. However, 1991 death statistics for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina offer a snapshot of the mounting casualties in the spreading hostilities. It was the first year of war in Croatia and the last year in which official statistics were gathered in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it plunged into conflict from 1992 to 1995. The numbers are a grim reminder of the high vulnerability of young people to ethnic tensions and war.

Figure 2.3 presents two scenarios. The first graph shows male mortality rates across the life span in Croatia in 1989 when both republics were at peace. The U-shaped pattern is typical of developed countries: infant mortality is relatively contained; children and adolescents have the lowest probability of death, and mortality bottoms out before or during early adolescence and then rises with age.

The second graph shows the change in male mortality between 1989 and 1991, the year when Croatia was overtaken with conflict and Bosnia-Herzegovina was on the verge of war. In contrast to the first graph, the comparison of these two years shows an inverted U-shape, a mortality wave which crests among 20-24 year-olds in Croatia and among 15-19 year-olds in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Many of the latter may have been conscripts aged 18-19 who were serving in the federal army as the conflict escalated.)

Estimates put the number of children killed in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina at 16,000 and the number of girls and women raped at 20,000 to 50,000. By the time the Dayton Accords between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia ended the hostilities in 1995, tens of thousands of children and youth had died and hundreds of thousands had been subjected to and involved in violence.

Figure 2.3



Male mortality by age in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1989 and 1991

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: The infant mortality rate is usually calculated per 1,000 live births instead of the rate per 100,000 children aged 0-1 used in the table on Croatia, 1989.

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Figure 2.4



Note: Data for Slovakia and Tajikistan refer to 1995 and for FYR Macedonia and Bulgaria to 199

Youth mortality due to injury and natural causes, 1998 (per 100,000 relevant population)

Sources: WHO (1999a); MONEE project database

Preventable deaths

Young people, especially males, typically see risk-taking behaviour in a different light than adults do and are also less experienced at managing risks. As a result, many youth deaths are caused by accidental injury, drowning, or poisoning and, at times, homicide and suicide, a loss which constitutes a "silent emergency" in many transition countries. These "non-natural" injuries and deaths are all, by definition, preventable. In parts of the region, "natural" causes are also significant contributors to youth mortality, mainly involving infectious diseases, but also maternity-related problems, among others. Clearly, many of these deaths are also preventable.

Figure 2.4 shows 1998 youth mortality rates in the region broken down into these two components: natural and non-natural causes. (Data are unavailable for Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania.) The data confirm that deaths from injuries account for much of the difference among youth mortality rates. The range in mortality rates from "natural" causes in the southern belt of the region indicates there is also plenty of room in some countries to improve preventive care in this regard.

In countries with the biggest rises in mortality rates, such as Russia or Kazakhstan, there has been an increase both in deaths from natural causes and in those from injuries. In some countries where the death rate is down, like the Czech Republic, a relatively larger decrease in deaths from natural causes outweighs and obscures an actual increase in deaths from injury.

One way to assess the number of young people who could have been saved through better prevention is to assume, for hypothetical purposes, that the risk of early death is the same for youth living in the transition region as it is for youth living in other industrialized regions. The last column of Table 2.1 shows the number of young lives that would be saved in each transition country if its youth mortality rate were the same as the rate in the European Union. Using this calculation, there are 45,000 "excess"

Table 2.1

Annual deaths among 15-24 year-olds and hypothetical numbers based on EU rates

	Actual deaths, 1998	Hypothetical deaths, using EU rate	Difference
Czech Republic	980	996	-16
Slovakia	584	556	28
Poland	4,569	3,829	740
Hungary	912	947	-35
Slovenia	239	176	63
Croatia	406	386	20
FYR Macedonia	183	197	-14
Bosnia-Herzegovina	632	309	323
FR Yugoslavia	804	958	-154
Albania	488	358	130
Bulgaria	925	729	196
Romania	2,748	2,246	502
Estonia	214	125	89
Latvia	425	200	225
Lithuania	595	315	280
Belarus	1,882	909	973
Moldova	618	376	242
Russia	42,225	13,133	29,092
Ukraine	9,089	4,365	4,724
Armenia	385	394	-9
Azerbaijan	1,226	816	410
Georgia	436	497	-61
Kazakhstan	4,939	1,620	3,319
Kyrgyzstan	1,010	531	479
Tajikistan	1,400	710	690
Turkmenistan	1,309	549	760
Uzbekistan	4,949	2,774	2,175
Total	84,172	39,002	45,170

Sources: WHO (1999a); MONEE project database

Note: The number of hypothetical deaths is based on the 15-24 population in the transition countries and the average youth mortality rate in the EU in the mid-1990s. The actual death figures refer to 1991 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996 for Albania and 1995 for Tajikistan.

Box 2.2

East meets West: the risk of accidental death

Young men are most at risk of dying from injuries, whether accidental, or intentionally inflicted. How well are the young men of the transition region surviving this threat compared to their peers in the European Union?

Figure 2.5 compares mortality rates due to all forms of injury in individual EU countries and in nine transition countries which have applied for EU membership, as well as in Russia, the country with the highest injury rate in Europe. The figure identifies four categories of non-natural death: motor vehicle accident, accidental death from drowning, fire, poison, etc., homicide, and suicide.

The figure shows a wide range in risk both in the EU and in the 10 transition countries. Within the EU, young males in Austria have three times more probability of dying of injury than do young males in the Netherlands, the best EU performer. However, the Russian rate is seven times higher than the rate in the Netherlands. The figure highlights the fact that the great divide in deaths from injuries in Europe follows the borders of the former Soviet Union rather than those of the former "Iron Curtain".

Five countries – Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland – have lower rates of death from injuries than do the worst-performing EU states, but this is largely due to lower rates for deaths from road accidents. The other five transition countries have road-accident rates which are higher than the EU average, despite their lower levels of motorization. In terms of other types of accidental deaths, most transition countries fare worse or much worse than the EU. Romania and, notably, the Baltic States and Russia have startlingly high non-road-accident death rates, and the incidence of youth suicide and homicide in the Baltic States and Russia is also shocking.

Overall, the figure suggests that there is much room for improvement within the transition region and within the EU. It is, however, encouraging to note that several EU countries (such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden) show relatively low rates of youth mortality from injuries. This progress in reducing the incidence of accidental and violent deaths among young people has taken place despite urbanization and an increase in travel, recreation and the use of vehicles, power tools and appliances. This success may provide models and best practices, such as life-skills education and targeted safety measures, that can be adopted and adapted in other countries.

Figure 2.5



Injury deaths among young men 15-24, mid-1990s (per 100,000 relevant population)

Sources: Micklewright and Stewart (2000); WHO (1996).

Note: Data refer to 1994. Suicide includes deaths from violent causes where evidence of the intent to commit suicide is unclear.

young deaths in the region each year, more than half the annual death toll among youth.

While Russia and some other countries show many "excess" deaths, the negative figures in Table 2.1 reveal the striking fact that the youth mortality risk in several countries is actually below the EU average. However, it is important to remember that the transition region has been relatively disadvantaged materially, including in the availability of the motorized vehicles which are involved in a high share of accidental deaths. So, lower youth mortality rates in the transition countries may be favoured by less urbanization, less traffic and less access by youth to cars, motorscooters and recreation activities. As Box 2.2 illustrates, despite this factor, the accident rate is often quite high.

Earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have already called attention to increases in youth homicides and suicides in many transition countries, particularly in the early 1990s and most notably in Russia. Figure 2.6 shows murder and suicide trends from 1989 to 1998 for males and females aged 15-24 in that country. Homicide and suicide rates follow similar but not identical patterns: the number of male murder vic-

Figure 2.6



Murder and suicide among 15-24 year-olds: trends in Russia, 1989-98 (per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: MONEE project database.

Figure 2.7



Note: First year is 1990 for Lithuania. Last year is 1997 for Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria and 1995 for Tajikistan. Belarus, 1989 is estimated.

Suicide rates among males aged 15-24, 1989 and 1998 (per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: MONEE project database

tims rose sharply in the early 1990s, then declined, while male suicide rates climbed quickly and settled at a much higher level; the rates for women have increased less during the transition, with deaths by homicide overtaking suicides.

Suicide is a bigger killer of young people across the region than is violence by others, especially since homicide rates have subsided in recent years, while suicide rates have not. Murder takes the lives of an estimated 5,000 males and 1,500 females aged 15-24 in the region every year – 15 males and 5 females per 100,000 population. (War deaths are not included in these numbers.) Suicide annually takes the lives of 10,000 males and 2,000 females – 30 males and 6 females per 100,000 population.

Figure 2.7 compares 1998 and 1989 suicide rates for males aged 15-24 in 24 transition countries. In 1998, rates were higher in 16 countries and particularly high – and rising – in Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; among those countries with relatively lower incidence in 1989, the rates more than doubled in Belarus and Turkmenistan. Some countries experienced rate increases in the mid-1990s that have since subsided (Statistical Annex, Tables 3.13 and 3.14). The incidence of suicide has also gone up among girls and young women in several countries. The Caucasus appears to be an exception to the overall patterns in the region, presenting not only low but declining rates, though recent data may be compromised by reporting problems.

Suicide is a public health issue in the broadest sense, associated with problems such as personal and family troubles, early pregnancy, bleak employment prospects, and a lack of a sense of purpose or belonging. If youth suicide rates can be seen as a warning flare of the general state of youth, then even the smallest increases should command the attention of governments and communities, and large increases should raise alarm.

The deteriorating general health of young people

At a time of life when young people are increasingly pursuing activities and making decisions on their own, they are also encountering a growing number of challenges and choices related to nutrition, healthy life styles, exposure to accidents and violence, high-risk behaviours like substance abuse, sexually transmitted disease, early and unwanted pregnancy – and the associated stress and psychosocial problems. It is important to gather information about and respond to the related broader health needs facing youth.

One way of exploring the general health status of youth is to find out how young people rate their own health. A major survey in 26 industrialized countries that asked young people the question "How healthy do you think you are?" found that adolescents in transition countries systematically offered less positive assessments than youth in Western Europe or North America. The 1997-98 Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children (HBSC) survey found that 84-89 percent of Czech, Slovak, Polish, and Hungarian adolescents and 81 percent of Russian youth described themselves as "very" or "quite" healthy. In Western countries, the ratio was more than 90 percent, and in some Scandinavian countries, over 95 percent.

Findings were similar in the 1993-94 HBSC survey, though the question was worded somewhat differently. Young people from the transition region were systematically less positive about their overall health status than their Western peers. The surveys also revealed a marked association between "feeling healthy" and "feeling happy", and adolescents from the transition countries reported themselves happy less often than did Western youth.

Table 2.2 presents evidence on two physical complaints frequent among youth: headache and stomach ache. Interestingly, neither the 1993-94, nor the 1997-98 survey discovered a close relationship between self-assessed overall

Table 2.2

Reported incidence of headache and stomach ache
(15 year-olds experiencing headache/stomach ache at least once weekly, percent)

	Headache					Stomach ache				
	Female		Male		Total, 1997-98	Female		Male		Total, 1997-98
	1993-94	1997-98	1993-94	1997-98	(1993-94=100)	1993-94	1997-98	1993-94	1997-98	(1993-94=100)
Slovakia	41	47	20	29	124.6	25	31	15	20	127.5
Poland	33	40	14	21	129.8	13	19	6	11	157.9
Hungary	41	48	19	29	128.3	17	28	11	16	157.1
Estonia	31	41	19	23	128.0	18	27	13	17	141.9
Latvia	36	41	14	19	120.0	22	24	9	13	119.4
Lithuania	42	48	22	22	109.4	22	25	10	12	115.6
Russia (regions)	41	45	19	28	121.7	14	23	11	16	156.0
7 transition countries	38	44	18	24	122.7	19	25	11	15	136.9
15 other countries/regions	38	41	20	23	109.3	19	22	11	12	113.3

Sources: Based on HBSC data in King et al. (1996) and Currie et al. (2000).

Note: For Russia in 1993-94, only students in St. Petersburg and the surrounding district were interviewed; the 1997-98 round also surveyed young people from Krasnodar krai and Chelyabinsk oblast. Regions within France and Germany represented these countries. For the UK, constituencies in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland were surveyed and reported separately.

health status and reported physical symptoms or related medication use: those young people who said they felt unhealthy were seldom the same ones who expressed these symptoms.

Table 2.2 shows data for the 22 countries and regions included in both surveys, including seven industrialized transition countries. It is striking that the 1993-94 data show almost the same percentage of 15-year-old girls and boys reporting headache and stomach ache in the transition countries and in the Western countries. This appears to indicate that young generations in Eastern Europe were no sicker than their Western peers.

However, the 1997-98 data show that, while the reported incidence of headache and stomach ache had climbed in all countries since 1993-94, it had climbed more steeply in Central and Eastern Europe. Western research identifies higher symptom rates within given countries with a higher incidence of distress, anxiety and unstable psychosocial environments. Figures on medication incidence (which may reflect symptom severity, as well as the better availability of medicines) seem to confirm that physical complaints among youth in the transition region are on the rise: the survey found a slight overall increase in medication incidence in the 26 countries covered, but sharp increases in the seven transition countries examined.

Figure 2.8



Health status of adolescents aged 15-17, Latvia, 1990-98 (percent)

Source: CSBL (1999).

Note: "Healthy" corresponds with "Group 1" in the registers. "Not very healthy" represents "Group 2" (often ill, illnesses are lasting, and after-illness periods are characterized by tiredness, irritability, sleep disorders, appetite loss, etc.). "Sick" refers to young people with congenital malformations and chronic pathologies ("Group 3").

Therefore, the conclusion cannot be dismissed that the 1993-94 and 1997-98 surveys captured a rapid transition from a low to a high prevalence of symptoms of ill health among the youth of Central and Eastern Europe. This troubling shift in self-reported health problems and assessments merits further investigation.

A valuable source of health-management information is the tradition in the region of medical check-ups at school and even sometimes in the workplace. Certainly, the nature and quality of the data vary, but overall the records confirm the above trend and add a further important finding: the disparities in the health status of youth are growing in the region.

Even in Slovenia, where the impacts of transition have been relatively moderate and evenly experienced throughout society, polarization in health has taken place; for example, school doctors found a greater share of both very well-nourished and poorly nourished students in 1996 than they had in 1987. Yet, many countries exhibit greater economic disparities than those in Slovenia, as well as poorer access to food. For instance, average annual meat consumption is 65 kilograms per capita in Slovenia, but only 37 kilograms in Bulgaria and 23 kilograms in Georgia; much of this variance is the outcome of the transition.

Another snapshot of changes in young people's health over the 1990s is presented in Figure 2.8, which is based on check-up records maintained on adolescents aged 15-17 by the Latvian Medical Statistics Bureau. Only 55 percent of the teenagers examined were found to be "healthy" in 1998, considerably lower than the share in 1990. The proportion regarded as "not very healthy" had grown from 25 to 40 percent.

A final insight gained from the records in various countries is that health conditions and health standards differ widely in the region. This appears to be true even among the countries that once all took part in the Soviet health system.

In Azerbaijan, for example, around 40 percent of the drinking water has been found to be contaminated with bacteria. Likewise, infectious diseases have greater impact where people are poor or are refugees and where there is a lack of money or access to preventive measures, treatments and medications. In such conditions, health problems which get attention in more affluent countries may simply go unnoticed or unchecked. ■

2.2 The Risks of Substance Abuse

Adolescence is typically the time of life when people first confront choices related to intoxicating and potentially addictive substances like tobacco, alcohol and drugs. Certainly, tobacco and alcohol use was common in the region before the transition and was even widespread in a number of countries. Drug abuse was rare in these closed and highly controlled societies.

The transition has opened up borders, values and opportunities, a process that has been accompanied by stress and turmoil. One of the unfortunate impacts of this change is an increased willingness on the part of many young people to experiment with controlled and illegal substances at the same time that these substances are becoming more readily available and are being more aggressively marketed.

Higher rates of smoking

With privatization and economic liberalization, the tobacco industry in the region has become dominated by large transnational firms. This shift has meant that the marketing of cigarettes has become more sophisticated. For example, branding now associates smoking with an affluent and advantaged Western life style or with other images which no doubt appeal directly to young people.

Based on data from the two HBSC surveys carried out during the 1990s, Figure 2.9 shows the share of 15-year-old students who say they smoke at least once weekly. The overall picture is that smoking has been increasing among both girls and boys across Europe, East and West. The figures show that smoking is now just as common among boys in Central and Eastern Europe as it is among their Western European peers, and in some countries even more common. In Western Europe, the share of adolescent girls who smoke is now often greater than the corresponding share of adolescent boys.

Pre-transition, girls in Central and Eastern Europe smoked much less than did either boys in the region, or girls in the West. During the transition, the incidence of smoking

Voices of Youth 4

Young people talk about smoking

Smoking is becoming more prevalent more quickly among young women than among young men in many countries of the world, including transition countries. Listening to what young people say about smoking can be an aid in the development of effective prevention and intervention strategies. The quotes below are from interviews with Russian, Romanian and Latvian youth.

- "I just feel scared. I'm 16 now. I smoke, and I do anything I want. What will happen to my children? I would not watch my kid start smoking at the age of 12. But I started at that age." (Klavdia, 16)
- "I started smoking when I was 12, and it was considered early . . . and now I see 9-year-old kids smoking everywhere." (Natalia, 15)
- "It all depends on your peer group: if more than 50 percent of your friends smoke, you will start smoking as well. If I am nervous, I can't help smoking." (Klavdia, 16)
- "We only had one class on [healthy living] – about the dangers of smoking." (Gianina, 16)
- "One cigarette per day could even lower the risk of cancer." (Elena, 19)
- "I can't say for sure that smoking is bad for my health or not. I don't have enough information to make this decision." (Tatiana, 22)
- "[My friends] find it normal to smoke and do not consider it a bad habit. They know I don't support their smoking, but I don't try to put any pressure on them to give up. I believe that it's a personal decision of every human being and that I don't have the right to impose my opinion on them." (Guntar, 22)



Note: See the note to Table 2.2.

Figure 2.9

15-year-old students who smoke at least once weekly, 1993-94 and 1997-98
(percent)
Sources: King et al. (1996); Currie et al. (2000).

Figure 2.10



Age at which Romanians aged 15-24 become regular smokers, 1996 (cumulative percent of relevant population)

Source: Serbanescu and Morris (1998a).

Note: "Regular smokers" are those who reported any regular tobacco use before the given ages.

has gone up among all groups, but more quickly among girls. On average, in the 15 Western countries surveyed, 20 percent more girls reported smoking daily or weekly in 1997-98 than in the same survey four years earlier. In the seven transition countries surveyed, 82 percent more girls smoked. In countries like Slovakia or Russia, where rates were still relatively low in 1993-94, the incidence of smoking doubled or tripled during this short period. In other countries, like Hungary, where a higher percentage of girls smoked in 1993-94, the increase was less steep, but still very significant.

The "catching up" trend among young women has many dimensions. A 1996 survey in Romania found that urban females of reproductive age were almost twice as likely to smoke as were non-urban women. It also found that the share of smokers among women climbed with education level. However, data on younger adolescent girls showed much less differentiation in terms of locale or education. Some surveys suggest that girls are more likely than boys to take up smoking and more likely to quit. In Estonia, for example, of the generation born between 1971 and 1980, more than 60 percent of the males surveyed said they had never been smokers, while only one-third of the women said this.

Smoking still appears relatively less common and largely confined to males in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Azerbaijan, for instance, recent household surveys report that one-third of adult men and only 1 percent of women say they smoke. However, the share of young women who smoke in these regions is rising. In Georgia, the National Centre against Smoking estimates that currently about one-third of pregnant and breastfeeding women smoke, up from 14 and 22 percent, respectively, in 1995. Tobacco use by pregnant and nursing women has health implications for newborns, including higher rates of stillbirth, low birthweight and congenital anomalies. Although many women stop smoking while pregnant, a survey in Armenia found that every second pregnant smoker did not.

Adolescence is a critical time to prevent smoking and to promote quitting because it is the moment in life when most people start the habit – a habit that is notoriously difficult to break once it is established and extremely detrimental to health, especially in the long term. A 1994 representative survey of Hungarian adults found, for instance, that, among smokers, 75 percent of men and 60 percent of women had begun smoking before age 20.

Figure 2.10 reports on how young people interviewed for the 1996 Romanian reproductive health survey recalled starting smoking. Among males, 6-13 percent recalled smoking regularly by age 10-14. After age 15, the share of people who had begun smoking rose steeply and then levelled out. This means that by age 25, 78 percent of men had a history of regular smoking, and two-thirds of them were still smokers. Girls are slower than boys to take up smoking and do so to a much lesser degree, as the figure shows. However, comparison with a similar survey carried out three years earlier confirms that relatively more girls are taking up smoking in this country, too.

Alcohol abuse: an old habit with new followers

Alcohol use and abuse are well established in all countries of the transition region. Alcohol is implicated in the region's high mortality rates and is a significant factor in accidents, domestic abuse and violence, emotional, mental and social ills, and crime.

"Alcohol is dangerous: most problems start off when you are drunk," commented Mikayel, a 16-year-old

Figure 2.11



15 year-olds reporting having been drunk at least twice, 1993-94 and 1997-98 (percent)

Sources: King et al. (1996); Currie et al. (2000).

Note: See the note to Table 2.2.

Table 2.3

Registered cases of alcohol abuse and addiction
(per 100,000 population age 15+)

	1989	1995	1998
Czech Republic	911	585	527
Slovakia	791	1,338	1,287
Poland	532	538	-
Hungary	1,245	971	901
Estonia	2,577	1,020	1,182
Latvia	3,380	2,698	2,580
Lithuania	2,880	3,691	3,454
Belarus	2,859	2,160	2,352
Moldova	285	227	245
Russia	353	288	201
Ukraine	-	228	187
Armenia	428	238	233
Azerbaijan	450	420	439
Georgia	-	333	288
Turkmenistan	890	802	811
Uzbekistan	-	710	640

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: End-year cumulative totals, except Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, for which data refer to cases newly registered during the year.

Russian, in focus-group research carried out for this Report.

Figure 2.11 uses data from the 1993-94 and 1997-98 HBSC surveys to show the share of 15 year-olds who said they had been drunk at least twice. The graph tells much the same story as the data on smoking: the rates of alcohol use in the CEE/CIS are significantly higher among boys than among girls, but girls are catching up in many countries.

Given the generally high levels of alcohol consumption in the transition countries, it is surprising that the share of Central and Eastern European teenagers who admitted having been drunk was smaller than the share among their Western peers. However, there may be a methodological problem, since teenagers in different countries or cultures may interpret "being drunk" differently. Indeed, significantly more Russian pupils reported having drunk some alcohol than did the Finnish, Canadian or US students interviewed.

Various sources suggest that, in parts of the region, young people start drinking at younger ages, that drinking throughout adolescence is more common and that the intensity of drinking (the frequency and the quantities) is rising. The data presented in Figure 2.11 show that alcohol abuse has been mounting more quickly in the transition countries than it has in Western countries. The Romanian survey mentioned above found that one-third of 11-year-old boys had consumed alcohol and that most males are occasional or regular drinkers (especially in rural areas) by age 16.

Table 2.3 shows the number of persons in the region registered for treatment for drunkenness and addiction to alcohol. Most belong to the mature adult population. Available sporadic data indicate that less than 10 percent of registered abusers are aged 15-24, in keeping with sources that suggest that "hard" drinking habits usually become established in the early 20s.

Figure 2.12



Newly registered alcohol abusers in Russia, 1990-98
(1989=100)
Source: MONEE project database.

Though chronic alcoholism may be rare among adolescents, there is a worrying trend in some countries, as Figure 2.12 illustrates with data from Russia. There has been a significant increase in the number of adolescents being taken to dispensaries dealing with alcohol-related problems even when the total number of registered abuse cases is stable or declining. It is reasonable to believe that these formal registers capture only a fraction of the actual alcohol abusers of any age.

Drug use: a new risk for youth

In countries around the world, the issue of drugs touches the lives of young people across the socio-economic spectrum: from youth experimenting with the latest "party" drug to vulnerable and marginalized populations, including refugee and displaced children, young sex workers and soldiers, street children, and institutionalized youth, who use drugs to cope with a stressful existence. Teen populations in the transition region are expanding at both ends of this continuum, and they are facing a drug issue that was unknown in their parents' time.

Illicit drugs, especially in the narcotic family, were relatively absent under communism. Travel was restricted; borders were tightly controlled, and local currencies were without value on the international market. Certainly, there was some abuse of available substances, including the practice of sniffing solvents. The changes triggered by the transition have, unfortunately, opened up the region not only to more democratic values and market forces, but to the trafficking, production and use of drugs.

Figure 2.13 shows rates of marijuana and solvent use among young people aged 15-16 in 10 transition countries and, for comparison, 10 countries outside the region. (The data typically refer only to students and so tend to exclude some higher risk populations, such as young people who have left school.) It is clear from the figure that, by the mid-1990s, there was already a drug problem among youth in the transition countries: roughly 10 percent of the secondary school-age population had used cannabis, and a similar ratio had abused solvents. These rates compare to the middle range of the industrialized countries represented. Telltale is the significant use of cannabis in the transition countries, where five years ago use was almost nil.

Given the burgeoning reliance on drugs in Eastern

Figure 2.13



Cannabis and solvent abuse among 15 and 16 year-olds, 1995 (percent of relevant population)
Source: UNCND (1999a).

Note: Data refer to lifetime prevalence rates, which reflect any experiment by an individual in the age group. The data are not strictly comparable, since collection and sampling methods have varied. The data refer to ages 15-16 for Bulgaria and Poland and to ages 18-24 for Germany. For Brazil, the year is 1997 and the ages 10-18. For the Netherlands, the data refer to 1996 and ages 12-19 for cannabis and to 1990 and ages 10-17 for solvents. For France, the year is 1993; for Sweden, 1997. For Spain, the year is 1996 and the ages 13-17. The US data refer to ages 13-17 in 1996.

Europe following the fall of communism, it is pertinent to ask whether rates have stabilized, declined or continued to rise since the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, in most countries in the region, only sparse information is available on drug-use incidence and patterns.

However, the evidence that is available through international surveys, opinion polls and rapid-assessment surveys does suggest that drug use is increasingly accepted by youth and is now widespread in Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, for example, recent data point to a serious rise in illicit drug-use rates in the late 1990s. An international survey carried out in 1999 by the European Schools Project on Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs (ESPAD) found that 25 percent of 16 year-olds in Hungary were using drugs. This compared to 19 percent in 1995, with the increment mainly involving marijuana and hashish. Prescription medications, such as sedatives and sleeping pills, combined sometimes with alcohol, remain a problem, especially among young girls, 12 percent of whom were relying on these legal drugs, while 1 percent were using illicit drugs.

In general, drug use seems to be less frequent and even strongly rejected among "mainstream" youth in the CIS countries. However, there are indications that significant pools of drug users have appeared both among the newly affluent and among socially marginalized youth in many cities and other areas in these countries. The dramatic rise in HIV infections among young adults in Ukraine and Russia has called attention to the scope of the drug problem, and outreach programmes aimed at syringe users report a mounting number of cases among young adolescents. A considerable part of these drugs are trafficked through Central Asia, a region which itself is experiencing growing drug use among youth. Surveys in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, found that 2 percent of secondary school students in 1994 had experimented with psychoactive substances and that the share jumped to 12 percent over the next two years. Rapid assessment surveys carried out in 1998 found that 7 percent of secondary school students in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, had used drugs.

Table 2.4 shows the number of registered drug addicts in the region. The rates are highest in Central Europe and the Baltic States and lower in the CIS, although not in every case. Certainly, these data capture only a fraction – according to some estimates, one-tenth or less – of the actual number of drug users; on the other hand, the increases in the number of registered users could reflect those longer time users who have only recently come into contact with the health care system. As Figure 2.14 illustrates through the situation in Russia, in many countries during the transition there has been an exponential growth in newly registered cases.

Doctors in FR Yugoslavia say that children and teenagers there make indiscriminate use of the available intoxicants, including glue, petrol, acetone, asthma spray, poppy-cocoon tea, hashish, marijuana, medications prescribed for mental illness – often combined with alcohol, which multiplies the effects of the substances. In parts of the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, various and sometimes converging factors – remote mountain location, a tradition of using the opium poppy in folk medicine, armed conflict, and persistent ethnic tension – facilitate drug production and trafficking.

The ESPAD survey found evidence of growing multiple-drug use and increasing reliance on LSD, crack, amphetamine-based ecstasy, and heroin. Other surveys in the region confirm the spread of heroin, a highly addictive and expensive drug (Voices of Youth 5). Various sources point to the rapid rise in the use of injected drugs, which represent a heightened risk of the transmission of infectious disease, including the HIV virus which causes AIDS. The ESPAD survey found that the use of injected drugs in Hungary was three times

Figure 2.14



Newly registered drug users in Russia, 1989-98 (per year, 1,000s)
Source: MONEE project database.

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Table 2.4

Registered cases of drug addiction, 1995-98

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total (per 100,000 population)				
Czech Republic	32.3	57.6	72.9	73.9
Slovakia	23.1	29.7	38.5	40.8
Hungary	–	–	78.2	88.6
Estonia	24.7	51.4	72.6	82.2
Latvia	32.0	36.3	40.2	44.1
Lithuania	46.0	63.4	77.5	77.5
Belarus	14.8	21.4	26.4	29.0
Moldova	7.1	9.6	24.2	36.9
Ukraine	24.0	25.4	21.1	21.7
Armenia	25.5	23.2	34.0	39.6
Georgia	48.2	52.5	50.3	55.3
Kyrgyzstan	15.0	20.0	18.8	15.4
Uzbekistan	29.0	32.9	37.2	41.2
Share of 15-19 year-olds among the total (%)				
Czech Republic	28.5	33.2	37.6	35.3
Slovakia	49.1	40.7	32.0	29.2
Hungary	–	–	17.4	17.7
Latvia	3.1	8.8	15.6	15.1
Belarus	1.8	2.3	1.4	1.2
Moldova	5.8	10.1	17.4	24.4
Kyrgyzstan	5.2	4.7	4.7	3.6
Uzbekistan	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: End-year. The data in the lower panel refer to people under 17 in Hungary and Latvia and 15-17 year-olds in Belarus and Uzbekistan.

more frequent in 1999 than it had been in 1995. In Ukraine, screening among 13,385 drug users during the first three months of 1999 found that more than 1,000, about 8 percent, were infected with HIV. UNAIDS reported 2,700 new cases of HIV among drug users in Moscow in the first nine months of 1999 alone.

Rapid assessment surveys in Central Asia have found that drug users are graduating more quickly from ingesting or inhaling drugs to injection and that many drug users start out with injections. Sharing needles and drugs aggravates health risks, particularly HIV transmission. Several sources also indicate that the age of first contact with drugs has become lower as the drug trade and drug use have spread in the region.

■

Voices of Youth 5

Vladymir's story: living with drug abuse

Vladymir is a 23-year-old drug user from Moscow. He was the subject of an individual interview associated with focus-group research carried out for this Report. At the time of the interview, Vladymir had been using drugs, including marijuana, hashish and heroin, for six years. He had stopped using heroin eight months earlier. This was his fourth attempt to get clear of drugs. However, he appeared to be under the influence of sedatives during the interview.

Vladymir recalled that, when he first came into contact with drugs, he was on the street with friends. "Nobody pushed me or tried to get me involved. I did it voluntarily."

According to him, it is easy to buy drugs. "In most cases, young people buy drugs on the street. There are special places in every district where you will always find someone you can buy drugs from. . . . Most young people steal to get money for drugs. Of course, it's expensive, but there's no way out."

The high health risks of drug injections were not lost on Vladymir. "Taking drugs is a risk to one's life. You always risk dying of overdose. It's easy to get infected with hepatitis and HIV."

Asked why he used drugs, Vladymir claimed psychological and physical dependence. "You simply cannot live without them." He had turned to his parents and medical clinics for help. "It was not possible to live that life any more. I simply could not go on like that."

Vladymir complained about his experience at the drug treatment clinic, however. He said doctors were polite, but cool and distant, and he often felt he was being treated like a "second-class human being", even as a criminal behind barred windows. He also said there was a lack of medications, especially those used to ease early physical withdrawal symptoms.

People who advised him to quit drugs were unable to follow through with appropriate psychological support, Vladymir said. He would only listen to a former drug user who knows what it's like to be addicted. Vladymir said he had heard from a friend in the drug scene about the effectiveness of 12-step programmes and had seen a presentation at the clinic, but he couldn't afford the $1,400 programme-fee. Interestingly, in the West, where the self-help recovery movement started and remains very popular, such programmes are run by the clients themselves, are inexpensive and are strictly non-profit.

The research interviewer made these observations about Vladymir: "The respondent was very indifferent towards everything. His eyes were empty; no expressions on his face; he did not care about anything, including his health and life. He seemed to be living in his own 'desert'. There are no people he cares about; there are no people who care about him; he has no interests, no plans for the future and no stories about the past."

2.3 Changes in Reproductive and Sexual Health

Attaining sexual maturity and becoming sexually active are hallmarks of adolescence and young adulthood. These dramatic changes in physical health and social behaviour are, naturally, accompanied by risks. Before the transition youth in the region tended to marry young and have a first child relatively young. During the transition years, the picture has changed substantially: youth are less likely to marry, but more likely to have sex at a younger age; teen birth rates have fallen across the region overall, but more of these births are occurring outside marriage and to very young teenage mothers.

The two most acute health problems associated with the reproductive and sexual health of young people in the region are sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and

Figure 2.15



Patterns of registered HIV incidence, 1989-98 (rates per 100,000 population aged 15+)

Sources: MONEE project database; European HIV prevalence database.

unwanted pregnancies ending in abortion. Before the transition, abortion rates were notoriously high in many countries, while the incidence of serious STIs was low. What has happened since?

Voices of Youth 6

Talking about the threat of sexually transmitted disease

Evidence shows that the incidence rates for sexually transmitted infections have gone up during the transition, affecting young people as well as older adults. These voices from Russia and Romania reveal the uncertainty and worry generated by this problem.

- "Using condoms is very important!" (Oana, 17)
- "Safe sex is essential. But it depends on the partner." (Cristian, 16)
- "The atmosphere in the [STI] clinic is uncaring. You should feel protected, like at home. The doctors should inspire more confidence. A smile and a few words of support are very important." (Andrei, 24)
- "I once went for a blood test, and there were a lot of young people doing an AIDS test. I was worried because you never know about the needles they use." (Karina, 15)
- "There are some infected people who mess around and infect as many people as they can, deliberately. . . . that's scary." (Ira, 16)
- "It would have been impossible to involve my parents. If only they understood, but usually they just start shouting at me, and I get even more scared." (Lena, 16)
- "I feel alone with this problem [gonorrhoea]. I no longer feel like a normal human being. I am really worried; nobody helps me. I'm going through it on my own." (Ksenia, 22)

The spread of HIV/AIDS

In many countries of the region prior to the transition, not a single young person was registered with HIV. Even in the early 1990s, the region was among the parts of the world least affected by AIDS. In recent years, however, there has been a frightening surge in HIV cases, particularly in the CIS. There were about 12,000 known cases in the region in 1995, and five times that number in 1999.

Taking into account that known cases represent only a fraction of the probable infections, UNAIDS estimated at the end of 1999 that 360,000 persons in the 27 countries of the region were infected with the virus. This implies a prevalence rate of 0.14 percent among the 15-49 population in the region, compared to 0.07 percent in East Asia and the Pacific, 0.25 percent in Western Europe, 0.56 percent in the Americas, 0.69 percent in Southeast Asia, and 8.0 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.

No immunization or cure exists for HIV-AIDS, and effective treatments which slow the progress of the disease are expensive and largely unavailable in transition countries. HIV transmission occurs mainly through the use of infected blood products, needle-sharing and sexual activity. Box 2.3 traces the epidemiology of HIV in the CEE and CIS. Understanding the routes of HIV infection among populations is important in the development of prevention and intervention strategies. In Western countries, experience shows that efforts to promote safer sex and safer drug use among high-risk populations reduce the infection rate not only in these communities, but in the general population as well.

Though it is clear that much of the upturn in the known cases of HIV infection is linked to the emergence of significant pools of users of injected drugs, there remains a considerable degree of uncertainty about the extent of heterosexual transmission and, particularly, about the future impact of the epidemic on youth.

Figure 2.15 illustrates the three prevailing patterns in HIV-incidence rates in the region: low but steadily rising rates, which are typical in most Central and Eastern European countries and which are represented in the diagram by Hungary, rates which peak then remain at low-medium levels, as in Poland (or Germany, which is included as an aid for comparison with rates close to the EU average), and rates which skyrocket, as in Ukraine.

Although the rates in the first two groups of countries are still relatively low, the rising trend is troublesome and strengthens the suspicion that the number of unreported cases is considerable. In some countries, like Bulgaria, official data are scanty. As experience has shown in other parts

Box 2.3

The HIV epidemic in the CEE/CIS

HIV infection rates were low in the region before the onset of the transition, though transmission was occurring in several countries through the use of blood products. In Romania, for example, an alarmingly high number of infants and children became infected in 1987-89 through blood transfusions and reliance on unsterilized syringes in children's institutions.

Routine screening of high-risk populations, such as patients with STIs, incarcerated people and drug users in contact with health or justice authorities, meant that the number of registered cases of HIV infection grew throughout the late 1980s and early 90s. Voluntary confidential testing is available, but so far has played a minor role in the detection of HIV infections.

About 12,000 cases of HIV infection, of which more than 3,000 were accounted for by Romanian children, were recorded in the region between the mid-1980s and the end of 1995. Just three years later, by the end of 1998, over 50,000 cases were known.

The distribution of the registered cases largely involves populations in the western CIS. Half of all reported cases are found in Ukraine, where the number of registered HIV infections has soared exponentially since 1995. The proportion of young people 15-24 among those known to be infected ranges from one-third in Latvia and the Czech Republic to two-thirds in Belarus.

Table 2.5 shows three-year aggregates of newly registered HIV cases in 26 countries since 1990. Although the number of registered cases is still relatively low, the table suggests that in most instances the incidence of the disease is accelerating. In 1996-98, 32,000 new cases were registered, up from 4,000 new cases in 1993-95. Preliminary figures produced by UNAIDS show that another 95,000 new cases were registered in 1999 alone.

There is ample evidence that much of the dramatic surge in registered HIV infections in Ukraine and other western CIS countries is accounted for by users of injected drugs. The sharing of needles and injected drugs is a primary route for the spread of HIV. Experts estimate that three or four of every five newly diagnosed infections in Russia and Ukraine occur among users of injected drugs.

Sex workers, most of whom are young, are another group vulnerable to HIV infection, and their numbers have been growing rapidly since the transition began. However, this population seems relatively less affected so far. In Moscow, for example, a recent test of 550 sex workers at an STI clinic found three persons infected. In Odessa, a focal point of HIV infection in the Ukraine, one-third of arrested drug users had the virus, but screenings of prostitutes in 1998 revealed that only 2-3 percent were HIV-positive. There is little information available on the sexual networking patterns of various high-risk populations; existing sporadic studies suggest, however, that drug users often have unprotected sex with non-drug users, which could create bridges for the virus to the general population.

In areas where HIV rates are still relatively low, such as Southeastern and Central Europe, the main route of transmission appears to be sexual, including male-to-male transmission. There is relatively little information about male-to-male HIV infection, because homosexual contact was outlawed before the transition and remains severely stigmatized and therefore concealed, especially in the CIS.

Table 2.5

Newly registered cases of HIV, 1990-98
(absolute numbers)

	1990-92	1993-95	1996-98
Czech Republic	143	105	144
Slovakia	10	24	34
Poland	1,041	1,346	1,768
Hungary	156	202	210
Slovenia	12	21	26
Croatia	-	153	146
FYR Macedonia	2	7	6
FR Yugoslavia	205	251	156
Albania	-	23	16
Bulgaria	12	16	95
Romania	-	-	690
Estonia	1	4	14
Latvia	10	34	205
Lithuania	14	24	88
Belarus	47	23	2,228
Moldova	3	14	859
Russia	609	453	9,871
Ukraine	174	1,499	22,868
Armenia	-	3	73
Azerbaijan	3	3	79
Georgia	10	3	51
Kazakhstan	4	7	772
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	27
Tajikistan	-	-	4
Turkmenistan	-	-	1
Uzbekistan	-	9	15

Sources: MONEE project database; Dehne (1999).

Note: Data show new cases registered during each of the three-year periods. Czech Republic, 1990-92: all cases known by year-end 1992, based on Dehne (1999). Slovakia, 1996-98: Dehne (1999). Croatia, Albania and Uzbekistan, 1993-95: all cases known by year-end 1995. Bulgaria, 1993-95 refers to 1993-94; 1996-98: Dehne (1999). Romania, 1996-98: refers to cumulative number of AIDS cases by year-end 1998. Russia, 1990-92: refers to 1987-92. Ukraine, 1990-92: all cases known by year-end 1992, includes AIDS cases. Armenia: Dehne (1999). Kyrgyzstan: includes foreigners.

of the world, openness, energetic monitoring and public debate on the related, often sensitive, issues are very important for effective prevention.

Where the increases in the incidence of HIV are gradual, transmission is likely occurring primarily through sexual activity rather than through the use of injected drugs. Some experts are forecasting that Ukraine and the other countries now experiencing the swift, drug-related expansion of HIV will follow the Polish model, eventually stabilizing, but at higher levels. In Poland, the HIV-incidence pattern is relatively well documented: the quick initial surge followed by stabilization is attributed to a rapid spread among drug users and a subsequent rise in awareness about risky practices. However, the registered number of new cases has been growing in Poland over the last few years, too, despite prevention initiatives targeting high-risk groups and more public awareness of sexual and reproductive health issues.

While HIV typically first affects high-risk individuals such as homosexual males, sex workers and injecting drug users, in many parts of the world the disease has radiated to other populations, especially where the general health of people is already compromised or stressed because of poverty, poor nutrition and inadequate care. In particular, young people are at higher risk of HIV-AIDS because of their behavioural patterns and because, according to the evidence, unsafe sexual practices are widespread in the region.

The incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis is increasing

The list of sexually transmitted infections is long, and, although syphilis, gonorrhoea and trichomoniasis can be treated effectively with timely intervention, other infections such as genital herpes or human papillomavirus remain in the body, leaving open the possibility of recurrent acute outbreaks. Some of these diseases may contribute to cancer in reproductive organs, especially among women, while syphilis and genital herpes, for instance, facilitate other infections, including HIV.

The transition has been accompanied by a serious advance in STIs like syphilis and gonorrhoea among adults and young people. Two observable patterns in the incidence of these infections among young people are illustrated by the cases of Poland and Russia. Figure 2.16 shows the registered infection rates for gonorrhoea and syphilis among young women aged 15-19 in these two countries. (Note the different scales for each country.)

In Poland, altogether, 10,400 new cases of sexually transmitted disease were recorded in 1989, the lowest population incidence in Central Europe. About 10 percent of the cases occurred among 15-19 year-olds. The figure shows that the vast majority of infections before 1992 involved gonorrhoea rather than syphilis and that diagnosis of gonorrhoea has plunged since 1990, so that the two diseases are now present at similarly low levels. The Polish pattern is similar to the patterns in other Central European nations and in the countries of the former Yugoslavia; however, Bulgaria and Romania have significantly higher incidence rates, and the number of registered cases has risen in recent years.

In Russia in 1989, the registered incidence of syphilis among females aged 15-19 was similar to that in Poland. However, gonorrhoea rates were 20 times higher: five adolescents in every 1,000 were infected annually. A similar situation prevailed in other parts of the USSR. Only in the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) was the incidence of gonorrhoea relatively low.

It appears that even before the transition sexual behaviour and sexual hygiene practices were particularly ill matched in Russia and the countries which now make up the western CIS. However, under communism, the combination of a highly controlled society and rigorous disease-management systems kept rates contained. When social

Figure 2.16



Changes in the incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis among females aged 15-19, Poland and Russia, 1989-98
(per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: To facilitate the visual presentation of changes over time, the scales for Russia are 10 times greater than those for Poland.

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Figure 2.17



Females aged 18-19 newly registered with syphilis in the CIS and the Baltic States, 1998 (per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: MONEE project database

Note: The year for Georgia is 1995, and for Turkmenistan, 1997. Kazakhstan is estimated.

and medical restraints were relaxed after 1991, it was only a matter of time before STI rates shot up. As the diagram on Russia in Figure 2.16 demonstrates, first the incidence of gonorrhoea increased, and then, in 1992-94, syphilis began spreading. The incidence rate for syphilis surpassed that for gonorrhoea in 1995.

Many infections are discovered during pregnancy testing and health check-ups for military service among older adolescents. During 1996-98, gynaecologists, dermatologists and other specialists found that more than nine of every 1,000 young Russian women aged 18-19 were infected with syphilis. This serious disease, even when treated promptly and properly, can impair long-term health, including the reproductive ability of women and the health of babies born to infected mothers.

Figure 2.17 shows the most recent figures for the incidence of syphilis among women aged 18-19 in those countries of the former Soviet Union for which data are available. It is worth noting that even relatively low figures often reflect an increase because the disease had almost been eradicated before the transition.

In the entire region in 1998, there were a half-million newly registered cases of syphilis, of which 15-17 year-olds accounted for an estimated 40,000 and 18-24 year-olds for another 200,000. Doctors found about 3,000 cases of syphilis among 10-14 year-olds. Given the difficulty of detecting this insidious disease, which often presents no obvious symptoms, the real size of the problem is presumably even bigger.

The climbing trend in sexually transmitted infections in the region is disturbing both for what it now represents and for what it may portend. Most troubling is the pattern in countries where an initial wave of gonorrhoea infection has been succeeded by a surge in the more destructive syphilis, and, more recently, the incidence rates for the deadly HIV have started to move up. This raises the spectre that, unless there is a substantive change in sexual behaviours and health practices, AIDS may yet stake a large claim on the youth of the region.

Youth pregnancy and abortion rates

Before the transition, the adolescent fertility and abortion rates in the region were very high in international comparisons. During the transition adolescent birth rates have declined, but marriage rates have declined even more quickly, and in many countries more births are occurring among unmarried teen mothers. So, what then has been happening with adolescent pregnancy and abortion rates over the same period?

Figure 2.18 illustrates the main patterns through the cases of Russia and the Czech Republic. Birth and abortion rates among adolescents have fallen in both countries, as they have in the majority of transition countries. However, in the Czech Republic, abortion rates have decreased less than birth rates, with the result that the number of abortions per 100 live births has climbed. The same scenario has taken place in 11 of the 20 countries for which data are available, mostly those in Central and Eastern Europe (Statistical Annex, Table 2.11). Meanwhile, as the figure shows for Russia, the ratio between adolescent births and abortions has changed little in the western CIS, and the abortion rate fell more than did the birth rate in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Although the absolute number of abortions has gone down among youth and adults alike in all countries (except Romania) for which data are available, the decline among teenagers has typically been weaker than that among adults.

Figure 2.18



Trends in adolescent fertility and abortion in Russia and the Czech Republic, 1989-98 (per 1,000 women aged 15-19)

Source: MONEE project database

Figure 2.19



Adolescent pregnancy rates, 1998 (per 1,000 women aged 15-19)

Sources: MONEE project database for CEE/CIS; Micklewright and Stewart (2000) for EU.

Note: The data labels refer to live births and abortions, which, in the figure, are taken together to represent the pregnancy rate. The unweighted average EU teen birth rate dropped from 16.1 to 12.3 between 1990 and 1995. Birth and abortion data for the EU refer to 1990, since for some countries no more recent abortion data are available. For several EU countries no abortion data are published; in most cases this is because abortion is legal only in very specific circumstances. For Albania, data on births refer to 1997, on abortions, 1995. Data refer to 1995 for Tajikistan. For FR Yugoslavia, data on abortions refer to 1996.

Box 2.4

Safer sexual practices among youth

"They should not look at us like criminals for buying condoms!" 15-year-old Natalia, of Russia, burst out in a focus group conducted for this Report. This single voice captures the exasperation that teenagers often feel in dealing with sexual issues and the gap that exists between healthy sexual behaviour and the realities of sexual life for young people in the region. The increasing presence of HIV/AIDS in the region underlines the need for safer sexual practices among youth. Safer practices include, among others, sexual abstinence, a delay in the onset of sexual activity, fewer sexual partners, and the use of condoms. As the previous chapter notes, abstinence or monogamy may have become more prevalent in some countries. However, the majority of the data reviewed in this and the earlier chapters are clear about the higher risk of unprotected sex among adolescents in the region.

How common is unprotected sex among youth in the region? In the Czech Republic, a 1993 survey found that 27 percent of girls aged 15-19 were relying on condoms during their first experience of sexual intercourse. In Russia, a 1996 survey found that 31 percent of unmarried women aged 15-24 employed any available modern method of contraception. According to the 1998 Romanian narrative survey, young people think that adolescent couples typically do not use condoms or other forms of contraception during their first experience of intercourse together, even though one of the partners may already be sexually active and, perhaps, exposed to sexual disease. This supported a 1996 Romanian reproductive survey which found that only 15 percent of the unmarried women aged 15-24 who were interviewed said they used contraceptives at first intercourse.

International fertility and family surveys show that, while in France, Spain, or Belgium three-quarters of 20-24 year-olds used contraceptive methods at first intercourse, only about 55 percent did so in Poland, Hungary, or Latvia. The surveys also reveal that French women report their first use of contraception at an average age of 18.7, only five months older than their average age at first intercourse. Meanwhile, in Hungary the difference was eight months, and in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania it was 2.5 to 3.5 years. This indicates that many Central and Eastern European women only start using contraceptive techniques a relatively long time after they have initiated their sexually active lives.

The surveys also found that younger generations are more likely than older generations to practice safe sex at first intercourse. The 1998 Romanian narrative survey asked sexually active youth which contraceptive method they had used in the past month. About 20 percent of women aged 18-24 had relied on condoms, and a similar share, oral contraceptives; condom use was slightly higher among 18-19 year-olds, but more than half adopted unreliable methods or no method at all.

Surveys have found that established couples in Central and Eastern Europe depend on condoms more frequently than do couples in the West, where oral contraception is more prevalent. In Latvia, for example, half of 18-19 year-olds with stable partners and more than a third of couples aged 20-24 who rely on contraception employ condoms. Even in Poland, where 27 percent of couples depend on periodic abstinence or withdrawal as contraceptive techniques, 10 percent of sexually active couples aged 20-24 use condoms, a similar share as those relying on other methods like birth control pills and intrauterine devices.

45

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In Romania, adolescent pregnancy rates soared after the 1989 revolution when abortion was legalized, but fertility and abortion rates have been falling more recently. In Poland, registered abortion rates have been plummeting since changes in legislation in March 1993, but there is little information available on how adolescents have been affected. Similarly, no data are available on teen abortion rates in Croatia, where total abortion numbers receded sharply in the 1990s.

Figure 2.19 presents teen pregnancy rates for the CEE/CIS and EU countries for which data are available. The diagram shows that rates are still high in most transition countries relative to Western countries. In Estonia, for example, of every 1,000 girls aged 15-19, 26 gave birth and 44 had an abortion in 1998. The figure shows that, following declines in the 1990s, teen pregnancy rates in Central Europe and parts of the Balkans are now in the higher range of the EU countries. It should be added that, in Western Europe, abortion is more concentrated among adolescents, while, in Eastern Europe, women over age 20 have about 90 percent of the abortions.

The findings of this Report on partnership formation patterns and sexual behaviour among young people, on the one hand, and sexually transmitted infections and adolescent abortion, on the other, underscore the importance of safer sexual practices among youth. However, various surveys in the region confirm that adolescents depend on contraception and safer sex practices in only a minority of cases (Box 2.4).

■

Voices of Youth 7

What do young people do to keep healthy?

Behaviours revolving around health vary widely among youth and are shaped by the environment, by the models young people look to and by individual attitudes, as these voices from the focus groups conducted for this Report show. Here, young people in Russia, Romania and Uzbekistan talk about what they do to stay healthy.

- "I eat whatever is available." (Kiril, 18)
- "I don't think I eat healthy food now, but I depend financially on my parents, and I can't afford to get things I would like." (Nikita, 16)
- "In Romania one can only rely on a heavy diet." (Gabriel, 17)
- "I'd never swap an apple for a sweet." (Carla, 24)
- "It's not that I'm trying to avoid [accidents and violence]; I am trying to find them." (Vova, 15)
- "Sometimes girls are too embarrassed to change into sports gear and go to sport lessons." (Dono, 18)
- "Not everyone feels up to going to the pharmacy to buy condoms. . . . you simply feel embarrassed. . . . I've heard that in other countries there are condom machines in every school. That's discreet." (Klavdia, 16)
- "I didn't think about the possibility of being infected [with a sexually transmitted disease]. I trusted my partner completely." (Ksenia, 22)
- "If you find a person who normally follows all the rules, that person will feel bad and will be excluded from his/her peer group. Later on, she will certainly understand that she was doing everything properly, but at the age of 15 she would feel handicapped." (Natalia, 15)

2.4 Designing Health and Development Interventions for Youth

One of the underlying principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is that children and youth must be active participants in matters that affect them; they must be free to express their opinions, and they must be heard. By participating in the design, development and administration of youth health services, youth can contribute not only to their own health today, but to their own health as adults and to the health of their children. Likewise, they can contribute to a more cost-effective and efficient health care system.

Listening sincerely to young people is a skill. As Voices of Youth 7 illustrates, it can be enlightening. Learning how to act on what one hears so that listening can become a policy-making tool is the next important step.

Changing the settings for health among youth

Certainly, as the determinants approach to health holds, the environments of the family, school and work are highly influential on the health and behaviour of young people, and they are therefore important settings for health promotion and intervention.

Data from the HBSC surveys confirm that, if the communication in their families is good, young people, especially girls, are more likely to perceive themselves as healthy, while older adolescents are less likely to smoke frequently or use alcohol. If adolescents are at ease talking to their parents, they will also find it easier to talk to older siblings and to acquaintances of both sexes and to have close friends. From 16 to 36 percent of 15-year-old students in the 1997-98 HBSC survey said that they find it difficult or very difficult to talk with their mothers; slightly more girls than boys felt this way. Altogether, Central and Eastern European teenagers were in the same range as their Western peers.

The survey included questions on the socio-economic background of the family, and the responses confirmed that there is a generally positive relationship between perceived family wealth or the socio-economic status of parents and the health of youth. Responses in the three transition countries covered in the survey produced two interesting findings. First, in the case of Russia, the survey found particularly strong associations between family wealth and feeling healthy. Second, in Russia, Hungary and Latvia – unlike in any Western country in the survey – famly affluence was also linked with higher rates of risk-taking behaviour such as smoking and alcohol abuse.

The family is important not only because it provides the home environment that is such a major determinant of youth development. It also offers care and conveys social norms and beliefs. Thus, the family is a crucial purveyor of health among youth. Moreover, the family also plays an important role in youth development through its interac-

Box 2.5

The weakening contact between primary health care and youth in the CEE/CIS

The link between young people and health services has become fragile for a variety of reasons during the transition.

Among youth, women typically make greater use of primary health care services, acting not only for themselves, but on behalf of children and male partners. The sharp decline in fertility in the region means this important population group now has less opportunity to come into contact with health screening and other health services.

Before the transition, childbearing generally peaked between ages 20 and 24 (as Figure 2.20 shows with 1990 data from Romania), and most women had given birth to at least one child by age 25. Though gynaecological check-ups should certainly not be restricted to pregnant women, the 1996 reproductive health survey in Romania found that only a quarter of young females who were sexually active had benefited from annual gynaecological check-ups, while 60 percent had never visited a gynaecological clinic. For young men, declining military recruitment means that there has been a drop in the associated medical check-ups.

Figure 2.21 demonstrates that existing monitoring systems aimed at sexually transmitted disease increasingly fail to reach adequately those infected, including youth. At the beginning of the transition, slightly more males than females were registered with treatment services for syphilis or gonorrhoea. This is consistent with the available information on sexual behaviours and the fact that the disease symptoms can be less explicit in women. Since the onset of the transition, the male-female ratio has increased for gonorrhoea and decreased for syphilis, a divergence which suggests that there are widening gaps in the coverage of the registers and, by implication, in treatment. These gaps highlight the need for new types of services which offer support, confidentiality and cooperation rather than shame, isolation and compulsory partner identification.

Figure 2.20



Childbirth in Romania according to the age of the mother, 1990 and 1998 (live births per 1,000 females of the relevant age)

Source: Ivan-Ungureanu et al. (1999)

Figure 2.21



The gender ratio in registered sexually transmitted infections in the CEE/CIS, 1989-98 (males per 100 females)

Source: MONEE project database

The contact between health service providers and youth is particularly troubled in the area of the prevention and treatment of drug use. Rapid assessment reports prepared in several CIS countries have concluded that the practice of close collaboration between law enforcement officials and health care institutions is destroying the trust between health care providers and drug users and that drug users are being treated in a rigid and repressive manner by authorities.

More multifaceted health care systems have been emerging in many countries. These include public and private services for pay. However, adolescents often exhibit little ability or willingness to pay for services.

Overall, the health care system which existed before the transition gave scant attention to the specific area of the health of youth. Unfortunately, the health care reforms undertaken since the beginning of the transition can claim little more. The declining frequency and effectiveness of youth contacts with health care systems warrant concern. Further investigation is needed into the development of health services which reach out to and invest in this important segment of society.

tions with other significant environments such as the school, the workplace and the community.

To be effective, youth health interventions need to take into consideration this broader environment around youth development, rather than focusing exclusively on narrow medical health outcomes. Research in the West has demonstrated convincingly that the mere availability of health care services does not guarantee that youth will rely on the services, in the same way that the mere provision of information is not sufficient to ensure a reduction in high-risk behaviours. Development factors such as the possession of positive goals in life, the presence of adults with whom young people feel close, and access to places where they feel safe make a difference by helping youth avoid risks and find positive responses to stress and to negative pressure from peers and adults, as well as to other health challenges.

The transition has also had implications for the health care systems in the region. Before the transition, there were many universal proactive health programmes covering young people through services such as regular check-ups at school and in the workplace, dental care, prenatal care for young pregnant women, the medical screening of young men for compulsory military service, and rigorous monitoring systems for infectious diseases. During the transition, these services have been considerably weakened, and therefore so have their linkages with youth, as Box 2.5 illustrates.

Student health screenings, which used to be universal, have been cut back in all countries for which information is available and, in some cases, have been eliminated. In Slovenia, for example, following the introduction of a family-doctor system in 1993, the number of secondary students receiving medical check-ups had halved by 1996, which led to remedial changes in health legislation the following year. In FR Yugoslavia, the frequency of medical screenings and dental-care visits among youth plunged over the 1990s. Even in countries which have maintained student health screenings, lower school enrolment rates and higher dropout rates have meant that more youth are being missed by the system, and these youth are now at particular risk, as the following chapters confirm.

Voices of Youth 8

Young people see barriers in health care services

Discussing health issues in focus groups arranged for this Report in Russia, Romania and Uzbekistan, young people comment on the barriers they face when they come into contact with the health care system.

- "If you don't have any friends or contacts among doctors, it is better not to consult them at all and try to cure yourself." (Galina, 19)
- "Since one has to pay anyway, I prefer to pay a private doctor." (Trajan, 17)
- "The equipment in the private sector is very good. But access is expensive, so that not everyone can afford it." (Laurentiu, 20)
- "You have to queue up for more than four hours to get in there." (Natalia, 15)
- "A girl who goes to see a gynaecologist risks being seen by locals in the queue and being considered no longer a girl." (Oigul, 19)
- "They [STI therapists] claim they maintain absolute confidentiality, but, at the same time, they ask for my identity card. I cannot trust them." (Ksenia, 22)
- "Doctors impose and prescribe, but we don't listen to them." (Kiril, 18)
- "Doctors are shocked when they discover that a kid has just come for a regular check-up." (Klavdia, 16)

Provision and partnership must be broadened

The growing health risks among youth in the region and the weakening links with health care systems call for a broad-based response from families, schools, civic society, providers of public health care, and youth themselves. As earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have pointed out, a wide range of preventive care, community and social services is lacking in the region. Pre-transition systems focused largely on the two ends of the service continuum: elementary and late interventions. This was true also in health care. Public health issues were narrowly interpreted, and there was a great void in the middle ground that must now be met through the provision of services and information: public education, preventive care, health promotion, support networks, counselling, hotlines, shelters, and other participatory and empowering initiatives.

In the past, health care workers and services tended to embrace a biomedical philosophy that was little concerned with human behaviour and development or the social determinants of health. There has been no special attempt to understand the health problems of youth. Youth organizations which participated in health campaigns have all too often been motivated by objectives identified from above rather than by genuine engagement with youth.

A challenge and an opportunity now exist to estab-

Box 2.6

Criteria for youth-friendly services

The concept of youth-friendly services is relatively new in public planning. Emerging experience finds that young people are more likely to use services if the services are perceived as:

- Respectful of confidentiality.
- Involving youth participation in design, implementation and administration.
- Culturally appropriate to the needs and perceptions of youth.
- Offered by health care workers who relate to the concerns and life styles of youth.
- Affordable.
- Comprehensive "one-stop" services.

lish a range of health strategies that addresses not only the specific health needs of youth, but also the broader environments which shape the well-being of young people.

The creation of health care services which appeal to youth has been extensively researched in many parts of the world through listening to youth and learning from what they say. This body of research confirms that young people do have preferences for specific characteristics in health care services (Box 2.6).

Youth need confidentialy, particularly when they seek advice or care involving their sexual health. They want affordable services and health care workers who understand their concerns, beliefs, anxieties, and desires. Voices of Youth 8 presents a sample of youth reactions to health care systems.

Communication is an important skill in the promotion of good health among adolescents and in building services that relate to the needs of youth and that youth can relate to in turn. Meaningful dialogue also enhances the health care provider's expertise and fosters a smooth provider-client relationship. Box 2.7 illustrates how communication can enable and reinforce health-promoting behaviour among young people.

Relying on peer promoters, educators and counsellors represents another effective way to involve youth in health strategies and the delivery of effective services aimed at youth. As Ksenia, a 22-year-old women from Russia, said in the focus-group research carried out for this Report, "We are reluctant to listen to our parents or other people much older than us. On the contrary, if we get information or advice from friends, they realize that this could happen to them, too. Young people do not judge or moralize; they live a similar life and are able to understand me."

Box 2.8 lists key lessons learned from peer-promotion projects outside the region. Although peer interventions have their limitations, experience shows that there are significant long-term benefits when the interventions are carefully planned and implemented. For example, a

Box 2.7

Communicating with young people about health issues

An important part of health promotion and protection among young people is an understanding among providers of the significance of effective communication with youth. For example, Table 2.6 presents the opinions of young people on the use of contraceptive methods at first intercourse.

Understanding these perceptions can play a crucial role in designing, communicating and delivering health strategies that inform, motivate, enable, and reinforce. What do these four key elements entail?

- *Inform.* To provide information that can be understood by the target audience in a way that is meaningful in the circumstances and the setting. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the "Safe Sex, City of Bishkek" project distributed 50,000 leaflets which had been designed by local artists and which supplied information on an STI/HIV hotline.
- *Motivate.* To help sustain interest in developing, continuing, or changing programmes, activities, or behaviour. For instance, in Albania, Population Services International has developed a social marketing programme which seeks to motivate young people to buy and use condoms. It relies on radio talk shows with youth to reduce the social stigmas associated with condoms. It also encourages the sale of condoms to men by male staff rather than female staff in order to lessen embarrassment.
- *Enable/Facilitate.* To furnish the tools, instruments, mechanisms, skills, or other means by which the target audience can proceed with the desired programme, activities, or behaviours. For instance, Tootsi Tuba and the Estonian Union for Child Welfare run day centres for vulnerable youth in locations that are familiar and easily accessible to young people.
- *Reinforce.* To support the continuation of a programme, activity, or behaviour, or to change a process. For example, a number of non-governmental organizations in Bratislava are helping drug-addicted youth organize positive activities such as competitive sports.

Table 2.6

Reasons for not using contraceptives at the first sexual encounter
(percent of respondents)

Romania, 1993 (girls 15-24)	**Moldova, 1997** (girls 15-24)	**Ukraine, 1999*** (girls 15-18)	**Bulgaria, 1996**** (both genders 15-25)
Lack of knowledge (27.2)	Wanted to get pregnant (41.3)	I don't want to (56.3)	I didn't think of contraception (21.2)
Wanted to become pregnant (22)	Didn't think about using a method (20.1)	I'm too young for this (37.5)	I don't wish to use contraception (18.1)
Didn't expect to have sex (21.6)	Sexual intercourse was unexpected (19.8)	My partner doesn't want to (25)	I don't know how to use contraception (9)

Sources: Serbanescu and Morris (1998a, 1998b); UNFPA et al. (1999); MOHB, Phare Programme and ASSA (1996).

Note: *Respondents could select more than one answer. **Among respondents not choosing the rhythm method.

major study of 21 Family Health International projects found that the majority of peer educators had made changes in their own lives and behaviour as a result of their involvement: 31 percent were practising safer sex and using condoms; 20 percent had reduced the number of their sexual partners, and 19 percent had changed their own attitudes.

Peer programmes are often strikingly cost-effective as well. For example, a study conducted in Mexico by the US Population Council found that the Community Youth Programme, which employed a peer strategy, was able to reach young adults with sex education and family planning information at one-third the cost per active contraceptive user of the integrated youth centres, which relied on a non-peer strategy.

■

Box 2.8

Lessons learned from peer programmes

- Many young people prefer to receive reproductive health information from peers rather than from adults.
- The involvement of peer promoters significantly increases referrals for contraceptive services at a fixed site.
- Peer promoters need to be selectively recruited and adequately trained, supervised and supported.
- Interactive training improves project outcomes.
- Peer counselling requires more complex training and supervision than does peer education.
- Turnover is a common problem in peer programmes, but this problem can be partially addressed by careful selection, by the use of contractual agreements and by good support, reinforcement and compensation or other rewards.

2.5 Conclusions

Growing up healthy, in the fullest sense of the term, is a right of all children and the privilege of too few young people in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that youth in the region feel worse and engage in unhealthy behaviours more often than did youth before the transition.

It is important to stress that in several countries – including those leading in the reform process – the mortality rates among youth have improved and, overall, are not far from those in the West. However, the evidence on suicide and substance abuse and self-assessments of health indicate that there is reason to be concerned about the general health of youth in these countries. At the same time, in many countries young people are facing a greater risk of dying than they did before the transition, as well as a greater risk of dying from either accidents, or natural causes than their peers experience in more affluent industrialized countries.

There appear to be two dominant storylines in the history of the health of youth during the transition. One revolves around the appearance of greater numbers of disadvantaged youth due to fewer opportunities in education, high youth unemployment and growing social inequality. The other revolves around the greater openness generated by the rapid removal of state controls on society and the emergence of new values and opportunities, especially relative to youth, who, however, are not always being supported by an adequate adjustment in care systems and policies. Wherever these two storylines cross – where unsupported youth find themselves in a frontier environment – the outcome can be devastating, as soaring HIV rates in parts of the region underline.

Clearly, there are considerable overlaps and important linkages among unhealthy behaviours such as adolescent drinking and smoking habits, high teenage pregnancy and abortion rates, alcohol or drug use and accidents, injuries and infections. While it may be tempting to focus primarily on those young people most at risk, one must remember that they are only the tip of the iceberg. A much larger and growing swath of the youth population in the region has also been engaging in unhealthy behaviours. Health policies therefore need to operate through broad programmes, as well as targeted interventions.

Under communism, life styles and the social environment were not adequately focused on youth, as the relatively high rates of injury and unwanted teen pregnancies demonstrate. In terms of psychosocial health, the environment was oppressive towards young people. Although basic public health care was widely available, youth were not identified as a distinct health population or treated with the respect and warmth so important in a client-provider relationship at this age.

As exemplified by the rising rates of sexually transmitted infection among youth, the pre-transition health care legacy is being undermined by the changes brought about by the transition. New approaches to youth health are required. However, while market forces are leading to the privatization of health care, often with positive results, the health of youth remains a public health issue to a large degree and must be addressed through public measures.

Certainly, some of the most serious new health risks facing young people are a result of the rapid collapse of state control and public order. Armed ethnic conflicts are ravaging parts of the region; the sex trade is growing alarmingly, and drug trafficking and use are a new and burgeoning problem. At the other extreme, some of the positive outcomes in the more open environment of the transition, such as more freedom to travel and more choice in leisure activities, can likewise expose young people to greater risks.

There is also evidence, however, that young people are taking advantage of the greater opportunities for healthy behaviour and individual accomplishment that the transition offers. In several areas of health in which youth in the region had a particularly weak standing in international comparisons before the transition, young people are now faring better. Mortality rates due to accidents have fallen in 13 countries, including the Baltic States, where they were notoriously high. Youth suicide rates have gone down in some countries, including Hungary, where the rates were always high. The strikingly high birth rates among teenage mothers have declined in Romania and Bulgaria, and the number of abortions among young women has diminished in Russia (although it is still the highest in Europe).

These positive results need to be strengthened, and the negative trends must be confronted. Youth-friendly health and development interventions clearly have great potential in this region, where general health service availability is good, but is also far from effective in appealing to and reaching young people. The variety of evidence presented in this chapter and confirmed in the focus-group research carried out for this Report points to a significant gap between the perspectives of health care providers, parents and teachers on the health needs of youth and the perspectives of the youth themselves. Forward-looking approaches are attempting to close this gap by involving youth in the design and implementation of appropriate and cost-effective health strategies. One of the key tools is encouragement for the participation of youth in efforts to address youth health issues, but this also means that there is a responsibility to listen to what youth have to say.

The analysis in this chapter has focused largely on health outcomes and behaviours. However, the overall well-being of youth involves many other issues that merit further investigation in terms of the realities in the region and the potential of young people. These issues, including education, employment, conflict with the law, and the participation of youth in civil society, all have implications for health and are important aspects of growing up healthy in the richest and broadest sense.

■

3 The School Years

The success of young people in meeting the challenges and taking advantage of the opportunities associated with the transition depends, to a large degree, on the knowledge, skills and attitudes they learn in school, at home and in their communities. What young people learn as they grow up is vital not only for their own lives, but for the good of society both as a whole and in all its economic, political and social aspects.

As the Convention on the Rights of the Child makes clear, every child has the right to free primary education and access, on the basis of equal opportunity, to secondary education, including general education and vocational training. The Convention calls for an education that develops the personality, talents and mental and physical abilities of children to the fullest.

Today "learning" and "education" are understood to encompass much more than the core years of formal schooling. "Lifelong learning", a concept being embraced around the world, promotes the idea that the learning process starts at the very earliest age and continues throughout the entire life span. It emphasizes that organized learning can take place in a variety of settings, including the workplace or a community centre, and that it involves formal, as well as informal opportunities. Societies that promote and support lifelong learning enable individuals to improve their health, livelihood, personal development, and participation in society; in turn, societies benefit from a healthier population, better social cohesion and greater economic expansion.

This chapter focuses on that part of the lifelong learning process where youth growing up during the transition are located today: upper secondary schools and higher education programmes. This is a pivotal stage. With basic education behind them, young people begin to make important decisions: Should I attend general or vocational-technical secondary school? Should I go on to college or university? Should I drop out of school? The inheritance of early family life and education begins to be played out with differentiating results. Is there the drive, the marks or the money for higher education? Or is it time to get a job? There is also the increasing influence of peer pressure and the exposure and vulnerability to risk-taking behaviours.

The formal education system is only one of several major spheres of influence on learning. However, school is a primary setting in any individual's life, along with home, work and the community. So, not only does school play an obvious role in learning, it is a key social environment in which personal development takes place. Schools are not just significant for education and its future rewards, they are crucial places for young people in the present. In other words, it is important not only that the curriculum be appropriate and the teachers well trained, but that the environment be stimulating, healthy and pleasant. School days, in more ways than one, last a lifetime, shaping attitudes towards learning that persist into adulthood. School thus has a key function in enabling young people to make a confident transition from adolescence to adulthood, from school to work and from family life to participation in broader civil society.

Many of these aspects of formal schooling are more intense in the transition region. Education has a vital function in preparing the transition generation to become the first to take a chosen place in new and rapidly changing market economies and in more open and democratic societies. The education systems in the region must therefore also change, so that what they teach is relevant to a generation charged with rebuilding an economy and promoting a new civil society. Restructured labour markets have meant high rates of youth unemployment and a more prolonged and complex transition from school to the workplace. The challenges facing the educational system in meeting the new demands are great and range from depleting resources to shifting institutional structures and responsibilities.

In this chapter, Section 3.1 examines trends in young people's participation in the formal education system at both upper secondary and tertiary levels. It also summarizes various influences on enrolment rates. Section 3.2 looks at access to education and training, in particular the effect of gender, family characteristics and income. Section 3.3 focuses on the content and quality of the educational process. It looks at achievement levels against international standards and the way curricula and broader learning skills match up with the needs of the new market economies and democratic societies.

■

3.1 Changes in Youth Participation in Education

The expansion of post-compulsory schooling has been one of the major developments in education throughout the industrialized world in recent decades, and the former socialist countries of the transition region are no exception in this regard. One of the main achievements of the socialist system was the successful establishment of universal basic education and a growing number of educational opportunities following compulsory schooling. For exam-

Box 3.1

Youth aspirations and attitudes: the importance of education

Many of the choices revolving around participation in education reflect the aspirations and attitudes of young people and the influence of parents, peers, teachers, prospective employers, and others. To what extent do youth consider attending school and studying worthwhile?

Figure 3.1 compares the views of people under 30 in six Central and Eastern European countries and nine other industrialized nations as revealed through a survey conducted in 1992-93. Among other questions, respondents were asked if a good education and "knowing the right people" were important for "getting ahead".

Young people in the six transition countries were typically less likely than young people in the other countries to think that a good education is essential for getting ahead. In the four Central European countries, just one in seven young people rated education "essential", a level found only in Norway and Sweden in the West. Meanwhile, in every established market economy surveyed, the share of young people who thought that education is essential was greater than the share who favoured knowing the right people. In the transition countries, this was true only in Slovenia.

These views were captured early in the transition period, and they refer mainly to countries at the forefront of reform. How has the situation changed since then? It is clear that "social capital", in the form of personal connections and mutual trust, is important everywhere. Younger people tend to have less social capital than adults, but may have more education, mobility and flexibility. In this light, market reform might help young people by creating a more competitive environment and raising the significance of the assets they possess.

"Personal connections are important for getting a job," commented Radek, 18, a young Czech man, during focus-group research for this Report. "Yet, even if you get the job because of your father, if you do not perform well, then these connections will no longer be of any help."

There are indications, indeed, that young people are assigning a greater value to education than they once did. Surveys in Latvia, for example, show a positive change in youth attitudes towards education, while activities which contribute less directly to personal development are now being considered less important (Figure 3.2).

In 1983, the surveys showed "education" ranked fourth, behind "job", "family" and "friends", among the activities young people valued most. By 1997, though the same four items still dominated the list, education had reached first place, followed by job, friends and family.

Figure 3.1



What does it take to get ahead?: The views of young people, 1992-93 (percent of respondents)

Source: International Social Survey Programme.

Note: The ISSP questionnaire asked about the importance of 13 factors, including a good education and knowing the right people. Responses were based on eight options, ranging from "essential" to "not important at all" and "don't know". The figure compares the shares of those who recognized one or the other of the above two factors as "essential". It relies on a subsample of the original survey and excludes respondents above 30.

Figure 3.2



What young people consider most important in Latvia, 1983 and 1997 (average, scale from 1 to 4)

Source: CSBL (1999)

Note: Based on surveys conducted in 1983 and 1997 among pupils of various ages. Respondents had to value items on a scale from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 4.

ple, in Hungary in 1990, 40 percent of 20-24 year-olds had secondary school certificates at a level higher than vocational, and 13 percent had tertiary level diplomas.

The transition to market economies and democratic societies in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS is having profound implications for education in these countries. How do young people perceive the changes? Box 3.1 and Voices of Youth 9 give some insights into the aspirations, values and attitudes of the transition generation.

Enrolment may be only one measure of young people's participation in education, but it is a fundamental one. The data on enrolment, discussed in the next section, tell a story that is relevant to the other facets of youth development – participation in the labour force, participation in society, conflict with the law, and overall health and well-being – reviewed in this Report.

The overall rate of youth enrolments

The crudest way to measure youth participation in education is to compare enrolments in upper secondary and tertiary institutions with the size of the youth population. In 1998, about 26.5 million people in the region were enrolled in secondary or tertiary educational or training programmes on a part- or full-time basis, almost one million more than in 1989. Set against a youth population of 65 million in 1998, the enrolment rate was 41 percent, about two percentage points less than in 1989, when there were six million fewer 15-24 year-olds in the region.

Meanwhile, the enrolment rate for the same age group in the European Union was significantly higher – 58 percent in 1995. Moreover, the slight decline in the transition countries since 1989 contrasts with the trend in Western Europe: 1987-95 saw a rise of nine percentage points in the enrolment rate in the EU.

Of course, these highly aggregated data may mask large differences among countries both in the levels of enrolment in any one year and in the changes over time. Figure 3.3 shows that this is indeed the case. There were substantial differences in enrolment rates in the transition region in 1989, with a range of 18 percentage points between the countries with the lowest and the highest participation rates. By 1998 this gap had widened to 47 percentage points.

In general, the Central European and Baltic countries recorded significant expansion in participation in post-compulsory education, particularly Poland and Latvia, where enrolment in 1998 approached or exceeded the 1995 EU average. However, sharp falls are found at the other end of the spectrum in the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where the data show that less than 20 percent of 15-24 year-olds were in formal education in 1998.

Southeastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia present an uneven accounting with both big increases and big decreases. In the ex-Yugoslav states, the considerable migrations of peoples (often forced migrations resulting from ethnic conflict and war) blur the picture. As the diagram shows, Slovenia currently posts the highest enrolment rate in the region, while the rate has risen slightly in Croatia. The absolute number of enrolments has also climbed in FR Yugoslavia, although it is not very clear how the rate has changed relative to population. A part of the upswing in enrolments in these countries may be due to mass influxes of people from war-torn areas nearby.

As in other cases outlined in this section, these data are based on information on enrolments and the size of

Figure 3.3



Youth enrolments in secondary and tertiary education, 1989 and 1998 (percent of 15-24 population)

Source: MONEE project database

Note: Enrolment data do not include individuals in these age groups who are still in basic education. This may lead to underestimates. First year is 1990 for Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Last year is 1997 for the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

Voices of Youth 9

Young people talk about the value of education

The attitudes and aspirations of young people differ considerably when it comes to education, and the range of views reveals much about the influence of expectations on school and work decisions. These voices were heard in focus-group research conducted for this Report. They belong to young people enjoying success in their chosen careers and to youth in reform schools in the Czech Republic, early school-leavers in Russia and Ukraine, secondary school students and graduates in Uzbekistan, and vocational school students and young people doing volunteer work in Latvia.

- "A good job is a job with the prospect of access to further education." (Ivana, 24)
- "In reform school, they offer training and education. I doubt I would attend school if I wasn't here." (Jarda, 16)
- "School-leavers often do not know whether the decision they took was the right one. On the one hand, it would be good to finish grade 11 and obtain a high school diploma, but, on the other hand, one just needs a vocation and a job." (Karina, 15)
- "Having a good time with friends and 'good education' are the same thing." (Trava, 16)
- "The quality of education depends on the teacher." (Katerina, 18)
- "I will have to finish school one way or another. Without school education, one will never get a decent job." (Nikita, 16)
- "[Education] is not very important. Today money counts for everything." (Vasia, 16)
- "Without education a person is a nobody." (Zhakhongir, 16)
- "The main goal is to get education. But what I mean by education is broader than its classical meaning. It is necessary to continue educating myself all my life and to help people, first of all those closest to you and then others also." (Maija, 21)
- "I think we should have more practice regarding the world of work. This would give us an opportunity to learn more about our future profession." (Harijs, 16)

population groups that has been gathered from separate sources. Due to migration or strife, these separate sources may be inconsistent (or inaccessible, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo). In this context, school enrolments may, in fact, reflect youth immigration more closely and in a more timely fashion than do population registers. Unrecorded out-migration can push calculated enrolment rates below their true values, as is probably the situation in Central Asia. Nonetheless, the general trend of slipping enrolments in most CIS countries as shown in the graph seems to be the true one.

Fewer youth complete basic education

To understand the changes in enrolments among 15-24 year-olds, one should take a step back and look at what has happened in basic schooling, the level of education before upper secondary. Unless 15 year-olds have successfully completed basic schooling, they will not be able to advance to the next level. The falls in enrolment shown for some countries in Figure 3.3 may be caused not so much by young people (or their families) deciding not to enrol, but by the inability of these young people to carry on at the upper secondary level due to a failure to finish basic schooling. In this case, the problem lies at the early stages of the school career.

Table 3.1 sheds some light on this concern. It compares the number of basic school graduates per 100 youth aged 15 (the age at which most children complete basic schooling) for the 12 CIS countries in 1989 and 1997. As the table shows, before the transition, almost all children in these countries, as elsewhere in the region, were finishing basic education.

However, the transition years have seen a sharp reduction in basic school completion in CIS countries, particularly poorer ones, with falls of 10-20 percentage points. Countries experiencing civil conflict are among those registering the largest declines. In Georgia, the graduation rate from basic school dropped below 70 percent in the mid-1990s before slowly recovering. In Tajikistan, torn by civil war, rates shrank throughout the 1990s.

Parts of Eastern Europe also show some notable deficits in basic school graduation. Rates in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, calculated the same way as those in Table 3.1, were all below 80 percent in 1997, while Latvia was the only Baltic State to reach 90 percent. In contrast, basic school graduation rates were in the 94-99 percent range in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 1996.

Falls in graduation reflect various factors, including dropping out early from school, late entry to school (after the compulsory starting age) and repetition of school years – all of which are causes for concern. These data suggest

Table 3.1

Finishing basic schooling in the CIS, 1989 and 1997
(number of graduates per 100 15 year-olds)

	1989	1997	Change
Belarus	98	88	-10
Moldova	96	77	-19
Russia	94	88	-6
Ukraine	96	89	-7
Armenia	86	73	-13
Azerbaijan	94	84	-10
Georgia	96	73	-24
Kazakhstan	100	89	-11
Kyrgyzstan	98	85	-13
Tajikistan	99	73	-26
Turkmenistan	96	80	-16
Uzbekistan	98	92	-6
CIS average	96	83	-13

Sources: CIS Stat (1999); MONEE project database.

Note: Graduates expressed as a percent of the population at the theoretical age for graduation, in this case 15 years. The CIS average is unweighted. Last year is 1996 for Turkmenistan.

that the eroding enrolment rates among 15-24 year-olds are at least partly caused by changes in schooling at a lower level. They underline that measures aimed at youth education and training need to be embraced within an integrated policy approach towards schooling for children of all ages.

Figure 3.4



Enrolments in upper secondary education, by subregion, 1989 and 1998 (average percent of 15-18 year-olds)

Source: MONEE project database

Note: The figures are unweighted averages of data for each country and include all forms of upper secondary education. The use of the 15-18 age group (rather than 16-18) may understate enrolment rates at both years in the Baltics, western CIS, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Former Yugoslavia includes data for Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Slovenia only. First year is 1991 for Southeastern Europe and 1990 for Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Last year is 1997 for the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

Diverging trends in secondary education

The changes in graduation at the basic level of school provide a good point of departure for distinguishing enrolment rates between upper secondary and tertiary levels of education. Box 3.2 describes the different types of post-compulsory education in the transition countries.

Figure 3.4 shows enrolment rates in 1989 and 1998 for youth aged 15-18 in all forms of upper secondary education. Transition countries in Central Europe average a modest increase, and the Baltic States a very slight rise over the transition period; all other subregions exhibit major falls in enrolment, ranging from eight to 23 percentage points. (There is no 1989 information for former Yugoslavia.) The data clearly imply that post-compulsory schooling has suffered a substantial reversal in these parts of the region.

Does the focus on just two years in Figure 3.4 hide a more complicated story of change during the transition years? This is indeed the case, as Figure 3.5 reveals; it presents upper secondary enrolment rates for eight countries for all years in the period 1989-98. In most of the countries, enrolment rates fell in the early 1990s before rising again. This occurred in Slovakia, for example, where the 1998 rate was 6 percent higher than the rate in 1989, and in Latvia, where rates plunged 10 percentage points before returning to pre-transition levels. Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan saw huge declines of about 25 percentage points up until 1995, but the rates in both countries, though still far below 1989 levels, appear to be recovering strongly. (It is unclear if, or how, these movements reflect changes in the consistency of data collection.)

Box 3.2

Types of post-compulsory education in transition countries

Upon successful completion of the eighth or ninth grade of basic education (primary and lower secondary school), young people in the transition countries typically have three ways to continue schooling.

- General secondary schools (often called gymnasia or lycees) offer four-year programmes of academic study with entry on a selective basis. These schools provide the main route to higher education. (In a number of countries, gymnasia streams begin in lower secondary grades.)
- Technical schools (technical gymnasia/lycees, "tekhnikums") offer three- to five-year programmes of technical study leading to a diploma and the opportunity to continue studying in areas such as medicine and engineering.
- Vocational schools (known in the former USSR as professional-technical institutions, or PTUs, and in Eastern Europe as apprentice schools) provide vocational courses of one to three years or more. Under central planning, students in vocational schools were most often trained for employment in a very specialized occupation, and the possibility for continuing into tertiary education was usually limited.

Higher or tertiary education beyond upper secondary schooling includes programmes leading to a first university degree or recognized equivalent (ISCED 6, according to the levels of the International Standard Classification System of Education; postgraduate study, ISCED 7, is not covered in this Report.) Non-university higher education programmes (ISCED 5) tend to parallel those for which university degrees are granted, but are shorter and more practical in orientation and do not lead to the award of a degree or its equivalent. The tekhnikums of the former USSR republics are sometimes classified as ISCED 5, but this Report treats these institutions as upper secondary schools on the grounds that the great majority of students are aged 15-19.

Upper secondary and higher education enrolments often encompass three categories of delivery. "Daytime" includes mostly young full-time students who are unlikely to be employed, while "evening" and "distance" courses embrace students of all ages and are targeted at those who are working full or part time.

However, the pattern of an early downswing followed by a rise is not found in all the countries represented. Tajikistan shows a decline year after year. Available data indicate that enrolment is almost collapsing there, from 61 percent in 1989 to 24 percent in 1998, a drop of 37 percentage points. In Turkmenistan, enrolment appears to have shrunk by 38 percentage points, to 30 percent in 1998, the only other case of a continuous decline. However, in several other countries rates have stagnated at greatly reduced levels, with only very small increases in recent years or with an oscillating rate from year to year. This is true of Belarus and Ukraine, with an overall fall of about 10 percentage points, and Armenia and Georgia, with an overall fall of about 20 percentage points.

General versus vocational and technical schooling

The main distinction in the types of upper secondary schooling is between the "general" secondary schools and the vocational and technical schools. The former, as the name indicates, provide a broader and more academic education and represent the principal route to university study. Vocational and technical schools offer education and training more directly linked to the job market, with vocational schools, in particular, allowing fewer opportunities for study at the tertiary level.

Figure 3.5



Enrolments in upper secondary education, selected countries, 1989-98 (percent of 15-18 year-olds)

Sources: MONEE project database; CIS Stat (1999).

Table 3.2

Enrolments in general and vocational/technical education, by subregion, 1989 and 1998
(average percent of 15-18 year-olds)

	General secondary			Vocational/technical		
	1989	1998	Difference	1989	1997	Difference
Central Europe	17.0	25.0	8	65.2	63.0	-2
Former Yugoslavia	16.9	19.7	3	–	55.6	–
Southeastern Europe	19.7	28.1	8	69.3	31.8	-38
Baltic States	31.7	42.4	11	39.6	29.5	-10
Western CIS	26.4	27.5	1	46.7	33.8	-13
Caucasus	35.9	28.8	-7	26.0	12.0	-14
Central Asia	37.9	28.7	-9	26.2	12.8	-13

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: The figures are unweighted averages of data for each country. They correspond to the data presented in Figure 3.4 with some rounding error and differences in subregional composition between years. General secondary: First year is 1994 for former Yugoslavia (excluding Bosnia-Herzegovina), 1991 for Southeastern Europe and 1990 for Poland. Last year is 1997 for the Czech Republic and Uzbekistan. Vocational/technical: Former Yugoslavia excludes Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia. First year is 1990 for the Baltic States. Last year is 1997 for Bulgaria, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kazakhstan.

A common view of the secondary school systems inherited from the communist period is that there is "too much" specialized vocational and technical education and "not enough" widely based learning through general secondary schools to meet the needs of new market economies. However, the truth is more complicated.

The emphasis of centrally planned economies on industry at the expence of services did have major implications for the education system. Examples unquestionably exist of narrow vocational training for employment in industries for which demand has now collapsed. Some countries had extreme specialization in schooling, notably Romania.

On the other hand, market economies need many of the skills supplied through technical and vocational schooling, and it is easy to point to school systems in successful Western European economies, like Germany, where technical and vocational education receives great emphasis. As much as the overall amount, it is the types and quality of vocational and technical education which matter, an issue considered further in Section 3.3.

Shifts in enrolments towards general secondary education may well reflect shifting demands as a result of negative attitudes to vocational and technical schools and because of aspirations for higher education. Table 3.2 shows how enrolments in the two types of schooling changed between 1989 and 1998, giving the average enrolment rates in various subregions.

The pattern is clear: there is, indeed, a switch away from vocational and technical education. In Central and Southeastern Europe, former Yugoslavia and the Baltic States, enrolment has increased in general secondary schools and decreased in vocational and technical schools. (The overall drop in Southeastern Europe is driven by a big fall in Romania.) In the western CIS, there is a slight rise in general secondary enrolments and a sharp drop in vocational and technical enrolments. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, enrolments are declining in all types of schools, but more so in vocational and technical schools.

Within the subregions, the pattern is generally the same in every country. Exceptions are Hungary in Central Europe and Estonia in the Baltic States, both of which have expanding vocational and technical enrolments, and Kazakhstan in Central Asia, where general secondary enrolments have climbed a few percentage points, like the case in Russia or Ukraine.

Table 3.2 also reflects what may seem a rather surprising relationship between the levels of enrolment in the two forms of schooling: some of the less industrialized countries have higher shares of upper secondary enrolment in general schooling than do more developed countries at the forefront of the transition process. For example, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia have little more than a quarter of total upper secondary enrolment in general schools, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have around two-thirds.

Differences in classification may be a factor, but the main reason is probably that the more industrialized economies of Central Europe require a greater degree of vocational and technical schooling to support them. The share of vocational and technical schooling in Central Europe – around three-quarters – is, in fact, very similar to that in Germany. The Baltic States, by contrast, have a much lower share of enrolments at the upper secondary level in vocational and technical education and a correspondingly higher share in general secondary schools – with values similar to those in Finland. (In the EU, an average 48 points out of the secondary enrolment rate of 83 percent in 1996 were vocational.)

Again, it is interesting to see how this pattern has changed throughout the years of transition. Figure 3.6 presents enrolment rates in the two types of schools for Hungary and Russia for each year in the period 1989-98. The experiences of the two countries provide a sharp contrast.

In 1989, enrolment rates in both general and vocational/technical schooling were quite similar in Hungary and Russia. The rates for general secondary schools changed over time in a similar way, too, both rising; although Hungary closed the gap from over six percentage points in 1989 to only two in 1998. However, the vocational/technical rates diverge. In Hungary, the rate stagnates in the early 1990s as the economy shrinks, but rises by 12 percentage points after 1993 when economic growth begins. The rate in Russia, however, has fallen by 13 percentage points, with no sign of a turnaround yet in sight. This large drop in vocational and technical enrolment accounts for much of the decline and hinders recovery in overall secondary enrolment in Russia (see Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.6



Enrolments in general and vocational/technical education, Hungary and Russia, 1989-98 (percent of 15-18 year-olds)

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: The definition of upper secondary schooling for Hungary includes all of general secondary but only some of vocational/technical. Education in tekhnikums in Russia is classified as non-university (ISCED 5).

Higher education

Higher or tertiary education has a long tradition in much of the region, and there was a considerable expansion of education at this level under state socialism. However, the planned economies of the past exerted an influence on tertiary education similar to the one they exerted on upper secondary schooling. They emphasized the development of

Figure 3.7



Enrolments in university education, 1989 and 1998 (percent of 19-24 year-olds)

Source: Statistical Annex, Table 6.4.

Note: Gross enrolment rates. The data relate to tertiary degree (or equivalent) study (ISCED 6). Hungary also includes non-degree programmes (ISCED 5). Slovenia 1998 includes candidates for graduation. Only full-time programmes are included in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and FYR Macedonia. First year in Croatia and FYR Macedonia is 1991.

qualified industrial labour, while neglecting the service sectors. (For example, there was little need for the courses in the law or in business studies that so many young people pursue in Western colleges and universities.) Moreover, wage policies lowered the financial returns on higher education. The transition to a market economy would therefore be expected to stimulate tertiary education.

Figure 3.7 presents changes in enrolment rates in degree-level study in the region between 1989 and 1998. (The data refer to ISCED 6 education provided by universities or their equivalents, except where indicated.) It is clear that there has been significant growth in degree-level education in almost all countries, and, in some cases, the increases are very large.

The average enrolment rate for the 26 countries presented rose from 16 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in 1998. Only three countries, Armenia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, registered declines, and quite large ones, with enrolment shrinking well below 10 percent in the two Central Asian countries. Elsewhere, however, the trend is unequivocal, as the changes in tertiary enrolment, in many cases, are driving the upswing in overall enrolment rates among young people in about half the region. Upper secondary school enrolments, by contrast, have often been dropping.

The growth in tertiary-level enrolment was steady throughout Central and Southeastern Europe. In all parts of the former Soviet Union, enrolments fell in the early 1990s before generally recovering. The recovery was strongest in the Baltic States and weakest in Central Asia.

Figure 3.8

Students in higher education in private institutions, 1998
(percent of total students)



Source: MONEE project database

Note: Definitions of "private" institutions vary widely.

Table 3.3

Family background of students enrolled in tertiary education in Slovenia, 1990/91 and 1994/95
(percent of students having parents with tertiary education)

	Full-time students		Part-time students	
School year	**Father**	**Mother**	**Father**	**Mother**
1990/91	33.0	23.4	16.9	9.0
1994/95	31.9	25.7	19.3	13.3

Sources: SORS (1991, 1995)

(The rates in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan show continuous decline.)

As a result of this pattern of change, there has been an enormous increase in the polarization among enrolment rates in the region. There were already some notable differences in 1989 (in part due to variations in the definition of tertiary education). By 1998, the differences had become much greater. Central Europe, Southeastern Europe and the Baltic States experienced the biggest growth in tertiary enrolment, which climbed by an average 10 to 12 percentage points. The average in the western CIS rose by five points, while the picture in the Caucasus and Central Asia was very mixed, with only Kyrgyzstan and Georgia registering substantial expansion.

Degree-level education has also become more varied during the transition, an important factor in accounting for and understanding the changes in enrolment rates. There has been growth both in non-university degree programmes and in programmes provided outside the public sector.

Figure 3.8 shows the share of students in private higher education for 13 transition countries in 1998. In Poland, Romania, Estonia, and Georgia, one-quarter or more of all enrolments were in the private sector. There has been a proliferation of new small colleges offering courses in business administration, accounting and computing; others are former state institutions which have altered status, and some still receive substantial public funding.

The development of part-time distance learning and non-university degree programmes has also been responsible for part of the boost in demand for higher education. These have largely attracted young people who are unable to undertake full-time university study because of the cost or because of their inadequate qualifications. Many students engaged in part-time study are also employed. In Slovenia, for example, more than 60 percent of part-time students in 1998-99 had jobs, compared with less than 1 percent of the full-time students. Part-time students in that country are also less likely to have had parents with higher education (Table 3.3). The expansion of part-time study at the tertiary level may well have resulted in greater equity of access to education opportunities in transition countries.

Factors in the changes in enrolments

Some obvious factors help explain the enrolment trends described above. The change in the structure of the economies of the region, from planned to market, has affected enrolments among the various types of upper secondary schools, as well as the overall level of tertiary enrolments.

Sustained economic growth, such as in the economies of Central Europe, fuels the demand for skilled workers and allows more resources, in real terms, to go into education. It is not surprising then that, alongside higher enrolments in general education, enrolments in technical and vocational secondary schools have also increased or stayed high, as in the case of Hungary and Poland.

In other parts of the region, notably the less industri-

Figure 3.9



Note: First year is 1990 for Poland, Romania and Estonia, 1992 for Croatia and 1993 for Slovenia. Last year is 1994 for Kazakhstan, 1995 for Albania, 1996 for Croatia, and 1997 for Ukraine, Armenia and Uzbekistan.

Changes in upper secondary enrolments and in GDP, 1989-98
(percent)
Source: MONEE project database

alized and less urbanized parts of the former Soviet Union, substantial economic recovery still lies in the future, and the transition years have seen a much larger shrinkage in national income. The same countries have experienced sharp falls in enrolments at the upper secondary level in both general and vocational/technical schools. The relationship between economic recovery and upper secondary enrolments is summarized in Figure 3.9.

The decisions young people eventually make about participation in education depend in large measure on how school and higher education are perceived by young people and their parents, including the advantages to be gained from continuing in education.

A key factor in the decision of young persons to enrol in education is the value in terms of employment prospects and the likely effect on earnings. There is insufficient evidence on whether education now has a greater impact on earnings than it did during the planned economy period, although this is typically presumed. Research in the Czech Republic and Slovakia has shown that education in 1995-97 had a substantially larger effect on earnings than it had exerted either under communism, or in the early transition years and that this effect was greater than the effect typical in OECD countries. More research of this type is needed, especially because the Czech Republic is unlikely to be representative of most of the region in this respect.

Education can also have an impact on employment probabilities. High levels of youth unemployment characterize much of the region (Chapters 1 and 4). Unemployment is a factor that is often thought to increase enrolment in full-time education. Higher youth unemployment obviously reduces the chances of young people getting a job on leaving school, thereby also reducing the expectations of incomes in the near future. Continuing with education may appear to be a more attractive option in this situation. If more education helps an individual find employment in the future, this is a further incentive to study.

On the other hand, a general expansion in unemployment modifies everyone's labour market prospects, so that the potential financial gain linked to further schooling is, on average, diminished, and this should tend to push enrolments down.

Last but not least, higher unemployment cuts into family incomes, an important resource for the support needed by a young person to get through schooling and higher education. Low real wages, wage arrears – both persistent problems throughout the CIS – and anything else that decreases family incomes may have the same consequence.

The stress which many families have experienced during the transition and which has exposed more young people to disadvantage is described by Irina, the 38-year-old mother of a school dropout in Russia, who was interviewed for this Report.

"We live in difficult times," she said. "Our kids are left behind in this life. Nobody cares that they get an education. Nobody cares for them at all: their parents are either too busy earning money, or are alcoholics and do not care about anything. Society does not bother either . . . . That is why I am concerned whether my son will be able to find a rewarding job which could satisfy him. If he will not manage to find one, his life will not progress properly."

■

3.2 Equity in Access to Education Opportunities

Equity in access to education remains a live issue in the established market economies. The entrenchment of long-term unemployment, the shifts in the demand for jobs requiring special skills and the emergence in some countries of higher income inequality are all trends which raise concern about the distribution of education opportunities.

The transition economies face these same challenges, often to an even greater degree. Typically, they have also had to cope with much lower national incomes. How have education opportunities at the post-compulsory level changed in the region during the transition? Who has benefited from the documented fluctuations in enrolment and who has suffered? Are the imbalances in opportunities at the end of the 1990s a cause for worry?

Increasing diversity: increasing disparity

The transition has led to such a substantial alteration in the education picture that one is hardpressed to give straightforward answers to the above questions. The positive changes in education include growing diversity and, therefore, much greater choice in what is being offered in educational institutions. However, evidence from many transition countries suggests that a greater divide has emerged in educational attainments and opportunities.

Figure 3.10

Changes in upper secondary and university enrolments, 1989-98 (percentage points)



Source: MONEE project database.

Note: See notes to Figures 3.4 and 3.7

The data reviewed earlier point to a weakening in education at the basic school level and in certain areas of upper secondary education, especially in vocational and technical schools in many countries. Meanwhile, participation in the academic tracks of secondary schooling and in tertiary education has generally expanded. Accordingly, the youth population is becoming more divided according to educational attainment: many will have more education, and many will have less than was the case before the transition.

To illustrate this greater divide, Figure 3.10 shows how the shifts in secondary and tertiary enrolments in 24 transition countries intersect. (The horizontal axis indicates the percentage point change in secondary enrolments among 15-18 year-olds, while the vertical axis indicates the corresponding change in tertiary enrolments among 19-24 year-olds.)

Enrolments have expanded both at secondary and at tertiary levels in six CEE countries, several of which are regarded as frontrunners in reform. At the other end of the spectrum, enrolments have narrowed at both levels in three countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the majority of countries, enrolments among 15-18 year-olds shrank, while they expanded among 19-24 year-olds. This suggests that there are fewer opportunities for many adolescents to graduate from upper secondary school, but, for those who do, there are greater opportunities to go on to tertiary education.

This situation entails more selection among adolescents for entry into upper secondary education. Is this process fair? And do the expanding tertiary enrolments mean that there is greater equity in access, as one would expect? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions appear to be negative in many cases.

This is the conclusion, for example, of a detailed OECD review of education in Russia, the largest transition country. Having listed a range of concerns about preferential access to better education opportunities, the OECD review argues that:

"Under the banner of 'increased choice', all these concerns point paradoxically to diminished educational opportunities for many children, especially those who are rural, less affluent, or less well connected – regardless of their individual merit. . . . As Russian society becomes increasingly

Box 3.3

Unequal access to education in Russia: an OECD review

In 1998, the OECD published a detailed review of education in Russia. The problems of unequal access identified by the review team included:

- Special links between the better schools and institutes of higher education reduce the open competition for admission to the latter.
- Fee-paying students lower the number of places normally available for allocation without fee.
- The access of the children of the new elites is privileged.
- "Desirable" schools charge for entry by requiring parents to make a donation.
- Teachers tutor their own students outside the classroom for pay.

What the OECD team described as an "elitist ethic" in Russia added to their concerns. This, the team concluded, was leading to a lack of interest – repeated in society at large – in the opportunities for children from dysfunctional families and from families with low incomes, as well as for children of low or even average abilities.



Figure 3.11

Changes in general secondary enrolment rates by gender, 1989 and 1998 (per 100 relevant population aged 15-18)

Source: MONEE project database

stratified in terms of wealth. Russian education is increasingly stratified in terms of opportunity."

Certainly, under state socialism, the region was not free from stratification of opportunity in post-compulsory education. Much evidence indicates the contrary, as the 1998 Regional Monitoring Report, "Education for All?", established. However, the OECD review calls attention to the sharp rise in inequality of opportunity during the transition years (Box 3.3).

What is the situation in other transition countries? Not all the problems identified in the OECD review are prevalent throughout the region, but similar issues are frequently mentioned in reports and research studies from various organizations both within and outside the countries and are often recognized by the governments themselves. Some of these are discussed hereafter.

It is worth emphasizing that a portion of the inequities in opportunity in upper secondary and tertiary education originate in schooling at the compulsory level. The failure to complete basic schooling successfully (or to complete it with good grades) is more common among certain groups of children, for example children in lower income families and children belonging to ethnic minorities, especially Roma populations. The establishment of fair systems of post-compulsory education that expand opportunities to as many young people as possible depends a great deal on what happens at earlier stages of schooling.

Several factors are associated with differences in education opportunities, including ethnicity, disability and locality: issues analysed in the 1998 Regional Monitoring Report. Locality, for example, raises important policy questions about decentralization in educational provision and funding and, as the earlier Report found, is a key issue in education policy in the region. Here below the attention is restricted to inequities according to gender and family income.

Gender and access

One of the achievements of state socialism was to advance education opportunities for girls and young women to a much greater extent than other countries at comparable levels of economic development. In some respects, the education situation inherited from communism left young women in a better position than young men to weather the transition because girls were typically overrepresented in general upper secondary schools, being less likely than boys to pursue the vocational or technical path.

Much of the decline in vocational and technical enrolments has involved young males, many of whom have thereby been pushed into general secondary education. So, what has happened to enrolments among boys and girls in general secondary schools?

Figure 3.11 highlights changes in general secondary enrolment rates by gender between 1989 and 1998 for 24 transition countries. It shows that, where enrolments have increased, they have generally increased among both boys and girls, and in five of the seven countries where rates have fallen they have fallen among both boys and girls. In 15 of the 24 countries, enrolments among boys have either risen less, or dropped more than enrolments among girls. Among the countries experiencing enrolment rate declines, in five countries (Czech Republic, Moldova, Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), enrolments contracted only among boys or more quickly among boys than among girls, while in two countries (Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), the decreases were bigger among girls or occurred only among them.

As highlighted in the 1999 Regional Monitoring Report, "Women in Transition", the majority of university students in the region are females. Since 1989, young women have generally improved their share in tertiary enrolments, although in some disciplines men have often been quick to seize the new opportunities. Exceptions are the Caucasus, where young women's average share remained at 46 percent, and Central Asia, where this average share went down from 45 to 40 percent. However, these averages hide large differences between countries. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan there has been little change in the gender ratio during the transition, and in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the young women's share dropped continuously between 1989 and 1998, from 39 to 25 percent and from 42 to 32 percent, respectively. In these countries, women's participation in tertiary education seems to have taken a huge step backwards.

Family income and access

Family income has now become a more important determinant of access to post-compulsory education in the region than it was before the transition. What are the direct costs of education to families and how have they changed? The list of costs includes formal fees, informal tuition charges, various "entrance fees", textbooks and other school materials, and allowances for young people studying away from home. All these costs serve to foster differences in access to education and learning achievement according to household income.

Formal fees have become a more prominent fixture in the region's education systems. The emergence of private education is the most obvious reason for this, but fees have also become common at the tertiary level in public systems. Private tertiary institutions in Latvia were charging from $500 to $1,000 per year in 1998, the sort of high costs which often prove insurmountable even for bright, motivated youth. In some countries, formal fees are now required even for upper secondary education in public schools. In Georgia, for example, a fee for grades 10 and 11 was introduced in 1996, and, though it was waived for 30 percent of children, the exceptions were made on the basis of assessed ability rather than on financial need.

Table 3.4 reports the answers of Russians aged 18-29 to a question in a 1998 survey on the importance of various factors for admission to institutes of higher education. Money to pay tuition fees was mentioned most frequently. The support of parents, ranked second, is clearly related to this, since parents are a key source of the money for fees and for bribes, the fourth item on the list. The large number of young people who believed personal ties are an important factor in admissions – more than one-fifth – is also troubling.

Tutoring charges are informal fees which, especially in poorer countries, teachers require for additional tutoring, often for their own pupils in public schools. They are a result of the marked fall in the real wages of teachers. Another result of lower wages may be the bribes for better exam grades that are reported as a common feature of school and university life in some countries. The lack of externally validated exam systems in much of the region contributes to this situation. In the same countries, informal entrance fees may have to be paid to get a child into a public kindergarten, school or university.

A 1996 World Bank survey in Armenia detailed the payments reported by parents to secure a place for their children in academic secondary schools and the amount per child requested by teachers for improved exam grades. In Moldova, many parents in a similar survey in 1998 reported that they hired tutors to ensure their children's success in university entrance exams, paying hundreds of dollars for tutoring in languages, mathematics and science during the last year of secondary school. Guaranteeing a place in university frequently means bribes. A place in the most prestigious faculties such as economics, law and medicine can cost $5,000 to $7,000.

A number of countries have abandoned the policy of supplying textbooks free of charge, especially for post-compulsory schooling. In many countries, the cost of textbooks and other school materials appears to be a serious barrier to learning and even to enrolments among children from poorer households, with textbook prices far higher relative to household incomes than they are in Western industrialized countries.

Households also have to meet indirect costs for schooling, especially for tertiary education. These include allowances for young people studying away from home. This is of particular concern for low-income rural households, because of the virtual elimination in some countries of state stipends for students. In the late Soviet period, the average student stipend paid by the state was 100 roubles per month, when the unofficial per-capita poverty line was 75 roubles. In 1995, the monthly student stipend in Azerbaijan was apparently sufficient to buy only one kilogram of poor quality meat.

Quantifying the impact of all these costs in terms of the differences in education access and learning is difficult. For enrolment – only one part of the picture – the possible effects

Table 3.4

The views of young Russians on important factors affecting admission to higher education, 1998
(percent saying "very important")

Money to pay tuition fees	42
Encouragement by parents	35
Good grades in secondary school	32
Bribes to institute staff	24
Personal ties with institute staff	22
Private tutoring	19
Helping the institute or staff get equipment	10

Source: Dobson (1998).

Note: More than one answer could be given. Results based on a VCIOM survey carried out in May-June 1998 among 1,248 young adults aged 18-29.

Figure 3.12

Enrolment rates by household per capita income
(percent)



Sources: Bulgaria, Romania and Azerbaijan living standards surveys; RLMS; EU Essex Survey.

Note: "Q" = households ranked by quintile according to income per capita (expenditure per capita in Romania), whereby "Q1" = the lowest one fifth of the income distribution and "Q5" the highest. In Romania, the two age groups are 15-18 and 19-2[illegible] are illustrated in Figure 3.12, which relies on household survey data on six countries in the mid-1990s. The diagram shows enrolment rates among young people in households in each one-fifth, or quintile, of the income distribution.

Enrolments among secondary school-aged adolescents in Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia differ by 30-40 percentage points between households in the poorest one-fifth and those in the richest one-fifth of the income distribution. The data for Azerbaijan indicate no systematic variation according to income, while in Uzbekistan young people in the poorest households exhibit the same enrolment rates as those in the middle of the distribution. In Russia, the difference between the poorest two-fifths and the rest is around 10 percentage points.

Enrolments among 19-22 year-olds also rise notably with family income. The difference in the rates between young people in the poorest one-fifth of households and those in the richest one-fifth ranges from 13 percentage points in Azerbaijan to 25 points in Bulgaria. (Among these countries, Bulgaria shows the largest differences between rich and poor for both age groups.) A study conducted in Latvia in 1998 for the World Bank confirms the impact of income on tertiary enrolment rates. Thus, 23-year-old Guntis left his course at a Riga trade school because he was unable to combine work with study and his parents could not afford to help him buy the necessary tools and equipment.

Of course, differences in enrolments according to income levels do not necessarily reflect only these differences in income. Low-income households may suffer from other disadvantages which, correlated with income, contribute to reduced enrolment, for example living in a remote rural location. Nonetheless, the data illustrate clearly how enrolments are strongly associated with family economic well-being.

Adolescents left behind: early school-leavers

The changes in enrolment rates show that the number of adolescents who are of secondary school age, but who are not attending school has risen during the transition period. How many young people are not in school? Who are they?

In much of the region, compulsory education has an upper age limit which coincides with the age pupils normally graduate from basic education (though young people have to extend their studies a year or two longer, for instance in several Central and Southeastern European countries, where the upper age limit of compulsory education is 16 rather than 15). Accordingly, before the transition, a substantial share of adolescents aged 15-18, the secondary school ages, were not in school in the region. In 1989, almost six million – one-quarter – of the 25 million young people aged 15-18 were not enrolled in upper secondary education.

Since then there has been a significant rise in this figure. By 1998, the number of adolescents not in school had climbed above nine million, or about 1.5 times the corresponding figure in 1989. This is more than one-third of the 27 million young people aged 15-18.

This large and growing number of young people out of school is certainly worrisome. Research in the West has revealed a correlation between leaving school early and risky health outcomes such as early pregnancy and unhealthy behaviours. Moreover, the danger of social exclusion is high among youth who do not attend school. The fact that these young people are concentrated in some countries raises concerns about the prospects for human development in these countries. They are also numerous in other countries, however. There is evidence that certain socially vulnerable groups are overrepresented among these youth, reflecting, among other problems, the growing inequality in access to education – a most disturbing outcome.

"Dropout" is often used to describe younger adolescents who do not finish compulsory basic education at the primary and lower secondary levels. According to official data, annual dropout rates are relatively low in the region: no more than 1-2 percent per year and often less. However, by the time an age-cohort finishes basic education, these annual rates build up. As discussed earlier, a significant pool of young people – 1-5 percent in Central Europe and 5-25 percent in the CIS, the Baltic States and Southeastern Europe – either do not finish basic education, or graduate only after a delay, and this is a major contributing factor in the poor access to upper secondary education.

Ethnic minority children, particularly the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, form a group vulnerable to non-attendance in school or to dropping out. In Bulgaria, for example, a 1999 UNICEF study on out-of-school children found that about half of the Roma children aged 7-16 interviewed did not go to school, though education is compulsory at these ages. A representative survey in 1993 on the Roma population in Hungary found that 2 percent of youth aged 14-29 and 5 percent of people aged 30-39 had never attended school, and more than half of the Roma in these age groups had not completed basic education. The cumulative effects of disadvantage are highlighted by the fact that less than 2 percent of the Roma youth aged 20-29 who were surveyed had completed secondary school qualifications at a level higher than vocational, and almost none had tertiary level qualifications.

Another particularly vulnerable group consists of the children in areas of conflict in the Caucasus, in Central Asia and in the former Yugoslavia. In Tajikistan, for example, schools in most of the country were closed for almost a year in 1992 due to civil war. Poor school attendance can be a prelude to dropping out. In Kyrgyzstan, a UNICEF study found that 5-10 percent of the children interviewed had missed 40 or more days of school per year and that 25 percent had missed 20 or more days.

Language is also an issue for ethnic minority children. For instance, a World Bank study in Georgia found that children in minority groups (Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russians) who had been reallocated to Tbilisi as a result of conflict in Abkhazia could not keep up with their classes because their Georgian was very poor. Studies have revealed that language is also a factor in the poor education achievement among Roma children.

Some of the reasons behind non-attendance in school are difficult to offset: armed conflict, political and social instability, the poor state of the economy. For some children, these factors are played out close to home through poverty, alcoholism, abuse, or family breakup. Many of these children will never attend upper secondary school; they form a very vulnerable portion of the youth population. In addition, there is evidence that a significant share of those young people who start upper secondary education leave it early.

Table 3.5 presents data on dropout rates at the upper secondary level for 10 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. It shows that rates range from 1.5 percent in Romania to 17 percent in Albania for general secondary education and from 3 percent in the Czech Republic to 17 percent in Albania for vocational secondary. Except in Albania, dropout rates are higher for vocational secondary than they are for general secondary. This may reflect lower quality in vocational programmes or greater predisposition among adolescents in vocational schools to drop out. It is also interesting to note that, in most CEE countries, the dropout rates are higher for young men than for young women.

Table 3.5

Dropout rates at upper secondary level, 1996
(percent of relevant population)

	General education			Vocational and training		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
Czech Republic	1.8	1.1	2.3	3.1	3.5	2.8
Poland	3.1	–	–	3.7	–	–
Hungary	6.4	6.8	6.1	13.6	12.8	14.5
Slovenia	5.4	2.3	7.4	13.7	15.8	11.4
Albania	17.4	22.4	12.9	16.9	21.2	7.2
Bulgaria	3.4	5.4	2.4	4.3	3.7	5.3
Romania	1.4	3.2	0.5	4.8	6.0	3.3
Estonia	6.3	7.8	5.3	10.9	11.5	9.9
Latvia	5.4	–	–	12.8	–	–
Lithuania	2.7	2.7	2.7	8.4	8.5	8.4

Source: ETF (1998), Annex 1, Tables 5a, 5b.

Note: Year is 1995 for the Czech Republic, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Nonetheless, some adolescent girls face particular pressures. Early pregnancy could be a determinant in decisions not to enrol in upper secondary education or to drop out, while poor education is often a factor in these pregnancies. Adolescents who have little education or who belong to ethnic groups among which having children at a very young age is the norm appear to be overrepresented among these young women. Studies carried out in the 1990s, for example, found that in Hungary Roma women aged 15-19 have fertility rates that are four times higher than the average and that in Bulgaria early sexual activity, extramarital birth and low educational attainment are frequently transferred from one generation to the next among certain minority groups. Prior to the transition, teen fertility was high in the region relative to other industrial regions, and, although births to young women have generally declined, they have increased among very young adolescents in Russia, Slovakia and several other countries.

Greater poverty during the transition and the associated financial need for young family members to work appear to have contributed substantially in parts of the region to non-attendance at schools. Children are often obliged to help their parents at home, and they may work outside the home for extra money. In cities, youth from poor families may leave school to work in street trades or even illegal activities. Where agriculture is the main employer, children and adolescents commonly miss school during the busiest agricultural season. Sadly, the lack of adequate clothing can also be a cause of poor attendance at

Voices of Youth 10

Leaving school early: a complex decision

The decision to leave school early and the reasons behind it involve a complex interplay of factors – ability, school environment, parental support, attitudes, and aspirations. These early school-leavers took part in focus groups organized for this Report in Russia, Ukraine and Latvia.

- "For some people even a university degree is not sufficient education, and for others nine grades are more than enough." (Lesha, 16)
- "On the whole I felt as if I was doing time when I had to go to school every day. I didn't feel comfortable there. . . . I've discussed it with my mother, and she said she does not want me to go on with school after nine grades." (Karina, 15)
- "I work at the petrol station. I help people who are getting petrol, and if they find me useful they give me some money. I also help my mother about the house." (Nikita, 16)
- "I would like to work with my brother to start a family business." (Slava, 16)
- "It's possible to get a diploma for money. . . . A diploma is one thing, and education is another." (Egor, 18)
- "I wish I could have some support, but I don't know what exactly. I think any type of support would do." (Nikita, 16)
- "It is not our parents who should support us; we should support them." (Gennady, 17)
- "Studying was too difficult for me. I felt that I could not follow the subjects. . . . It's better for me to start working." (Ksenia, 16)
- "Teachers often say that they are too busy, that they do not have time for extra classes, that they have a miserable salary." (Irina, 16)
- "I think that everything in my life will turn out OK. I want to find a job and have my own family, my own house, and live separately from my parents." (Ksenia, 16)
- "One needs harmony. If you are supported by the family, by the state and by the school and if you believe in your abilities, you will achieve everything." (Vasia, 16)
- "I have had to study in a very cold classroom in winter before, where we had to study wearing jackets. The room was very cold, dark and unfriendly: we were in no mood to study there." (Karene, 17)

school. A 1998-99 study in Kyrgyzstan by the Asian Development Bank revealed that the lack of shoes and clothes accounted for 12 percent of school non-attendance.

Igor, a secondary school headmaster in Ukraine who was interviewed for this Report, offered this bald assessment:

"[School-leavers consist of] teenagers from low-income families solely motivated to earn money, lazy teenagers who do not want to do anything, and children from families with one or two alcoholic parents."

As Voices of Youth 10 illustrates, the reality is certainly more complex, and the school environment itself, including the quality of teaching, is a factor in young people's decisions whether to continue their education or not.

Children with disabilities and ethnic minority children also receive less education because of discriminatory practices in schools. Again, this happens already at the basic level. In several countries in the region it has become routine to refer healthy Roma children to special classes or schools for children with special education needs. In Hungary, for example, a 1995 study found that one of six or seven schools surveyed operated "gypsy classes" with inferior educational standards. Contrary to local expectations, dropout rates among Roma students were worse in these schools than in those offering integrated education.

In poorer countries, cuts in financing have meant the elimination of posts among teachers who tutor children and youth with disabilities at home, leaving these vulnerable youngsters to the resources of their families. Similarly, lack of adequate transport, particularly in rural areas, can affect decisions to attend school. According to a UNICEF case study in Lithuania, for instance, the disintegration of collective and state farms has led to the disappearance of collective farm transportation, and, as a result, rural children have little choice but to stop attending if they live far from a school.

One of the saddest comments to come out of the focus groups and individual interviews organized for this Report was the lament of Lesi, a Ukrainian social worker who deals with school dropouts.

"Now I will tell you the truth," she said after the microphone had been switched off. "Nobody cares about these children at all. This is the truth."

■

3.3 Schools as Enabling Environments

Of course, it is not enough to look at access to education for young people. What goes on inside the classroom is also of immense importance. The experiences of young people in school help prepare them successfully to enter the labour market and participate more broadly in society. They impart particular knowledge, as well as core capacities and life skills. Most young people spend a large portion of their waking lives in school, and on this basis alone schools should be pleasant and stimulating places where youth are happy to spend time.

Unfortunately, there is much less information available on these qualitative aspects of education. Here, the analysis is reduced to sporadic snapshots rather than systematic reviews of the inheritance of the past and the changes during the transition in the 27 countries of the region.

Declining enrolment rates in certain types of schools and among certain youth populations may reflect a disaffection with school systems both as an immediate environment and as a preparation for adult life. How do schools in the transition countries fare on measures of formal learning achievement? Are students getting what they want and need from schools in the region? How smooth is the important transition from school to work?

The quality of education

In the Third International Mathematics and Science Study, or TIMSS, a 1995 international comparative study of learning achievement, the participating transition countries performed very well. The average scores among eighth graders (typically aged 13-14) in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia were above international averages in both mathematics and science and above the average scores for England, Germany and the US. Of the 41 countries under study, the Czech Republic ranked second in the world in science and sixth in maths.

The results among students in the final year of upper secondary school (typically aged 17-19) suggest that the early advantage enjoyed by young people in the transition countries has been worn away by the time they leave school. Table 3.6 shows the differences in the average scores achieved in mathematics and science by children in

Table 3.6

Performance in maths and science, 1995
(point differences relative to international average scores)

	Mathematics		Science	
	Eighth graders	Final year, secondary	Eighth graders	Final year, secondary
Czech Republic	53*	-34	59*	-13
Slovenia	30*	12	45*	17
Hungary	27*	-17*	39*	-29*
Russia	25*	-29*	23*	-19*
Lithuania	-33*	-31*	-38*	-39*
US	-11	-39*	20*	-20*
International average score	511	500	515	500

Source: Mullis et al. (1998).

Note: Eighth graders were generally 13-14 years old. The age for the final year of secondary school ranged from 17 to 19. International averages were based on the country means of the 20 countries that took part at both the eighth grade and the final year levels. The scales are not directly comparable for the two age groups. An asterisk indicates that the country score was significantly different from the international average.

the eighth grade and by youth in the final year of secondary education. Eighth graders in four of the five transition countries where both age groups were tested scored significantly higher than the international average in both maths and science. Only Lithuania scored lower. In contrast, students in the final year of secondary school scored below the international average in four of the five transition countries. This time, the only exception was Slovenia (although the results there were still below the scores in basic education in that country).

It is difficult to determine how applicable these results are to other transition countries, since there are few cross-country studies of learning outcomes. The only other recent survey, an OECD study of "functional literacy" – the ability to understand and interpret written information – has found that young people aged 16-25 in Poland lagged significantly behind their peers in 11 countries in the West (younger children were not included). A more complete picture awaits further surveys and additional research.

Why might schools in the transition countries appear to fall short in serving older teenagers? A selection effect, whereby the weaker performers fall out of the mix by the time cohorts reach higher grades in some education systems, but not in others, does not appear to be the cause. Country rankings are very similar when only the scores of the top 25 percent of students in each country are considered.

Perhaps the different skills tested among the eighth graders and the students in the final year affected the outcome? The younger students answered straightforward knowledge-based questions. The older students took math and science "literacy" tests aimed at measuring how well they could use their knowledge to address real-world problems. The varying results are consistent with the widespread impression that education systems under state socialism were much more effective at imparting knowledge than in showing students how to apply what they had learned, particularly in new situations. Naturally, this raises questions about how well young people in the region are being prepared for a new labour market which places a high premium on flexibility, innovation and sound decision-making.

Another explanation of the decline in performance among older students may be that these students have become alienated by teaching content and teaching methods, especially rote learning, and this affects their scores. Figure 3.13 shows the share of students in the 1995 international survey who said they liked physics and biology. In every country in which the questionnaires were completed there is a decline in enthusiasm for physics as students get older. With the exception of Russia, this drop in the preference for physics is more pronounced in the transition countries than in the West. Interest in biology changes much less as students move from eighth grade to the final year of secondary, but in all five transition countries the interest wanes, while in the West it increases in all but one of the five nations surveyed.

The school environment

The school environment affects not only the academic performance of students, but also their capacity to enjoy and participate in daily living. Western research has convincingly shown that the school has an important role in shaping youth health and overall well-being. For example, a large study of adolescent health in the US found that a sense of connectedness to school was a key factor in safeguarding young people from risk behaviours, including drug and alcohol use, violence and unprotected sex. It isolated the presence in school of a concerned adult as one of the key elements in establishing this sense of connectedness.

Questions designed to gauge youth perceptions of the school environment have been included in the international Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children survey (see Chapter 2). In 1993-94, the question, "Do you agree that school is a nice place to be?", elicited more positive responses in Western Europe and North America than it did in the transition region. Among 15 year-olds, an average 56 percent of girls and 51 percent of boys in the West agreed, compared to 43 percent of girls and 40 percent of boys in the transition countries. In St. Petersburg, the only part of Russia included, the responses were the most negative: only 15 percent of girls and 20 percent of boys agreed with the statement.

However, a second survey, carried out in 1997-98, gives the impression that the problem of motivating students is not limited to the transition region. Here, 15 year-olds were asked whether they agreed with the statement, "I like school a lot". Only about 17 percent of girls and 14 per-

Figure 3.13

Share of students who said they liked or liked a lot physics and biology, 1995

(percent)

Sources: Mullis et al (1998); Beaton et al (1996a).



Table 3.7

Views of 15 year-olds about their teachers, 1993/94 and 1997/98
(percent)

	"Teachers encourage me to express my views in class" (1993/94)		"My teachers are interested in me as a person" (1997/98)	
	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
Latvia	52	48	34	30
Lithuania	39	37	27	35
Estonia	46	43	12	13
Russia	24	31	42	45
Poland	50	45	42	40
Czech Republic	26	28	46	42
Slovakia	25	32	46	53
Hungary	50	49	24	34
Average	39	39	34	37
Finland	32	30	15	19
Austria	39	35	29	32
Sweden	46	38	38	31
Norway	55	53	39	43
Canada	58	60	48	40
US	-	-	45	39
France	41	41	41	43
Denmark	52	44	55	52
Germany	52	50	48	44
England	-	-	39	39
Average	47	44	40	38

Sources: King et al. (1996); Currie et al. (2000).

Note: Averages are unweighted averages of national results. France, Germany and Russia are represented only by regions.

cent of boys in both the transition countries and the West answered that they did.

The sense of connectedness and self-realization is further illustrated by the survey's question on teachers, described in Table 3.7. The range of responses among individual countries is large, but students in the transition countries seem generally somewhat less likely than their peers in the West to believe that teachers are interested in them and their views.

As with health care, it appears that the prevailing approaches to teaching are narrow and formal in the region. The traditional emphasis is on imparting particular information and knowledge, usually with the teacher in front of the class. There is also evidence that teachers – mostly females – are relatively older. Teacher morale can be low due to inferior pay, wage arrears and inadequate classroom resources. Teacher salaries, insubstantial under communism, have declined further in a number of countries. A 1995 study in seven transition countries found that teachers often perceive their social status to be relatively low and do not consider teaching a desirable profession. All these factors raise questions about how well teachers can relate to and motivate young students, especially boys.

Schools also have a function in ensuring that young people are able to protect their present and future health. This role involves creating safe and healthy environments for students and imparting knowledge and skills that promote healthy life styles.

Health education is in one sense a body of knowledge, but it can also be thought of as a life skill that empowers young persons, helping them to avoid violence, unwanted pregnancy, or sexually transmitted disease, for example, and giving them the confidence and the facts to make reasoned decisions about drug and alcohol use.

"Our system of teaching is different," says Katia, a 48-year-old teacher in Russia. "We do not intend to teach people about life; we are here to provide knowledge."

Various evidence suggests that many teachers in the region see no role for themselves in imparting instruction about "life skills". Some teachers do view this as one of their functions, however. As in other parts of the world, educators appear particularly divided on issues related to sexual and reproductive health.

Some countries in the region make no provision for sex education in schools. In Latvia and Lithuania, students

Voices of Youth 11

Students speak out about being heard in school

That they are not being listened to is a common complaint of young people in school, as well as in other settings. Today, the growing emphasis on youth participation in matters that affect them demands a greater emphasis on hearing what they have to say. These young people spoke up about teachers during focus-group research conducted for this Report.

- "I would like to change teachers' attitudes towards the students. Nowadays, teachers are too arrogant; they do not want to listen to a student's opinion. If the student is quiet and silent, he is good. If a student stands up for himself and has a personal opinion, they are very much against it." (Martinsh, 16)
- "There are some teachers who respect the opinion of students, but they are in the minority. Others do not care at all." (Inga, 18)
- "[Teachers] just need to complete the curriculum. . . . they don't care about anything else." (Dmitry, 17)
- "There are some good teachers who understand us and will help if you have problems. Others, the bad ones, don't care. Even if you turn to them for some extra assistance on a difficult topic, they'll send you away, saying you should have worried about that earlier." (Gennady, 17)
- "Teachers did not pay any attention to weaker students, they never tried to do anything to make these kids study. They were giving them '3' for their intermediate leaving certificate and then threw them out." (Maxim, 18)
- "We have the opportunity to spend time with our teachers. We can talk to them both during and after class. We can even go for a coffee with some teachers, but this of course depends very much on the personality of the teacher and the student." (Karene, 17)
- "Sometimes I look at my teacher and I feel sorry for her. I see that she can't concentrate, is thinking about other things. And I wish that she didn't have to worry about all these everyday cares, that she had enough money to concentrate on doing her job and teaching us well." (Gairat, 15)

can participate in an optional programme on health education, but it does not cover family planning. In Armenia and Georgia, little or no health education of any kind is available in or out of school, though in Georgia informative articles on relevant health topics are published in newspapers through a government-supported project. In Armenia, sex and reproductive health are still considered "inconvenient" subjects for school.

Elsewhere, sex education is offered in schools, but is either optional, as in FR Yugoslavia, or fails to cover the topic adequately. In Romania, a 1996 survey indicated that 88 percent of young women and 77 percent of young men aged 15-24 had received some sex education in school, but only 36 percent had learned about sexually transmitted diseases, while only 25 percent had learned about birth control methods. In Slovenia, sex education is supposed to be part of the core curriculum, but is sometimes simply not taught due to a lack of qualified teachers and teacher attitudes towards the material. In some countries, religious influences preclude the teaching of sex education in schools.

A health-friendly school system is one that understands the purposes of education in much broader terms than the provision only of "facts for life". Research has shown that improving general capacities like critical thinking, analysis, conflict resolution, teamwork, and effective communication has a beneficial effect on young people's health behaviours and their ability to resist negative pressures. Certainly, these pressures and risks are greater among youth today than they were before the transition. In the market economies and the democratic societies in which

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Box 3.4

Health-promoting schools: making health part of the daily school routine

Education systems have an important function in fostering the health of young people not only through instruction in health care, but through the school environment. The European Network of Health-Promoting Schools is an innovative WHO initiative with 40 full members, including 17 transition countries.

The schools commit themselves to championing better health by transforming themselves into safe and health-enhancing environments in which young people can work, learn and thrive. Participating schools adopt an integrated approach to health promotion, making it a priority in the curriculum, in school management practices and in the physical and social environment of the school. The aim is make health consciousness an essential element in every aspect of the daily routine in education.

Partnership is a key operating principle, whereby teachers, pupils, parents, and the wider community are encouraged to work together to improve health.

"It has become a tradition with us to start every day at school with a motivational pep talk," says the coordinator of a health-promoting school in Ukraine. "It helps a great deal to cheer up both the teachers and pupils, establishing the right attitude for the school process." Debating clubs conduct competitions which motivate students to research, think about and debate their views on health issues.

The first European conference of health-promoting schools, "An Investment in Education, Health and Democracy", was held in 1997. The conference resolution outlined the 10 principles of a health-promoting school:

- *Democracy.* The school is founded on democratic principles conducive to the promotion of learning, personal and social development, and health.
- *Equity.* The principle of equity is enshrined within the educational experience; this guarantees that schools are free from oppression, fear and ridicule and fosters the individual's ability to attain his or her full potential free of discrimination.
- *Empowerment and action competence.* The school improves young people's ability to take action and generate change; empowering young people enables them to influence their lives and living conditions.
- *School environment.* The school environment, both physical and social, is emphasized as a crucial factor in promoting and sustaining health.
- *Curriculum.* The curriculum provides opportunities for young people to gain knowledge and insight and to acquire essential life skills; it must be relevant to the needs of young people and inspirational for teachers and other school staff.
- *Teacher training.* The training of teachers is an investment in health, as well as in education; legislation and appropriate incentives must guide teacher training, using the conceptual framework of the health-promoting school.
- *Measuring success.* The school assesses the effectiveness of its actions upon the school and the community; measuring success is viewed as a means of support and empowerment.
- *Collaboration.* Shared responsibility and close collaboration among government ministries at the national, regional and local levels are central requirements in strategic planning; roles, responsibilities and accountability must be established and clarified.
- *Communities.* Parents and the school community have a vital role to play in leading, supporting and reinforcing the concept of school health promotion; working in partnership, schools, parents, NGOs, and the local community represent a force for positive change.
- *Sustainability.* All levels of government must commit resources to health promotion in schools; this contributes to the long-term, sustainable development of the wider community, and, in return, communities will increasingly become a resource for their schools.

young people in the region are living today, broader skills are also much more in demand and much more relevant than is the narrow set of skills that was the legacy of the education systems before the transition.

Box 3.4 describes WHO's innovative initiative for health-promoting schools that aims to integrate health care into all aspects of school life, including the curriculum and the physical and social environment.

The transition to the labour market

Though educators everywhere may argue about how and to what degree schools should prepare students for the labour market, there is no question that schools are critical for young people in their transition to the workplace. The collapse of central planning has been accompanied by the collapse of the often strong, if rigid, link between vocational and technical schools and the workplace. Changes in the structure of economic production, the appearance of new forms of work organization and the globalization of the economy have rendered certain skills and specializations obsolete and have caused others, such as language skills and computer literacy, to become more in demand.

Graduates are no longer being recruited solely on the basis of the possession of formal diplomas and certificates. Hiring practices are changing rapidly, especially in economic growth sectors. Basic work competencies are no longer sufficient, and formal assessments of attitudes, individual potential and life skills are gaining ground. This is especially true in countries where the market reforms are well advanced, as Box 3.5 shows in the case of employer needs in the Czech Republic. This profound shift obviously poses considerable challenges for education systems.

What are the needs of young people in their preparation for employment in the current context of rapid social and economic change? First, young people must secure broader competencies that will help them adapt in a rapidly transforming economy. Second, schools must offer a place

Box 3.5

What employers want in young employees: a Czech survey

In 1998, the Institute for Information on Education asked employers about their needs and opinions concerning the hiring of young people fresh out of school. The survey involved a random sample of 820 businesses which had employed school-leavers during the preceding two years.

The survey questionnaire embraced a number of issues, such as important skills, the difficulty of finding people with these skills, the responsibilities of education systems and employers in the development of these skills, and cooperation between schools and employers in education initiatives.

The survey results revealed that employers gave top priority to company loyalty. University graduates were expected to be able to make decisions, work within a team, demonstrate initiative, be self-starters, and learn. They were to possess proficiency in communication, be computer literate and show command of languages. The willingness to learn demonstrated by young people leaving secondary schools (vocational and general) was more highly appreciated than advanced technical knowledge. Teamwork, basic abilities like reading and the capacity to understand instructions and work with figures were also prized.

Employers had the most difficulty finding university graduates who knew foreign languages, showed initiative and produced high-quality work. Employers said that the most difficult qualities to find among youth leaving secondary schools were cost-consciousness, ability to produce quality work, good technical know-how, initiative, and the capacity to make sound decisions.

The survey found that most employers thought schools and universities should impart basic and general knowledge and that personal qualities should be developed both in school and in the workplace. Employers complained that they had to provide training to employees in areas which should have been taught in schools, particularly foreign languages and computer and communication literacy.

Finally, employers gave themselves high marks for contributing to the education process. Two in every three permitted cooperative placements or offered extra opportunities for students, mostly from secondary schools. The vast majority of the cooperative efforts involved the presence of students at company facilities (Table 3.8).

Table 3.8

Cooperation of employers with schools and universities in the Czech Republic, 1998
(percent of participating employers)

On-the-job training for students	60
Visits to companies	37
Students viewing work processes in companies	34
Participation in the evaluation of students	30
Various types of lending to schools/universities	18
On-the-job training for teachers in companies	17
Sponsorship of schools/universities	17
Sponsorship of individual students	13
Organizing lectures, interviews in schools/universities	12
Company staff viewing teachers in class	8
Teaching specialized subjects in schools/universities	8
Membership on school/university boards	6

Source: Novák (1999).

to learn skills which are suited to the emerging requirements of the labour market. Third, schools can improve the integration between learning and work through the development of new types of partnerships between schools and enterprises.

How have education systems changed so as to respond to the fresh needs of the economy? Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have started to reform vocational and technical curricula. In these countries, there has been a shift away from narrow specializations towards skills which can be adapted to various work settings and are therefore more appropriate for a market economy. The goal is a better balance among general education subjects, instruction in the theoretical foundations of specific occupations and practical skills training.

Along with new areas of economic activity, such as business, commerce, banking, and insurance, new occupations have also appeared for which curricula have been designed. In many countries, efforts have been undertaken to increase training in languages and information technology throughout the education system. Box 3.6 examines the enabling potential of information technology for the benefit of young people both at school and in the transition to work.

The current reform of curricula does not seem to have progressed very far, as a large mismatch remains between labour market needs and the skills of new labour market

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Box 3.6

Tools for change: information and communications technology

Enabled by information and communications technology, the knowledge-based society is making literacy in information and communications technology a required skill for work and learning. In many countries, children have access to computers as early as primary school. However, a "digital divide" has appeared within and among countries between those who have access to computers and the Internet and those who do not.

Greater contact with computers and the Internet offers a number of advantages. It can complement and reinforce classroom learning, help build self-esteem and academic skills and make learning more fun, thereby leading to less absenteeism and fewer dropouts. Outside the classroom, the Internet can be used as a tool for gathering information, improving foreign language comprehension and technology and information skills, and networking with peers nearby or far away.

Governments in some transition countries have made substantial commitments to furnishing schools with computers and Internet links. In Hungary, for example, the Schoolnet programme has supplied secondary schools with computers and Internet access, although the original plans calling for access at the primary level had to be cut back. A 1998 survey revealed that nearly two-thirds of 15-24 year-olds possess some computer literacy.

In Slovenia, almost all schools are "wired". In 1997, 20 percent of all primary pupils were attending computer courses. In upper secondary schools, at least one year of computer education is compulsory. Thus, 68 percent of the students in upper secondary schools in 1997 had some computer knowledge. According to a survey in 1997, the Internet was being used by more than half of upper secondary school pupils and one-third of seventh and eighth graders. Schools account for almost half of all Internet users in Slovenia.

A 1999 survey in Estonia found that computer use was significant even among the very young. More than half of all 6-7 year-olds and 91 percent of 12-14 year-olds had used a computer, and 58 percent of 15-19 year-olds had surfed the Internet at least once during the previous six months.

Meanwhile, the level of computer literacy is much lower among young people in a number of countries. Equipping schools with computers is sometimes a serious problem, especially because of the rapid pace of technological change. Although enormous efforts have been undertaken in recent years, the situation in schools in some countries is quite unsatisfactory.

In Moldova, only half of secondary schools, gymnasia and lycees offer computer classes and possess computer equipment. In Azerbaijan in 1997, only one-fourth of secondary schools had computer facilities, and the distribution ranged from 15 percent in rural schools to 49 percent in urban schools. In Georgia, computer classes have been attracting substantial interest, but computers remain unavailable in many schools. The number of secondary schools equipped with computers is even declining: only 245 secondary schools had computer facilities in 1998 compared to 438 in 1990.

Finding trained teachers is also a challenge. For example, in FR Yugoslavia, many schools own computers, but there are few adequately trained staff to make the most of them. People with computer skills tend to prefer higher-paying jobs or to work abroad rather than teaching. In Croatia, only 212 of the 346 schools, or roughly two-thirds, have trained computer teachers.

Even in the more well off parts of the region, there is a digital divide within countries. In Hungary, while 81 percent of young people in education and 54 percent of young workers possess computer skills, only 35 percent of the unemployed and 25 percent of young people who are neither studying, nor working have any computer literacy, thus potentially limiting their opportunities.

In general, relatively few households in the region have computers, and those which do tend to have higher incomes and fewer children. Schools can perform a very important function in reducing the inequality in computer access. In particular, targeted interventions could help reach disadvantaged youth.

entrants. The results are often negative in terms of high unemployment or the limited ability of young people to become effective quickly in new jobs. Evidence for this is offered in Figure 3.14, which shows the differences between unemployment rates among youth according to level of education and average youth unemployment rates in eight transition countries in 1998.



Note: Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Kyrgyzstan and 1999 for Tajikistan. Youth are aged 15-24.

Figure 3.14

Youth unemployment rates by level of education, 1998 (percentage point difference from average youth rate)

Source: MONEE project database.

In all the countries represented in the figure, the labour market is flooded with young school-leavers with less than upper secondary education, while young people with higher education enjoy a competitive advantage, though this advantage differs markedly from country to country. It appears that general upper secondary education still does not meet the needs of the labour market, since, in most of the countries, young people who have completed this level of education face a relatively more serious risk of unemployment. This outcome may also show the limitations of the attempts to shift emphasis away from technical and vocational education and towards general secondary schooling.

A recent review by the European Training Foundation concludes that vocational education in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe suffers because of poorly qualified teachers and trainers, as well as outdated curricula and equipment. Most of these countries also face a lack of funds. These limitations hamper efforts to develop flexible secondary school systems which are responsive to the needs of youth, including the professional aspirations of young people.

■

3.4 Conclusions

This chapter examines youth participation in upper secondary and higher education in terms of enrolment, equitable access and the quality of education. Learning may be a lifelong process, but the formal schooling years are a pivotal stage in this process, one where the legacy of family environments begins to be played out and one where young people begin to make major life decisions on their own.

The rise in tertiary enrolments in much of the transition region is good news. However, in many countries this runs counter to falls in upper secondary enrolments among adolescents and the growing numbers of youth who are unable to make the transition from basic to subsequent levels of education. In 1998, over three million more adolescents aged 15-18 had either not enrolled, or had dropped out of schools. The upheavals which have accompanied the transition appear to have had a major negative impact on secondary education, especially on vocational and technical education.

It is promising for the future that, in several countries at the forefront of the transition process, both secondary and tertiary enrolments have risen, and, in several countries, enrolments are now approaching the levels in the European Union. However, against a backdrop of increased opportunities for youth to attend university, participation in secondary schooling has fallen and is low by EU standards even in some of the countries, like the Czech Republic, which are regarded as transition leaders.

The countries which exhibit lower participation rates in education also tend to lag behind in economic recovery and reform. The shifts in secondary enrolments show a striking correlation with the changes in GDP in the region. This parallel de-investment in the future in many countries raises uneasy questions about how and whether the large pools of poorly qualified young people will eventually be able to participate in and contribute to rebuilding the economies and societies of these countries.

The transition process presents huge challenges for youth education in terms not only of how many youth are being educated, but also of how they are being educated. The quality of education young people receive is important for the future, as well as for the current well-being of these people. In learning achievement, several transition countries that excel in basic education in international comparisons show less convincing outcomes in secondary education. It appears that youth feel less well in schools and profit less from their studies than they ought to. Overly specialized training curricula and rigid teaching styles are being questioned not only by many young people, but also by new economic and social demands that require new professional skills and broader competencies in areas such as critical thinking, participation, teamwork, and conflict resolution.

Public- and private-sector efforts are being undertaken in many countries to enhance education opportunities and adapt schools to the needs of youth. Thus, for instance, many countries are striving to put computers into classrooms, though there is a "digital divide" within and among countries. And, despite signs of the emergence of more youth-friendly schools in many countries, equal education opportunities remain a huge challenge across the entire region.

The constellation of factors that is impeding access to education is most evident among students who leave school early. Young people from low-income households or broken families, rural residents, migrants, and ethnic or other minorities appear vastly overrepresented in this group. The regular advancement of the education of young people, in schools and outside the classrooms, is important in reducing the various risks to youth development, which tend to have a cumulative effect on the most vulnerable youth.

There are nevertheless many promising signs of a greater awareness among youth of the importance of education. This is particularly relevant for fresh approaches and policies which see young people as a resource and which are grounded on youth participation. Throughout the region, the creation of education systems that prepare students for the future even as that future is rapidly changing remains an immense challenge. There is a need and ample room for education policies and programmes which promote human development, social cohesion and economic growth by investing more efficiently and more broadly in adolescents and youth. ■

4 Working Life

The transition from school to work is a crucial phase for young people as they take on a larger and more independent role in society. A good start in the labour market can lay a strong foundation for personal and professional development throughout adult life; a poor start can seriously impair future prospects.

The experience of entering the labour market is shaped by many factors, some rooted in early childhood and the family, others determined by broader social and economic environments. The changes in economies and labour markets associated with the transition have had profound and sometimes severe consequences for the women and men of the region. The impact on young people – the first generation moving from education to employment in the new market economies – has been examined and understood only to a limited extent. Labour force surveys and similar data sources on the subject are spotty, and consistent time series or longitudinal data on youth are largely lacking. Using the data which are available, this chapter paints, in broad strokes, the picture of employment among this pivotal transition generation.

As they come of age in the emerging market economies of the region, young people are facing considerably different work prospects than their parents did in the former centrally planned economies. Under communism, high school enrolments and full employment were usual, and the entry of youth into the labour market was closely controlled. Young people leaving school were not only guaranteed work, but were obliged to work, and those who did not work were stigmatized as "parasites". This structured system of job placement confined opportunities and choices for young people, but it also provided them with stability and social integration, offering immediate job and wage security, as well as broad access to benefits such as childcare, workplace health services and, often, housing.

The collapse of the centrally planned economies has presented young people with a changing labour market environment where new opportunities and fresh obstacles abound.

Youth are meeting both the positive and the negative challenges of the new, emerging workplace with impressive vigour. Yet, because their lives are now less settled and because they have relatively little work experience, young people are more vulnerable to the dynamics of the labour market. Some youth populations are encountering particularly serious stumbling blocks to job success.

Section 4.1 looks at the trends in youth labour force participation, employment and joblessness, areas in which the transition has created new realities. Section 4.2 describes the changing nature of the working conditions being experienced by youth. Section 4.3 examines groups of youth who must deal with obstacles to employment and highlights factors which contribute to the amount of job success. Section 4.4 shows how youth are rising to the employment challenges. Section 4.5 discusses policies affecting youth employment and explores areas for action.

■

4.1 From School to Work: A More Difficult Passage

Of the 65 million youth aged 15-24 living in the 27 countries of the region in 1998, roughly 26 million (41 percent) were enrolled in education; 21 million (32 percent) were employed, and 18 million (27 percent) were neither in education, nor in employment.

In other words, the majority of youth are not in school. A large proportion are making a contribution to the economic life of the transition countries, but many are coming upon difficulties early in their working lives. Certainly, young people must navigate new, often troubled waters in trying to take their place in the world of work – a long way from the lock-step between school and work that their parents knew.

Fewer youth in the labour force and fewer employed

How much has youth participation in the labour force changed since the transition began? In answering this question, one should first point out that, except in Yugoslavia, formal unemployment was virtually non-existent in the centrally planned economies of the region. So, employment and labour force participation were practically identical. Since the onset of the transition, unemployment has become a reality for many, so that the "economically active" youth population today includes the employed, as in the past, but also young people who are out of work and actively seeking work.

Figure 4.1 shows the changes between 1989 and 1997 in the crude rates of economic activity for two groups of youth, those aged 15-19 and those aged 20-24. The data cover 10 transition countries (with the notable absence of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Albania, and those countries affected by the war in the former Yugoslavia) and, for comparison, a selection of established market economies.

As the figure shows, the trend has been decreasing labour force participation among teenagers and young adults across the board. Among teenagers aged 15-19, activity rates fell by nearly nine percentage points in the transition countries represented, similar to the change (down 11 percentage points) in the European Union. The decline in labour force participation among young adults 20-24 was greater in transition countries, with an average drop of 10 percentage points, compared to six percentage points in the EU.

The contraction in youth economic activity in the region can be partially explained by an overall increase in enrolments in secondary and tertiary education. In several countries a rising share of young people are postponing entry into the labour market by staying in school (a trend also observed throughout Western Europe). This is especially true in the Central and Eastern European countries represented in the figure. Young people may be opting for more education both because it is becoming difficult to find work and because acquiring more knowledge and skills will improve their chances of eventual career success.

However, part of the fall in youth economic activity is explained by the fact that young people are withdrawing from the regular labour market by neither working, nor looking for legitimate employment. Some may participate instead in the substantial informal economy that has been flourishing during the transition; others may be relying on subsistence farming. Both of these activities tend to be poorly captured in statistics.

It could be estimated that, despite a rise of six million in the youth population, 11 million fewer jobs were held by young people aged 15-24 in the 27 countries of the region in 1998 relative to the situation in 1989. (This estimate assumes that all youth participating in the labour force in the region were employed in 1989, that is, unemployment was negligible, as noted earlier.)

What share of youth in the region are actually employed? Table 4.1 shows crude ratios of employment among young women and men for 15 transition countries and several other economies. The data reveal large regional differences in youth employment, ranging from 14 percent in the Caucasus to 41 percent in the Czech Republic, and

Table 4.1

Employment-to-population ratios for youth 15-24, 1998
(percent of relevant population)

	All	Men	Women	Difference
Czech Republic	41.5	47.4	35.8	11.6
Slovakia	32.4	34.0	30.6	3.4
Poland	27.1	29.6	24.5	5.1
Hungary	35.6	39.8	31.1	8.7
Slovenia	38.3	40.9	35.6	5.3
Bulgaria	21.6	22.5	20.8	1.7
Romania	37.6	43.2	31.7	11.5
Estonia	37.3	41.5	33.1	8.4
Latvia	31.3	36.8	25.6	9.8
Lithuania	35.5	40.3	30.5	9.8
Russia	28.9	31.3	26.4	4.9
Azerbaijan	14.7	14.5	20.9	-6.4
Georgia	14.5	16.9	11.9	5.0
Kyrgyzstan	40.2	47.9	32.5	15.4
Tajikistan	22.1	24.2	14.4	9.8
CEE/CIS-15	30.6	34.1	27.0	7.0
France	24.3	26.8	21.9	4.9
Germany	44.4	46.8	41.9	4.9
Italy	25.2	30.1	20.3	9.8
Spain	24.7	29.5	19.4	10.1
EU-15	36.2	39.6	32.7	6.9
Turkey	38.1	51.1	26.5	24.6

Sources: MONEE project database; OECD-CCET Labour Market Database; OECD (1998a); Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys; Eurostat (1998).

Note: Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, 1997 for the Czech Republic, the EU countries and Turkey and 1999 for Tajikistan. "CEE/CIS-15" is the average only among the transition countries included.

Figure 4.1



Share of economically active youth, 1989 and 1997
(percent of relevant population)

Source: ILO (1999).

Note: Age definitions and years may vary slightly for some of the countries. "CEE/CIS-10" is the average only for the transition countries included. "EU-13" is all 15 EU countries as of 1997, except Belgium and Austria. "OECD-22" is all 26 OECD member countries as of 1997, except Austria, Belgium, Iceland, and Switzerland. Economically active persons are all those who, according to ILO definitions, are either employed or unemployed.

a significant gender gap, whereby the share of young women employed is smaller than the corresponding share of young men.

Because the demand for young workers is highly sensitive to aggregate economic conditions and the state of the labour market, the sharp reduction in youth employment in the last decade must be set against the backdrop of the big declines in GDP that affected all countries in the region early in the transition. The economic shocks were particularly severe in Southeastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia and the CIS. The impact on youth employment varied, however, falling on Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia especially hard in the first part of the 1990s, but less so, for example, on the Czech Republic. In the CIS, the economic shocks tended to be absorbed by labour hoarding, that is, by overstaffing and overemployment, with a corresponding fall in real wages.

Since 1995, GDP has been growing in some countries as economies have adjusted, while it has continued to shrink or has stagnated in others. Figure 4.2 charts changes in GDP and youth employment between 1995 and 1998 in 11 transition countries, revealing several scenarios in regard to the relationship between economic growth and jobs among youth.

In the Central European countries of Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, advanced economic reform and economic recovery have translated into more employment, which has been concentrated among young people. By contrast, economic growth in the Baltic States and the Czech Republic and Slovakia has been associated with a decline in youth employment. (These countries, apart from Slovakia, are still far from achieving full economic recovery or have recently experienced slowdowns in economic growth.) In Bulgaria (where employment plunged in the early transition years) and in Ukraine, youth employment held its own despite an ongoing fall in GDP, while in Russia youth employment has slumped relatively more than overall employment and GDP.

Economic growth is therefore not necessarily being accompanied by a corresponding boost in job creation, and the impact on youth may be quite different from that on adults. There are signs that economic growth, linked to consistent economic reform, can benefit youth more than it does adults and that labour hoarding and the protection of existing jobs are relatively less advantageous for youth. Nonetheless, the evidence is inconclusive, and a solid verdict must await further investigation.

Youth joblessness is widespread

In 1998, an estimated eight million of the 65 million youth in the region were looking for work, but were unable to find

Figure 4.2



Note: Youth refers to ages 15-24. Years are 1995-97 for the Czech Republic.

Youth employment and economic growth, 1995-98 (percent change)

Sources: MONEE project database; OECD-CCET Labour Market Database; Statistical Annex, Table 9.1.

Table 4.2

Unemployment among youth 15-24 and overall unemployment, 1998 (percent)

	Youth	Overall	Difference
Czech Republic	6.9	4.2	2.7
Slovakia	20.4	11.1	9.3
Poland	23.3	10.6	12.7
Hungary	13.5	7.8	5.7
Slovenia	17.4	7.1	10.3
Croatia	31.4	9.9	21.5
FYR Macedonia	70.9	34.4	36.5
FR Yugoslavia	61.1	18.5	42.6
Bulgaria	32.2	14.0	18.2
Romania	18.3	6.3	12.0
Estonia	15.7	9.9	5.8
Latvia	25.5	13.8	11.7
Lithuania	22.2	13.3	8.9
Russia	26.8	13.3	13.5
Georgia	27.5	14.3	13.1
Azerbaijan	46.4	23.3	23.1
Kyrgyzstan	37.3	27.2	10.1
Tajikistan	33.2	19.6	13.6
CEE/CIS-18	29.5	14.4	15.1
Germany	10.7	9.9	0.8
France	29.0	12.6	16.4
Italy	33.6	12.4	21.2
Spain	39.2	20.9	18.3
UK	13.6	7.1	6.5
EU-15	21.2	10.8	10.4

Sources: MONEE project database; Eurostat (1998); Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys.

Note: Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, 1997 for the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the EU countries and 1999 for Tajikistan. "CEE/CIS-18" is the average only among the transition countries included.

it. Significant and widespread unemployment is a largely new phenomenon in the region, and the experience can be bewildering for youth.

"In the past the government used to support people," said Andrey, 17, of Russia, in focus-group research carried out for this Report. "They provided secure jobs. And now all the factories are shut down, and we cannot find a job."

The consequences at this critical stage in life can be serious. A number of studies in OECD countries have shown that unemployment early in working life may damage future employment prospects. A troubled transition from school to workplace influences behaviours such as household and family formation. Youth unemployment is often associated with social problems such as violence, suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, and crime. A rocky entry into adult life for a significant part of the population can resurface as long-term and wide-ranging political, economic and social difficulties down the road.

Are young people in the region relatively more at risk of unemployment than are young people in established market economies? How does youth unemployment vary across the region? Table 4.2 sheds light on answers to these questions by showing the youth and overall unemployment rates in 18 transition countries in Europe and Central Asia in 1998.

Table 4.3

Unemployed youth 15-24 with no work experience, 1998
(percent of unemployed youth)

	15-19	20-24
Poland	80.4	46.8
Hungary	77.3	28.2
Russia	65.0	25.9
Kyrgyzstan	55.0	24.1

Sources: RLMS Round VIII; Hungarian and Polish labour force surveys; Kyrgyzstan living standards survey.

Note: Year for Kyrgyzstan is 1995.

The youth unemployment rates in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are now around double the overall unemployment rates, a trend observed in most OECD countries as well. In 1998, the average youth unemployment rate for the 18 transition countries represented in Table 4.2 stood at 30 percent, 15 percentage points higher than the overall unemployment rate. Moreover, in 11 of the 18 transition countries for which data are available, both the youth unemployment rate and the ratio of youth unemployment to overall unemployment are higher than the EU averages.

The distribution of youth unemployment in the transition region exhibits large subregional disparities. As in the European Union, there seems to be a north-south divide. Youth unemployment rates are substantially worse in Southeastern Europe (71 percent in FYR Macedonia, 61 percent in FR Yugoslavia, 35 percent in Bulgaria), in the Caucasus (46 percent in Azerbaijan, 27 percent in Georgia) and in Central Asia (37 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 33 percent in Tajikistan). This is partly explained by the armed conflicts and severe drops in GDP that have marred the transition in the south.

Youth unemployment takes various forms, and the distinctions have important implications. For some young people, unemployment is a brief interlude between jobs. But many unemployed youth looking for work have never had a job: they have been unable to gain a toehold in the labour market. Still others join the long-term unemployed who are unable to find a first or any other job for many months.

The adverse consequences of unemployment are likely to increase with the length of unemployment, and long-term unemployment (being without a job for more than a year) is severe among youth in much of the transition region, from Poland to Central Asia. The proportion of long-term unemployed differs greatly among transition countries (as it does in the EU), ranging from 16 percent in the Czech Republic to 68 percent in Georgia. In eight of the 15 transition countries represented in Figure 4.3, the share of long-term unemployed youth exceeds the EU average. Long-term unemployment is less a problem among youth than among adults, but it is nonetheless a serious concern at this formative time of life.

Table 4.3 shows the proportion of young unemployed who are still searching for a first job. It reveals that the share of youth who have no work experience and remain unemployed is particularly high in Poland and Hungary, where youth employment has been rising in recent years. Success is much more elusive for those aged 15-19 than for those 20-24 in all four countries in the table, as it is in many OECD countries. However, the lack of work experience is significant among the older cohort as well – a circumstance that calls out for efforts aimed at getting youth off to a better start in the world of work.

The unemployment rates presented so far capture the share of youth who are actively looking for work, but cannot find a job, among all youth who are economically active (that is, among those who are employed or are looking for work). While this is a good indicator of job-search success, many young people, especially adolescents, are not looking (or have

Figure 4.3



Long-term unemployment among youth 15-24, 1998
(percent of youth unemployed)

Sources: MONEE project database; OECD-CCET Labour Market Database; Eurostat (1998).

Note: Year for Armenia, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the EU countries is 1997. "Long term unemployment" refers to 12 or more months spent in unemployment as defined by the ILO.

given up looking) for employment. A fuller picture of joblessness among youth can be gained by seeking beyond unemployment data to the number of young people who are neither in the labour force, nor in education. Apart from the estimated eight million unemployed youth in the region, another 10 million 15-24 year-olds are not in education and are economically inactive.

Table 4.4 displays, for selected countries, the share of youth aged 15-19 who were unemployed and the share of those who were neither in the labour force, nor in school in 1996 and 1998. The aggregate of these jobless youth shows the proportion of the adolescent population that is neither in education, nor in jobs.

The proportion of the 15-19 population who are neither in the labour force, nor in school is considerable in each transition country represented in the table. This share is often greater than the share of the unemployed, and, for the most part, it is greater in the transition countries than in other industrialized countries. In 1998, for example, the aggregate proportion of youth who were neither in school, nor in employment reveals that, relative to the measure of unemployment, the incidence of "joblessness" was 1.4 times higher in Latvia and more than three times higher in the Czech Republic. It can obviously be misleading to focus only on unemployment figures for information on joblessness among youth. Policies must therefore take into consideration this discrepancy.

While it is to be expected that teenagers are less likely than young adults to look for work, the extent to which such inactivity among adolescents may persist when these people reach their early 20s is unclear.

Figure 4.4 presents 1998 data on the share of those who are not in the labour force and not in education among the broader youth group aged 15-24. It also includes countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus and breaks the share down by gender.

Table 4.4

Joblessness among youth 15-19 according to two measures, 1996 and 1998
(percent of relevant population)

	Unemployed		Not in education, not in the labour force		Not in education, not in employment	
	1996 (a)	1998 (c)	1996 (b)	1998 (d)	1996 (a+b)	1998 (c+d)
Czech Republic	3	6	6	13	9	19
Poland	5	4	3	3	8	7
Hungary	5	4	-	9	-	13
Slovenia	3	5	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	11	6	24	-	35	-
Romania	9	7	12	10	21	17
Estonia	5	5	9	7	14	12
Latvia	11	7	4	3	15	10
Russia	6	6	8	9	14	15
Canada	4	-	4	-	8	-
France	2	-	1	-	3	-
Germany	2	-	2	-	4	-
Italy	6	-	10	-	16	-
Spain	9	-	5	-	14	-
Sweden	2	-	5	-	7	-
UK	7	-	5	-	12	-
US	3	-	5	-	8	-

Sources: MONEE project database; OECD (1998a).

Note: The "unemployed" are regarded as part of the labour force, as they are actively looking for work. Empty cells indicate no data are available. Age is 14-19 for Spain and 16-19 for Sweden, the UK and the US. First year for Bulgaria is 1995.

Figure 4.4



Youth aged 15-24 not in education and not in the labour force, 1998
(percent of relevant population)

Sources: MONEE project database; Bulgarian, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan living standards surveys.

Note: Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan and Bulgaria and 1999 for Tajikistan.

There are a number of features worth noting. First is the very high proportion of jobless youth in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where, as Chapter 2 describes, youth participation in education has also declined. Second, for every country except Latvia, the figure shows that, as might be expected, the share of youth out of school and out of the labour force was higher among young women than among young men. This gender gap points to the role of child-rearing and to women's unequal position (see later). Third and perhaps most surprising is the fact that parental obligations appear to explain only a relatively small part of these youth inactivity rates: the share who remain outside both education and the labour force is significant among both young women and young men. ■

4.2 Youth at Work

Despite the spectre of joblessness that looms over youth in the region, one young person in three is employed. It is equally important to examine this positive side of the labour force picture. Just as the process of entry into the job market has changed greatly since the transition began, so have the nature and conditions of employment. Understanding and adapting rapidly to the new workplace are essential for the development of policies and programmes that promote youth participation in the labour force.

This section looks at these questions: In which sectors and occupations are jobs for youth being created? What is the quality of these new jobs? What can young people expect from their jobs?

The changing nature of youth employment

The past decade of economic reform has brought substantial changes to the industrial structure of employment in the region. Smokestack industry is shrinking, and the service sector has been expanding greatly in many countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Agriculture is still a mainstay in other countries, particularly those where economic renewal is stymied and economic opportunities outside agriculture in rural areas are limited. In line with the economic reforms, the role of the private sector has been growing everywhere, though public-sector employment is still substantial in all countries and even crucial in some. How have the huge structural changes affected youth employment? This is a pertinent question which, unfortunately, has been little researched so far.

Table 4.5 shows employment figures in selected branches of the economy in six transition countries in the second half of the 1990s. Since these data are taken from various household surveys, the industrial structure of employment is not strictly comparable among the countries; however, the proportions of youth and total employment suggest some consistent patterns.

It is clear from the table that in the three Central and Eastern European countries young people have made greater inroads than older adults into commerce, trade and services outside government. In Poland and Latvia, youth are overrepresented in manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas, and water ("industry" in the table). However, in Poland, one of the region's strongest economies, 25 percent of young working people were employed in that area, compared to 31 percent as recently as 1994, while the share of youth employed in "trade" had risen from 16 percent to 24 percent. In trade, the share of youth was greater than the share of the overall employed in all six countries in the table, indicating that youth are finding relatively easier access to jobs in this area. On the other hand, the share of youth was lower than that of older adults in all countries in "government, health and education".

Table 4.5

The distribution of employment by economic sector, late 1990s
(percent)

	Poland (1998)		Bulgaria (1995)		Latvia (1996)		Azerbaijan (1999)		Kyrgyzstan (1995)		Tajikistan (1999)	
	15-24	Total	15-24	Total	15-24	Total	15-24	Total	15-24	Total	15-24	Total
Agriculture	14.0	21.3	9.1	7.8	10.8	8.8	26.2	23.0	51.5	39.3	60.4	49.1
Industry	24.8	24.4	29.5	34.8	26.7	24.5	8.0	13.6	10.3	13.5	3.0	6.7
Construction	7.7	7.0	7.4	7.9	4.2	5.7	2.3	3.8	2.3	3.0	2.0	3.4
Trade	24.1	15.1	30.1	14.7	23.8	17.3	8.8	4.7	10.3	8.6	8.7	7.3
Transport	2.4	5.9	9.1	9.9	5.4	8.4	2.4	6.1	3.8	6.0	1.3	3.3
Finance	7.2	5.0	1.1	3.3	2.1	2.8	2.4	1.9	1.1	1.6	0.3	0.6
Government, health, education	19.8	21.3	7.4	17.9	27.1	32.5	21.0	22.0	20.8	28.0	20.1	25.3
Other, not specified	0.0	0.0	6.3	3.7	0.0	0.1	28.8	24.9	0.0	0.0	4.2	4.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Polish labour force survey; Latvian household budget survey; Bulgarian, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan living standards surveys.

Note: "Industry" includes mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas, and water. "Trade" includes repair services and hotels. "Finance" includes insurance and real estate. "Government" includes public administration and defence, and "health and education" include social work and other community, social and personal service activities.

Though the public sector has been thinned out considerably in most countries during the transition, a sizeable government sector is an integral part of even advanced market economies. Public-sec-

Table 4.6

Enterprise employment distribution by the age and number of personnel, 1998
(percent)

	Poland		Hungary		Russia		Kyrgyzstan	
Age:	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54
Number of employees								
20 or less	60	46	42	42	30	20	50	41
21-100	18	21	–	–	37	33	36	38
101-500	17	29	–	–	17	26	9	16
more than 500	5	4	–	–	16	21	5	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: RLMS Round VIII; Kyrgyzstan living standards survey; Polish and Hungarian labour force surveys.

Note: Year for Kyrgyzstan is 1995.

for employment can be used as an active labour policy tool. It can provide young people access to their first jobs. Government jobs can also afford young people the opportunity to participate in the public decision-making process and to contribute to policies, programmes and services – especially in health and education – directed at youth. The apparent underrepresentation of youth in the government sector thus raises several questions, including questions revolving around the issue of whether the links between public jobs and youth labour markets are being acknowledged and addressed fully in the transition countries.

As Table 4.5 confirms, the role of agriculture in employment is very important for youth and adults in the Caucasus and Central Asia; in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agriculture accounts for a much greater share in youth employment than it does in total employment. This contrasts with Poland, for example, where small agricultural farms are more significant for jobs among older persons than among youth.

In 1998, the private sector represented an average 58 percent of recorded economic output in the region, ranging from 20 percent in Belarus to 85 percent in Hungary. Given the burgeoning of private employment in the informal sector, the real extent of private economic activity is undoubtedly much greater. Has this rise in private business been to the advantage of youth? Evidence from labour force surveys suggests it has.

In Poland, 95 percent of teenagers 15-19 and 80 percent of youth 20-24 are working in the private sector, compared to 68 percent of young adults 25-29. In Estonia, 81 percent of youth 15-24 work in the private sector, compared to 69 percent overall. In both Hungary and Bulgaria the share of employed youth working in the private sector in 1998 was about 10 percentage points higher than the share of adults. The situation is similar in Central Asia, although the formal private sector has expanded less there than it has in Central and Eastern Europe. In Tajikistan in 1999, 23 percent of employed youth and 18 percent of employed adults were working in the private sector; in Kyrgyzstan in 1995, the numbers were 36 percent for employed youth and 11 percent for working adults.

In the new market economies, young people are tending to become more concentrated in small businesses, where the jobs are often more flexible, for better and for worse. Table 4.6 examines the presence of youth in small businesses in Poland, Hungary, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan in 1998. It shows that the majority of employed youth in these countries were working in firms with less than 100 employees and that the proportion of youth in small businesses was, in general, greater than that of adults.

A sign of the greater flexibility in jobs overall is the rise in part-time employment and the more frequent reliance on short-term contracts, particularly among youth – types of work that were rare in the centrally planned economy, where employment was generally permanent. For example, labour force surveys show that the share of young workers 15-24 in part-time employment in Slovenia climbed from 6 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 1998 and in Latvia, from 10 percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 1998. Data available for 11 countries in the mid-1990s show that the share of youth working part time ranged widely, from less than 3 percent in Hungary to 30 percent in Kyrgyzstan. In six of nine countries for which data are available, the proportion of part-time employment was higher among youth than among the total labour force.

In Hungary, the 1998 labour force survey reveals that 20 percent of employed youth 15-19 had short-term contracts. In Poland, the figure is almost 15 percent of youth, compared to 7 percent of adults. The share is much higher in some poorer countries, like Bulgaria, where 43 percent of employed youth and 21 percent of employed adults are working on short-term contracts.

Part-time employment and short-term contracts offer flexibility to both employers and employees. They can provide young people with a start in the workforce and allow them to combine work with education or raising children. However, this same flexibility can translate into less secure jobs and an erosion in employee rights and benefits. In several countries, changes in labour laws have reduced the length of time between the termination notice and severance, as well as the amount of severance pay. Employers now also more frequently ignore laws requiring notice of termination, severance pay and occupational safety. These changes associated with the new economic environment are cause for concern, especially in the new private sector and in small businesses, where monitoring and formal complaint procedures are less likely to be implemented.

Meanwhile, trade union membership, especially among youth, has been declining in the countries for which data are available. Trade unions remain stronger in Central and Eastern Europe than in the former Soviet Union, but, despite efforts to modernize their role as advocates for workers, they are usually much more active in large, public enterprises rather than in the growing private sector, especially small businesses. A shake-up in working conditions has been occurring not only in the transition region, but also in post-industrial economies in the West and in globalizing marketplaces. This represents both a challenge and an opportunity for employers and for countries to ensure the development of work environments that value and respect workers and their rights.

Wages and job satisfaction

Wages and benefits are the most obvious indicators of individual economic well-being, but other less measurable indicators, such as job satisfaction, have important consequences for personal development and the contribution of employment and work to the broader society. It is difficult to gauge the value of intangibles such as career aspirations and job satisfaction, but a variety of objective and subjective pointers can provide insights. These include the extent to which a job matches the qualifications of a worker, the willingness of the worker to change jobs and the level of self-reported satisfaction with work.

Various labour force surveys conducted in the region in 1998 reveal that a substantial share of youth have jobs that do not match their qualifications, a situation that merits attention. In Hungary, for example, this was the situation among about 45 percent of employed youth 15-19 and 43 percent of those aged 20-24. In Poland, more than 48 percent of school-leavers had taken jobs which did not correspond to their education. At the same time, research shows that individuals with higher education are much more likely to find relevant jobs.

Other evidence from the region attests to a gap between the aspirations of youth and the realities of the job market. In Russia, for instance, Round VIII of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey carried out in 1998 shows that almost 50 percent of young employed people 15-24 wanted a different job, compared to 39 percent of adults aged 25-54. The 1998 Polish labour force survey found a lower, but still substantial number of employed people wishing to change jobs: 15 percent among youth and 7 percent among adults. Among the youth in Poland who want to change jobs, 60 percent say it is because they desire a better job, more money, or a better match with their qualifications.

The International Social Survey Programme carried out in Russia and five Central and Eastern European countries in 1997 included questions on job satisfaction. About 70 percent of the young workers in the five CEE countries were satisfied with their jobs. This is comparable to the corresponding ratios for the total workforce and for young workers in Western countries. In Russia, on the other hand, barely more than half of the employed people young or older appeared content.

While job satisfaction may be difficult to describe, money talks, as Radek, 18, of the Czech Republic, illustrated in focus-group research for this Report.

"Our manager is Belgian," he explained, "and was very surprised by the statistics which show that money is the greatest motivator for 75 percent of employees in our country." In fact, especially in the eastern parts of the region, where labour hoarding became common, the early years of transition produced a sharp drop in real wages (Statistical Annex, Table 9.5). Though wages have since been recovering in many countries, the level of real wages in 1998 was above the 1989 level only in the Czech Republic. Declining wages were exacerbated in several countries of the former Soviet Union by widespread wage arrears.

Young people in the region, as elsewhere, tend to earn less than older adults do, a circumstance usually associated with relative work experience. Figure 4.5, relying on the findings of the 1996 International Social Survey Programme, assembles data on the earnings of workers 18-29 and those aged 30-54 in seven transition countries and a number of established market economies. Though the data are not strictly comparable, the figure shows that youth earnings, as a share of the corresponding adult earnings, range from 70 percent in Russia to 86 percent in Bulgaria and Poland. The relevant numbers in the West were 67 percent in Norway, 72 percent in Germany and below 50 percent in Canada and the US.

Figure 4.5



Relative median monthly earnings of youth 18-29 and adults 30-54, 1996 (adult earnings=100)

Source: International Social Survey Programme

Note: Czech Republic: total monthly net salary or wage, income from additional employment, unemployment benefits, entrepreneurial profit. Poland: monthly earnings from present job or business after taxes. Hungary and Bulgaria: net monthly earnings. Slovenia: last regular monthly income after taxes. Latvia: monthly net income. Russia: monthly wage, together with all bonuses, compensations and other payments. France: monthly earnings. Germany: monthly earnings after taxes and social insurance. Ireland: yearly income before taxes and social insurance. Norway: personal gross income before taxes in 1995. Sweden: income per month before taxes. Canada: monthly income. US: earnings in 1995 from all jobs before taxes and deductions. Sample size ranges from 57 to 613 observations for the 18-29 age group (average 186) and from 221 to 1,165 observations for the 30-54 age group (average 520).

The ratio of youth to adult earnings in the figure appears to be relatively high in the transition countries. This finding merits more thorough investigation, but it should not be entirely surprising. The transition countries which are frontrunners in reform and in which the distribution of youth in more well paying sectors is quite favourable are overrepresented in the figure. It is also possible that job tenure or work experience is less a factor in earnings in these countries, where many young people have acquired a good level of education. There could also be a selection effect in operation in that the youth who are still employed in these countries tend to have more well paying jobs. This is quite probably the case in Bulgaria, for instance, where youth employment has collapsed.

Minimum wage legislation can be particularly important to young people because many youth entering the labour market do so at the low end of the wage spectrum. In Central and Eastern Europe, minimum wages are about one- to two-fifths of average wages; in the CIS, minimum wages have fallen dramatically and often reach only a fraction of average wages. It is usually argued that higher minimum wages may raise the earnings of youth, but reduce their employment opportunities. This does not appear to be what is happening. However, impact assessments of youth employment and earnings could be useful, especially as some countries are currently revising their minimum wage laws and considering substantial increases.

The decline in real wages in the region has frequently been accompanied by cuts in work-related benefits, especially for employees, often young, at the lower end of the pay range. Young workers, especially those who are parents, may be particularly hard hit by less access to work-related housing support, health services and kindergartens. As one young mother, Lena, 16, of Ukraine, said in focus-group research carried out for this Report: "It would be better to find a job which does not bring a lot of money, but which gives a secure salary with social benefits and provides the opportunity to send a child to kindergarten."

■

4.3 Barriers to Youth Participation in the Workforce

A number of studies in established market economies have shown that the speed with which young people find their first job after leaving school has a strong impact on their employment and career prospects, while a poor beginning in the labour market can be difficult to overcome (Box 4.1). If a good start is an important building block for future success, it pays to look at young people who are having a tough time, and it pays to ask why.

Less education can mean less success

In the transition countries, as in most industrialized countries, young school-leavers with few skills have more difficulty finding a first employment. Because of the growing ranks of underqualified school-leavers and young job-seekers with little or no experience, a significant pool of youth is at risk of settling into low-paid, insecure jobs or of remaining out of regular work.

In the region, educational achievement does have an impact on the risk of being unemployed, as Chapter 3 describes. Table 4.7 offers further insight by presenting unemployment rates in eight transition countries for youth with various levels of education. The results indicate that there is a clear association between education level and

Box 4.1

The first job effect: evidence from transition and established market economies

Getting a first job while still in school or soon after leaving school tends to have a big influence on the future employment prospects of young people. A recent investigation of German and US longitudinal data shows that employment rates in the first and fifth years after leaving school were higher among individuals who had been working during their last year of school than among those who had not.

This positive "first job" effect seems to weaken, but not disappear over time. The difference in employment rates in Germany between those with early job experience and those without it was 23 percentage points in the first year after graduation, but only three percentage points in the fifth year, while in the US the corresponding rates were 20 and 13 percentage points apart, respectively.

Evidence for five established market economies – Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, and the US – also shows that a greater amount of time spent in jobs during the first year after leaving school is associated with a greater chance of being employed each subsequent year. This "persistence" is more apparent among those with more education, though only to a small degree. The differences in the consequences attached to a first work experience which is full time and one which is part time likewise seem significant. In general, in the five countries investigated, part-time first jobs are associated with less stable employment histories. Conversely, in all five countries, starting off unemployed or not in the labour force leads to substantially less accumulated time in employment in subsequent years.

For transition countries, an econometric analysis of the determinants of the time spent in unemployment was conducted for this Report using microdata for a sample of unemployed young people in Bulgaria (1995) and Poland (1998). After controls for education, gender and region, the results show that unemployed youth in Poland with no first work experience had a higher chance of being unemployed longer than did those possessing such an experience. In Bulgaria, however, there were no significant differences.

unemployment. In all the countries shown in the table, youth with less than upper secondary education showed the highest unemployment rates, and in most of the countries these rates were much higher than the rates among youth with more education. The risk of unemployment is often reduced by one-half or much more for those with more education.

Table 4.7

Unemployment rates among youth 15-24 by education level, 1998
(percent)

	Tertiary			Upper secondary			Below upper secondary
	All	University	Non-university	All	General	Vocational	
Czech Republic	-	10.8	-	-	13.7	10.5	17.3
Poland	19.6	14.4	23.9	20.6	19.8	22.9	24.5
Hungary	4.1	5.8	3.7	9.8	11.6	8.9	18.3
Latvia	4.1	-	-	22.8	-	-	31.5
Russia	14.6	12.8	16.1	28.9	36.5	25.9	50.0
Azerbaijan	30.5	32.2	22.7	48.0	50.7	42.7	49.9
Kyrgyzstan	21.0	-	-	37.9	39.6	33.1	39.7
Tajikistan	19.5	-	-	31.5	32.1	28.3	39.6

Sources: Novák (1999); Polish and Hungarian labour force surveys; RLMS Round VIII; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys; Latvian household budget survey.

Note: Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, 1996 for Latvia and 1999 for Tajikistan.

Table 4.8

Unemployment rates among economically active youth 15-24, by gender, 1998
(percent)

	Men	Women	Difference
Czech Republic	4.0	5.0	1.0
Slovakia	21.0	20.0	-1.0
Poland	21.4	25.5	4.1
Hungary	14.8	11.6	-3.2
Slovenia	17.3	19.0	1.7
Bulgaria	35.0	28.7	-6.3
Romania	17.3	19.7	2.4
Estonia	16.9	14.1	-2.8
Latvia	21.8	30.3	8.5
Lithuania	23.5	20.3	-3.2
Russia	26.2	27.4	1.2
Azerbaijan	50.0	35.6	-14.4
Kyrgyzstan	36.8	38.2	1.4
Tajikistan	34.5	31.7	-2.8
CEE/CIS-14	24.3	23.4	-0.9
France	32.8	24.6	-8.2
Germany	10.3	9.6	-0.7
Italy	28.7	39.9	11.2
Spain	33.1	46.1	13.0
UK	15.6	11.0	-4.6
EU-15	19.9	22.8	2.9
Turkey	14.0	15.0	1.0
US	11.8	10.7	-1.1
OECD-29	13.3	14.0	0.7

Sources: MONEE project database; OECD-CCET Labour Market Database; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys; OECD (1998a); Eurostat (1998).

Note: Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, 1997 for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the EU countries and 1999 for Tajikistan.

There are, however, large differences among countries in this "return" on education. For example, Latvia and Russia have similar overall rates of youth unemployment, but the unemployment rate among youth with higher education is three times lower in Latvia than it is in Russia. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, unemployment rates are high even among those young people with higher education. These cases can be explained by variations in the net demand for workers with more education.

Other evidence on the region indicates that well-educated workers are not only more likely to avoid unemployment, but also more likely to earn higher pay. Earnings function estimates for several countries in the mid-1990s show a wage gap between workers with primary or lower education and workers with higher education.

Young women face disadvantages

If education is a key factor in finding a good job, then the evidence in Chapter 3 suggests that employment rates should be high among young women in the region. However, young women are doing less well than young men in the workplace. Employment rates are generally lower among young women than among young men. In the 15 transition countries presented in Table 4.1, this gender gap in employment ranges from two or three percentage points among youth aged 15-24 in Bulgaria and Slovakia to more than 15 percentage points in Kyrgyzstan and hovers around 10 percentage points in half the countries. It is not surprising then that the unemployment rate is greater for young women than for young men in about half the countries, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Romania, Latvia, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan (Table 4.8).

As Table 4.8 shows, unemployment among the economically active is also frequent among young men (and in some countries, like Azerbaijan, young men appear to experience significantly worse employment opportunities than young women). Still, it is important to remember that relatively more young women than young men are neither in school, nor in the labour force in these, as well as in other countries (see Figure 4.4). What is happening with those young women who are not working and who do not register as unemployed?

Fertility rates have declined in the region during the transition, but many women are still adolescents or young adults when they have their first children. Meanwhile, as Chapter 1 notes, the frequency of births outside marriage has gone up in most countries. No doubt this means that a portion of the young women who show up neither in school, nor in the labour force are, in fact, mothers who are raising children and, increasingly, are without the support of a partner in marriage. The 1999 Regional Monitoring Report, "Women in Transition", showed that employment rates fall among women as the number of children rises. For example, among women aged 26-29, a 1997 survey in Hungary found that 82 percent of those with no children, 52 percent of those with one child, 35 percent of those with two children, and 11 percent of those with three or more children were employed.

Different policy responses are required to support young women who have children and want to work, but cannot find employment, young women who have withdrawn temporarily from the labour market, but now wish to return, young women who have been discriminated against in hiring because they have children or who have not received leave benefits though they have children, and young women who have no children, are out of school and are economically inactive. These issues present a rich field for further research on the determinants of gender differences in work.

Voices of Youth 12

Young women talk about barriers to employment

Balancing work and family responsibilities is a challenge for young women. The young women and mothers below participated in focus groups conducted for this Report in the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Romania.

- "There are still advertisements in newspapers . . . where being a man is one of the criteria required for a position. Abroad, it would be considered discriminatory." (Ivana, 24)
- "I lost my job because of my baby. I used to have a very good job, but, once I got pregnant, they told me that they were going to sack me as soon as the laws allow it." (Lessi, 21)
- "I was working for a private firm, and I was really scared that they would sack me when the baby came. On the contrary, they have helped me a lot, and I can return to work when I will feel like it." (Olga, 19)
- "I can't work eight to ten hours, as is now required. My mother can't stay with the baby continuously; and I can't afford a babysitter." (Emilia, 21)

Social attitudes about gender roles, especially the responsibilities around child-rearing, are an important determinant of the employment experience of women (Voices of Youth 12). As the 1999 Regional Monitoring Report explored, female employment rates, which were outstandingly high by international comparison before the transition, have gone down in much of the region. That Report also found evidence that employers are less likely to hire unemployed women with family commitments and less likely to advance women's careers. In transition and Western countries alike, even where there are family-friendly policies which permit parental leave, as well as maternity leave, the leave is overwhelmingly taken by women rather than men.

Figure 4.6 is based on the results of a 1994 survey which shows that a substantial share of young men and women in Central and Eastern Europe agree or strongly agree that a man's role is to earn money and a woman's role is to look after the home and family. It is unclear whether or how much these attitudes were a legacy of or a reaction to pre-transition times, or an interpretation of the new freedoms and choices which have accompanied the transition. In any case, the attitudes were sharply different in Western Europe, where few young people supported the gender division of responsibilities.

Figure 4.6



Youth who agree with traditional views on gender roles, 1994 (percent)

Source: International Social Survey Programme.

Note: Share of youth 18-29 who agree or strongly agree that a man's job is to earn money and that a woman's job is to look after the house and the family. The sample range of observations is 198-491 in the CEE and 179-660 in the EU. The average sample among the countries included is 302 in the CEE and 381 in the EU.

Youth in economically depressed areas

The disparities between unemployment levels and the number of job vacancies are significant throughout the region. Because of the relative concentration of declining industries in some places and of employment-generating sectors, like services, in other places, mainly big cities, this imbalance was expected to occur early in the transition as economies were restructured. However, as the transition has progressed, there are few signs the large disparities are decreasing. Meanwhile, the social infrastructure (kindergartens, schools, hospitals) for improving the employability of the labour force is deteriorating or non-existent in the economically stressed areas, creating a vicious circle of disadvantage.

The ability to leave a depressed local labour market affects the employment opportunities of job-seekers, and this mobility, or lack thereof, may partially explain the employment gap between urban and rural youth. Significant barriers to internal mobility include the uncertainty of moving without the guarantee of a suitable job, inadequate rental housing markets in places where there are jobs and the lack or rising cost of public transportation for commuting to work.

A study conducted in 3,000 Hungarian villages in 1993 showed, for example, that commuting costs exceeded unemployment assistance benefits a mere 15 kilometres from the place of residence, reached the level of the minimum wage about 26 kilometres from home, and exceeded average unemployment insurance benefits only a few kilometres further on.

Table 4.9 provides data on rural-urban differences in labour market outcomes among economically active youth aged 15-24 in selected countries of the region. Youth unemployment rates are higher in urban areas than in rural areas in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Moldova. Youth unemployment rates are similar or higher in rural areas than in urban areas in Poland, Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, indicating that lower labour mobility may be a factor in these countries. However, in most of the countries represented in the table, the share of young people who are employed is higher in rural areas. This is true even in countries in which rural unemployment is higher. This suggests that there are fewer educational possibilities in rural areas, but it also demonstrates that the agricultural sector can act as a sponge to absorb the jobless when employment is hard to come by. Many of the jobs may be on collective farms, which have often been restructured more recently than industrial enterprises, or on family farms, including newly privatized farms.

Table 4.9

Rural-urban differences among youth 15-24 in the labour force, 1998
(percent of relevant population)

	Unemployment rate			Employment-to-population ratio		
	Rural	Urban	Rural – urban	Rural	Urban	Rural – urban
Poland	23.8	22.2	1.6	29.0	28.4	0.6
Hungary	15.9	14.3	1.6	35.3	33.9	1.4
Bulgaria	50.0	41.3	8.7	21.2	18.4	2.8
Romania	11.3	27.2	-15.9	52.1	26.1	26.0
Latvia	10.4	28.8	-18.4	38.4	33.4	5.0
Lithuania	21.2	23.2	-2.0	41.1	27.2	13.9
Moldova	12.0	30.7	-18.7	–	–	–
Russia	22.7	18.6	4.1	26.4	34.8	-8.4
Kyrgyzstan	41.1	27.4	13.7	28.2	25.4	2.8
Tajikistan	34.3	28.1	6.2	22.1	21.5	0.6

Sources: Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldovan labour force surveys; RLMS Round VIII; Bulgarian, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys; Latvian household budget survey.

Note: "Unemployment rate" is the share of the unemployed in the economically active population. "Employment" and "unemployment" are based on ILO definitions. Age for Lithuania is 14-24. Year is 1995 for Bulgaria and Kyrgyzstan, 1996 for Latvia and 1999 for Tajikistan. For technical reasons or because of the different survey periods, the rural-urban averages do not always correspond with the youth unemployment rates in Table 4.2.

Table 4.10

Rural-urban differences among youth 15-24 out of the labour force, 1998
(percent of relevant population)

	Not in education, out of the labour force			In education		
	Rural	Urban	Rural – urban	Rural	Urban	Rural – urban
Poland	7.7	8.4	-0.7	46.5	46.5	0.0
Hungary	20.7	13.8	6.9	37.2	46.8	-9.6
Bulgaria	29.5	19.0	10.5	18.3	41.0	-22.7
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–
Latvia	11.8	8.5	3.3	33.4	36.0	-2.6
Lithuania	8.2	4.1	4.1	–	–	–
Moldova	–	–	–	–	–	–
Russia	20.6	8.6	12.0	39.3	44.6	-5.3
Kyrgyzstan	25.6	17.8	7.8	23.2	30.4	-7.2
Tajikistan	36.8	37.8	-1.0	27.1	30.3	-3.3

Sources: Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldovan labour force surveys; RLMS Round VIII; Bulgarian, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys; Latvian household budget survey.

Note: Age for Lithuania is 14-24. Year is 1995 for Poland and Kyrgyzstan and 1999 for Tajikistan.

A complementary picture of rural-urban labour market differences is provided in Table 4.10, which presents the situation among economically inactive young people. It shows that in rural areas a much higher proportion of young people have left both the labour force and the education system, while in urban areas more young people who are not in the labour force are still in education. This difference points to particular difficulties in the countryside: young people may simply give up on job-hunting when they cannot find employment within commuting distance; others, especially young mothers, may withdraw from the labour force in the absence of childcare services or kindergartens, and youth who are without jobs may be unable to stay in school because education facilities are fewer.

All this suggests that the barriers to employment are greater for young people living in economically depressed rural areas. The capacity of family farms to absorb young unemployed people should not be a reason for policy inaction on youth joblessness.

Minorities struggle for equal access and participation

The provision of equitable labour market opportunities for minority populations is a problem in the region. Before the transition, cultural and social diversity was officially recognized by the state and in some ways artificially promoted for propaganda purposes – a tactic that may now be creating backlash. The uniformity of big, impersonal state systems failed to promote the participation of minorities in terms of genuine expression and empowerment, and the rights of minorities – including ethnic, cultural and religious groups – were largely levelled out, like those of the general population.

In the unfettered environment of the transition, the opportunities are greater both to respect and to ignore the rights of minorities. In many countries of the region, there is a growing effort involving international bodies, non-governmental organizations and emerging civil associations to put the rights of minorities on the public agenda. A recent study by the International Labour Organization, for example, has drawn attention to the low employment prospects faced by ethnic minorities like the Roma in Central and Southeastern Europe, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, the so-called "small nations" in the Russian Federation, or ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation. The ILO study shows that the higher incidence of unemployment among ethnic minorities is attributable not only to differences in job qualifications, such as lower levels of education, but to discrimination in hiring and firing practices.

There is also evidence that youth who belong to ethnic minorities suffer a disadvantage in employment. In Estonia, for instance, the 1998 labour force survey reveals that long-term unemployment is much higher among young people who are not ethnic Estonians. In Hungary, a number of sociological surveys have found that young Roma experience particular difficulties in entering the labour market. Disadvantages are also experienced by minorities other than ethnocultural minorities: young people with health problems and physical disabilities are also vulnerable, and the obstacles they encounter call for policy responses.

In many countries in the region, the transition has seen the emergence of non-governmental organizations which promote access to work for young people. Some, like the Youth Azeri Parcel Service profiled in Box 4.2, focus on the needs of disadvantaged youth. This service illustrates how public-private partnerships can, through relatively minor investments in society's most vulnerable members, produce significant dividends – social, moral and economic. ■

Box 4.2

Overcoming obstacles to employment among disadvantaged youth in Azerbaijan

Diversity in society is often accompanied by disparity: some groups – including ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities – are pushed to the fringes of the community. The link between this marginalization and poverty is clear and, during the turmoil of the transition, often especially close.

Through the initiative of new civil groups and non-governmental organizations, there is a growing number of projects in the region that seek to create a new social balance. They embrace an approach to social justice that is based on human rights and according to which it is fair – and very often more efficient – to enable people who experience disadvantage to participate in society to the best of their ability.

The Foundation for Disadvantaged Azeri Children and Youth was founded in 1995 to help disabled and orphaned Azerbaijani children and youth become independent and socially active members of their communities. The foundation has gained considerable recognition for its pioneering Youth Azeri Parcel Service (YAPS), which was launched in 1997 and which relies on disabled youth to run the office, while orphaned youth make deliveries. It now has more than 50 employees, who make an estimated 170,000 deliveries each year. Annual revenues have reached $100,000.

YAPS is proof that public-private partnerships can be viable and also successful. Feasibility studies convinced business leaders to fund and use the new service. The government came on board by providing the service with premises and tax-exempt status. The parcel service is touted as Azerbaijan's first organization "by the disadvantaged for the disadvantaged".

"I am now the sole breadwinner for my brother and sister," proudly states Yuri, an 18-year-old YAPS employee who recently moved up from courier to office administrator. "I have also learned how to use a computer and to speak English." Without his current job, he says, it is doubtful he and his siblings would have been able to stay together after his parents died.

YAPS is not only economically, but socially successful. The company has helped break down social taboos and prejudices concerning orphans and youth with disabilities. In 1999, YAPS was in a position to donate $8,000 through UNICEF for other projects addressing the needs of Azerbaijan's most disadvantaged groups.

Profits from YAPS also support the foundation's Child Help Line, a 24-hour telephone hotline operated and managed by youth with disabilities. It was anticipated that, by the end of 1999, the hotline would have handled some 150,000 calls dealing with issues such as drug abuse, suicide, family problems, stress, depression, and violence. The helpline also serves as an effective and much needed "antenna" in the collection of social information on the state of children and youth.

Both projects attest to the soundness of having youth participate in the development and administration of their own services, as put forward in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

4.4 Youth Responses to Employment Problems

The previous section has shown that securing a good job has become increasingly difficult for many young people in the transition region, especially for those who are women, less educated, living in economically depressed areas, or members of minorities. However, with resilience and enterprise, many young people are rising to the challenges of establishing themselves in the workplace. Lesha, 16, of Russia displayed this self-reliant attitude in a focus group which met as part of the research for this Report: "Nothing and nobody but yourself can influence you on your way to your goals." This section looks at the strategies young people have adopted to handle their transition from school to work in these difficult times.

School with or without work

In recent years, young people in OECD countries have tended to extend their education in response to the intense competition in the labour market and the rising demand for skilled labour. Staying in school allows young people to avoid entering the labour market at a time of high unemployment and to raise their future career and earnings prospects by improving their knowledge and skills. This pattern has also been observed in several, though not all transition countries.

As Chapter 3 shows, most young people in the region are aware that education is a key factor in getting ahead in life, and this translates into rising participation rates in tertiary education in Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltic States and the Slavic countries of the former Soviet Union. However, as Figure 3.3 shows, overall youth participation in education has declined in several countries, mainly in the southern belt of the region.

Evidence from labour force surveys shows that a significant number of young people in the region are combining work and studies. This growing overlap is, in part, made possible due to the increased availability of part-time jobs. In Poland in 1997, about 28 percent of graduates had worked while studying, especially at the tertiary level. In Latvia, the figure was 17 percent in 1996, and in Bulgaria 5 percent in 1995. In Georgia in 1998, about 14 percent of teenagers 15-17 combined studies and work. In 1999, in Tajikistan, 6 percent of young employed people aged 15-24 were also studying; in 1995, the figures were 10 percent in Kyrgyzstan and 11 percent in Azerbaijan. In OECD countries, the share of students who are also participants in the labour force ranges from 2 percent in Italy and Greece to 37 percent in the US and 53 percent in the UK.

This work-education strategy allows young people in the region to offset declining family incomes, while gaining practical job experience. It also affords opportunities to establish contacts which are quite important in securing full-time employment later on.

Financial support from family and friends

Another way for youth in the region to support themselves while studying or looking for a job has been to rely on family and friends. The housing shortage has obliged many young people to live in extended family situations. The reduced levels of real wages and social benefits mean that many of them simply cannot afford to set up an independent household.

Sociological surveys carried out in 10 transition countries in 1995 included a question designed to gauge the most important source of income among youth under age 29. As expected, a regular job was the biggest single contributor in all countries, representing the top source of income for 40 percent (Romania) to 80 percent (Czech Republic) of young people. However, in some countries, like Poland, Bulgaria, Belarus, and Ukraine, help from family and friends was still the most important source of income for 6 to 9 percent of young people.

Other evidence suggests that, while it may not be the most important source for most youth, support from friends and family plays a significant role. For example, a recent study showed that more than half of young Russians aged 18-29 were receiving financial support from parents, and one in 10 was obtaining money from friends and neighbours. In Estonia in 1998, 78 percent of youth aged 15-24 who were not working reported parental support as their main source of income, as was the case for 89 percent of those in school, and 44 percent of those neither working, nor studying. Other detailed studies confirm the importance of private transfers within family incomes during the transition, with parents strongly supporting their children, even when the children are not living with the parents.

The ability of youth to rely financially on family is, of course, constrained by the income and employment status of other household members. Figure 4.7 looks at the household context of unemployed youth in six transition countries and six established market economies. It shows that about one-fifth of the unemployed youth in the transition countries were living in households where no one had a job. The share ranges considerably among countries, from a small proportion in Central Asia to more than one-third in Hungary, where the share is comparable to the EU average.

Where youth unemployment rates are low, there is a tendency for the share of unemployed youth living in workless households to be high. This suggests that particular groups of young people are at especially high risk of being jobless, a situation calling for targeted measures that take into account the context in which these people live. In countries with high youth unemployment rates, however, broader policies are also needed to address the root causes of unemployment.

Figure 4.7

Youth unemployment and the risk of living in workless households, late 1990s
(percent)



Sources: RLMS Round VII; Bulgarian and Tajikistan living standards surveys; Hungarian and Polish labour force surveys; Latvian household budget survey; OECD (1998a); Eurostat (1998).

Note: OECD (1998a) for the share of youth in workless households; Eurostat (1998) for youth unemployment rates. Workless households refer to households with no other persons aged 15-64 in employment. Year is 1995 for Bulgaria, 1997 for Poland and 1999 for Tajikistan. See also note to Table 4.2.

When youth do look for work, evidence shows they tend to rely on personal contacts and direct approaches with employers rather than on state employment offices. This emerges from statistical surveys and also shows up in the focus-group research carried out for this Report (Voices of Youth 13).

As Table 4.11 shows for four countries in 1998-99, the share of unemployed youth who, in looking for work, relied on friends, relatives and acquaintances (ranging from 40 percent in Poland to 78 percent in Russia) was greater than the share of those who used state labour offices. A study of 800 unemployed youth in eight locations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia attests to the use of personal connections: during the previous month 57 percent of the respondents had looked for a job through labour offices, 36 percent through friends and relatives, 34 percent through employers, and 31 percent through job advertisements.

Social capital in the form of personal connections is important in job-seeking, but youth tend to have fewer resources than adults, and disadvantaged youth fewer still. Understanding how young people look for and secure employment is important in the development of appropriate labour policies.

Youth self-employment: a growing enterprise

Because of economic transformation and liberalization and the overall loss of jobs in the region, self-employment has increased substantially, especially in the informal sector. A growing number of young people have opted for self-employment for a variety of reasons – to avoid unemployment, to contribute to family income, or to stake a claim in the marketplace.

Table 4.12 gives an idea of the extent of reported self-employment among youth in selected transition countries.

Voices of Youth 13

How to get a job?

Young people are aware that personal connections can help widen their access to jobs. However, the perceptions of the importance of such connections vary, as the voices of young workers on the job in the Czech Republic and youth who have lived in state institutions in Romania illustrate.

- "At the outset of a career, parents can play an important role. Parents' connections could help a young person get a job, for instance." (Dagmar, 23)
- "I think it could cause problems if others feel that I have got this job because of my parents. Help is important in terms of support while studying." (Kamila, 23)
- "I can read, write and do sums. That's all I need for a normal job. . . . You have to know the right people, that's all you need." (Edi, 18)
- "OK, suppose I go to the labour resources centre to apply for a job? Be sure that if another pays bribes, I won't see any job." (Gheorghe, 19)
- "I would consult job centres and employment agencies as a last resort. First I would use personal contacts." (Ivana, 24)

Table 4.11

Ways of seeking a job among 15-24 year-olds, late 1990s
(percent of job-seekers ticking the answer)

	Poland (1998)	**Bulgaria** (1999)	**Estonia** (1998)	**Russia** (1998)
State labour office	–	41	33	38
Friends or relatives	40	58	50	78
Directly to employers	39	19	45	51
Advertising notices	18	16	90	48

Source: Bulgarian living standards survey; RLMS Round VIII; Estonian and Polish labour force surveys.

Note: More than one answer was possible, so the data do not sum. "State labour office" for Estonia excludes job seekers who are in education, since these are not allowed to register.

Box 4.3

Young entrepreneurs in the new market economies

A detailed study carried out in 1996 and 1997 and involving 550 young entrepreneurs in four countries of Central and Eastern Europe and three CIS countries revealed important features of youth self-employment.

Youth entrepreneurship in all seven countries shared several characteristics, including the fresh approaches adopted by the entrepreneurs, their work-centred life styles, their business inexperience, the newness of the form of business, the lack of business support services, and the potential for extremely rapid growth.

The research also identified noteworthy differences among countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, the new businesses were generally more suited to the education and training of the young owners. Self-employment had been the goal of the majority before completing their education. The business often represented a full-time occupation and was the main source of income. Many of the enterprises were legally registered, and the young entrepreneurs had a relatively positive outlook about the future.

Meanwhile, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, youth self-employment was largely restricted to street trading. Most activities were in the informal sector. Bribery was more common. Businesses were usually owned by partners rather than sole proprietorships. Independent female entrepreneurs were rare, and the entrepreneurs felt they needed to succeed quickly because the gradual development of their enterprises was likely to be impeded by changes in the political and economic environment.

There are sizeable differences among countries, with shares ranging from 2 percent in Russia and Azerbaijan to 25 percent in Kyrgyzstan. Relative to that of adults, self-employment among youth appears similar or higher in the Caucasus and Central Asia and lower in Central and Eastern Europe. In the EU, self-employment is mostly lower among youth than among adults. This may relate to the nature of self-employment in the region (Box 4.3). Youth can seize the burgeoning opportunities in the new services sector, and they also fit the need in most new small businesses for flexibility and mobility.

Barriers and drawbacks to youth entrepreneurship exist in the region. In some transition countries, self-employed persons are not covered by unemployment insurance or social assistance, nor are they eligible for benefits such as disability and pensions. Young entrepreneurs must also deal with frequently changing legal frameworks and fiscal systems, the lack of access to credit, especially microcredit, and the lack of business mentoring and planning services.

Table 4.12

Self-employment in selected transition countries, 1998 (percent of overall employment by age)

	15-24	25-54
Hungary	7.7	13.5
Bulgaria	5.7	–
Russia	2.3	5.1
Azerbaijan	2.4	2.3
Kyrgyzstan	25.2	22.4
Tajikistan	14.1	11.3

Sources: Hungarian and Bulgarian labour force surveys; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan living standards surveys; RLMS Round VIII.

Note: Excludes subsistence farming. Year is 1995 for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan and 1999 for Tajikistan.

Table 4.13

Alternative activities in Russia, 1998

	15-24		25-54	
	N	%	N	%
	Engaged in subsistence farming			
All	183	11.9	652	15.6
Unemployed	22	18.2	52	16.1
Out of labour force, out of education	47	26.0	166	24.4
	Engaged in informal jobs			
All	133	8.7	534	12.8
Unemployed	26	21.5	80	24.8
Out of labour force, out of education	19	10.5	107	15.7

Source: RLMS Round VIII.

Note: "Engaged in subsistence farming" refers to those who had worked during the seven days previous to the interview on an individual plot, a dacha, or garden plot (excluding farm plots). "Engaged in informal jobs" refers to those who, during the month preceding the interview, had a regular job along with a second job, as well as to those with no regular job who were engaged in an additional kind of paid work. "Unemployed" and "out of the labour force" differ slightly from the ILO definitions. Here, they refer to those individuals who do not declare themselves employed, who have no main jobs, and who are looking and available for work ("unemployed") or who are not looking for work ("out of the labour force").

In much of the region, a good deal of youth self-employment does not constitute full-time legitimate work, but is performed as a second job or as occasional work, or takes place largely in the informal sector in services, street trading and subsistence farming. Accurate estimates of the share of young people engaged in the informal labour market are difficult to obtain. There are also a number of practical problems in measuring the importance of subsistence farming, not least of which is the difficulty in distinguishing between small agricultural businesses and unpaid work on family garden plots.

Table 4.12 reports particularly low youth self-employment rates for Russia. Table 4.13 uses data from the same source, the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, to explore the extent of informal jobs and subsistence farming among youth and adults in that country in 1998. It reveals that about 12 percent of youth were engaged in subsistence farming, while 9 percent held informal jobs. Although the sample is too small to draw firm conclusions in detail, it appears that such activities are more frequent among the unemployed and among those who are neither in the labour market, nor in education.

There are indications that subsistence farming and other informal activities are also widespread among youth in other countries. A 1995 poll reported that "growing food" was the single most important strategy used by people under age 30 to maintain their standard of living. This was true for 15 percent of young people in Hungary and Poland, 20-25 percent in Slovenia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, and 38 percent in Romania. The high ratios of young people who are neither in employment, nor in the education system in many countries provide further evidence that informal, unregistered employment tends to be extensive in the region.

While informal jobs and subsistence farming have no doubt provided important safety nets for young people, they do not represent a satisfactory longer term solution for the employment needs of youth. Moreover, informal-sector workers are vulnerable to exploitation and may have little power to advance their own interests and secure safe job conditions. The larger society also misses out on the employment benefits paid for by businesses and on individual income taxes.

■

4.5 Institutions and Policies Promoting Employment

In the challenging conditions associated with the transition, young people have used a variety of strategies to cope with the move from school to working life. However, many survival strategies have negative social consequences or cannot be sustained over the long term. Obviously, the prospects of youth are played out against a much larger economic scene, and broad economic policy will make the biggest difference in the working lives of young people. This section looks at labour market policies and initiatives that target specific points of contact between young people and work. As the high youth unemployment rates and joblessness even in the countries leading the economic recovery demonstrate, there is much room for action in this regard.

Figure 4.8



Note: "Youth" are aged 15-24. Year is 1995 for Bulgaria and 1997 for Kyrgyzstan.

Ratio of registered unemployed to labour force survey unemployed, 1998

Sources: MONEE project database; Bulgarian living standards survey.

Employment services and centres

New types of employment assistance have appeared in all the countries of the region. Employment services already existed in some places, in particular the Soviet Union, but their role was rather different from that of employment services in established market economies. The main function of labour departments in the Soviet Union was to match the individual to the needs of enterprises within a context of labour shortages.

The establishment of new employment services in the region has been supported extensively by Western partner institutions and international organizations. Although there are few services specifically geared to youth, these national labour offices and their regional and local branches offer young people various services and training programmes. In most countries, the trend is towards a rise in the share of youth engaged in various initiatives organized by labour offices.

The new institutions suffer, nonetheless, from varying problems, including lack of funding, inexperience, overregulation, understaffing, low salaries, and poor motivation among staff. As a consequence, employers tend to have little confidence in these institutions and use other channels to recruit new workers. The number of job vacancies reported to labour offices is usually estimated at only around 30 percent of the openings in the labour market. This is one reason why many young job-seekers do not rely on labour offices. In turn, this diminishes the effectiveness of the centres in the eyes of employers, thereby contributing to a vicious circle of ineffectiveness.

Another outcome of the poor performance of employment services is the low level of registration among the unemployed. Moreover, young unemployed people are less likely than the older unemployed to register with the public services (Figure 4.8). The ratio of the registered unemployed to the unemployed as determined by labour force surveys is especially low in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Besides the low expectations connected to obtaining a job through a state employment service, other factors help explain the limited registration of unemployed young people. Many youth may not register because they simply do not qualify for unemployment benefits or because they find these benefits too low to warrant the hassles of registration. In 1997, the average unemployment benefit as a proportion of the average wage was only 8 percent in Estonia, 20-25 percent in Russia, the Czech Republic and Croatia, and 30-35 percent in Bulgaria and Poland. Worse, in some countries of the former Soviet Union, unemployment benefits are frequently in arrears. In some countries, young school-leavers simply are not allowed to apply to employment services. In Lithuania, for example, only people over age 16 who are not working or who are not studying full time are eligible. This means that students wanting to combine studies with work cannot register.

Passive labour policies: how effective are they?

With the emergence of formal unemployment, unemployment benefit schemes were introduced throughout the region. Initially, they were quite generous. The level of benefits was high, and the period of payment relatively long by Western standards. However, as the economic realities of transition have set in, including shrinking government revenues and rising unemployment and inflation, which has eroded the real value of benefits, the capacity and the effectiveness of benefits systems have diminished. Many countries have trimmed the benefits, reduced the period of payment and restricted entitlement.

In most countries, the period of payment for unemployment insurance benefits currently falls in the range of six months to one year. To become eligible for the benefit, registrants typically must have been employed for at least six to nine months, a requirement which excludes young school-leavers who have little or no job experience. In order to discourage people from giving up jobs or from seeking new jobs, some countries explicitly restrict the benefit entitlement to bar young school-leavers and persons quitting jobs voluntarily.

The lack of incentives to take up unemployment benefits and the eligibility restrictions mean that a relatively small share of the youth identified as unemployed in labour force surveys are receiving benefits. Thus, in the mid-1990s, the share was below 2 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 6 percent in Latvia, 9 percent in Russia, 10 percent in Bulgaria, and 37 percent in Hungary. For the two countries for which 1998 data are available, the share of unemployed youth receiving benefits had declined sharply: to 28 percent in Hungary and to less than 2 percent in Russia.

In several countries, those who are ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits or whose benefits have run out can receive some form of assistance. Many countries, including Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ukraine have established systems of social assistance. Others, like Hungary and Bulgaria, have introduced means-tested unemployment assistance that is available only to those who previously received insurance benefits. In general, however, social assistance has eroded, and in some Southeastern European countries and in the CIS arrears and even non-payment are frequent.

As a consequence, in most countries unemployment benefit insurance has, to a large degree, lost the capacity to perform its two main functions: to prevent economic deprivation among the jobless and to enable the jobless actively to look for work. For many young unemployed who may have particular difficulty accessing unemployment benefits, the only escape from poverty is financial support from family and friends or jobs in the informal economy.

The effectiveness of unemployment insurance benefits relative to social assistance is debated, and youth get caught up by the shortcomings of each approach. Young people may fail to qualify for unemployment benefits, which, in view of the substantial long-term unemployment in the region, may dry up anyway. Meanwhile, social assistance which relies on household means-testing will do little to boost the autonomy of young people already obliged by circumstances to live with parents or extended family.

It is therefore important to develop support systems that suit the aspirations of young people for independent living. Certainly, because of the pressure on passive labour policy measures, such as unemployment insurance, there is a more recent tendency in the transition countries to address youth unemployment through active labour policies, a trend which is also evident in Western market economies.

Table 4.14

Public expenditure on labour market policies in selected countries, 1997

	Total (% GDP)	% total labour expenditures for:	
		Active measures	Unemployment compensation
Bulgaria	0.5	30.9	69.1
Croatia	0.7	21.4	78.6
Czech Republic	0.2	36.2	63.8
Estonia	0.2	52.7	47.3
Hungary	1.2	32.8	67.2
Kazakhstan	–	23.0	75.0
Poland	1.9	–	77.6
Russian Federation	0.3	34.1	65.9
Ukraine	0.2	34.8	65.2
Austria	1.7	25.4	70.5
Denmark	5.8	30.8	38.3
France	3.1	42.2	46.0
Germany	3.8	33.0	65.7
Ireland	4.1	40.8	56.3
Portugal	2.0	48.2	45.2
Spain	2.4	21.1	78.9
Sweden	4.3	49.2	50.8

Sources: OECD (1998a); Nesporova (1999).

Note: Active measures include the costs of public employment services and administration. Year is 1996 for Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, France, Ireland, and Portugal and first nine months of 1998 for Kazakhstan. Two last columns do not necessarily sum to 100 because expenditures on other passive measures such as early retirement are not included in the last column.

Active labour market policies

Most established market economies, particularly those in Europe and especially the Scandinavian countries, implement active labour policies which focus on the integration into the workforce of vulnerable groups like the long-term unemployed and first-time job-seekers. In the transition region, active labour market policies aimed at reducing and preventing social exclusion had to be developed from scratch in the late 1980s and early 90s.

The initial programmes typically focused on training schemes and the preservation of existing jobs, but they were often poorly planned and not well targeted on the needs of specific groups. For example, though many young unemployed people participated, few of the programmes were designed specifically for youth. More recent policies represent an improvement, but still face obstacles in coverage, targeting and financing.

Most youth-related policies today involve training, subsidized employment, or public works. In Slovenia, for instance, the National Employment Office furnishes information, counselling, training, and other forms of assistance to the unemployed. Its special programme, Clubs of Job-seekers, offers information on effective job-search techniques and targets the long-term unemployed and first-time job-seekers, apparently with some success. In the Czech Republic, the Bridge project supplies counselling, retraining and job placement for youth aged 15-18 who have received inadequate basic education. In Hungary, the School-leavers Employment Programme helps unemployed youth under age 25 gain work experience and contacts by providing wage subsidies to employers willing to hire them.

Echoing trends in the West, a few programmes also exist to encourage unemployed youth to start their own businesses. In Hungary, there is the Unemployment Benefit Programme for Entrepreneurs, and Poland promotes self-employment among unemployed or laid-off workers through the Loans for Individual Economic Activity, which delivers financial support and business training. In Georgia, the State Programme of Youth Policy Implementation 1996-2000 fosters courses in entrepreneurship and the development of a more supportive business environment, including youth-friendly banks.

Overall, however, the funding of labour market policies, whether active, or passive, remains very low in the region relative to the EU. Table 4.14 shows the share of GDP spent on labour market polices in a selection of transition and EU countries and the breakdown for active and passive measures. Apart from Poland and Hungary, the transition countries invest only a tiny fraction of GDP on labour measures, several times less than established market economies. Among the transition countries represented, the expenditures on passive measures outweigh those on active measures everywhere except in Estonia.

The small portion of GDP spent on active labour market policies raises doubts about the effectiveness of the expenditure. The message from the Western experience is that programmes vary greatly in impact over time. Nonetheless, recent OECD and ILO reviews and programme evaluations show an emerging consensus that some programmes, such as those involving training and self-employment, have a good chance of being effective and that better targeting on the needs of specific groups can enhance job-seeking.

Another important message is that, in policy-making, there needs to be a distinction between teenagers and young adults. The most desirable solution to the employment problems of teenagers is to help these young people remain in school, reenter the education system, or pursue more training as quickly as possible. For young adults in their 20s, it is more important to enable them to acquire work experience and to raise their skills in order to avoid the traps of unemployment and social exclusion.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of active labour market policies in transition countries because of the relative newness of the initiatives and the absence of adequate monitoring systems. Only a few countries, like Poland and Hungary, regularly follow up on programme participants. Preliminary evidence for transition countries suggests that active measures have produced disappointing results thus far. Initiatives like public works and, to a lesser extent, subsidized employment have tended to perform poorly and to register low job-placement rates. Likewise, the inefficiencies which characterize many state employment agencies in transition countries further reduce the effectiveness of programmes.

However, there are success stories. The impact of programmes promoting self-employment among unemployed youth has generally been positive. Training schemes are generating high placement rates among young unemployed in many transition countries. For example, Hungary has undertaken policy adjustments in recent years and now puts greater stress on active measures, such as counselling, personal development, skill-training, and wage subsidies for employers who hire first-time job-seekers. The share of unemployed youth benefiting from such measures rose from 26 to 44 percent between 1997 and 1998.

The World Bank recently conducted an evaluation of active labour programmes in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Turkey, and the results confirm that training and self-employment have a generally positive impact on overall employment, while the effectiveness of wage subsidies and employment service initiatives are mixed, and public works schemes often perform poorly.

The research also concludes that programmes have variable outcomes depending on the target group. In particular, youth appear to benefit more from training and wage subsidies, the latter exhibiting a positive impact on youth in each of the four countries examined. The benefits of self-employment schemes in the transition countries were about equal among participants with basic or secondary education, but were less apparent among participants with higher education. This is in marked contrast to the experience with self-employment programmes in the West, where participants with more education do better than those with less. The result in the transition countries may reflect the wide-open territory for new small businesses in these formerly planned economies and is an important difference to consider in policy-making.

■

4.6 Conclusions

A good start in the labour market is a key determinant of the participation of youth in society and of their future prospects. A poor start can inhibit and even thwart the participation and contribution of youth, sometimes with serious personal and social consequences.

In the centrally planned economies before the transition, young people were assigned jobs upon leaving school, and unemployment and job insecurity were virtually non-existent. On the other hand, there was little room for individual aspirations and personal career development: absenteeism and demoralization were common in the workplace, and private enterprise was largely prohibited.

The transition has opened up new employment prospects for youth in the region, but it has also rendered the path from school to the workplace more rocky in many ways.

Economic activity rates among youth have declined in every country during the transition, although rising enrolment in education accounts for part of this decline in several countries. In 1998, the average rate of youth unemployment stood at 30 percent in the 18 transition countries for which data are available. This was 15 percentage points higher than the overall unemployment rate and eight percentage points higher than the unemployment rate among youth in the European Union. These high rates are a concern, despite signs that youth employment is recovering in a number of countries. A considerable share of the unemployed youth in the region had been without a job for more than a year. In addition to the unemployed, a substantial portion of the youth population is neither in the labour force, nor in education. The emergence of large pools of jobless youth who are not looking for work is a very worrisome trend in several countries, mainly but not exclusively in the southern part of the region.

The transformation of economies has entailed considerable changes in the nature of employment and in the working conditions encountered by youth. Young people have been particularly active in small private businesses, and their flexibility and mobility have been welcomed in growth areas like the service sector. However, employment has become less secure and less permanent. An increasing number of young workers are employed in occasional jobs or have short-term contracts. The gap between successful young workers and those in low-paid and insecure jobs has also widened markedly. A majority of young workers do report being satisfied with their jobs, although the positions often do not match their education and do little to advance their longer term aspirations. There is also evidence that certain populations of young people – the less educated, young women, residents of remote or rural areas, and members of minority groups – are especially vulnerable to labour market exclusion.

It is reassuring that many young people have been able to find jobs at wages which compare well with those of middle-aged adults. Indeed, youth-adult wage ratios are often more favourable in the transition region than in the established market economies. An increasing number of youth are remaining in education to enhance their job prospects. Many have been able to count on support from family and friends, while studying or looking for work. Many others have been able to rely on family and personal connections. Still others have reacted to the sluggish labour demand by creating their own jobs or by taking part in the informal economy. Reliance on subsistence farming is the last resort for the most vulnerable.

While the array of coping strategies being developed by youth is impressive, they clearly need more public policy support. Part of the rise in higher education enrolment may reflect a response to the immediate risk of unemployment, rather than a belief that education is useful for finding a job. Often, the coping strategies used by young people are not sustainable in the long term. Meanwhile, these young people may be working in poor conditions in businesses which contribute little to public coffers in the way of taxes.

Although there have been substantial efforts to overcome the obstacles faced by young people in the labour markets of the region, much remains to be done. There is a void in youth-related labour market programmes in many countries, and there is need to monitor the impact of existing policies. Still, there is an emerging consensus that improvements in the services offered by employment agencies and enhancements in the targeting of active measures on youth promise particularly good returns in the region.

The available evidence suggests that young people who are making the transition from school to the workplace can benefit especially from training and self-employment programmes, as well as programmes to assist first-time job-seekers. There is also a strong case for promoting labour mobility. Such an effort could involve fundamental improvements in transportation systems and in infrastructure. Tax reform and the integration of informal activities such as commercial trading or part-time work into the regular economy would help protect the rights of workers and increase the capacity of governments to supply assistance to the most vulnerable.

The transitions from school to work and from childhood to adulthood are often abrupt. Given the evidence of how important a successful first-job experience is for the future prospects of young people leaving school, greater policy support and more intervention at this pivotal juncture in life make good sense economically and socially. ■

5 Young People in Conflict with the Law

The issue of criminal justice is vital to any consideration of the development and well-being of young people. Most children and young people knowingly break the law at some time: most of these are neither arrested, nor embark on a life of crime. However, the small minority of young people aged 15-24 who do come into more serious or repeated conflict with the law account for a relatively large share of the crimes in society.

The justice system in any country must then perform a complex task: it must respond to criminal acts by young people with an eye to both the victim and the youthful offender; it must respond appropriately to young offenders, taking into account age, responsibility and social circumstances; it must set boundaries between behaviours that are significantly anti-social and those which are part of the normal growth process of testing youthful autonomy against social norms.

International standards on juvenile justice – generally restricted to those people under age 18 – reflect this understanding, as Box 5.1 describes. The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the "Beijing Rules") say the most appropriate response must be found to offending by a young person who is at "that period of life when she or he is most susceptible to deviant behaviour". One of the fundamental principles of the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency states that "youthful behaviour or conduct that does not conform to overall social norms and values is

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Box 5.1

International standards on youth justice

Criminal justice and crime prevention have been a major issue in the international community for the last 50 years, particularly in terms of the development of international standards in a human rights context. A UN Congress has been held on the subject every five years since 1955, when the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were adopted. In recent decades, special attention has been paid to juvenile justice.

The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) were adopted in 1985, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) devoted its longest provision (Article 40) to juvenile justice. In 1990, three major related UN instruments were adopted by the General Assembly: the "Riyadh" Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, and the "Tokyo" Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures.

The main principles embraced in these wide-ranging juvenile justice standards can be summarized as follows:

- Prevent offending through social justice, access to education, vocational training, recreational and cultural activities, and "safety nets".
- Foster the well-being, rights and self-respect of juvenile offenders at all stages.
- Decriminalize offences as much as possible and adopt a reasonable minimum age for criminal responsibility.
- Establish a separate system to deal with juvenile offenders, serviced by appropriately trained professionals.
- Avoid the formal justice system where possible and appropriate.
- Ensure due process.
- Adopt responses that are educational and rehabilitative in nature.
- Use the deprivation of liberty only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time, both pre-trial and as a sentence.
- Prohibit the death penalty and life imprisonment for those under age 18 at the time of their crime.

The Committee on the Rights of the Child, which reviews compliance with the 1989 Convention, has given generally negative assessments to the transition countries regarding these standards. However, these evaluations capture as much the legacy inherited from former governments as they do the efforts of new democratic governments. In any case, it should be noted that the committee has criticized the great majority of the world's countries – regardless of socio-economic status or political and legal system – for their records in the juvenile justice sphere.

Indeed, when opening the 22nd session of the Committee on 20 September 1999, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bertrand Ramcharan, declared that "juvenile justice constitutes one of the main challenges for the implementation of the CRC". As countries in the transition region reform their legal and justice systems, there is an important opportunity for them to rise to that challenge.

often part of the maturation and growth process and tends to disappear spontaneously in most individuals with the transition to adulthood" (Article I.5.e). It is also pertinent to this Report, which covers youth aged 15-24, that the Beijing Rules conclude that "efforts shall be made to extend the principles embodied in the Rules to young adult offenders" (Article 3.3).

Under communism, non-conformist behaviour of all types was less common and less tolerated – and so was crime. Reported crime rates were generally low, sometimes very low, compared to those in other industrialized regions. In 1989, the highest crime rates in the region were recorded in Slovenia and Hungary – around 2,000 crimes per 100,000 population, compared to more than 7,000 crimes per 100,000 population in Germany and the United Kingdom.

As earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have described, the transition to more open societies and market economies has been accompanied by growing disparity within and among the countries of the region, a deterioration in social cohesion and a general increase in violence and lawlessness in society, including the rise of organized crime. With the role of the state shrinking, structures and systems that indirectly militate against crime have been weakened and even dismantled. These include high-employment practices, youth organizations, access to cultural and sports activities, and restrictions on the movement of people within and among countries. The systems directly involved, such as courts and police, are often ill prepared and without adequate resources to cope with the new realities.

In much of the region, an oppressive authoritarian environment has been supplanted by one where authority is questioned and challenged, where a new emphasis is placed on individual aspirations rather than social conformity, and where systems of social support and control are under stress, but where there are also particular opportunities for reform. This raises the question of what has happened with youth and the law in this changing environment and whether and how countries are reforming their justice systems to reflect the new realities and new opportunities that have accompanied transition.

This chapter looks for answers to this question against the backdrop of international standards. Section 5.1 examines the rates and the trends in youth crimes in the region and analyses their changing profiles. Section 5.2 highlights how protective factors have weakened and the risks increased during the transition. Section 5.3 assesses how governments, the judiciary and society as a whole have balanced the need to address growing crime and at the same time find appropriate responses to young people in conflict with the law.

5.1 Changes in Youth Crime

Youth is a time of increased risk-taking behaviour, and, in keeping with that reality, young people tend to constitute a disproportionately high share of recorded criminal offenders. Typically, a distinction is made between younger and older offenders. Data used in this chapter generally differentiate between crimes committed by juveniles aged 14-17 and crimes committed by young adults aged 18-24. It is important to note that social and legal approaches to these two groups of young offenders vary considerably and that countries follow different practices, which may also change over time.

Looking at and beyond juvenile crime rates

The measured level of youth crime in any country depends on a number of factors, including the legal age of criminal responsibility, the definition of crimes, and the general level of reported crime in society. This section is concerned specifically with juvenile crime, which typically covers youth aged 14-17 and for which justice approaches are distinct from those taken with children under 14 and young adults 18 and over.

Figure 5.1 compares the number of registered juvenile crimes in transition countries in 1989 and 1998. While still protected by international standards relating to children, the adolescents to whom the data refer have reached the age of criminal responsibility – though the responsibility may be limited – for acts in conflict with the law.

The figure reveals two main findings. First, registered juvenile crime rates were much higher in 1998 than in 1989 in most countries, suggesting an overall rise in juvenile crime in the region. Of the 25 countries for which data are available for both years, rates were higher – almost double – in 16 countries, pushing the unweighted regionwide average from 1,100 to 1,800 crimes per 100,000 juvenile population.

However, few countries are "average" in this regard, as the second finding underlines. There is a marked difference in registered juvenile crime levels among the 27 countries of the region. Central European countries show relatively high juvenile crime rates, while the Baltic States and the western CIS countries have somewhat lower rates. The Balkan countries mix very high and very low rates, while the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia have consistently low juvenile crime rates.

This subregional pattern has persisted over the transition years: rises in juvenile crime rates have taken place largely in countries where initial levels were high. In all nine countries where rates have dropped, initial rates were relatively low. However, in some Southeastern European countries, like Romania and Bulgaria, juvenile crime rates have gone from being relatively low to near the top of the range in the region.

Figure 5.2 shows trends throughout the transition

Figure 5.



Juvenile crime rates, 1989 and 1998 (crimes per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: Statistical Annex, Table 8.1

Note: Juveniles are 14-17 years old except in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (15-17), Poland (13-16) and Estonia (15-17 for the first year and 13-17 for the last year). First year is 1990 for Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, 1991 for the Czech Republic, Croatia and FYR Macedonia, and 1992 for Estonia. Last year is 1997 for FYR Macedonia. Data refer to 1995 for Bosnia-Herzegovina and 1997 for Albania. Data for Hungary, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan refer to the number of offenders.

period for five countries from different subregions. It illustrates that registered juvenile crime rose quickly in the early 1990s in many countries, including Russia, where it peaked in the mid-1990s, and, in some countries, rates have increased again in recent years.

How well do these figures reflect reality? Certainly, there are reasons to assume the gap between registered and actual crime has widened during the transition. Weakened registration and the varying capacity of law enforcement institutions to identify perpetrators have no doubt influenced the size of the gap and contributed to changes in official crime rates. On the other hand, new problems such as the illegal drug trade have not only created new areas of criminal activity, but, in some cases, prompted new definitions of criminal activity in the law.

Although these considerations may blur the picture presented in Figure 5.1, the conclusion it points to is still obvious: in much of the region young people under 18 are now at greater risk of coming into conflict with the law than they were before the transition began. This means that the workings of the juvenile justice system are more in the spotlight, including how the system defines criminal responsibility and crimes and how it approaches and treats offenders.

Figure 5.2



Trends in juvenile crime in five countries, 1989-98 (crimes per 100,000 relevant population)

Source: Statistical Annex, Table 8.1

Note: Juveniles are 14-17 years old.

Box 5.2

The issue of the minimum age of criminal responsibility

The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child does not stipulate an age below which a child "shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law" (Article 40.3.a), but it calls on states to fix such an age. The 1985 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) do, however, set out the guiding principle that "the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity".

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which monitors compliance with the Convention, has considered a minimum age of 10 unacceptably low for criminal responsibility, though this age or lower is found in several industrialized countries, including age 10 in England and Wales and age 7 in Switzerland and many US states.

Table 5.1

Minimum ages of criminal responsibility (years)

	General	Serious or very serious offences
Czech Republic	15	
Slovakia	15	
Poland	17	15
Hungary	14	
Slovenia	14	
Croatia	14	
FYR Macedonia	14	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	14	
FR Yugoslavia	14	
Albania	14	
Bulgaria	14	
Romania	14	
Estonia	15	13
Latvia	16	14
Lithuania	16	14
Belarus	16	14
Moldova	16	14
Russia	16	14
Ukraine	16	14
Armenia	14	
Azerbaijan	14	
Georgia	16	14
Kazakhstan	16	14
Kyrgyzstan	16	14
Tajikistan	16	14
Turkmenistan	16	14
Uzbekistan	16	14

Sources: MONEE country reports, except: UNICEF (1999a) for Central Asia; Asquith (1999) for Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine; UN (1993a) for Romania; UN (1998a) for Lithuania; UN (1998b) for Georgia; MSRA (1998) for Armenia, and UNICEF-Sarajevo (communication, 2000) for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Note: The age of criminal responsibility for premeditated murder is 13 years in Uzbekistan. Empty cells indicate that the "general" age applies.

Table 5.1 presents an important variable in juvenile justice: the minimum ages of criminal responsibility. Prior to the transition, all countries had established minimum ages of criminal responsibility that fell well above thresholds described by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (Box 5.2). As the table confirms, these levels have generally been maintained during the transition. While higher minimum ages of criminal responsibility are positive, they do not guarantee that the best interests of the child are protected, and, in some cases, adults who criminally exploit children can take advantage of them.

More important to the quality of justice for juveniles is how unlawful offences are defined, categorized and processed, whether as criminal or non-criminal offences, as serious or non-serious crimes. In this regard, the standards inherited from the communist period are often less than benevolent for youth. In many transition countries, "serious" criminal offences cover a wide range of acts, and, where these include property crimes, even petty property crimes such as shoplifting, youth are at high risk of tough sentencing, given that most youth crime is property crime.

As the transition progresses, the diversity is increasing in the way offences are classified and in the way they are dealt with in the countries of the region. For example, in Estonia, the deliberate destruction of property, petty theft, the illegal manufacture of a weapon, and the public consumption of alcohol all now fall under administrative or non-criminal law. Meanwhile, in a number of countries, petty theft is still considered a criminal offence.

This diversity in approaches no doubt explains part of the differences in the registered juvenile crime rates in the region, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. However, it seems that the definitions and classifications of offences have a relatively minor impact on juvenile crime in society. As Figure 5.3 shows, throughout the region juvenile crime rates are generally high where total crime rates are high (as in the Czech Republic or Poland) and low where total crime rates are low (as in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan). This suggests that it is the general level of criminality and how crimes are perceived and laws enforced that make the real difference.

Overall, the diagram suggests a close correlation between general crime rates and juvenile crime rates. However, it also calls attention to some outliers, such as Hungary, where juvenile crime rates are only half as high as overall crime rates, and, conversely, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Bulgaria, where juvenile crime rates are much higher than total rates. These particular cases raise questions about how adolescents are treated and protected in these countries.

Figure 5.3 also shows that countries tend to form clusters by subregion. (For comparison, the figure also includes some industrialized countries outside the region.) Overall, the geographical pattern suggests that the more urbanized societies have higher registered crime rates, both juvenile and total, than do those countries where traditional rural life styles and communities remain strong. While this pattern may reflect variations in actual levels of criminal activity, it no doubt says something about differences in social controls, social cohesion and how justice is dispensed.

It is likely that traditional rural societies in the southern belt of the region rely more on family and community controls to prevent, proscribe and punish anti-social behaviours and therefore exhibit markedly lower registered crime rates. Meanwhile, the urban industrialized nations of Central and Eastern Europe may resort more to formal legal and judicial measures, which show up as higher crime rates. This pattern has implications for

Figure 5.3

Total crime rates and juvenile crime rates, 1998 (crimes per 100,000 relevant population)



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Sources: Statistical Annex, Tables 8.1 and 8.3; UN (1998c); Interpol (1996).

Note: Year is 1997 for FYR Macedonia, Albania and Armenia and 1996 for Argentina, Japan and the US. Juvenile crime data refer to the number of perpetrators for Hungary, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Figure 5.



Total crime and homicide rates, 1998

(per 100,000 population)

Sources: Statistical Annex, Table 8.1; MONEE project database.

Note: Data for FYR Macedonia and Ukraine refer to 1997. Homicide data for FYR Macedonia, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan include attempts.

youth in various parts of the region, with some more likely to become involved with the justice system, and others more likely to experience social remedies, especially for less serious offences. These cultural and institutional differences mean that youth in different countries who commit the same offence may experience very different treatment and consequences.

Figure 5.4 provides another perspective on crime patterns by comparing overall crime levels to homicide rates by country. This comparison takes a crime which is readily defined and taken very seriously in the justice systems of all countries – homicide – and sees how it fits with the geographical pattern of overall crime rates noted in figures above. Interestingly, Figure 5.4 shows that the homicide rate follows a very different pattern in the region – almost the inverse, in fact, of the total crime rate. Homicide rates are lower, for example, in Central Europe and higher in Central Asia. If homicide rates echo overall crime rates (and likely do so, at least in terms of the rates for crimes of violence), this figure suggests that the actual levels of criminality are highest in the region in the Baltic and western CIS states and that crime is most underrecognized and underreported in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Box 5.3 further investigates the issue of the gap between reported crime rates and actual crime levels. The victim surveys reviewed confirm that the probability of burglary, robbery, or assault is also high in the southern belt of the region, and that it is not crime, but the reporting of crime that is lower in the CEE/CIS compared to other industrialized nations.

It is clear from the preceding that caution is needed in interpreting and comparing crime data, because reported crime rates are shaped not only by the actual incidence of crime, but by the way offences and the age of criminal responsibility are defined and by the approaches and efficacy of law enforcement and judicial systems. However, even considering these factors, it is apparent that juvenile crime has increased during the transition, and, in some countries, the increase has been considerable.

Age and gender patterns in youth crime

So far, this chapter has considered only juvenile crime, involving youth under 18 – those who are still covered by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This Report also seeks to draw attention to young people aged 18-24. These people are typically considered "adults" in terms of the justice system, but they are, nonetheless, still maturing into adulthood.

Studies have found that, in industrialized societies, committing offences is most common among older adolescents and young adults. Usually, the acts are not serious, and most first-time young offenders do not end up pursuing a criminal career. For example, government statistics for 1996 in the Netherlands showed that rates of criminal offence peaked at ages 18-19, and a 1993 study in Scotland found the peak age for committing crimes was 18. A 1993 study in the UK based on self-reported offending revealed rates which were much higher among the 18-25 age group than among 14-17 year-olds. Serious and more deliberate offending tends to appear during early adulthood, but, like frequency of offending, it usually decreases among people above age 25.

Data available for the transition region suggest that the age structure of registered offenders follows this pattern. Figure 5.6 shows the ratios between juvenile and young adult crime rates in 12 countries. In most of the countries crime rates were higher among 18-24 year-olds than among 14-17 year-olds, though differences ranged widely among countries. Only Poland and Bulgaria reported higher crime rates among juveniles than among young adults. In line with the perception that juvenile crime may involve less contact with the formal justice system in countries along the southern belt of

Box 5.3

Safety measures: crime rates and victim surveys

Official data on crimes are the end result of legal definitions of crimes, the vigour with which these laws are enforced, the propensity of victims to report crimes, and the efficacy of the police in responding – a complex process which changes not only from place to place, but also over time. It is accepted that crime data underestimate actual levels of crime in any country.

Victim surveys, though they have their limitations, can help shed light into the gap between reported crime rates and the true safety of the social environment. Such surveys have been largely unknown in the transition region, but the International Crime Victim Survey, conducted by the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, included 19 transition countries in its 1996 round.

Interestingly, the survey also asked respondents their reasons for not reporting crimes. Compared to other regions of the world, a lack of confidence in the capacity or willingness of law enforcement agencies to act on complaints was especially evident in the transition countries, where this was the main reason. The survey also found that prevalence rates of victimization for these crimes was generally higher in the transition countries than in Western Europe, the English-speaking New World and Asia, but generally lower than in Africa and Latin America.

Figure 5.5



Victimization by type of crime, 1996
(percent)

Note: Data refer to burglary, robbery, assault with force, and sexual assault. They show the share of people aged 16 years or over living in urban areas who experienced a specific form of crime once or more than once in 1996. The surveys followed the same methods for obtaining cross-country comparability, and the results were weighted to make the samples representative. CEE/CIS refers to the 19 transition countries listed. "New World" includes the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The estimates for Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are based on selected countries.

Source: Zvekic (1998).

The survey gathered information about property crimes and crimes that involved the threat of personal injury – assault, robbery and burglary. As Figure 5.5 shows, responses from the transition countries indicate relatively high victimization rates, and, overall, these present a rather flat pattern across the region (with a few exceptions like Hungary and Estonia).

This perspective on crime is notably different from that presented by the reported crime rates in Figures 5.1 and 5.3, where the range among countries is much greater and the subregional patterns are more pronounced. This suggests that there is a gap between actual crime and reported crime and that the relative size of the gap varies among countries, dependent on a number of factors, as noted above.

The picture that emerges from the victim survey in the transition countries is that the prevalence rates of victims of crime are similar to those in industrialized countries, but the rates of reporting crimes is much lower than in industrialized countries; the reporting rates are more comparable, in fact, to those in developing countries.

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the region, as noted above, the figure shows that young adult crime is much more common than juvenile crime in the Caucasus and in the Central Asian countries represented.

Figure 5.7 offers another view of age and crime by using data from the late 1990s to present crime rates among various age groups in four transition countries. It confirms that the commission of crimes is more frequent among young adults than among juveniles. It also shows that, consistent with international findings, crime rates in Russia and Lithuania peak within the 18-24 age group and then decline. Interestingly, in Armenia and Tajikistan, crime rates peak in the 25-29 age group. This reflects the evidence put forward above that crime may be underreported in the Caucasus and Central Asia and suggests that offending by youth – inhibited and managed through family and social controls – surfaces later in adulthood.

A closer examination of the age structure of juvenile offenders in the region shows that, in most countries for which data are available, older juveniles (age 16-17) are more criminally active than younger ones (age 14-15). In Latvia and Lithuania, for example, the share of older juveniles is 1.5 to 2 times greater than the share of younger perpetrators. The same pattern emerges in Slovenia; in Russia in 1998, older juveniles committed 72 percent of all juvenile crimes.

However, particularly troubling evidence suggests that there has been a disproportionate increase in the number of very young offenders, those under age 14, though data are scarce. In Georgia in 1998, offenders under 14 accounted for more than 7 percent of all registered crimes. In Russia, the estimated share of very young offenders in recent years has been one-third in total crimes.

Figure 5.6



Young adult crime rates compared to juvenile crime rates in 12 countries, 1998 (juvenile crime rate=100)

Note: Young adults are 18-24 years old, and juveniles are 14-17 years old except in Poland, where young adults are 17-24 and juveniles are 13-16, and in Estonia, where juveniles are 13-17.

Source: MONEE project database.

Figure 5.7



Crime rates by age group in Russia, Lithuania, Armenia, and Tajikistan, late 1990s (perpetrators per 100,000 relevant population)

Note: Data refer to 1998 for Russia, Lithuania and Tajikistan and 1996 for Armenia. For Lithuania and Tajikistan "30-49" refers to people 30 and above. The number of perpetrators differs from the number of crimes because one person may commit more than one crime or a number of persons may commit a single crime in alliance.

Sources: MONEE project database; Goskomstat (1999a); MSRA (1998); MIAL (1999).

Data from the region do not yet suggest an unduly high incidence of repeat offences, although this is clearly rising. Recidivism among juveniles in Belarus more than doubled between 1989 and 1998, involving 15 percent of all registered young offenders in 1998. In the Czech Republic, the share of repeat offenders among juveniles also climbed, exceeding 20 percent in 1996, 1997 and 1998. In Estonia in 1998, 23 percent of juveniles charged with a criminal offence were repeat offenders.

This raises the question of whether the "experimental" brushes with the law common in early adolescence are, in fact, leading to more chronic criminal behaviour among youth in the region. This bears investigation in light of the growing risks, weakened protective factors and lack of early intervention strategies and services, an environment discussed below. The question also calls attention to the efficacy of the inherited juvenile justice systems in integrating offenders into society.

Around the world, breaking the law is predominantly a male phenomenon. Evidence from the UK, for example, shows that, in 1997, males made up 83 percent of offenders for all age groups. In the transition region, too, males are overrepresented and consistently account for 90-95 percent of juvenile offenders in all countries for which data are available.

Evidence suggests, however, that the number and the share of girls coming into conflict with the law have recently begun to rise, especially in the northern and western parts of the region – a trend found also in some industrialized countries. In Hungary, for instance, the number of girl offenders increased by 20 percent between 1994 and 1998, while the total juvenile crime rate was levelling out. In Russia, the number of girls brought to Offices of Internal Affairs (the OVD) was 2.5 times higher in 1998 than in 1993, whereas the registered juvenile crime rate declined over the same period. Girls are still committing far fewer crimes than boys, but the fact they are gaining ground is disturbing. This "catching up" by girls has also been observed for other risk-taking behaviours, such as smoking and substance abuse, as Chapter 2 describes.

This phenomenon has not been evident in the Caucasus or Central Asia. Since the onset of the transition, societies in these subregions have tended to maintain and sometimes even strengthen traditions which exert stronger social control over the behaviour of girls than they do over the behaviour of boys, resulting in tighter ties to the household and not much deviancy among girls. The number and the share of girls registered by inspectorates in juvenile cases in Azerbaijan, for instance, have fallen and constituted only 2 percent of all registered juveniles in 1998.

The Regional Monitoring Reports pay close attention to gender inequities and point to opportunities to redress historical imbalances. In the case of juvenile crime, the gender gap is being closed because of the expanding role of young female offenders. This is patently the wrong direction and requires public policies which confront the root causes of both male prominence in crime and growing female participation.

The changing nature of youth crime

Youth crime has not only become more prevalent in the region during the transition, but it has also changed in nature. Property crimes account for more than two-thirds of juvenile crimes in all countries for which data are available. However, the share of violent crimes by young people is likewise expanding in many countries.

Homicides, rapes, aggravated assaults, and grievous bodily harm committed by juveniles have become more frequent in the majority of countries for which data are available. In some countries, the rise in violent juvenile crimes has been greater than the rise in property crimes. The biggest increases have been in Poland, where violent crime rates among juveniles have quadrupled, and in Bulgaria, where they have more than tripled. In Lithuania, the share of violent juvenile crimes has been growing during the transition, nearly tripling in recent years: violent crimes now constitute more than 20 percent of all juvenile crimes, the highest share in the region. In 1998, recorded juvenile violence was tending to stabilize in these Baltic States and CEE countries, albeit at the new, higher levels.

In the CIS, register data show a decline in the violent crimes committed by juveniles, most notably in Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. Evidence suggests, however, that young people in these countries, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia, are more frequently committing aggressive and violent acts. A recent study has found, for instance, that violence was strongly underreported in Moldova, especially violence against women and, in particular, rape.

In the region during the transition Russia has had the highest juvenile homicide rates, a relatively well-documented and unambiguous source of evidence on violence. The peak rate for the whole region – 29.7 homicides per 100,000 males aged 14-17 – was registered there in 1994. In the late 1990s, the juvenile homicide rate also exceeded 20 per 100,000 relevant male population in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Lithuania, a rate three or more times higher than the rates in Central Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the US the peak for male juvenile homicide rates was considerably greater, at 52.2 per 100,000 in 1993. This puts the rates in the transition region into perspective.

Figure 5.8 shows changes in juvenile homicide rates and total homicide rates between 1989 and 1998 in the 18 transition countries for which data are available. The figure provides clear evidence for 12 countries of the mounting violence perpetrated by juveniles. Even more striking is the fact that in most of the countries the rise in juvenile homicides exceeded the change in total homicides. It is a universal experience that the vast majority of homicides are committed by males.

Figure 5.9 illustrates two scenarios: in Poland, violent juvenile crime rates more than tripled from 1991 to 1994, easily surpassing young adult rates; in Ukraine, by contrast, violence was being committed more frequently by young adults than by juveniles, and this pattern has become more evident during the transition. Studies conducted in other regions of the world have found that violent crimes are being committed largely by youth on the threshold of adulthood.

Another significant change in the nature of crime committed by youth is the expanding involvement of youth in the illicit drug trade and drug use, as Chapter 2 describes. Some Central Asian countries, in particular, have become both producers of drugs and major portals for drugs from Asia, notably Afghanistan, to other parts of the region, to Western Europe and beyond.

Recent studies in the region have found that drugs are a mounting problem among youth both as users and as perpetrators of drug-related crimes. The number of registered drug-related crimes in Kazakhstan rose from very low levels at the outset of the transition to

Figure 5.8

Changes in total homicide rates and juvenile homicide rates, 1989-98 (per 100,000 relevant male population, 1989=100)



Source: MONEE project database.

Note: First year is 1990 for Romania and Ukraine, 1991 for Bulgaria and 1993 for Croatia and Estonia. In Poland juveniles are 13-16 years old. In Estonia, they were defined as 15-17 year-olds in 1993 and 13-17 year-olds in 1998. Homicide data for Estonia, Lithuania and Turkmenistan include attempts.

Figure 5.9

Violent crimes committed by juveniles and young adults in Poland and Ukraine (per 100,000 relevant population)



Source: MONEE project database.

Note: The age groups for Poland are 13-16 and 17-24 and for Ukraine, 14-17 and 18-24.

13,000 in 1995 and almost 19,000 in 1998. Evidence suggests that the pattern of juvenile crime activity in nearby Kyrgyzstan has recently become strongly influenced by the growth in drug use. A 1998 study for UNAIDS estimated that half the population of the city of Osh in that country was "connected with the maintenance of the 'viability' of the existing narcotics route" through the area.

In Slovenia, where drug use among young people has been expanding, the increasing association of juveniles in illegal drug production and the drug trade has also become apparent. There is evidence of similar developments in FR Yugoslavia and of a rapid rise in drug-related crimes in the Baltic States. In Bulgaria, the number of identified perpetrators of drug-related crimes more than quadrupled from 1996 to 1998 (Table 5.2). These crimes were committed mainly by young adults, with the growing involvement of juveniles.

In Russia, the number of registered drug-related crimes committed by juveniles increased from 3,500 in 1993 to 11,200 in 1998. Numbers soared in 1997, doubling from the previous year. This type of crime is also a serious juvenile problem in Ukraine, as Table 5.3 shows, with high and growing rates in recent years.

Table 5.2

Perpetrators of drug-related crimes by age, Bulgaria, 1996-98
(absolute numbers)

	Total	14-17	18-30	31-40	Over 40
1996	175	8	113	26	28
1997	360	39	227	53	41
1998	770	122	467	91	90

Source: Kitanov (1999).

Table 5.3

Drug-related juvenile crimes in Russia and Ukraine

	Absolute number				Increase (1995=100)		
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1996	1997	1998
Russia	4.570	5.527	10,205	11,179	120.9	223.3	244.6
Ukraine	799	1,013	1,036	1,189	126.8	129.7	148.8

Sources: MONEE project database; MLSD (1998); SSCU (1998).

The 1999 Regional Monitoring Report, "Women in Transition", calls attention to a similar burgeoning in the sex trade in the region, one that involves not only greater activity in the transition countries, but "exports" to Western Europe and other regions, including trafficking in human beings. This insidious industry overlaps with the drug trade and disproportionately affects young people, especially young women, exposing them to greater risks both as perpetrators and as victims.

Notwithstanding the caution with which data have to be interpreted, the findings in this section send a clear message: the climbing numbers and the changing nature of youth crimes deserve more in-depth investigation and action regarding the circumstances that foster and promote this perilous environment. ■

5.2 Greater Risks, Weaker Protection for Youth

Crime prevention is a vital component of justice policy. Numerous studies have shown that the propensity to offend is shaped by the interaction of a variety of positive and negative factors at the level of the individual, family and society. Poverty, social disadvantage, family dysfunction, low self-esteem, and inappropriate public policies for coping with "at risk" youth can contribute to behaviour which brings young people into contact with the justice system. On the other hand, socio-economic security, close intrafamily relationships, attachment to school, and constructive use of free time contribute to high self-esteem and positive participation in society.

A large body of evidence presented in this and earlier Regional Monitoring Reports shows that social and economic stress has exacerbated the negative factors described above. A broad range of prevention and intervention strategies, as described in Box 5.4, are needed to address the worrisome combination of greater risks and weakened protection that young people in the region face. However, the transition process has also created new opportunities for positive change.

Changes in social and family risk factors

The higher registered level of juvenile crime and the relatively high level of criminality found by international victim surveys for transition countries call out for in-depth studies and empirical research into the ways youth are being affected both as perpetrators and as victims of crime. Such studies, which would no doubt help identify and document the social determinants of youth crime, are largely missing in the transition region, though they are essential to the development of preventive and protective policies. The need for research is especially keen because there is ample evidence that the social and economic conditions which may contribute to youth crime have become worse since the transition began.

It is a commonly held view, for example, that economic needs and desires can prompt people to take up crime. A recent study in Latvia, carried out by the Criminological Research Centre, found that 82 percent of respondents considered unemployment and low income the main causes of juvenile delinquency. Large falls in economic output have entailed poor job prospects and persis-

Box 5.4

Countering juvenile crime: prevention and intervention

Efforts to counter the conditions that precipitate unlawful behaviour can be made at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. On all three levels, most countries in the region have been confronted by formidable challenges since the transition began. Yet, though the collapse of authoritarian governments has been accompanied by instability over the short term, the removal of oppression has also freed up space and energy for building systems, processes and structures anew.

- *Primary prevention.* This broadest level of protection – national policies and programmes that contribute to economic well-being, social justice and an inclusive society – includes opportunities for education, employment and social mobility that meet the expectations of young people. A supportive environment for private initiative and entrepreneurship, labour rights, social security benefits, youth associations and other non-governmental organizations, and after-school cultural and leisure facilities are also part of this basic level of protection, as is a well-defined and accepted system of civic values.
- *Secondary prevention.* This is the constellation of positive measures that creates a "safety net" able to benefit those persons who have been identified as being "at special risk". While some elements of the primary prevention system were abundant under communism, these individual secondary supports and intermediary services were largely absent. They include appropriate monitoring systems and a wide range of family and youth support and counselling services that reach out to the most marginalized and at-risk young people in an attempt to remedy the conditions which can foster offending.
- *Tertiary prevention.* This tactical layer is basically reactive, responding to offenders with a view to avoiding recidivism. It requires measures specifically targeting persons in conflict with the law. Again at this level, the policies and structures inherited from the communist past have proved inadequate to meet the new social environment of the transition, characterized by new patterns and levels of offending. Particular attention must be paid to the development of positive, non-custodial sentencing options that serve to prevent the further marginalization of young offenders and, in conjunction with after-care services, favour the reintegration and participation of these young people in society.

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tent unemployment for many young people in much of the region and may create greater vulnerability to offending among youth. Certainly, it is tempting to link the big rises in youth unemployment rates in Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States to the higher levels of juvenile crime registered in those countries.

Nonetheless, youth crime does not necessarily exhibit a strong association with youth unemployment, as the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland show. In the Czech Republic, registered youth crime has climbed by more than 60 percent during the transition, despite only modest long-term unemployment among youth, a recovery in real wages and only moderate increases in income inequality. Poland, on the other hand, has experienced much higher youth unemployment, but a smaller rise, 30 percent, in juvenile crime. In terms of poverty, the poorest 10 percent of the Czech population endured a 17 percent decrease in real income levels between 1989 and 1997, while the poorest 10 percent in Poland suffered a 50 percent drop during the same period.

It therefore appears that, while poverty may be a factor in youth crime, it is not the only factor and perhaps not even the most pivotal one. Among the social factors that matter, family cohesion and supportive social environments play a powerful preventive role against the involvement of young people in high-risk behaviour, as research in a number of Western countries has demonstrated.

Within the family, both parental presence at home and attachment to family members are important. Living in dysfunctional families – characterized by conflict, inadequate parental control, weak intergenerational ties, and premature autonomy – is closely associated with delinquency. Peer pressure (including siblings) is also very important, as is connectedness to teachers and school. A UK study involving a self-reporting survey among adolescents found that, keeping other factors constant, the strongest correlates of offending were contact with delinquent peers, truancy and low parental supervision. Among those who reported weak or medium intrafamily relationships, 70 percent of males and 33 percent of females acknowledged that they had committed a criminal offence; these shares were halved among youth reporting a strong family attachment.

With the general lack of stability that has accompanied the transition, a growing number of families have fallen into distress, if not crisis. In Poland, research indicates that about half of young perpetrators come from broken homes; the share of young offenders from incomplete families in Slovakia and Slovenia is also significant.

Living in a single-parent family is recognized as a factor in offending in Latvia. However, research in the West has repeatedly found that single-parent and step-parent families are not in and of themselves associated with children who offend. What matters is the parental capacity and willingness to supervise and support children and the qual-

Voices of Youth 14

Leaving institutional care: an anxious time for vulnerable young people

When youth have become wards of the state, the passage from childhood to adulthood is particularly trying, and the passage from the institutional setting to independence in society is an especially vulnerable time. These voices have been gathered from focus-group sessions and individual interviews in Romania among youth who were in institutions or who had recently left institutional care. They reflect attitudes and anxieties about finding work, a home and a place in the world, and they illustrate the intergenerational nature of social marginalization.

- "I don't get anything out of [financial advice], since I don't have any money." (Edi, 18)
- "I would like to apply for an allowance, but I don't know how to go about it." (Emerich, 17)
- "Pretty often, violence is unavoidable." (Paul, 18)
- "I try to listen to what others say about [health risks]. I suppose sexually transmitted diseases could be a big threat." (Adrian, 19)
- "We live in an aggressive environment. Drugs are a bad part of it. We've got to know how to protect ourselves." (Angela, 17)
- "I don't want children. I don't like them." (Ana-Maria, 17)
- "You have to start from scratch: home, family. . . . You have to get rid of the habits of 'flock' life." (Razvan, 19)
- "You have to begin with gathering things, starting with teaspoons. . . ." (Gheorghe, 19)

between parents and children.
region, recent studies in Georgia
deprived of parental control and
at risk of offending; in some cases
children to commit crimes. In
enders most often come from fam-
and family cohesion are low.
nal Monitoring Report, "Children
nd Eastern Europe: Perils and
nce the transition began, higher
juveniles in the region are being
ts and are suffering abuse and vio-
actors which contribute to a strong
Children in disadvantaged fami-
es for legitimate employment and
cial exclusion are overrepresented
plight of ethnic minorities and
displaced persons and refugees in
ecially distressing.
haviour endangers the physical or
, the conventional solution in the
ve the children and place them in
ren suffering from inappropriate
utions – as Human Rights Watch,
has documented in Romania and
rt 2000 – are at high risk of offend-
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have to leave institutional care at
14).
to the vacuum that exists in most
he secondary levels of prevention
context of family, school and the
keep a bad situation among chil-
worse. It also speaks to the lack of
as international standards require,
of intervention, institutionaliza-
ites policy in the region, creating
people who leave public care ill
t adult life.
lack of legislation to protect them
as a consequence, the lack of a
ssist those who leave institutional
e provider at a government insti-
rviewed for this Report. Without
abilitation in children's homes to
rate in society, there is a strong
oung people will return to state
prisons.
describe the growing numbers of
dropouts in the region since the
large numbers of youth who are
ucation, nor working. This trend
cs in the CIS countries, where the
youth who commit offences is still
about one-third of the offenders
ecent years neither attend school,
the share is above 35 percent. In Russia, the ranks of those adolescents who, through their actions, their friends, or simply their environments, have somehow caught the attention of the authorities have swelled 2.5 times during the transition, to about 100,000 persons. Figure 5.10 illustrates the trend in Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, where the number of crimes committed by juveniles had doubled by the mid-1990s and has remained at the higher levels.

As Western research has established, there is a link among school attendance, connectedness to teachers and involvement in crime or other negative behaviours. This

Figure 5.10



The rise in crime among juveniles out of school and out of work, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, 1990-98 (1990=100)

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: Data for Belarus and Moldova refer to the number of perpetrators and for Georgia to the number of crimes.

Table 5.4

Attitudes among 14 year-olds towards a "friend" committing a crime, by family economic status and mother's educational level
(percent of respondents)

	Poor family, poorly educated mother	Poor family, highly educated mother	Affluent family, poorly educated mother	Affluent family, highly educated mother
Reject behaviour	47	40	41	48
Understand behaviour	31	42	20	28
No clear opinion	22	18	39	24

Source: Shunghina (1999).

Note: The sample study comprised interviews with ninth-grade students from poor and affluent families. Questions were framed so as to gain insight into the students' own propensity to commit blackmail, fraud and theft or other property crimes.

points to the importance of addressing risk-taking behaviours among young people by strengthening the role of schools in fostering personal development and social cohesion.

Changing values and changing behaviours

During a time of rapid social change and unstable conditions such as those accompanying the transition, young people are more vulnerable to coming into conflict with the law: all of society is adapting to new realities, and previously established social norms and taboos are being widely challenged.

Their ties to family and school weakened, a greater number of young people in the region are seeking a feeling of connection and belonging by joining or setting up groups or even organized gangs. In association, youth have a high propensity for committing offences, usually acting together and often after excessive alcohol consumption. These spontaneous gangs of young people also attract the attention of those adults wishing to engage youth in criminal activities. So, a desire for community can lead some young people to become members of the criminal community.

In Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine in the mid-1990s, for example, only 20 percent of the juveniles who committed crimes were acting alone. The rest were acting in groups, on occasion with adults. In Poland, two-thirds of the identified juvenile offenders had been acting in association with peers or adults. In Estonia, 74 percent of the juveniles convicted of criminal offences in 1998 had been acting as members of groups.

Indirect evidence of the recruitment of young people by adults for criminal activity can be found in the number of registered crimes for which juveniles are charged with adults. In Russia, for instance, the number of these crimes tripled between 1990 and 1998, reaching 20,000 cases, in 1998, of adults who were charged for crimes involving children. Organized crime, including the illicit drug trade, has contributed significantly to this trend. A 1998 report for UNAIDS stated that, in Kazakhstan, "drug dealers widely involve minors (under 16) in the drug business."

There is also troubling evidence about the attitudes of young people in the region towards breaking the law – a lack of concern or of respect by a substantial share of youth that no doubt mirrors broader attitudes in society. A recent survey in Georgia that asked young people about their attitude towards the law found that only 20 percent were generally positive; 32 percent would obey "justifiable" laws, and 27 percent would contest any "restrictive" law.

A 1997 study in Russia found that 27 percent of 17 year-olds considered it acceptable to earn money by violating the law. Another study among 14 year-olds in Russia that same year found that – regardless of family status in terms of income and education – less than half the respondents would reject the behaviour of friends who committed crimes. A surprisingly large number of young people had no clear opinion or even understood the behaviour of those who commit offences like blackmail, fraud and theft (Table 5.4). Interestingly, the one notable difference among teens from various socio-economic backgrounds was that teens in low-income families with well-educated mothers were twice as likely to approve actively of crime as those in affluent families with poorly educated mothers. This appears to support arguments that the worsening in the relative status of many families during the transition – rather than mere family poverty – is influencing youth attitudes towards lawbreaking.

Studies reveal that, in a growing number of cases, young offenders in transition countries like Bulgaria or Hungary say that committing property crimes is a better alternative than finding a job. In Lithuania, a survey conducted among offenders found that the main reason given for committing crimes was that crime was a "way of life". Voices of Youth 15 provides insights into the motivation of young people in conflict with the law. ■

Voices of Youth 15

Turning to crime: why do young people offend?

In focus groups conducted for this Report, young offenders in two reform schools in the Czech Republic talk about why they had committed crimes.

- "I enjoy stealing. I like it." (Milan, 17)
- "You could make ends meet, but what kind of life is that? You can't afford a lot of things – entertainment, good quality shoes and clothes – you have to be very modest." (Jarda, 16)
- "It's important what kind of friends you have. Once you have been part of a gang, you get bored with normal people." (Martin, 18)
- "Everyone wants to get the respect of the others in the gang; others will follow . . . ." (Jarda, 16)
- "You feel you are different." (Libor, 17)
- "I started because I felt that my family saw me as scum and good for nothing. Later, I started enjoying it; I needed more money." (Petr, 19)

5.3 Public Policy Responses to Young Offenders

The rise in youth crime in the region has taken place in an environment of broader social and economic changes which have affected families, communities, employment opportunities, social values, civil society, and the role of the state. Attitudes, behaviours and policy strategies in each of these areas can have an impact, positive or negative, on young people coming into conflict with the law.

This section looks specifically at how countries are responding to youth crime through their justice systems and whether these responses are effective, respect human rights and follow international guidelines and principles.

According to the 1985 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the aims of juvenile justice are to "emphasize the well-being of the juvenile" and "ensure that any reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the offenders and the offence". The rules also state that "strictly punitive approaches are not appropriate."

The reference points change dramatically, however, for young adults. As of their 18th birthday, young people are invariably dealt with under the "generic" justice system, where emphasis is at least as much on punishment as on rehabilitation and where the standards of protection are lower. This poses problems for the simultaneous examination of the situations of juveniles and of young adults in conflict with the law – the age ranges covered by this Report. However, international standards provide justification for applying a juvenile justice "lens" to young adults, and this chapter adopts such a perspective.

Justice systems in transition

The transition countries have been faced with tremendous tasks – and opportunities – in rebuilding their justice systems to align with the shift to democratic societies. Often concurrently, this involves, notably: reviewing and reforming laws, law enforcement and the judiciary; training and retraining the variety of professionals concerned; creating new instruments for preventing crime and dispensing justice, and securing resources to implement the new legislative provisions and policy decisions. Not surprisingly, the results of such a vast enterprise have been checkered, as the findings of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, summarized in Box 5.5, indicate. When confronting the "new face" of crime in the region, resource-strapped governments with a vast range of transition-related problems to resolve have relied largely on inherited responses and infrastructures.

Most countries in the region have at least amended and some have overhauled the fundamental legislation affecting juvenile justice, particularly during the second half of the 1990s. Bulgaria has adopted amendments to the penal code and enacted a new law for combating and preventing juvenile delinquency, and the Czech Republic and Ukraine have both taken steps to protect children's rights through reforms in penal codes.

New or modified penal or civil codes have also been adopted in Albania (1995), Poland (1998), Russia (1996), and Georgia (1997), and revised codes of criminal procedure have been approved in, for example, Russia and Georgia. Usually, one aim of the revision process is to ensure that international standards are well reflected in the texts. Thus, the new Polish penal code places special emphasis on non-custodial measures for juveniles, and the Lithuanian Code of Criminal Law envisions a special system of sanctions for juveniles. Azerbaijan and Georgia, among other nations, are in the process of reviewing the legislative provisions relating specifically to juvenile offenders.

There are also cases where new legislation may be seen as going in the opposite direction. Reforms to criminal codes in some Central Asian countries, for instance, have resulted in harsher maximum sentences for most types of offences, and, correspondingly, there is an apparent hardening of the judicial response to "habitual" petty offenders. Similarly, Russia's 1996 criminal code expands the list of "serious" offences for which the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 14 rather than 16. Reportedly, Slovakia is considering lowering the age of responsibility in response to an increase in serious crimes by younger children.

Contact with the justice system has long-term consequences for young people, and every point of contact, from the moment of arrest to the final decision of the court, is crucial to the success or failure of the intervention.

It is useful to map out the dimensions of the discussion on youth justice in transition countries. There are generally three distinct age groups to consider in regard to young people in conflict with the law: children under 14, juveniles aged 14-17 and youth aged 18-24. There are two primary avenues for dealing with young people in conflict with law: the courts and non-judicial bodies such as the commissions for youth affairs or the equivalent entities that exist in many transition countries. Generally, young people over 18 are dealt with through the courts; children under 14 are handled by non-judicial mechanisms, and juveniles can be processed through either. This last "grey area" requires particular attention, since it means that juveniles in different jurisdictions may be treated quite differently for the same type of offence, and it raises questions about how "appropriate" are the responses in terms of international standards on juvenile justice.

Furthermore, jurisdictions assign varying degrees of "seriousness" to similar types of offences, so that the same act of offending may be considered non-criminal in one country and a serious criminal offence in another. Again, the juvenile age group seems the most likely to get caught up in this discretionary middle ground.

Finally, there are two main sentencing options: deprivation of liberty and non-deprivation of liberty. There is reason for particular concern regarding the age and the type

Box 5.5

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reviews juvenile justice in the transition region

So far, 20 countries in the transition region of Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic States have submitted initial reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. As of June 2000, 16 of these reports had been reviewed.

In general, the Committee's assessments have been critical, calling overall juvenile justice "a matter of concern" in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. It has commented positively on law reform in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, and Ukraine, and Russia was commended in a 1993 review for its stated intention to establish juvenile and family courts, but then chastised in a 1999 progress review for failing to realize that goal. Among those countries reviewed, the only transition country that has escaped comment, positive or negative, is Croatia.

Some of the main needs pinpointed by the Committee are highlighted below. It should be noted that the Committee, in its remarks and recommendations, is not always consistent among countries and over time and that some reviews date from the early 1990s. Furthermore, often the Committee has naturally commented in most detail on those reports which have been the most informative and self-critical.

- *A comprehensive review and reform of the juvenile justice system in the spirit of international standards:* particular attention is needed in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, and Russia.
- *Training on relevant international standards for judges, law enforcement officials, correctional officers, and social workers:* particular attention is needed in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and FR Yugoslavia.
- *Better protection of the rights of children deprived of their liberty:* particular attention is needed in Armenia (with special reference to the length of pre-trial detention, the limited access to visitors during that period, the length of sentences, and the conditions of detention, including non-separation from adults), Azerbaijan ("corrective labour institutions"), Georgia (the conditions of detention, including inadequate food, clothing, heating, educational opportunities, and leisure activities), Hungary (ill-treatment in detention centres), Kyrgyzstan (the length of pre-trial detention, the limited access to visitors and the non-separation from adults during that period, and the length and conditions of detention as a sentence, including inadequate food, clothing, medical care, and educational and leisure activities), Poland, Slovenia (the length of pre-trial detention), Russia (the length of pre-trial detention, the conditions in pre-trial detention facilities and special educational establishments, the treatment in educational colonies, and the conditions in prisons in general), Ukraine ("correctional labour colonies"), and FR Yugoslavia (pre-trial detention).
- *An independent and accessible complaints system for detained juveniles:* particular attention is needed in Georgia, Russia and FR Yugoslavia.
- *Less recourse to deprivation of liberty, development of alternative measures:* particular attention is needed in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, and Russia.
- *Adequate respect for the child's right to prompt legal assistance and judicial review:* particular attention is needed in Armenia (access to legal aid), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Kyrgyzstan (access to legal aid).
- *Adequate respect for the views of the child in court proceedings:* particular attention is needed in Armenia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
- *Eliminating, in the justice system, stigmatization of particularly vulnerable groups of children, such as Roma:* particular attention is needed in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
- *More attention to preventive measures:* particular attention is needed in Poland and Ukraine.

Among other country-specific concerns of the Committee:

- Azerbaijan: the lack of an appropriate and independent monitoring system for all types of detention centres and the need for disaggregated data and appropriate indicators to assess the situation of children.
- Russia (1999 review): police brutality and the torture of juveniles detained during the investigation of alleged offences.
- Ukraine: inadequate respect for fundamental rights and legal safeguards in all aspects of the juvenile justice system and the full independence and impartiality of juvenile judges.
- FR Yugoslavia: lack of protection of the rights of the child during investigation procedures.

Clearly, many of these issues, though raised in relation to given countries, are, in fact, of wider concern in the region. Likewise, the highlighting of particular issues does not set a limit to the scope of change needed. Countries in the transition region and, indeed, around the world have much to accomplish in order to breathe the spirit of the Convention into their juvenile justice systems.

Note: Countries which have submitted initial reports not yet reviewed by the Committee (as of 15 June 2000): Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Tajikistan. Countries which have not yet submitted initial reports (as of 15 June 2000): Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

of offence for which deprivation of liberty is the response. In general, there is also concern over the degree to which responses, of whatever sort, are in reality constructive.

The differences between court hearings for juveniles and those for adults are much the same in the region today as they were before the transition: proceedings involving juveniles are held in camera; parents are obliged to be present; the potential sentences are either less severe, or more sentencing options are available, and, in theory at least, access to legal counsel is automatic. The lack of special training to deal with young people and the lack of familiarity with the rights of young people are pervasive, although attempts are being undertaken to ensure that all judges and professionals have the proper understanding of relevant youth issues.

International standards do not explicitly require the establishment of separate courts for juveniles, but do demand that states promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities, and institutions specifically relevant to children. All Western democracies have courts for young offenders that involve a distinct setting and specially trained personnel, as well as unique procedures and tailored sentencing options. Such courts have existed in the transition region, for example in Poland, but have been more the exception than the rule, particularly in the CIS countries, though the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are among those which have expressed a desire to establish a special juvenile court system when resources become available.

Prior to the communist system, Bulgaria relied on designated judges and prosecutors in major cities to deal with juvenile cases, and efforts are now under way to reinstate this scheme. Russia has a number of specialized judges, too. However, such an approach is often difficult to implement. Albania is a hard case in point: abolished as "unnecessary" under communism, the Ministry of Justice was reinstituted in 1991, and courts were set up in each of the country's 36 districts. Unfortunately, a third of these courts were disabled or destroyed during civil unrest in 1997, and the justice system is only beginning to recover. A World Bank study that year showed that many district court judges were new graduates in their early 20s who had no practical experience. The country's first graduating class of judges and prosecutors from a newly established school for magistrates was expected in 2000. A start has also been made in the adoption of special provisions for juveniles through the creation of family sections in courts in the main cities and steps, as yet unrealized, to assign specially qualified judges in juvenile cases.

A viable court-based juvenile justice system requires a substantial financial investment and a supportive environment. This means not only special courts, but also the availability of specialized professionals, programmes and facilities aimed at prevention and intervention before and after the court appearance of an individual juvenile offender. The existence of sentencing options is particularly important, especially alternatives to the deprivation of liberty.

Sentencing and the deprivation of liberty

The deprivation of liberty – defined according to international standards as placement in any kind of facility, penal or not, from which the person concerned cannot leave at will – at any point in juvenile justice processes is an issue of grave concern. International standards call for the use of detention only as a last resort and for the shortest time possible.

It can be persuasively argued that custody exacerbates the propensity to re-offend. As Martin, 18, an offender in a Czech corrective facility, said in focus-group research carried out for this Report: "Prison has changed me, but in a negative way – I now know how to behave real bad." There are certainly legitimate concerns about the impact of conditions in state facilities on young offenders.

A 1995 survey on secondary school-age children in Ukraine revealed the staggering scope of physical and sexual abuse among adolescents living in the institutions of the Ministry of the Interior, with 50 percent of adolescents reporting unwanted sexual contact, and as many as 30 percent reporting having been raped. Several of the HIV epidemics noted in Chapter 2 that swelled the number of HIV-infected people in the CIS began in prisons, where young male adults can be particularly vulnerable to abusive practices.

Although conditions vary greatly, problems include overcrowding, poor nutrition and lack of medical supplies. Regimes can be harsh, making use of punishments prohibited according to international standards. UNICEF surveys have found that solitary confinement is allowed in all five Central Asian countries; corporal punishment and reduced food rations are permitted in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and family visits are restricted in all these countries except Kazakhstan. As recently as late 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture expressed concern about the health status of the detainees and the inadequate food, clothing and footwear in two juvenile correctional facilities in Kyrgyzstan.

The deprivation of liberty of young people is not only an outcome of sentencing, but can and does take place before trial. In Kyrgyzstan, all boys charged with "serious" offences, which in that country include minor property offences, are detained in a wing of the youth penal colony to await court appearance. They are allowed just one hour of daily exercise outside their cells and have no access to educational facilities, nor rights to family visits. Worse, the average pre-trial detention period for accused juveniles in 1997 was six months. Similarly, pre-trial custody for juveniles in Albania can run to eight months or more, and of special concern is the practice of detaining juveniles along with accused adults in overcrowded and unhygienic facilities, although the juveniles are allowed family visits fortnightly.

Following reviews in 1994 and 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture severely criticized Russian authorities for heavy-handed use of pre-trial detention, especially of first-time offenders, and for the "life-threatening" and "torturous" conditions of detention. The Special Rapporteur found that there had been no improvements on either count between the reviews. The recourse to pre-trial detention for juveniles in Romania has been a cause of similar concern. For their part, Bulgarian authorities have conceded that penal proceedings often continue well beyond the time limits allowed by law and that the long period of pre-trial detention can lead to serious conflicts between juvenile detainees and staff in the correctional homes where the juveniles are remanded.

The deprivation of liberty can also be the final outcome of judicial proceedings: the sentence. Although judges have some discretion in sentencing, evidence in a number of transition countries, including Romania and Russia, shows that children as young as 14 have been sentenced to long periods of deprivation of liberty for minor offences such as petty theft, even when it is a first offence.

Comparing evidence on sentencing patterns from country to country over time can be difficult, yet there are some observable trends in the region.

Prior to the transition, courts in most countries relied heavily on two types of sanction: the deprivation of liberty and the threat thereof, that is, a form of suspended sentence often involving reporting to and surveillance by authorities. With the exception of some Central and Southeastern European countries, including former Yugoslavia, non-custodial options were rare.

Today, the availability of sentencing options other than the deprivation of liberty (actual or "suspended") varies greatly, and so, consequently, does the recourse to custodial sentences. In countries where probation services exist, they tend to be frequently used in addition to or instead of custody. For example, Russian authorities report that, from 1992 to 1996, recourse to probation more than doubled, accounting for 16 to 35 percent of juvenile cases. In Hungary in 1997, 61 percent of juvenile offenders were put on probation; in Poland, the share was 40-50 percent, with another 20 percent placed under the "accountable supervision of parents or guardians".

In contrast, Albania has no probation option and relies heavily on the deprivation of liberty, with no less than 80 percent of juveniles convicted of penal offences in the first nine months of 1999 receiving custodial sentences, compared to 8 percent in Hungary in 1997, for example. Functional probation services remain unavailable in many countries, including Georgia, Lithuania and Kazakhstan. In these three countries in 1998, judges ordered custodial sentences for almost one-third of the convicted juvenile offenders (28 percent, 31 percent and 31 percent, respectively). Nonetheless, in Lithuania, this represented a substantial improvement over the situation just two years earlier, when almost half (47 percent) of the sentences involved the deprivation of liberty.

When probation is unavailable, the recourse to suspended sentences, with or without supervision, is gaining favour in many countries. In Estonia and Kazakhstan, two-thirds of the juvenile sentences in 1998 were suspended, as were the majority of cases in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. In contrast, the increasing reliance on probation in Russia in 1992-96 was accompanied by a drop in the use of suspended sentences from 70 percent to 33 percent rather than by a substantial fall in imprisonment rates, which declined only from 30 percent to 25 percent.

Though suspended sentences avoid the problem of incarceration and can be effective deterrents, they still do not constitute "positive sentencing". Though not exhaustive, Table 5.5 shows that many countries are making efforts through penal codes to establish or expand non-custodial penalties, including apologies to vic-

Table 5.5

Various non-custodial sentencing options available in the transition countries

	Warning	Reprimand	Apology	Compensation	Fine	Community service	Restrictions	Supervision	Suspended sentence / conditional discharge	Probation
Czech Republic					√	√√		√√	√√	
Poland			√	√				√		√√
Hungary					√	√			√√	√√
Slovenia		√			√		√	√		
Croatia								√		
FYR Macedonia	√							√		
FR Yugoslavia								√√		
Bulgaria	√	√	√	√		√		√	√	
Romania		√							√√	
Estonia	√		√			√			√√	
Latvia				√	√	√				
Lithuania			√	√	√	√	√	√	√√	
Moldova										
Russia									√√	√√
Ukraine								√		
Georgia	√	√	√	√	√		√	√		
Kazakhstan	√			√	√	√	√	√	√√	
Kyrgyzstan	√	√	√	√	√			√		
Tajikistan					√	√	√	√		
Turkmenistan	√		√		√			√		
Uzbekistan					√	√				

Sources: MONEE country reports, UN (1995, 1997a, 1998a), Asquith (1999), UNICEF (1999a).

Note: The table is indicative, not exhaustive. Double ticks correspond to an option which is reportedly relied on with particular frequency.

tims and community service. Such alternatives are an important basis upon which to build positive sentencing.

Overall, the evidence does suggest that the recourse to sentences of deprivation of liberty may be levelling off or even declining in parts of the region. This would be promising given the relatively long periods of detention to which juveniles and young people can be sentenced. The maximum prison terms for juveniles convicted of "very serious" criminal offences are often 10-15 years (Table 5.6).

Table 5.7 attempts to pull together the available data on registered juvenile crimes and sentencing, including sentences of deprivation of liberty. Such data are very difficult to obtain (indeed, the table covers only 11 of the 27 countries in the region), and the reliability and comparability of the data are problematic even within the same countries over time.

So, what can be said about trends in sentencing? The figures on the changes over time suggest that, with few exceptions, the number of formal sanctions broadly followed the increases in registered juvenile crimes between 1989 and 1998 in most countries. The difference between the registered crimes and the sentencing figures implies that in the majority of cases juveniles were acquitted, were not processed, or were dealt with through non-judicial procedures, while similarities in the figures suggest that the proportion of such cases remained relatively constant over time, although further investigation would be needed to reach a firm conclusion.

The situation in terms of sentences involving the deprivation of liberty is less clear. It appears that, in Central and Southeastern Europe, the deprivation of liberty was relied on less frequently in 1998 than in 1989, while in the countries of the former Soviet Union an opposite trend seems to have taken place.

Figure 5.11 shows that, while Russian courts seldom levy maximum sentences on juveniles, they nonetheless impose substantial jail time. In 1996, when 30,000 juvenile offenders were deprived of their liberty, 40 percent were sentenced to more than three years, including 26 percent of those sentenced for the relatively lesser crimes of theft and "hooliganism". Figure 5.12 further illustrates how discretionary sentencing can differ considerably among countries, in this case Estonia and Russia, where young offenders are much more likely to receive sentences of more than two years.

It also seems that judges in several countries are shying away from lengthy prison sentences, and a more lenient approach in general is reported in a number of countries. In Hungary, for example, judges reportedly are resorting less often to imprisonment for property crimes: in 1997, 43 percent of such cases entailed prison terms of less than six months, compared to only 27 percent in 1990, and this despite a rising crime rate.

The problem is that "leniency" remains at the discretion of the court and does not represent a firm principle for the delivery of juvenile justice, as envisioned in international standards and conventions. Truly "positive" sentencing requires appropriate and constructive responses tailored to the offender, rather than simply a lighter version of the punitive sanctions imposed on adults.

"Educational" approaches raise concerns

It is often claimed that the basic approach to juvenile offenders in the transition region has been and still is "educational" rather than punitive. The emphasis on education is particularly marked in countries of the former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia, educational measures accounted for half the sentences of juveniles in 1998; supervision orders and reprimands made up a further 40 percent. In FR Yugoslavia, responses are mainly educational or involve additional supervision, and FYR Macedonia also emphasizes educational measures. Russia

Table 5.6

Maximum allowable prison sentences for juveniles, late 1990s
(years)

	Term of sentence
Hungary	15
Slovenia	10
FYR Macedonia	10
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10
FR Yugoslavia	10
Albania	15
Bulgaria	12
Estonia	8
Latvia	10
Russia	10
Georgia	10
Kazakhstan	12
Tajikistan	15
Uzbekistan	10

Sources: MONEE country reports, except UN (1997a) for FYR Macedonia, UNICEF-Sarajevo (communication, 2000) for Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN (1995) for Bulgaria, UNICEF (2000a) for Albania, and UNICEF (1999a) for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Note: In Latvia the maximum prison sentence for the most serious crimes is 15 years.

Table 5.7

Juvenile crime, sentencing and the deprivation of liberty, 1989 and 1998
(totals and percent)

	Crimes			Sentenced			Deprived of liberty		
	1989	1998	1998/1989	1989	1998	1998/1989	1989	1998	1998/1989
Czech Republic	13,688	16,730	122.2	3,500	4,605	131.6	648	427	65.9
Slovakia	4,103	6,849	166.9	2,151	3,027	140.7	–	–	–
Hungary	9,661	12,866	133.2	6,362	8,036	126.3	873	539	61.7
FYR Macedonia	3,753	5,910	157.5	1,214	745	61.4	115	44	38.3
Bulgaria	6,022	18,943	314.6	1,734	2,605	150.2	400	210	52.5
Romania	9,245	43,839	474.2	1,983	11,196	564.6	1,509	1,373	91.0
Estonia	1,563	2,264	144.8	963	1,502	156.0	145	272	187.6
Latvia	2,562	4,023	157.0	1,142	1,678	146.9	–	849	–
Lithuania	2,702	4,977	184.2	1,228	2,121	172.7	399	456	114.3
Belarus	6,574	9,990	152.0	3,303	5,712	172.9	507	1,034	203.9
Azerbaijan	503	766	152.3	324	458	141.4	45	117	260.0

Source: MONEE project database.

Note: First year is 1990 for Romania, 1991 for the Czech Republic and Lithuania and 1993 for Estonia. Last year is 1997 for FYR Macedonia, Belarus and Azerbaijan. "Crimes" for Hungary refer to the number of offenders. "Deprived of liberty" refers to the number of cases of juveniles placed in prisons, jails, work camps, colonies, reform schools, and so on, that is, some "punitative", and some "educative" institutions. It refers to cases during the year unless noted below. The number of juveniles in prison in the Czech Republic at year-end was 483 in 1989 and 619 in 1998; the corresponding numbers in Slovakia were 310 and 99. Data for FYR Macedonia refer to juveniles placed in prison and "educative" institutions, and for Romania to the total number of children in "reformatory schools" at the end of the year. In Bulgaria the data refer to those entering prison; 251 juveniles were in prison at the end of the year in 1989, and 148 in 1998. The corresponding numbers for juveniles in "educative" institutions were 1,556 and 733. In Estonia the data refer to the number of juveniles sentenced to imprisonment; the number of juveniles in prison at the end of the year was 24 in 1989, and 48 in 1998, while there were about 300 juveniles in "educative" institutions.

Figure 5.11



Prison sentences for juveniles, by type of crime, Russia, 1996 (percent)

Source: Family in Russia (1997)

Figure 5.12



Young offenders by length of prison sentence, Russia, 1996, and Estonia, 1997 (percent distribution)

Sources: Family in Russia (1997); ESA (1999a).

Note: The maximum prison sentence for juveniles is 10 years in Russia and 8 years in Estonia.

has "educational colonies", and there is evidence that first-time offenders as young as 14 who have been sentenced for petty theft are being detained in these institutions.

So, though the "educational" approach sounds progressive on the surface, there is cause for misgiving. Many countries do not have the adequately trained social workers, psychologists and special teachers that educational facilities imply. Some efforts are being made in this regard, but the lack of qualified staff and of funding remains an obstacle. And, as importantly, educational measures still involve the deprivation of liberty, usually for up to three years, in a closed educational or correctional facility.

Of special concern regarding these "educational" placements is the fact that they can be ordered not only by the courts, but also by administrative bodies. In other words, the deprivation of liberty may not be subject to a judicial decision or to judicial review. Though non-judicial bodies are positive mechanisms for handling young people who come into conflict with the law, as Box 5.6 describes, such authority to deprive young people of their liberty, as in the case of commissions for youth affairs, is inconsistent with due process and human rights.

In Lithuania, juveniles can even be sent by protection services and schools to "special correctional care homes". In Estonia, the Committee for the Under-aged, set up in 1998 to deal with 7-18 year-olds, can send juvenile offenders to a "special educational institution". The Commission for Youth Affairs in Georgia can send young offenders to an open rehabilitation centre or "children's shelter", but also, if they do not reform, to a closed correctional institution for one to three years. The counterpart in Turkmenistan can place a juvenile in a special "vocational" school. In the countries of former Yugoslavia, the centres for social work, which predate the transition, play this role. Such centres in Slovenia initiate about 80 percent of the admissions to "institutions for children and youth with behavioural and personality disorders", while the rest are sent there by the courts.

While "diversion" to non-judicial settings is a well-accepted and preferred channel for dealing with juveniles in conflict with the law, the rights of children are vulnerable and can be violated if democratic values and due process are not integral to these intermediary processes and environments. The international standards are clear: human rights and legal safeguards must be fully respected, including the right to contest the facts and appeal to a higher authority.

Yet, there is also an obvious need for more intermediary interventions in all countries of the region, including constructive approaches such as mediation and reparation. Nonetheless, there are glimmers of "restorative" justice in the region: in the community mahalla committees in Uzbekistan, in Latvia, where mediation is practised to some degree, in the family courts of Poland, and in Estonia's vision of juvenile justice. The overarching goal of these approaches is to confront young offenders with their accountability without reinforcing the social marginalization which only increases the propensity to re-offend.

The role of civil society and public opinion

While responsibility for juvenile justice lies directly with the authorities, it is clear that civil society also plays a significant role. The attitude of the community, expressed through organized civil society and more informal "public opinion", can influence the degree to which responses to juvenile offenders are punitive or positive. And international standards, which recognize that voluntary organizations are insufficiently depended on in juvenile justice systems, call on governments to "coordinate crime prevention efforts with non-governmental agencies". The Committee on the Rights of the Child has specifically recommended to several countries in the region – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, FYR Macedonia, and Russia

Box 5.6

Alternatives to the courts: non-judicial entities in the region

Procedures to deal with certain offences by entities other than the courts have existed in the region for some time. In the CIS, the most common "diversionary" structures are the commissions for youth affairs (the exact name differs from country to country). Their composition may vary, but it usually includes representatives of state stakeholders, for example departments of health, education, social affairs, youth police, the guardianship commission, and community organizations. These commissions typically report to the local executive authority and deal with children under the age of criminal responsibility for the particular offence committed, those accused of a "non-serious" offence, all administrative offences committed by young people, and cases of children for whom the use of protection measures may be required. The decisions of the commissions in regard to offenders may range from a simple warning to a child and the child's parents, the requirement that the child make a public apology, the requirement to pay a fine or compensation, through to placement in a "special" reform, educational, or vocational training establishment.

Diversionary structures do not have to be exclusively devoted to dealing with young offenders. In Uzbekistan, "mahalla" committees are a traditional form of community organization that survived the communist period. They are now being actively promoted as a low-level administrative unit. The mahallas constitute a nationwide network of local units, with each neighbourhood committee covering from 150 to 1,500 households. The committees currently serve a dual role. On the one hand, they administer state social assistance to the most needy in their communities, and, on the other, they perform their traditional function of helping to solve social and family conflicts within communities. This latter function is based on cultural traditions of respect for the authority of community elders. The commissions for youth set up in many mahallas can play a significant role in dealing with minor offences, supervising offenders and working with children with behavioural difficulties.

– that they improve cooperation with NGOs.

The efforts of organized civil society and the legislative, policy and programme initiatives of governments are undertaken within the wider context of public readiness. Manifest as public opinion or as the reaction of unorganized civil society, this public readiness is a factor in determining the speed and degree with which change can be effected. As one observer in the region notes, alternatives to custodial sentencing can be successful in a functioning community-based culture, but a gestation period is required before they can be introduced into societies where community structure is dysfunctional for socio-economic or political reasons.

Since civil society is in the process of being rebuilt in the region, NGOs are relatively new. They often lack experience, skills and funding. It is also often a struggle to develop public confidence in services such as confidential hotlines and crisis centres, because these are novel and unfamiliar and because of an "allergy" to and a distrust of the organizations inherited from the communist past. This experience has been reported by NGOs running phone helplines and crisis centres in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Governments are still not accustomed to working with NGOs and can be suspicious of allowing them to grow, let alone fostering this growth. Access to detention facilities by NGOs in some countries remains difficult or impossible.

On the positive side, civil organizations are actively involved with young people in conflict with the law at the level of both prevention and intervention. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the Child Protection Centre works with out-of-school and street children, providing "safe houses" for the latter. CARMEL organizes activities for young detainees, including recreation and education programmes and family visits, as well as pre-release preparation and post-release support. The Kyrgyz Youth Human Rights Group, an advocacy and monitoring group founded in 1995, has assigned special importance to children's issues, including the deprivation of liberty. It coordinated an "alternative report" on the situation of the country's children for presentation to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in February 2000. ■

5.4 Conclusions

Governments, civic institutions and international organizations concerned with youth development face particular challenges in dealing with the issue of young people in conflict with the law in the transition region. Youth is the age when individuals typically assert their place in society and experiment with anti-conformist behaviours. However, in the context of the rapid changes, the new circumstances and the weakened protection that have accompanied the transition, this tendency renders the young people in the region especially vulnerable to coming into conflict with the law.

Indeed, analysis finds that registered juvenile crime rates – notably low in the tightly controlled communist societies of the past – have risen in most transition countries, as have overall crime rates. Rates range widely among countries, but tend to be highest in Central Europe and lowest in the Caucasus and Central Asia (although it would appear that for various reasons reporting is weaker there than it is in the more urbanized areas). Higher crime rates can have negative consequences for the image of youth, reinforcing stereotypes of young people as a problem group rather than as a positive resource in society.

There is also evidence of new and troubling trends: relatively high numbers of very young offenders (under age 14), the expansion in the share of girls among young offenders and the emergence of new types of offences, such as drug-related crimes, that hardly existed before the transition. Property crimes still constitute the majority of offences, but violence is becoming more frequent. In some countries, like Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania, reports of violent crime involving youth have increased many times over.

These higher levels of crime are certainly cause for concern. Moreover, they can make it politically difficult to reform justice systems to satisfy international standards based on human rights. International victim surveys carried out in the mid-1990s suggest that people in all parts of the transition region are exposed to relatively high crime levels in terms of assaults, robbery and burglary. Acts like these are not tolerated in any society and can mobilize public opinion in such a way as to create a hostile climate against social groups associated with lawbreaking.

Given this situation and the broad streak of anti-authoritarianism that communism eventually provoked in much of society in the region, a broad dialogue on justice and law enforcement, one that includes the voices of younger generations, would clearly be worthwhile. The views of young people about issues of crime and justice hold up a mirror to the societies in which they live, but they also reveal much about young people's beliefs regarding the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. In this light, the apparently temperate and even approving attitudes of many young people in the region towards unlawful acts are no less disquieting than is the evidence that juvenile offending is growing.

The registered figures on juvenile crime are still relatively moderate in international terms. Nonetheless, among the 27 million youth under age 18 in the region, there are about a half-million new cases of adolescents in conflict with the law every year. That only a few thousand young people commit major violent crimes shows clearly that the reform of juvenile justice systems in the vast area of the less serious offences would offer broad benefits.

There is no doubt that the transition countries are confronted by a complex task in the effort to reform justice systems, including juvenile justice systems. Young people and their behaviours are substantially shaped by experiences in a variety of settings: home, school, community, and the general society. These settings and structures have been under great stress and are undergoing profound change during the transition. Addressing the root causes of youth crime requires action at the primary and secondary prevention levels in the everyday environments of young people.

Effecting the changes required to bring legislation, policies and practices more into line with international standards at the tertiary level – at the level of the justice system itself – will take time and will require more wide-ranging changes in society. Yet, one issue stands out as particularly urgent in most countries of the region: the excessive reliance on the deprivation of liberty as a response to young offenders. Whether through pre-trial remands, court sentences, or "correctional" or "educational" measures meted out by courts or non-judicial bodies, recourse to institutional placements remains high in the region. Moreover, detention facilities can be overcrowded, unhealthy and sometimes very harsh. Justice systems in many transition countries still send adolescents to closed institutions for long periods of time for acts, like shoplifting or taking a bicycle, that most teenagers commit at some time as they are growing up, though they do not embark on a life of crime.

Many countries have reviewed their approach to juvenile offenders – though, it appears, this is less often the case in their approach to young adult offenders – and are placing more emphasis on non-custodial responses and on prevention. Several countries have expressed the intention to adopt special measures in dealing with youth in the courts and in seeking non-custodial outcomes. Implementation has been less successful, however, due in part to shortages in funding and in appropriately trained personnel.

Alternatives to the judicial process already exist in the region, largely through inherited structures like commissions for youth affairs or similar non-judicial bodies. Building upon these mechanisms is vital, but progress needs to be consistent with international standards in terms of the respect for human rights and legal safeguards. One of the concerns revolving around existing non-judicial bodies is their authority to deprive young citizens of liberty without due process or access to judicial review. One of the benefits, perhaps the greatest one, is the opportunity to prevent the remarginalization of young offenders and to reduce greatly their propensity to re-offend.

There have also been tentative steps along the road to "restorative justice". Psychosocial services have been reinstated in many countries. A small but growing number of qualified personnel now exists to provide more opportunities for improving preventive services and extending the use of "positive" non-custodial sentencing options. Training based on best practices reflecting international standards is becoming more widespread in many countries.

The space for non-governmental initiatives is increasing. The climate within which NGOs operate can still be dissuasive or grudgingly tolerant, but the state and the public are sometimes very supportive. Though often fragile, the efforts of organized civil society in responding both preventively and reactively to juvenile offending can be encouraged and built upon.

The task of developing an appropriate justice policy to respond to young people in conflict with the law involves much more than merely setting up a specialized court system or providing training in human rights for the personnel dealing with offenders. The experiences of young offenders in terms of treatment prior to a hearing and constructive sentencing options count at least as much and may count far more. In this light, how society treats its young members who are in conflict with the law should be seen in the context of broader policy approaches and in terms of what society offers its youth as citizens.

6 Young Citizens

Citizenship is one of the most basic rights of every child, young person and adult. It is the recognition that a particular individual has a legitimate claim to be part of a country and therefore to contribute to and partake of the nation's assets. Citizenship confers specific rights – such as the right to a name, a passport, access to basic education, health care and certain social benefits, or the right to marry and to vote – that are acquired over the course of a young person's life, some at birth, some during childhood and others during adolescence.

Indeed, many of the important rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship are acquired simultaneously or in very close succession during adolescence. Typically, by 16, young people have reached the age of consent and the age of criminal responsibility, and they have acquired the right to apply for a driver's licence and to work full time. By 18, young persons are usually considered young adults, fully autonomous and able to take on all the responsibilities and duties of citizenship. They are legally considered old enough to make decisions affecting their health, such as whether to smoke or to drink alcohol; they may be liable or eligible for military service, and they have the right to vote and, with it, the right to formal participation in the political life of the country.

The right to vote in free and democratic elections has long been a benchmark of social and political justice, but experience has shown that being entitled to this right does not automatically translate into increased participation in political and social life. In a number of Western democracies, for example, young people have long had the right to vote, but voter turnout among youth has historically been low, and it has been falling over the past two decades. So, a question arises: How can social and political participation be made more meaningful for young citizens?

In the past, in democratic and communist countries alike, youth have been raised to citizenship through a process of socialization that involves controlling and regulating the activities of young people until they have internalized existing social norms, and then they are allowed to take their place in existing institutions. Today, however, there is a body of opinion which argues that the way to prepare young people to become active and engaged citizens is to encourage their participation in decision-making processes at all stages and in all areas or settings of their lives, including the family, school, workplace, and community. (See Chapter 1, Box 1.1.)

In recent years, ways have been articulated to develop policies and programmes which can help realize the rights of youth and enhance the contribution of youth to society (Box 6.1). Significant work has been carried out in Western Europe, but this new focus on youth is also highly relevant to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, where the young people raised during the transition are growing up with expectations and possibilities which are vastly different from those of their parents.

Indeed, the period during which the transition generation has been growing up – from children aged 5-14 in 1989 to teens and young adults aged 15-24 in 1999 – has been a period of major changes in what citizenship means in the region. While not all the changes have been positive, the fact remains that this generation is approaching adulthood in anticipation of exercising full human rights, after following several generations who experienced a much narrower and less participatory conception of citizenship. The role which the new generation of young citizens will play will depend upon how much these citizens are recognized as partners and valuable resources for advancing human development and social and political transformation in the region.

Section 6.1 looks at the participation of young citizens in the political and social life of the transition countries. It presents information on their readiness to vote, their trust in political institutions and their attitudes towards democratic institutions and values. The section also looks at the participation of young citizens in civil society and the function of youth organizations, clubs and associations. Section 6.2 highlights approaches to youth policy, an area where consensus is emerging out of debates in both the East and the West. Section 6.3 offers some insights and conclusions on the state of youth in the transition region, drawing on the evidence and analysis in all six chapters of the Report. It points out areas for policy action, public and private.

■

Box 6.1

Promoting youth participation: laying the groundwork for policies and programmes

The current international emphasis on youth participation has its roots in the International Youth Year declared by the United Nations for 1985. Since then, there has been a series of international meetings and declarations which have set out a framework for youth programmes and policies.

- In 1995, the UN adopted the "World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond" to provide a policy framework and guidelines for action to national governments and non-governmental organizations. The programme has three themes – participation, development and peace – and identifies 10 priority areas for action ranging from education and health to juvenile justice. The final and concluding priority is "the full and effective participation of youth in the life of society and in decision-making."
- In 1998, the Third World Youth Forum held by the United Nations in Braga, Portugal, brought together representatives of youth and youth-serving organizations, the UN and intergovernmental organizations under the theme "Youth Participation for Human Development". The forum adopted a "Youtn Action Plan" which emphasized the need to promote the participation of all young people, including youth from indigenous cultures and youth with disabilities, living in poverty, or subjected to violence.
- In 1998, the first World Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth met in Lisbon (immediately after the Braga Youth Forum). The Lisbon Declaration on Youth Policies and Programmes includes eight sets of measures, one of which is participation. Its description of participation reflects an awareness of the need to employ gender-sensitive measures which ensure equal access for young women and young men, to facilitate access by youth to legislative and policy-making bodies, and to give higher priority to marginalized, vulnerable and disadvantaged young persons.

European institutions have been developing their interpretation of the principles set out in international declarations. During the 1990s, maximizing young people's contribution to the building of society became the most widely asserted goal of youth policy in contemporary Europe. The Council of Europe has played a major role in the discussion and, since 1989, has been the main link for political cooperation with those transition countries which have opted for democratic political systems. In 1995, the Council's Directorate of Youth and Sport created a new European Youth Centre in Budapest to help implement its programmes.

- One of the first statements made under the aegis of the Council of Europe was the European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Municipal and Regional Life, which was adopted in 1992 by the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities. The first part of the charter describes guiding principles for sectoral youth policies, such as the promotion of youth employment, social and health prevention policy, the provision of information centres and databanks for young people, and the promotion of equal participation by young women and men. The second part of the charter outlines the institutional structures needed to favour youth participation at the regional level. It recommends, for example, the establishment of youth councils made up of young people elected by their peers.
- In 1996, the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation 1286 in which Article 8 addresses participation as a means of realizing the rights enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It calls for "the views of children to be heard in all decision-making which affects them, and to enable them to participate actively, responsibly and in a manner appropriate to their capacity, at all levels of society – in the family, in local communities, in schools and other institutions, in judicial hearings and in national government, and to teach children how to act as responsible citizens, to encourage them to take an interest in public affairs and to reconsider the age at which young people can vote."
- In 1997, the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation No. R (97) 3 on youth participation and the future of civil society. The governments of member states were urged to foster partnerships between youth organizations and authorities at the national, regional and local levels, to encourage young people to participate in the voluntary sector, and to promote cooperation between young people and local and national youth structures in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within the framework of existing European programmes.
- A European Union white paper on youth policy is being prepared for presentation in early 2001. The European Union has been particularly active in promoting exchanges and mobility among young people through its "Youth for Europe" and "European Voluntary Service" programmes (united in 2000 as a single EU "Youth Programme") and especially through its education programmes (Socrates, Leonardo). The EU has also been active in providing information services for young people through its Eurodesk network.

6.1 The Political and Social Participation of Young People

Young generations have an important part in the social and political life of their countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Commonwealth of Independent States, youth have a special opportunity to participate in consolidating democracy, developing civil society anew and, in many countries, building recently independent nations. The identification of young persons with and their participation in these historical changes can help ensure the sustainability of the reform process. Through their participation in new democratic institutions and socio-cultural activities, young people can also help shape society and so make it into one with which they identify.

While in Western societies the participation of young citizens typically includes transforming established systems in a relatively stable environment, in the transition countries young people are faced with building new political systems and civil societies, while coping with much greater risk and uncertainty. The participation of young citizens in the transition countries has not necessarily been hampered by economic instability and falling standards of living – even though there are worrying signs of the exclusion of many young people from school, work, families, and communities. The presence of younger adults in high government posts is potent evidence of the doors opened by the transition to people who have fresh ideas, energy and dynamism, characteristics generally associated with younger age. The success of many young people in seizing the opportunities created by the transition extends not only to politics, but also to emerging civic organizations and grassroots movements.

New opportunities for political participation

The involvement of young people in politics can take a variety of forms. One of the most common ways to gauge political commitment is to look at levels of voter turnout. Voting is the most basic of democratic acts, and the vigour of a democratic society is often measured by the extent to which its citizens take part in elections.

There are several reasons why the participation of young citizens in national and local elections or referendums is important. First, young people may have political interests which differ from those of older voters and which should be represented. Second, while young people may feel that they have less impact than older generations in many situations, the right to vote is an equalizer in that each person has one vote and thus possesses the same ability as others to exercise influence in political elections. Third, participation in the decision-making process promotes awareness of citizenship issues. It can also be argued that young people should be encouraged to develop the habit of voting in order to enhance and maintain democracy for the future.

Before the transition, there was no genuine choice of political parties or representatives in elections. Nonetheless, voting was a legal obligation, and failure to vote was met with formal and informal sanctions. Thus, there was a tradition of voting, but no tradition of voting to influence events. With an average turnout of 99 percent, elections were largely a formality, and young people over 18 were compelled to cast their votes, as were all other adults.

As Chapter 1 notes, the view of young people in the region on the transition is generally more favourable than that of older people. But is this support manifest in higher turnout rates in nationwide elections?

Using information from opinion polls organized by the European Union in 19 countries in the region during 1995-97, Figure 6.1 illustrates the extent to which young and older people in the transition countries have been prepared to exercise their right to vote. In most countries, about two-thirds of respondents said they would cast their

Figure 6.1



Intention to vote, by age group, 1995-97
(percent)
Source: Eurobarometer microdata.

Note: Annual samples have been pooled for 1995-97. Average national pooled sample sizes are 308 for youth and 1,991 for persons 25 and over.

Figure 6.2



Voter turnout, by age group, Western Europe, 1989-94 (percent)

Source: IDEA (1999)

Note: Data are from surveys conducted following national elections in 1989-94 in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

votes if a general election were to be held tomorrow. The survey shows that the intentions of younger and older adults correlate to a large degree, but there is a certain generation gap. In this case, one that falls short on the side of youth: in 15 of the 19 countries represented in the diagram young people were less prepared to vote than were adults over age 24.

It is, however, a common experience in democratic societies that young voters exhibit lower turnout rates than do older age groups. Some studies have suggested that youth turnout in elections in the transition region throughout the 1990s was equal to, if not higher than, that of their Western peers. Indeed, apart from Central Europe and the Baltic States, the difference between young and older age groups presented in Figure 6.1 is not very substantial.

Voter participation rates by youth in some CIS countries, as well as the former Yugoslavia, are no doubt affected by the fact that many of these youth are citizens of new sovereign states. Young people may more readily associate themselves with the newly independent nations and show an enhanced sense of civic pride.

Figure 6.2 shows selected international evidence on the pattern of voter turnout by age. The data refer to post-election surveys carried out in 15 Western European countries in 1989-94. The diagram illustrates that the turnout rate is lowest among the youngest age category (in this case, 18-29), at about 80 percent; the rate increases into middle age, peaking among electors aged 60-69 (93 percent), before declining slightly for the oldest age group. Overall, the turnout level among electors aged 18-29 is about 10 percentage points lower than the average.

Why do younger voters show generally lower turnout rates than older adults? The lower rate is sometimes attributed to the fact that young people are still learning about citizenship and the political choices available to them. Often, they are not yet sure how to vote. Figure 6.3 shows the extent to which indecision may deflate young voter turnout rates. The figure presents pre-election survey data on voting intentions in Poland, a transition country where voting patterns by age are generally very similar to those found in Western countries. As the diagram indicates, in the 1997 national elections, 25 percent of 18-24 year-olds (and 30 percent in the 1998 local elections) were not sure if they were going to vote. As young people grow older, they acquire resources that enable them to participate in elections, including familiarity with the electoral process and with political parties.

The data reviewed here so far refer to later transition years, by which time several countries, like Poland, were enjoying some economic progress, though others were still experiencing economic instability. The question naturally arises whether and to what extent voter participation rates can be associated with either satisfaction, or impatience among citizens about the economic and social returns of the transition process. As earlier Regional Monitoring Reports have pointed out, in several countries leading in reform, elections repeatedly produced changes in governments in the 1990s, indicating voter frustration with a transition process that had been slower and more painful than foreseen. Official election data in various transition countries show no more than 50-60 percent average turnout rates.

Various studies in the West have found that voter turnout levels have been declining for all age groups over the past two decades, and in some countries the turnout rates among young people have decreased more quickly than average. In Finland, for example, the turnout of 18-30 year-olds in national elections fell from 72 percent in 1975 to 59 percent in 1991, while overall turnout receded from 78 to 72 percent in the same period. These

Figure 6.3



Intention to vote, by age group, Poland, 1995-98 (percent)

Source: GUS (1998)

Note: 1995 results refer to the two rounds of the presidential elections. 1997 results are for the parliamentary election. 1998 results are for local elections. "Will vote" refers to those who are definitely or probably going to vote.

falling rates have triggered concern because they are seen as a sign of disaffection towards the country's political institutions.

Although they allow only a crude comparison between 1995-97 and earlier years, the Eurobarometer data used in Figure 6.1 suggest that there has also been a decline in the propensity to vote in more than half of the transition countries surveyed. However, there appears to be no clear linkage between political participation and the economic returns – positive or otherwise – of the transition, and the data indicate little change in the gap in turnout rates between young and older people.

In the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, people's attitudes towards government are encumbered by a traditional lack of trust in the state and, simultaneously, by overly high expectations with regard to the state's ability to secure them adequate standards of living.

Even though young people may display less distrust or have lower expectations than older generations, the questioning attitude typical of youth may make them sceptical or critical towards any authority. It can therefore be anticipated that young people will show a considerable degree of frustration at the difficulties democratic governments have in tackling the inherited or the new problems of their countries.

Several sociological surveys and polls in the region have found, indeed, a considerable degree of mistrust among youth towards the formal institutions of the new democracies. A national survey of young people aged 18-25 carried out in Latvia in 1998, for example, revealed among youth an overall lack of identification with political parties: 89 percent of respondents thought the activity of political parties did not refer to them; 61 percent were not interested in political parties, and almost half said none of the parties had any interest in the problems of young people. A 1998 survey entitled "Young Russians' Lives and Views" that was commissioned by the US Information Agency and conducted among young people aged 18-29 by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research suggests that two of every three youth in Russia have a highly negative opinion of the primary institutions for the delivery of democracy.

While such expressions of disaffection are worrying, there is also evidence that many young people have a strong sense of democratic values. For example, in the 1998 survey of young people in Russia, more than two-thirds of respondents thought it "impermissible" to cancel presidential elections, limit opportunities to travel abroad, or ban meetings and demonstrations, and more than half thought it "impermissible" to impose censorship on the media (Table 6.1).

The 1998 sociological survey in Latvia confirms that, although young people are often distrustful of political parties, they are not uninterested in political events. As Table 6.2 shows, 85 percent of respondents were definitely interested in and "more or less" interested in the political life of the country, compared to less than 15 percent who were not interested. More than 60 percent had at least some interest in the work of the government, and more than half had at least some interest in the work of parliament.

Table 6.1

Youth attitudes towards democratic structures and civil liberties, Russia, 1998

(percent of respondents)

	Permissible	Not permissible	No opinion	Total
Cancel presidential elections	15	69	16	100
Ban meetings, demonstrations	19	67	14	100
Limit travel abroad	19	68	13	100
Impose censorship on the media	28	55	17	100

Source: Dobson (1998).

Note: Summary of the answers of young people to the question: "Let's suppose that a leader came to power who wanted to establish strict order in our country. In your opinion, would it be permissible or impermissible to do the following to establish order: . . . ?" Sample size was 1,248 Russians aged 18-29.

Table 6.2

Young people's level of interest in political life, Latvia, 1998

(percent of respondents)

	I'm interested, and I understand	More or less interested	I'm not interested
Political life in Latvia	17.8	67.5	14.7
Work of parliament	4.5	49.5	45.9
Work of government	6.6	57.2	36.2
Activities of political parties	3.0	35.6	61.4

Source: CSBL (1999).

The implication of the above is that young people in the region are not resolutely alienated from political life, but, rather, that they may not be finding appropriate channels to participate. Factors such as education and ethnicity also make a difference; surveys in various countries have found a positive correlation between political interest and education, while there is some evidence that youth belonging to ethnic minorities often feel poorly represented by political institutions.

Being politically active and socially committed certainly involves much more than merely casting a vote for a political party. In Voices of Youth 16, young Latvians interviewed for this Report talk about what participation means to them. In Western democracies, lower youth voter turnout has been accompanied by greater youth involvement in more informal or issue-based movements, such as environmental groups. In many CEE countries, young people were visibly active in the protests which led to the fall of communism. With the demise of communist youth organizations and of censorship and monopoly over the political, social and cultural activities of youth, there is now a much greater scope for the expression of youth interests, commitments and initiatives in the various forums of civil society.

Voices of Youth 16

Participation: youth talk about taking part and being heard

Young people in Latvia talk in focus groups and individual interviews about their desire to participate in society and in decision-making in various areas of their lives. All the respondents are already involved in volunteer activities.

- "I want to be needed by society and by the people of Latvia. I do not want to live in any other country, and I want to dedicate my life to my country. I need to get appropriate education and experience for this." (Mara, 21)
- "[Influencing political decisions] is very important to me. Even if these decisions do not affect the whole country, I would like to be able to express my opinion." (Maija, 21)
- "We used to have a society which stuck together; it was not possible to survive in any other way. Nowadays, it is possible to live independently. Thus, everyone should contribute something to decision-making." (Edmunds, 24)
- "I would like others [at school] to respect my opinion and to be interested in it." (Albert, 15)
- "It does not happen frequently that teachers consult with their students. This might only be the case for some minor decisions such as classroom cleaning or a party for our class." (Katia, 16)
- "I am involved in a students committee in my spare time. Students are the future generation, and it is important and rewarding to assist them and to protect their interests." (Eva, 19)
- "We have two types of older colleagues at work. Some treat young people well and understand us. Others, however, think that young people are not worth speaking to." (Irina, 17)
- "My parents consult me if there is an important decision to be made, but it does not always happen. I think that my opinion has some weight, but it is not really significant." (Katia, 16)

Youth participation in civil society

Young people participate in civil society through a wide range of activities, including social organizations, sports and recreation clubs, and non-governmental organizations. In these settings, young people can find platforms where their opinions can be articulated and expressed and where they can simply enjoy being young. Youth organizations, in particular, provide a space where young people can develop and represent their interests. In the transition countries, much of this type of participation is still emerging and evolving as a new relationship forms between the state and civil society.

In the past, youth belonged to mass organizations controlled by the state, such as the Komsomol in the former Soviet Union. Membership was not obligatory, but was strongly encouraged, and failure to join could lead to penalties such as denial of access to certain jobs or places in higher educational institutions. It is estimated that, in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, 65 percent of 14-28 year-olds were Komsomol members. In some Central and Eastern European countries membership was even more widespread; in Bulgaria, for example, 80-90 percent of youth in this age group were members of the equivalent organization.

These communist youth institutions were used as vehicles to control and socialize youth with the intent of preserving the status quo. However, they did provide structured settings where young people could meet and enjoy sports and other activities. With the demise of these organizations, young people have lost not only access to low-cost sports and leisure facilities, but a mechanism for exercising a cohesive presence in society. What they have gained are opportunities to take part in a much broader range of organizations and to make individual choices about when and how to participate.

During the transition the share of youth formally joining in social organizations has been low. Although there is now a great variety of associations, there is also a tendency among young people to reject organized activities – a backlash, perhaps, to the flag-waving conformity of the communist youth groups. On the basis of a Council of Europe study carried out in the late 1990s, it has been estimated that less than 10 percent of young people on average are members of social organizations in the region; in some countries the share is less than 5 percent.

Individual country reports for the same study have revealed, for example, that there were some 600 youth organizations in Romania in 1994, but only 2-3 percent of young people were members, and in Hungary, while almost 13 percent of young people were active in some kind of political youth organization between 1988 and 1993, the share has since dropped below 5 percent. Information from a sociological study in Latvia suggests that, in 1998 less than 2 percent of students aged 15-18 were members of a youth organization. The participation of the 18-25 age group is higher, but still only 2.4 percent; a greater share, 16 percent, are members of leisure clubs.

Organizations which are specifically focused on youth can now generally be divided into those which are sponsored by the state or by a political party and those being created in the growing NGO sector. Some organizations remain politically oriented; both newly formed political parties and the successors of communist parties in some countries have formed youth sections. In Russia, the liberal Yabloko Party has a youth branch, as does the Russian National Unity Party. Other groups are non-political, but aim to help young people broaden their interests and develop skills (for instance, AMAVET in Slovakia). Some are cultural in orientation and, for example, promote folk music or have a religious affiliation. Others represent national minority groups. Thus, organizations exist in Slovakia for young Hungarians and Roma. Still others are work related, such as associations of young entrepreneurs.

Many of the new youth organizations in the region are run by NGOs. However, most NGOs suffer from their lack of a past in the region and the wariness of governments and populations towards them. They do, however, tend to possess expertise and the ability to respond to the needs of young people on a local basis.

Table 6.3 presents survey data on attitudes towards NGOs in five CIS countries. In Ukraine and Belarus around 60 percent of 18-24 year-olds think the right to form an NGO is important, a somewhat more positive view than that of older people; in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 48-60 percent of the young people surveyed believe NGOs are necessary. Government attitudes are also changing. In Albania, for example, the government has appealed to NGOs to play a role in youth organizations involved in projects to combat racism. Still, many NGOs suffer from funding problems, and many are shortlived.

Table 6.3

Young people's attitudes towards NGOs in five transition countries, 1996 and 1999
(percent)

	NGOs are necessary		Would work for an NGO		The right to form NGOs is important	
	18-24	25+	18-24	25+	18-24	25+
Ukraine	32	23	30	25	61	49
Belarus	–	–	–	–	60	56
Kazakhstan	48	45	19	21	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	60	50	45	41	–	–
Uzbekistan	58	56	–	–	–	–

Source: IFES (2000).

Note: In Belarus, the question was whether the right to freedom of association is important. Based on unpublished data from surveys in Ukraine and Belarus in 1999 and in the other three countries in 1996.

Mass organizations have been replaced by a plurality of non-governmental and civil organizations and groups. In a 1999 Hungarian survey, one-quarter of the youth organizations in the country reported membership above 500 persons, while half of them reported membership of 200 or less. There has also been a splintering of more general organizations into separate groups with distinct purposes – leisure and sports clubs, youth wings of political parties, cultural and social groups.

Table 6.4 lists the types of activities which various youth organizations in Hungary were offering to young peo-

Box 6.2

Young people and sports

Regular physical activity is considered important for young people not only because of its direct benefits for physical health, but because, as research has shown, it enhances self-esteem and contributes to moral and social development.

The Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children survey, sponsored by WHO, included questions on exercise among young people in seven Central and Eastern European countries in both 1993-94 and 1997-98. Students were asked how often and how many hours a week they took part in "vigorous intensity activity" outside school. Vigorous activity was defined as "the equivalent of at least slow jogging, which might be expected to leave the participant feeling out of breath and sweaty." The 1997-98 survey found that regular exercise was strongly associated with perceived health status, feeling confident, making friends, spending time with them outside school, and having access to a family car (which is more closely associated with higher household income in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe).

Figure 6.4 shows the share of 15-year-old male and female respondents who reported getting regular exercise in 1993-94 and in 1997-98. The earlier survey found the levels somewhat lower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, which may reflect the closing of sports facilities and the higher cost of new private clubs in the early 1990s. The later survey revealed a clear reduction in the share of young people exercising regularly in six transition countries, where the dropoff appeared more robust than in the Western countries surveyed. A comparison of the two diagrams indicates that in both surveys a considerably lower share of girls than boys reported regular exercise and that activity among girls had declined especially in the CEE countries (with the exception of the Czech Republic). Given the positive impact of sports on self-esteem and self-confidence, increasing the involvement of girls can be seen as an important means of advancing gender equality.

Figure 6.4



Share of 15 year-olds exercising two or more times a week, 1993-94 and 1997-98
(percent)

Sources: Currie et al. (2000); King et al. (1996).

Note: Caution is needed in interpreting the data. The questionnaires were administered in different countries at different times of year, and there may be seasonal variations in the opportunities for outdoor activity.

Box 6.3

The Western image: Russian youth living with cultural globalization

Throughout the 1990s, young people in Russia were being increasingly exposed to Western youth culture, particularly through greater access to the media, consumer products and travel. Internet use is limited, but growing in major centres, especially among youth. Estimates suggest that in 1999 between 1 and 3 percent of the population had access to the Internet. Young people constituted almost half of the frequent users, and people under 35 made up over three-quarters of this group.

Given the prominence of Hollywood movies and new-style nightclubs in Russia's cities, it might be expected that young Russians are gorging on the forbidden Western fruits denied their parents. However, recent research shows that they are not simply passive consumers of "ready-made" youth culture, but are involved in a much more complex process of adaptation and reformulation. Young Russians are, in effect, contributing their own voices to global youth culture.

Since 1996, the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, together with Ulianovsk State University in Russia, has been studying the impacts of cultural globalization on the cultural practices of Russian youth. The project has involved empirical research in the cities of Moscow, Ulianovsk and Samara. About 1,000 young people aged 15-25 have been surveyed in the two provincial cities, and a further 270 young respondents have taken part through in-depth interviews or focus groups. The results of the research trace two important processes under way in the post-Soviet cultural life of young people.

First, young Russians have increasingly complex and differentiated perceptions of "the West". Although the images of the West remain dominated by the US, young Russians increasingly differentiate between the US and Europe, a change from the single, coherent "other" perceived in Soviet times. Moreover, young Russians are becoming more discriminating about how sweet the "forbidden fruit" of the West really is. While young people continue to have a positive image of Western life in terms of material comfort and individual and creative freedom, they are critical of features which they perceive as superficial, overly pragmatic, and lacking in community feeling and spirituality. Young Russians describe Western electronic music as "music for the body" and Russian folk or rock as "music for the soul".

Second, now that exposure to Western culture is more widespread rather than reserved for a privileged few, various groups of young Russians are responding to Western culture in different ways. Among the many style-based movements, two broad identities among youth can be discerned: "progressive" and "normal".

"Progressive" is how young people in the dance and club scene refer to themselves. They are the music-centred descendants of the *stiliagi* rock 'n' rollers of the 1950s and the *tusovki* of the 80s, who included highly visible urban tribes like punks, hippies, bikers, and fans of heavy rock. The new economic and leisure opportunities of the 1990s, combined with the impact of "rave" parties and electronic dance music, have meant that tusovki gather increasingly in cafes, bars and clubs rather than parks, squares and underground stations as they did a decade ago. The progressives project an open and outward-looking mindset which embraces innovation, creativity and the latest Western life styles. At the same time, a concern for authenticity is being expressed, often in the form of a criticism that Western culture seems soulless and commercial.

"Normal" is used to describe the majority of young people who spend time with their friends in neighbourhood courtyards, listen to pop music and engage in organized sports and leisure activities. These people tend to see "progressive" youth as different and to reject their worldview and emphasis on style and individual pleasure. "Normals" follow mainstream fashion and understand music as the background for, rather than the focus of, peer group activities, such as drinking, talking and meeting members of the opposite sex.

Figure 6.5 illustrates the variety of strands in the individual responses being worked out by young people to the growing opportunities for cultural expression and the parallel increase in the exposure to the cultural effects of globalization.

Figure 6.5



Mapping the youth scene in Samara, April 1998

Source: Pilkington et al (forthcoming)

ple in 1999. The data confirm that sports is by far the most popular type of activity: over 80 percent of youth organizations offer sports activities, compared to 46 percent which conduct cultural activities, 29 percent representing professional groups, and only 2 percent declaring themselves as political organizations.

Sports and leisure facilities tend to be more popular than other types of organizations, but leisure facilities, such as sports clubs, are now usually relatively expensive and thus inaccessible to many young people. Commercial leisure activities are growing, but many young people are excluded due to a lack of financial resources. Attempts have been made to resist this trend; for example, in Bulgaria the Council of Ministers adopted a decree in 1995 enabling local authorities to forbid the privatization of cultural, educational and sports facilities for children and young people. However, such measures will only have limited effect unless local authorities have the resources to maintain low-cost public infrastructure. Evidence from WHO-sponsored surveys, presented in Box 6.2, throws light on regular exercise among youth in several transition countries.

As in the West, youth in the transition region are becoming a distinct category of consumers, an identity their parents had little chance to indulge under central planning. The collectivist ideology and conformist practices of the past are being replaced not only by individual cultural expression, but also by the individualism of consumerism. This consumer culture goes hand-in-hand with the greater role and influence of the mass media, particularly television and advertising, in transition countries.

Many young people find themselves with few resources to satisfy their desire for individual self-expression, which is now often associated with different styles of clothing and dancing and different tastes in music. But, as the example of Russia in Box 6.3 demonstrates, limited resources have not kept young people from experimenting with a large variety of styles and engaging in – rather than just consuming – a global youth culture which has its origins in the West.

Some young people have more difficulty adapting to this fresh search for individual identity or the emphasis on consumerism. For example, Nadia, 17, who was interviewed in Uzbekistan for this Report, talked about her perception of the differences in values and experiences between her generation and older people.

"In the school class," she said, "the children divide themselves into the rich ones and the poor ones. They are classified according to the way they are dressed. . . . In our generation, everyone looks out for himself."

Not surprisingly, given her comments, this young woman has found a way to participate in and contribute to society through volunteer work. "Voluntarism" existed in the region before the transition, but, under communism, the public face of voluntarism often took the form of a top-down initiative or a mass effort, for example a weekend shift at one's factory job or tidying up streets and public places.

The opportunities for new types of voluntarism are expanding in the region. Frequently, they represent ways for young people to satisfy their desire to contribute to society or to pursue their own personal and social development. They also function as alternatives to work in environments in which employment opportunities are lean; then they can be a means of building the experience and connections that may lead to a job or to future learning opportunities. Sometimes volunteer activities are simply interesting pastimes, and sometimes they allow young people to see direct results from their efforts, as Voices of Youth 17 describes.

Volunteer work can provide substantial rewards for young individuals, as well as for the broader community, as poignantly illustrated in Box 6.4, which describes a youth participation project in Kosovo refugee camps. This case highlights the capacity of participatory approaches to promote empowerment among youth rather than dependence, even in the most difficult circumstances. ■

Voices of Youth 17

Volunteer work: making a difference

The opportunities for volunteer work are expanding in the transition region. These young people discussed their experiences in focus-group research for this Report in Latvia.

- "I like doing voluntary work because it allows me to meet very interesting people, the ones who motivate me to do things." (Gaatis, 18)
- "It is nice to feel that you are surrounded by people who are willing to share their time with others." (Maija, 21)
- "This job gives me new insights, new friends and new possibilities." (Andris, 20)
- "I am doing it because I can see the results of my work, and it is extremely rewarding." (Eva, 19)
- "This is my life. I cannot imagine myself sitting in front of the TV in the evening, while I could help someone in the meantime." (Irina, 17)
- "It is very unpleasant when you are trying hard to help people and they ask what you are getting out of this and why you are doing this job for free." (Ilse, 21)
- "If you do something and succeed, your motivation is increased." (Ina, 16)

Table 6.4

Activities of youth organizations in Hungary, 1999 (percent of youth organizations reporting a given activity)

Sport programmes	81.6
Cultural programmes	46.0
Professional training	28.8
Interest groups	23.5
Other programmes for young people	17.7
Publishing activity	17.1
Provision of services to young people	14.5
Environmental protection	11.3
Religious activity	6.7
Other activities	6.7
Political activity	1.8

Source: DOSZ and JTM (1999).

Box 6.4

Youth participation in Kosovo refugee camps

A youth participation project undertaken in six Kosovo refugee camps in the Kukes area of Albania in the spring of 1999 shows how young people can make a difference in their own lives and their immediate communities even in desperate circumstances.

There were about 40,000 refugees living in the camps. Half the refugees were youth aged 15-25 who were being increasingly affected by boredom, loss of direction and erosion of self-confidence. The project set out to address these problems by empowering young people to take part in camp life and, in the process, develop organizational and leadership skills that could be transferred through them back to life in Kosovo.

With the help of the Albanian Youth Council, a Kosovar Youth Council with elected members was set up in each camp. Formal dialogues were established between the councils and other camp "players", such as managers, representatives of international agencies, and other refugee groups. The aim was to give youth a voice and an active role in camp life.

The young people eventually took more initiative and became better organized, and they acted as partners themselves for many UN agencies and NGOs working to alleviate the crisis. Their activities included setting up camp schools, organizing camp cleanups, sports tournaments and concerts, raising funds for poor families, distributing information on landmines, and influencing the decisions of camp managers.

Young people involved in the project were interviewed about their experiences.

"We had been completely shocked and traumatized," said one. "Now we are living better, trying to engage in sport. Before the youth council I was bored. Now everything has changed."

"Now with the youth council we can all contribute to help each other," remarked another. "We have a say in how the camp is run and are getting more space."

6.2 New Approaches to Youth Policies

So far, this chapter has examined the relationship between youth and society from the perspective of youth. However, the other side of the coin is just as important: How does the larger society view its youth? This section examines public policy as the instrument through which society expresses its views. Most countries, whether they are established democracies or are in transition, do not have a single, coherent youth policy. Instead, a youth perspective is incorporated into other major policy areas, such as labour market, housing, education, and social policies. Youth policy is then understood as a collective term for a constellation of separate policy aims concerning the lives of young people.

However, as Box 6.1 notes, there has been a growing realization in the international community that youth issues cross not only sectoral, but also geographical borders. Accordingly, the attention being given at the international and supranational levels to youth issues is growing. This process has facilitated the development of a more holistic approach to youth policy and a clearer concept of what is required to enable young citizens to exercise their rights and responsibilities now and in the future. The process has resulted in attempts by various Western European countries to develop more coherent long-term national youth policy and has stimulated the European Union and the Council of Europe to work towards a European statement on youth policy.

During the first years of transition, youth as a specific policy constituency was not a high priority on national political agendas in the transition region. However, concerns about the present and future circumstances of young people began to attract notice, and, since the mid-1990s, more attention has been paid to the reorientation of youth policies. There is an emerging recognition that young people are not simply adults-in-waiting, but individual citizens with clear rights which must be addressed. Nonetheless, most transition countries are still struggling with the formulation of youth policies and the search for resources to implement concrete measures.

The youth policy debate

Youth policy in Western Europe and other established democracies is in flux, and the last decades have witnessed a change in concepts and approaches. It is useful to look at this experience. The example of Western European countries is important in the process of the reformulation of youth policies both for those transition countries which have officially applied for EU membership – the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia – and for those which are participating in the broader forum of the Council of Europe.

During the postwar period in Western Europe, "youth" emerged as an identifiable group with its own culture, consumer goods and markets – and with its own set of problems. This emergence of youth as a distinct segment of the population coincided with a growth in leisure time and an expansion in the time being taken by young people to transit from education to work and from the family home to independence. There was a growing awareness of the need to develop specific policies for this new group. The emphasis was, however, on educating young people into becoming good citizens through a top-down approach, and many policy measures focused on the "reintegration" of problem youth into the mainstream. The goal was socialization, and the vehicle was often leisure activities, as in Eastern Europe.

In Western Europe during the 1970s, there was a new emphasis on the need to involve young people in political decision-making processes, and some concrete steps were taken to give young people a voice, such as the creation of local youth councils in some countries. However, the economic downturn of the 1980s changed both the circumstances and the policy environment revolving around youth. The budget resources for youth services were decreasing, even as the social problems among youth were growing. Efforts were focused on high-risk populations, such as school dropouts, the homeless and youth in conflict with the law. However, policy interventions were implemented in a rather fragmented way.

In general, the 1980s also saw a philosophical shift away from the welfare state towards more individual responsibility. At the same time, there was a realization that youth could not be treated as a single homogeneous group and that there was a need for individualized and flexible approaches. This spawned the trend towards decentralization in policy development, with responsibility devolving to local governments and the engagement of local youth organizations.

Throughout the 1990s the youth policy debate in Europe was increasingly influenced by the goal of encouraging youth participation in all aspects of society, and this fed into the discussion on the need for an overall national policy. Every country has its own mix of policy objectives and policy measures, but four recurring policy goals can be identified:

- Promoting the participation of young people and providing the opportunity for them to participate and develop as individuals and citizens.
- Protecting vulnerable youth and preventing the marginalization and social exclusion of subgroups in the young population.
- Preventing and counteracting anti-social and self-harming behaviour among young people.
- Guaranteeing and protecting the political, legal and social rights of young people, including the creation of the legal frameworks and institutional structures necessary to protect young people's rights and provide social services.

Within these broad policy goals, there are also two identifiable approaches to the design of policy measures. The first can be called "reactive", the second "proactive". In reality, the two approaches can be used in concert to provide an integrated strategy. However, these approaches can also be linked, though not exclusively, to different perceptions of youth – either as a problem group, or as a valuable resource.

The first approach reacts to problems, so that, in policy terms, youth becomes cast as a troubled constituency. Policy measures tend to be paternalistic and aimed at instilling the acceptance of prevailing social norms. As an "emergency response", this approach can be successful in tackling the immediate or emergent needs of vulnerable

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Box 6.5

European youth policies stress networks and information

For young people to be more active and more responsible for their own choices, many Western governments and organizations consider the provision of information and counselling as priorities. According to the Council of Europe, "young people have a right to full, comprehensible and reliable information, without reservations, and to counselling on all problems concerning them in all sectors, without exception, so that they may have complete freedom of choice, without any discrimination or ideological or other influence." So, greater emphasis is being placed on information both as a need and as a resource in the pursuit of policy objectives.

A number of examples exist of facilitated access to information in youth policy measures in Europe. In France, there is a network of youth information centres consisting of a national centre, 23 regional centres and eight centres in départements, including overseas. In Austria, a youth information service, set up in 1994, provides general information of interest to young people, information on Europe, leisure and creative projects, and an Internet "mailcorner" – together gathering about 30,000 inquiries a year.

The Internet offers a powerful enabling tool for collecting and supplying this information and for establishing and maintaining a dialogue between users and providers of youth services. In 1998, the Fifth Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Youth put forward the idea of "studying the feasibility of a European youth media circle which should allow young people, in particular disadvantaged young people, to have access to media and new technologies, and thus promote a direct dialogue between young people in order to find common solutions to their problems."

sections of the youth population. The problem is that reactive policies often stand alone, rather than forming part of a cohesive strategy.

The proactive approach favoured in recent years has strong links to the youth participation debate. It encourages measures that enable young people to use their capacities and to participate in the development of society, including in those areas of immediate concern to them. The debate on participation has promoted awareness of the need to involve young people in the development of the policies and programmes that will affect them, and this raises a number of issues.

Young people are a very diverse group, and they are active in an increasingly complex world; programmes and opportunities must reflect this diversity and complexity. So, it is often necessary to involve a wide variety of youth constituencies. Typically, this involvement is most effective at the local level. However, such a decentralized participatory model can be plagued by a fragmentation in efforts and a lack of coordination, and this underlines the crucial nature of a clear national framework for youth policy and, perhaps, a national coordinating body.

In Western Europe there is a growing consensus on the necessity for a national youth policy that embraces individual locally based measures and programmes, needs-led initiatives that are guided by young people's perceptions of their problems and wants, and a preference for policies that are "proactive", as well as "activating" in character, that is, ones that encourage autonomy and responsibility among young people.

The reformulation of youth policy in the transition countries

Youth policy in the transition period has been characterized by a phase of deconstruction of past organizations, approaches and institutions and a phase of reconstruction. This process has so far largely involved the search for a suitable distribution of responsibilities among government ministries and levels of government, as well as attempts to reconceptualize the approaches to youth policy.

The process of the reformulation of youth policy in the transition region suffers, in many ways, from the lack of previous debate on the subject and the shadow cast by the former communist youth organizations. The new youth groups which might act as partners in policy formulation must be built up from scratch (even though some, like the Scouts, had rich traditions in many countries prior to communism). There is also the question of resources: governments are retreating from social policies which are costly and unprofitable in political and economic terms. One such area is housing, in which, because of privatization, the pre-transition policy of providing youth with cheap rental apartments has been abandoned, although some countries have made efforts to establish savings or credit schemes to help young people obtain housing, especially young couples with children. According to one estimate for the Czech Republic in the late 1990s, almost half of the families including adults under age 34 did not have their own housing.

In line with the overall thrust towards reducing the role of the state in the lives of citizens, including young citizens, there is a general aversion in the region to top-down approaches and large national entities. In the Czech Republic, government representatives have said they do not want to create formal structures like those which once existed to deal with youth issues. In Azerbaijan, two years of hard discussion were required before 10 youth organizations were finally able to form the National Youth Organization in 1995. Previously, the various organizations feared losing their independence or seeing the rebirth of the Komsomol. In Poland, attempts following the 1993 elections to create a national body for the coordination of youth policy failed. In Hungary, MISZOT, a democratic forum for youth organizations that had been established in 1988, was eventually dissolved. While the lack of an umbrella youth organization may create problems and hinder the development of an integrated youth policy, it also creates more room for grassroots initiatives and generates pressure on the government for decentralized policy-making. This in turn may contribute to bringing the citizens a step closer to democracy – much in line with the original goals of the transition.

During the 1990s many transition countries succeeded in establishing national youth councils, while in others more than one body now exists to coordinate the activities of various youth organizations, for example, the Democratic Union and the Albanian National Youth Council in Albania, the Croatian Youth League and the Croatian Students' League in Croatia, and the Slovak Youth Council and the Slovak Youth Assembly in Slovakia. In several countries broad coordinating structures have been successfully established, such as the Council of Lithuanian Youth Organizations set up in 1992 and the Albanian Joint Advisory Committee on the Coordination of Youth Work. In other countries, such as Poland, there is no central government coordinating body, but attempts have been made to represent youth at the local government level. Youth town councils have been established in over 40 of the most important Polish towns. The members of the youth town council in Cracow, for instance, are appointed from among secondary school students. They take part in the work of the local town council and offer advice particularly in the areas of culture, education and sports.

Certainly, during the reconstruction phase, new players have emerged, including domestic and foreign NGOs and international organizations. Several transition countries are already involved in EU youth programmes, especially those Central European countries which are

Table 6.5

National structures for youth policy in selected transition countries, late 1990s

	Government bodies and coordinating structures	Parliamentary representation	Youth policy statement	National association of youth organizations
Albania	Youth Directorate, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport; Joint Advisory Committee on the Coordination of Youth Work, with representatives of the Ministry and NGOs		Youth bill in preparation	Democratic Union; Albanian National Youth Council
Armenia	Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth; Interministerial Council; Departments for Youth Affairs being established in the 10 regional government offices	Standing Committee on Science, Education, Youth Affairs and Sport		National Council for Youth Affairs (1997)
Azerbaijan	Ministry of Youth and Sport			National Youth Organization (NAYORA)
Belarus	Youth Committee of the Council of Ministers	Subcommittee on Youth	"The Basis of State Policy in the Field of Youth"	
Bulgaria	Committee for Youth, Physical Education and Sport (1997); Interministerial committee to coordinate national youth policy	Committee on Youth, Sport and Tourism	"Youth of Bulgaria", policy programme for 1997-2000	National Youth Council (1997)
Croatia	Youth Department within the National Office for the Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Youth (1997)	Committee for Family, Youth and Sport		Several, including: Croatian Youth League; Croatian Students' League
Czech Republic	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport	Committee for Science, Education, Culture, Youth, and Sport; Subcommittee for Youth		Several councils, including Consultative Council; Youth Council of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; Youth Council of the Bohemian and Moravian Lands
Estonia	Youth Department, Ministry of Education; Committee on Youth Affairs (1995)			Estonian Youth Council
Hungary	Ministry of Youth and Sports (1998)	Committee on Education, Science and Sport; Subcommittee on Youth		National Youth Council (MAGYIT); National Children and Youth Parliament (OGYIP)
Latvia	Youth Affairs Department, Ministry of Education and Science; Committee for Youth Education and Youth Affairs		"Concept of Youth Policy" (1997)	Youth Council of Latvia
Lithuania	State Council for Youth Affairs (representing government bodies and NGOs)	Youth Affairs Committee		Council of Lithuanian Youth Organizations (LiJOT) (1992)
Moldova	Directorate on Youth within the Youth and Sports Department			National Youth Council (1995)
Poland		Subcommittee on Youth Affairs, Committee on Education		Polish Youth Council
Romania	Youth Directorate, Ministry of Youth and Sport	Subcommittee on Youth, Committee on Education and Science		
Russian Federation	State Committee for Youth Affairs	Subcommittee on Childhood and Youth Affairs (Duma)	"Youth of Russia Programme" (1998-2000)	National Council of Youth Unions
Slovakia			"The Principles of State Policy in the Youth Sector in the Slovak Republic" (1992); "The Concept of Prevention and Youth Development" (1995)	Slovak Youth Council; Slovak Youth Assembly
Slovenia	Youth Department; Joint Committee on Youth Affairs, representing government and NGOs		National Youth Programme (1996)	National Youth Council
Ukraine	Ministry of Youth and Sport	Commission on Youth Sports and Tourist Affairs (Supreme Council); Youth Parliament (1998)	Declaration on the Basic Principles of the National Youth Policy of Ukraine (1992)	

Sources: COE (1998a); Gazsó (2000a, 2000b) for additional information on Hungary; MYS (2000) for additional information on Azerbaijan.

Note: The COE (1998a) study was carried out in 1995 and revised in October 1998. Information was supplied by the member countries. Institutional changes in all of the countries are still in progress. The table should therefore be considered indicative rather than exhaustive. When available, the year when the structures were created or the programmes were initiated is given in brackets.

immersed in advanced negotiations to join the European Union. For example, in 1995, the Hungarian government set up the Mobilitas Youth Service, a national agency charged with implementing the EU's "Youth for Europe" programme and other bi- and multilateral agreements. Some CIS countries are also taking part in European initiatives. Thus, young people in Georgia are participating in EU youth programmes.

The initial distrust is gradually being overcome and replaced by an acceptance of NGOs as partners in youth policy formulation and implementation. Nonetheless, very few youth organizations possess the assets to maintain a presence and participate in higher levels of decision-making – assets such as experience and expertise, a recognized status and a strong position from which to negotiate, communication skills, infrastructure, and staff.

This raises the risk that, unless youth policies are developed within government that incorporate bottom-up approaches, local initiatives will remain stuck at the local level and the diversity of youth needs will not be adequately reflected in lawmaking and law enforcement. Despite the understandable aversion to large structures mentioned above, a youth agency within the government or attached to parliament is required so that support can be channelled to these local initiatives and responses to them can be coordinated. It is encouraging that some countries, for example Albania, Lithuania and Slovenia, have established national advisory committees on youth affairs that include representatives of government bodies and NGOs.

Indeed, another sign that youth issues are moving up the policy agenda in the region is the trend to create youth ministries or to extend the responsibilities of the government agencies charged with youth issues. These central agencies coordinate or at least harmonize the youth-related work of various ministries in areas such as health care, education, defence, and finance and have direct responsibility for youth issues that fall outside the mandate of other government agencies. Thus, the Ministry of Youth and Sports was established in Hungary in 1998 and is the first youth agency to exist at ministerial level since 1989.

Table 6.5 offers an indicative picture of youth structures in the region. It sets out information supplied by some of the transition countries to the Council of Europe for a study of youth policies and legislation. The table shows that Albania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, and Romania have

Box 6.6

Youth policies and programmes in CEE/CIS

Although youth programmes in the transition region are diverse, trends are emerging in the formulation of youth policies. The four most visible strands of youth policy to appear so far can be summarized as follows:

- **Programmes that deal with prevention and interventions related to health and risk-taking behaviour. For example, the "Youth of Russia" programme (1998-2000) includes measures to tackle the health problems of young people affected by drug addiction, alcoholism and infectious diseases. In Ukraine, there is a programme aimed at the prevention among young people of alcoholism, drug addiction, lawbreaking, and other anti-social behaviours. In Lithuania, one of the objectives of the new State Council for Youth Affairs is to offer support to young people in prison.**
- **Youth unemployment is also being addressed through various youth policy measures. In Romania, the government promotes a system of ongoing training, ensuring interaction between training institutions and the labour market so that young people can move easily from one system to the other. In Azerbaijan, protection for the business activities of young people has been incorporated into youth policy. Likewise, in Georgia "supporting youth entrepreneur activities" is considered a priority.**
- **Fostering cultural and national identity among young people is regarded as an important part of nation-building in several newly independent countries. Youth policy is therefore expected to contribute to the diffusion of patriotic values. In Azerbaijan, the spread of a "spirit of love, devotion and defence of the motherland" through the promotion of cultural and historical heritage is a priority in youth affairs. In Moldova, youth policy is supposed to reflect "national and universal values, and historical and cultural peculiarities of the Republic". Russia also pursues the "creation of suitable structures to aid the spiritual, moral, civic, and patriotic education of young people, based on their own personal development."**
- **Several youth policy initiatives focus on the need to promote the integration of ethnic minorities and refugees in society. In the Baltic States, policies pay particular attention to the cultural and social integration of young people from ethnic minorities through multicultural learning and youth participatory initiatives at the local level. The youth affairs committee of the Lithuanian parliament supports the cultural and social integration of young people from ethnic minorities and deals with young people's eligibility for national service, education in citizenship through the army, and the difficulties young people face in rural areas. Reducing ethnic conflict and promoting multiculturalism are also challenges in countries with persistent minority and refugee problems, such as FYR Macedonia and Azerbaijan.**

similar ministerial structures, while other countries (Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia) have youth committees or departments responsible for youth affairs. Still other countries (Latvia, Estonia and Croatia) give responsibility for youth matters to a special department within a ministry (for example, the ministry of education).

Youth programmes in the region are becoming increasingly diverse, and, as in Western countries, they range from smaller schemes responding to the needs of very specific groups to programmes that tackle big national issues. One important goal – international youth exchanges and participation in programmes of Western countries – has already been mentioned. It appears that there are four other dominant goals of youth policies in the region: preventing risky health and social behaviours, enhancing youth employment, fostering national identity and cultural heritage, and promoting the integration of ethnic and other minorities into society. Box 6.6 offers some examples of relevant policy measures.

Clearly, many of these programmes have been created in response to new social problems among youth, including risk-taking behaviours and social exclusion. Still, how much they reflect a "reactive" approach or how much they encourage autonomy and build on the responsibility of young people is difficult to say and requires specific investigation.

Given their education, their mobility, their language skills, and their tendency to look outward, youth can more easily be considered the natural winners of the transition in countries in which economic recovery has been achieved, education enrolment and employment are rising, and membership in the European Union is on the horizon. In these countries, it may also be easier to develop youth policies which view young people as a rich national resource. In countries which are still trapped by economic problems and in which the tendency to look inward is stronger, youth may be more readily seen as a problem group in need of more schooling, jobs and social control.

In both cases the recognition that young people are not an homogenous group is gaining ground, and "one-size-fits-all" policies are being replaced by more decentralized and more targeted interventions. There is little evidence thus far, however, that policies and services relevant to youth are being built on adequate research, systematic youth involvement, monitoring, and evaluation.

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6.3 Conclusions and a Policy Agenda

This Report focuses on the lives, choices, challenges, and opportunities of a unique segment of the youth of the world – the young people living in the 27 countries of the former Eastern bloc. It investigates the adolescent and early adult years of the children of the fading cold war, those for whom the precious process of growing up has coincided with the deconstruction and at times painful demolition of the structures which governed the lives of their parents. These young people have come of age in societies which are undergoing profound and rapid change.

One key dimension of the lives of this "transition generation" has been precisely the exposure to huge change, an experience that is recognized as a risk factor for youth when it is associated with uncertainty. Preceding generations had to face only a relatively brief, well-structured transition from childhood to adulthood, growing up as they did in the stable, if oppressive, conditions common behind the Iron Curtain. In those days, most adolescents were in school, and those who were not had jobs; people married relatively young and readily found employment; the school and working environments both involved a high degree of social control. In a manner similar to youth in agrarian and rural societies, the youth of the industrialized countries under state socialism emulated their parents, who had few choices, but predictable futures.

The transition has shaken up this predictability and exposed the region to new ideas, new information and new influences; it has called value systems into question and devalued the authority and the knowledge of older generations; it has transformed former political and economic structures. At the same time, it has increased communication and created a cascade of new opportunities in society, particularly for young people.

Youth outcomes and basic causes

The analysis in this Report finds great changes in the most intimate sphere in the lives of youth: family formation. Marriage rates have plunged in all countries. In 1998 the number of women aged 16-24 becoming spouses was reduced by half with respect to nine years earlier. Fertility rates also fell. These trends, when added to the significantly higher rates of youth who are not in employment, suggests that there has been a huge shift towards longer paths in the transition from youth to adult life.

There are also indications that new patterns are emerging in the way young adults are living. More youth are cohabiting, spending longer years in education and combining study and work, especially in Central Europe and the Baltic States. An increasing share of these young people have access to the Internet and will spend time abroad on their own or through organized programmes such as student exchanges or temporary work arrangements. The Report finds evidence that young people are overrepresented in the new private sector, and, despite an overall rise in wage inequality, the gap between the wages of youth and the wages of older people is strikingly narrow in the transition countries. Youth appear to be supportive of economic and political reforms and the greater freedom and personal liberties these have entailed.

The longer transition from youth to adulthood should by no means be understood to indicate that youth populations are generally more dependent or troubled. Often, these longer paths are associated with the greater opportunities available in social environments that are increasingly becoming characterized by a global culture, more communication and greater efficiency and by more flexibility, mobility and space for individual choices, life styles and diversity. The longer youth transition may therefore reflect changes in the broader environment, where learning is becoming a lifelong process, secure "jobs for life" are the exception rather than the rule, families have fewer children, and the divisions between youth and adulthood are less and less marked.

The Report nevertheless finds ample evidence that the passage through the years of youth has also become more complex and risky in the region. Much larger pools of young people are neither in school, nor in the labour force; youth unemployment rates are high, and the shares of the long-term unemployed among jobless youth are rising. Many more young people are working in jobs which offer few career prospects, do not provide social security coverage and entail working conditions which may be unsafe or even exploitative. There is evidence of a deterioration in the overall health of youth, involving poorer nutrition and higher rates of tobacco, alcohol and drug use. Sexually transmitted infections have reemerged as serious problems in many countries and pose a major threat to the health of youth. In several countries HIV-AIDS rates have climbed, and in some countries – where transmission has occurred through populations of injecting drug users – infection rates have soared to frightening levels.

Accident rates among youth are high in international comparisons, often strikingly high, despite relatively low levels in the use of automobiles or other motorization and in access to organized leisure activities. In many countries, the number of deaths of young people from injuries or natural causes is greater now than it was before the transition. The incidence of suicide and violence among youth has increased, at times to alarming levels. More young people are in conflict with the law now than pre-transition, and there are indications that offenders are younger and more likely to be repeat offenders. Some surveys have found surprisingly tolerant attitudes among youth towards unlawful behaviours; others have revealed disturbingly little trust in the state and its institutions.

What are the root causes of these problems, and how can transition societies counter the negative trends?

The findings of the Report suggest that there is a positive correlation between changes in youth participation in education and employment on the one hand and economic growth and market reforms on the other. Schooling and job opportunities are generally associated with healthy behaviours, less conflict with the law and stronger civic commitments. One obvious way to improve youth outcomes is, therefore, to strengthen the commitment to the market and to democratic reforms, a forward-looking strategy which can build on young people as a key resource and potential ally in the reform process.

However, the Report finds that higher school dropout rates, more social exclusion and various negative health behaviours among youth are also showing up in countries which are frontrunners in reform and which are posting signs of strong economic growth. Nor does it seem plausible that the lack of economic growth is a satisfactory explanation alone, since many well-established and dynamic market economies are experiencing similar problems.

There is an association between youth outcomes and socio-economic variables such as family income, parental education, rural or urban location, or ethnicity. Family and parental factors tend to explain a considerable portion of the differences in schooling, learning achievement, health, and job opportunities (and even peer associations and marriage choices) in every society. As analysis in this and earlier Regional Monitoring Reports has shown, such factors also played an important role before the transition. However, inequalities in family income and in access to services (often resonating with ethnic and geographic divisions) have grown during the transition, and the gaps are appearing as bigger differences in youth outcomes.

A socially more sensitive approach to the reforms would therefore also be a more youth-friendly strategy. Stronger public policies and private initiatives on the social side would facilitate equal opportunity in education, access to basic health services and family support for young women and men; youth would also benefit from less ethnic tension and lower rates of crime and violence. To achieve this, however, youth concerns need to be represented in strategies and programmes.

Under communism, school enrolment, the frequency of contacts with the health care system and reliance on particular risk-taking behaviours, such as drug abuse, were far less an individual choice among youth. The passage through the years of youth was highly structured, and behaviours were tightly controlled. Today, young people are citizens of free societies and have rights and make choices, and, because the structures and controls of the former state have collapsed, the influence of family background is more visible than before. However, it is worth recalling that, in some countries, the more elevated socio-economic status of parents can have a negative association with healthy behaviour among youth and that sometimes closing the gender gap unfortunately means more substance abuse and higher crime rates among young women.

The promotion of economic growth and the development of civil society, if accompanied by investments in public health, education and social protection, can create a foundation for sound youth policies, but they do not necessarily result in better youth outcomes. There is a need – and ample room – for the design of more specific youth-friendly policies. How can these policies be developed, and what sort of changes and interventions are required in the transition countries?

An agenda for youth-friendly interventions

The first goal that youth-friendly policies must aim at is to ensure that youth becomes recognized as a distinct population group with particular needs and capacities. It is curious, but revealing, that in the traditional approaches to youth, the only domain where this elementary condition was at least formally met in the region was juvenile justice.

The second goal of youth-friendly policies should be to open a meaningful dialogue with youth on the issues that affect their lives and the decisions they face. This dialogue should be multifaceted, supported by detailed research and political commitment, and designed to aid the development and reformulation of policy responses.

This Report, reviewing national data and international surveys, identifies the following thematic issues as most in need of programme and policy intervention, further research and debate, in the multinational context of the transition.

- Programmes that target youth mortality due to accidents and violence.
- Support services and interventions to reduce stress, youth depression and suicide.
- Programmes against substance abuse, including smoking, excess alcohol consumption and drug use.
- Reproductive and sexual health programmes focused on safe sex, adolescent fertility and sexually transmitted infections.
- Access to information, life skills, youth-friendly services,

Box 6.7

A framework for adolescent health programming

Assessment of the level of adolescent programming
(The further one progresses down the list in the provision of answers for a country, the deeper the level of programming.)

- What is the nature of political commitment to adolescents and young people across the sectors covering health, development, protection, and participation?
- Have priorities been set through relevant recent research and through systematic youth involvement? What are the priorities in terms of key problems and selected solutions?
- Where some interventions are ongoing, have they reoriented existing resources or generated additional investment? Is sensitization and training on adolescence provided to health and social workers, educators and youth workers, law officers, and religious leaders? Are young people recruited to provide input to youth services?
- Is there a systematized effort to monitor and evaluate policies, programmes and activities (whether funded by government or other agencies) using available indicators of success, quality and impact?

Major types of interventions
(A country requires at least a little of each type in order to ensure adequate coverage.)

- Supportive policy environment for youth-work service providers and safe spaces for young people and their families.
- Availability, accessibility and renewal of appropriate, understandable information for each age range.
- Relevant educational curriculum delivered using the life skills approach and interactive methodologies to build competence and ability.
- Adequate counselling facilities in educational, health care and residential settings mediated by trained providers, whether professional, peer, or other volunteers.
- Youth-specific and youth-friendly health and social services which adequately address key health and development problems.

Coverage and involvement in the following areas are essential
(The settings and actors involved will differ from country to country and within countries according to the culture and traditions of groups, including ethnic, sexual and linguistic minorities and the disabled.)

- Community and religious groups.
- Youth-serving organizations and youth movements, clubs and associations.
- Street work with especially vulnerable groups.
- Family and home support networks.
- Schools, colleges, universities.
- Workplaces, vocational training centres.
- Residential care centres, centres for justice administration.
- Television, radio, Internet service providers, magazines and newspapers.
- Sports, leisure, discotheques, and shopping facilities.

peer programmes, and supportive environments to counter the threat of HIV-AIDS.

- Programmes addressing the root causes of poor basic education completion rates, weak vocational and technical education enrolment, and high dropout rates.
- Equal opportunity in education, including paths to tertiary education.
- Access to language courses and to the Internet.
- Access to life skills education and non-formal learning.
- Recognition of the special needs of marginalized groups of young people, including ethnic minorities.
- Access to a first job.
- Working conditions and career perspectives in the private sector.
- The issue of public sector employment of youth.
- Active labour market measures, including certain types of programmes which are particularly successful among youth in the transition countries.
- Primary and secondary prevention of youth getting into conflict with the law.
- Positive sentencing options in juvenile justice, including alternatives to the deprivation of liberty.
- Programmes that enhance civic values and education in good citizenship.
- Partnerships with and communication among civic and grassroots youth groups and organizations.

To illustrate the scope and the depth of the actions needed in these fields, Box 6.7 outlines a framework based on experience gained in adolescent health and development interventions in various countries of the world. It is clear that political commitment is essential, and, even though interventions may target only one major area, such as health, a multisectoral approach and the involvement of a range of activities and actors are recommended. This comprehensive and multilayered approach reflects the recognition that youth issues are interrelated and often have common roots, that youth is not a homogenous group, though, as a group, youth have particular needs and capacities, and that some segments of the youth population are more vulnerable than others and may need additional support.

International experience is not sufficient in itself for the development of meaningful programmes and cannot replace country-specific research on the particular needs of youth in given economic, social and cultural contexts. An international perspective is nonetheless important. It can often be helpful in supplying useful guidance for youth-friendly policies and in highlighting common underlying problems.

From the analysis and the data provided in this Report, the following cross-cutting issues emerge.

- Little trust between youth and service providers and state planners.
- Little discussion and dialogue on sensitive issues relevant for youth.
- Lack of appropriate recognition of psychosocial factors in youth development.
- Narrow sectoral approaches to youth health, development, or employment.
- Lack of common terminology and approaches to youth issues.
- Overemphasis on technicalities of service delivery and underrecognition of factors that determine service delivery, such as confidentiality and affordability.
- Little involvement of youth in service planning and provision.
- Little recognition of youth as an asset and as able partners.
- Little research and few surveys and statistics targeted at youth and young families.
- Little dialogue at national and local levels on youth issues.

While it is essential to call attention to factors which hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions and service provision, it is also essential to call attention to and build upon existing strengths. While the region has a weak track record in communication and in the supply of information to youth, a major element of any youth-related policy and youth advocacy, it has strong traditions and staff who are often well trained in providing quality services for children up to age 18. This is a huge asset, and, although the 10 years of the transition may have eroded some of these capacities, they have also seen the appearance of new types of services, the launch of reforms and the expansion of the range of providers.

These services and supports are clearly important for adolescents. It is also important for all young people because, as analysis has repeatedly found in various countries and settings, much of the success or the failure which surfaces in adolescence and young adult ages is rooted in childhood. In other words, to reap the rewards of positive policies and programmes for youth, it pays to make the appropriate investment earlier in life with child-friendly policies and programmes. Well-articulated youth policies, through their impact on young mothers and families, can then benefit from the fact that young children are healthier and better cared for. Finally, while it is important that policies distinguish youth from children, it is also true that many issues and challenges are shared and call for action across the board.

The decade of transition has eroded many doctrines once closely held in the region, and this dissolution can be liberating. It may, for instance, help uproot the belief that children and adolescents have no need for rights and dignity, that young people are passive recipients of social values, public services, economic goods, and political priorities. It may promote the understanding that, in mind, body and spirit, the 65 million members of the youth nation in the region form an immense asset for the 27 transition countries and beyond in this time of rapid economic and social transformation.

■

Voices of Youth 18

Jan and Ira: a tale of two futures

Jan and Ira are just two of the 200 young individuals from the region whose voices have reached this Report. They come from different countries and very different circumstances, but they are both intent on doing the best they can for themselves and for their countries. Their stories illustrate what a great resource youth can be in the nation-building of the transition.

Jan, 24, is a project manager for an international company in the Czech Republic. He is married and comes from an educated, hard-working family. His father is a lecturer at the university; his mother is a bank officer, and his sister is studying economics. Jan himself graduated from a secondary technical school and, like his father, from the faculty of electronics at the technical university. His parents have been very supportive of his education.

"They motivated me to study," he says. "Although it was not easy for them, they were willing to pay for my language course." His father also steered him toward his current employer when he was researching his thesis. Jan wrote on a topic suggested by the company and then began working for the firm while he was studying. Upon graduation, the company sent him on a three-month study trip to Finland and hired him full time as a project manager.

Jan feels his education, foreign language skills, initiative, and involvement with his future employer as a student all helped him get the job. He likes his work and feels it is a good start to his career.

"My work motivates me," he says. "It is demanding; I have an opportunity to learn new things. It offers professional growth."

Jan hopes to become a line manager in the company and feels he has the support of his boss and colleagues.

"[Managers] respect our opinions because they are aware of the fact that society and the market is changing opinions of young people and that this could be of high importance, particularly because young people see things differently."

Ira, 19, is a single mother who lives with her 14-month-old daughter, her mother and her father in Ukraine. She and her father have jobs, and her mother stays at home and cares for the baby.

"I was 16 when I got pregnant," she explains. "My parents were shocked. When my partner learned that I was pregnant, he gave me some money to have an abortion. But I was scared to have an abortion, as it usually has some side effects, negative, for one's health. We got married anyway, but after six months we divorced."

Having a partner and a traditional two-parent relationship is desirable, but not a priority for Ira. If she had her say, Ira would make sure family planning was taught in school and young women could have direct access to women's health centres. Meanwhile, she deals with the realities of young motherhood.

"It is too difficult to work and study simultaneously if you have a child," she says. "Now I am only working." She believes the government should support young mothers who are still going to school. Ira also recognizes that being a young single mother makes her financially vulnerable.

"I think that having a baby creates some additional problems in looking for a job."

She remains undaunted, however.

"I am very happy with my child," she says. "I love her so much. Of course, a child ties my hands in a way, but I am sure I will reach my goals." These goals include going on to study economics at university, getting a good job as a manager in finance and providing a sound education for her daughter. But will Ira's country benefit from her dreams?

Statistical Annex

The data in the Statistical Annex are taken from various sources. The great majority are provided by the central statistical offices participating in the MONEE project. In some cases additional calculations have been made to derive figures which are comparable among countries, for example enrolment rates in education. Other sources are given in the table notes when relevant. The phrase "MONEE project database" given as the source to a number of tables and graphs in the main text usually refers to data provided by central statistical offices. (The data are not necessarily consistent with those found in other UNICEF publications, which sometimes rely on non-national sources.) The Glossary, which follows the Statistical Annex, offers descriptions of some of the indicators used.

A menu-driven database called "TransMONEE 2000", which includes the data in the Statistical Annex, together with a substantial amount of additional data, can be downloaded free of charge from UNICEF IRC via the Internet. It is available in Windows95/NT environment. The database allows the user to extract a profile of economic and social indicators for a single country or to compare a single indicator across subregions, countries and time-periods. Data can be converted into index form or expressed as rates of change. Data can also be output as a table or graph and can be exported to different file formats, for example for further use in a spreadsheet package.

For more details and instructions for downloading and installing the database, see the UNICEF IRC website at <http://www.unicef-icdc.org>. The database can also be downloaded through the European University Institute (Italy) at <ftp://datacomm.iue.it/unicef/> or through the Centre for Europe's Children, Glasgow University, UK, at <ftp://eurochild.gla.ac.uk/monee/>. To access an interactive version of the database, see the website of the Centre for Europe's Children, Glasgow University, UK: <http://www.eurochild.gla.ac.uk>.

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1.1 Total population (beginning of year de facto population, thousands)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic[a,b]	10,292	10,334	10,360	10,362	10,305	10,313	10,326	10,334	10,333	10,321	10,309	10,299	10,290
Slovakia[a,b]	4,991	5,145	5,264	5,288	5,272	5,296	5,314	5,336	5,356	5,368	5,379	5,388	5,393
Poland[c,d]	35,578	37,203	37,885	38,038	38,183	38,309	38,418	38,505	38,581	38,609	38,639	38,660	38,667
Hungary[c,e]	10,708	10,579	10,589	10,374	10,355	10,337	10,310	10,277	10,246	10,212	10,174	10,135	10,092
Slovenia[c,f]	1,801	1,973	1,996	1,996	2,000	1,999	1,994	1,989	1,989	1,990	1,987	1,985	1,978
Croatia[c,g,h]	4,588	4,702	4,762	4,773	4,781	4,782	4,734	4,705	4,712	4,681	4,663	4,668	4,674
FYR Macedonia[h,i]	1,909	–	–	–	2,035	2,047	2,063	2,009	1,957	1,975	1,989	2,003	2,018
Bosnia-Herzegovina[j]	–	–	4,435	4,478	4,518	–	–	3,885	3,484	3,197	3,167	3,294	3,426
FR Yugoslavia[a,c,k]	9,842	10,209	10,445	10,500	10,558	10,434	10,469	10,503	10,535	10,568	10,594	10,614	10,633
Albania[c,l]	2,671	2,957	3,182	3,250	3,266	3,224	3,172	3,166	3,198	3,241	3,281	3,315	3,348
Bulgaria[c]	8,862	8,961	8,987	8,767	8,669	8,595	8,485	8,460	8,427	8,385	8,341	8,283	8,230
Romania[a,c]	22,201	22,725	23,112	23,211	23,192	22,811	22,779	22,748	22,712	22,656	22,582	22,526	22,489
Estonia[a,c,m]	1,469	1,529	1,566	1,572	1,570	1,562	1,527	1,507	1,492	1,476	1,462	1,454	1,446
Latvia[c,m]	2,512	2,579	2,666	2,673	2,668	2,657	2,606	2,566	2,536	2,502	2,480	2,458	2,439
Lithuania[c,m]	3,413	3,545	3,675	3,708	3,736	3,747	3,736	3,724	3,718	3,712	3,707	3,704	3,701
Belarus[m,n]	9,622	9,969	10,152	10,211	10,212	10,233	10,298	10,319	10,297	10,264	10,236	10,204	10,179
Moldova[m,n,o]	3,987	4,195	4,335	4,359	4,364	4,357	4,346	4,350	4,346	4,332	4,318	3,651	3,650
Russia[a,m]	138,483	143,033	147,022	147,662	148,164	148,326	148,295	147,997	147,939	147,609	147,137	146,739	146,328
Ukraine[m,n]	49,953	50,858	51,452	51,584	51,690	51,802	51,989	51,860	51,474	51,079	50,639	50,245	49,851
Armenia[a,m,n]	3,074	3,317	3,288	3,515	3,578	3,649	3,708	3,739	3,753	3,767	3,780	3,792	3,805
Azerbaijan[a,m,n]	6,114	6,622	7,014	7,115	7,219	7,324	7,440	7,550	7,644	7,726	7,800	7,877	7,949
Georgia[a,m,n]	5,053	5,264	5,401	5,414	5,422	5,420	5,405	5,391	5,375	5,373	5,381	5,395	5,402
Kazakhstan[a,m,n]	14,832	15,739	16,194	16,298	16,358	16,452	16,426	16,335	15,957	15,676	15,481	15,188	14,901
Kyrgyzstan[m,n]	3,593	3,976	4,254	4,335	4,390	4,452	4,469	4,430	4,451	4,512	4,574	4,635	4,699
Tajikistan[a,m,n]	3,899	4,493	5,092	5,232	5,342	5,555	5,556	5,688	5,757	5,860	5,899	6,004	6,100
Turkmenistan[m,n]	2,826	3,189	3,545	3,611	3,703	3,798	3,895	4,002	4,435	4,528	4,605	4,681	4,738
Uzbekistan[m,n]	15,758	17,926	19,905	20,227	20,613	21,112	21,608	22,097	22,467	22,912	23,349	23,772	24,136

a. De jure population concept.
b. 1980: census.
c. 1980, 1985: mid-year population.
d. 1992: census.
e. 1990: census.
f. 1991: census. To 1992 de jure citizens of former Yugoslavia w/permanent residence in Slovenia. Since 1992 permanent residents of Slovenia.
g. 1989-90: CBSC (1996).
h. 1991-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
i. 1980: mid-year population.
j. 1994-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
k. 1999: IRC estimate.
l. 1989-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
m. 1989: census.
n. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1998a).
o. 1998-99: excludes Transdniestr.

1.2 Population, age 0-14 (beginning of year, thousands)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	2,316	2,253	2,176	2,121	2,065	2,010	1,948	1,893	1,843	1,795	1,751
Slovakia	1,362	1,346	1,319	1,301	1,279	1,256	1,226	1,195	1,165	1,134	1,102
Poland	9,673	9,613	9,523	9,411	9,277	9,111	8,923	8,678	8,446	8,170	7,861
Hungary	2,203	2,131	2,064	2,010	1,958	1,911	1,870	1,836	1,802	1,772	1,745
Slovenia	424	418	411	401	390	379	369	360	348	338	329
Croatia[a]	–	–	–	915	890	878	862	838	819	806	794
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	–	491	490	487	484	482	479	476	473
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b]	–	–	–	691	663	608	708	612	583	593	602
FR Yugoslavia[c]	2,447	2,433	2,414	2,359	2,335	2,310	2,284	2,259	2,238	2,207	2,177
Albania[d]	–	1,065	1,077	1,086	1,093	1,100	1,105	1,109	1,110	1,108	1,102
Bulgaria	1,888	1,801	1,743	1,684	1,615	1,573	1,528	1,481	1,438	1,388	1,341
Romania	5,559	5,508	5,396	5,185	5,030	4,878	4,731	4,574	4,435	4,336	4,259
Estonia	349	350	349	343	329	318	309	299	289	279	269
Latvia	571	574	574	570	554	539	525	509	492	473	452
Lithuania	832	838	845	844	837	826	815	802	787	771	753
Belarus	2,337	2,357	2,355	2,345	2,342	2,317	2,273	2,215	2,154	2,085	2,007
Moldova[e]	1,211	1,219	1,217	1,208	1,195	1,184	1,166	1,142	1,113	934	900
Russia	33,984	34,030	33,893	33,563	33,067	32,357	31,756	30,968	30,059	29,018	27,833
Ukraine	11,101	11,092	11,042	10,966	10,927	10,776	10,532	10,254	9,967	9,643	9,237
Armenia[d]	–	1,067	1,090	1,104	1,111	1,104	1,086	1,062	1,034	1,001	971
Azerbaijan	2,300	2,349	2,399	2,446	2,484	2,518	2,539	2,533	2,557	2,580	2,606
Georgia	1,338	1,335	1,330	1,322	1,301	1,275	1,245	1,213	1,180	1,144	1,104
Kazakhstan[c]	5,208	5,183	5,160	5,151	5,104	5,020	4,862	4,734	4,608	4,443	4,288
Kyrgyzstan	1,593	1,627	1,651	1,674	1,687	1,681	1,683	1,700	1,705	1,700	1,694
Tajikistan	2,187	2,252	2,312	2,407	2,429	2,500	2,525	2,559	2,539	2,545	2,533
Turkmenistan	1,436	1,463	1,497	1,532	1,569	1,607	1,800	1,823	1,841	1,847	1,848
Uzbekistan	–	8,259	8,447	8,661	8,879	9,062	9,174	9,313	9,401	9,453	9,430

a. 1992-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
b. 1994-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
c. 1999: IRC estimate.
d. 1990-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
e. 1998-99: excludes Transdniestr.

1.3 Population, age 15-24 (beginning of year, thousands)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	1,468	1,508	1,545	1,592	1,638	1,679	1,709	1,715	1,705	1,684	1,643
Slovakia	788	799	810	829	850	874	896	911	922	928	928
Poland	5,181	5,257	5,375	5,524	5,669	5,817	5,973	6,111	6,220	6,335	6,456
Hungary	1,418	1,445	1,511	1,561	1,593	1,609	1,619	1,619	1,614	1,597	1,568
Slovenia	296	295	294	292	291	291	293	297	297	296	293
Croatia[a]	–	–	–	648	636	641	647	646	644	645	645
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	–	318	320	319	319	322	325	328	330
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b]	–	–	–	728	688	615	532	477	474	502	530
FR Yugoslavia[c]	1,534	1,548	1,565	1,547	1,561	1,572	1,580	1,592	1,593	1,599	1,605
Albania[d]	–	626	611	576	541	532	542	558	575	591	608
Bulgaria	1,228	1,207	1,211	1,226	1,229	1,233	1,231	1,228	1,224	1,222	1,214
Romania	3,680	3,803	3,918	3,958	3,892	3,817	3,791	3,788	3,805	3,776	3,727
Estonia	216	216	216	217	216	214	211	210	208	208	209
Latvia	370	368	365	361	351	346	341	336	331	332	338
Lithuania	560	553	546	561	553	548	544	540	533	527	525
Belarus	1,413	1,414	1,405	1,401	1,417	1,437	1,455	1,475	1,487	1,502	1,535
Moldova[e]	625	627	637	645	649	659	676	693	710	619	637
Russia	19,722	19,689	19,730	19,891	20,163	20,535	20,933	21,209	21,433	21,709	22,162
Ukraine	6,902	6,954	7,044	7,119	7,206	7,261	7,304	7,334	7,303	7,268	7,314
Armenia[d]	–	572	579	586	595	602	611	623	637	651	665
Azerbaijan	1,379	1,367	1,364	1,352	1,343	1,330	1,324	1,331	1,343	1,357	1,369
Georgia	833	817	805	807	807	805	808	808	814	824	836
Kazakhstan[c]	2,752	2,729	2,694	2,737	2,770	2,791	2,756	2,720	2,726	2,702	2,679
Kyrgyzstan	771	785	796	811	816	813	825	841	858	876	899
Tajikistan	990	1,006	1,017	1,063	1,057	1,074	1,088	1,108	1,130	1,165	1,208
Turkmenistan	699	704	719	737	756	775	859	874	890	909	926
Uzbekistan	–	3,888	3,936	4,016	4,107	4,192	4,291	4,377	4,469	4,570	4,696

a. 1992-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
b. 1994-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
c. 1999: IRC estimate.
d. 1990-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
e. 1998-99: excludes Transdniestr.

1.4 Population share, age 0-14 (percent)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	22.4	21.7	21.1	20.6	20.0	19.4	18.9	18.3	17.9	17.4	17.0
Slovakia	25.9	25.5	25.0	24.6	24.1	23.5	22.9	22.3	21.7	21.0	20.4
Poland	25.5	25.3	24.9	24.6	24.1	23.7	23.1	22.5	21.9	21.1	20.3
Hungary	20.8	20.5	19.9	19.4	19.0	18.6	18.3	18.0	17.7	17.5	17.3
Slovenia	21.2	20.9	20.6	20.1	19.6	19.1	18.5	18.1	17.5	17.0	16.6
Croatia[a]	–	–	–	19.1	18.8	18.7	18.3	17.9	17.6	17.3	17.0
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	–	24.0	23.7	24.2	24.7	24.4	24.1	23.8	23.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b]	–	–	–	–	–	15.6	20.3	19.2	18.4	18.0	17.6
FR Yugoslavia[c]	23.4	23.2	22.9	22.6	22.3	22.0	21.7	21.4	21.1	20.8	20.5
Albania[d]	–	32.8	33.0	33.7	34.5	34.8	34.6	34.2	33.8	33.4	32.9
Bulgaria	21.0	20.5	20.1	19.6	19.0	18.6	18.1	17.7	17.2	16.8	16.3
Romania	24.1	23.7	23.3	22.7	22.1	21.4	20.8	20.2	19.6	19.2	18.9
Estonia	22.3	22.3	22.2	22.0	21.5	21.1	20.7	20.3	19.8	19.2	18.6
Latvia	21.4	21.5	21.5	21.5	21.3	21.0	20.7	20.3	19.9	19.3	18.5
Lithuania	22.6	22.6	22.6	22.5	22.4	22.2	21.9	21.6	21.2	20.8	20.4
Belarus	23.0	23.1	23.1	22.9	22.7	22.5	22.1	21.6	21.0	20.4	19.7
Moldova[e]	27.9	28.0	27.9	27.7	27.5	27.2	26.8	26.4	25.8	25.6	24.7
Russia	23.1	23.0	22.9	22.6	22.3	21.9	21.5	21.0	20.4	19.8	19.0
Ukraine	21.6	21.5	21.4	21.2	21.0	20.8	20.5	20.1	19.7	19.2	18.5
Armenia[d]	–	30.3	30.5	30.3	30.0	29.5	28.9	28.2	27.4	26.4	25.5
Azerbaijan	32.8	33.0	33.2	33.4	33.4	33.4	33.2	32.8	32.8	32.8	32.8
Georgia	24.8	24.7	24.5	24.4	24.1	23.7	23.2	22.6	21.9	21.2	20.4
Kazakhstan[c]	32.2	31.8	31.5	31.3	31.1	30.7	30.5	30.2	29.8	29.3	28.8
Kyrgyzstan	37.5	37.5	37.6	37.6	37.7	37.9	37.8	37.7	37.3	36.7	36.1
Tajikistan	42.9	43.0	43.3	43.3	43.7	44.0	43.9	43.7	43.0	42.4	41.5
Turkmenistan	40.5	40.5	40.4	40.3	40.3	40.2	40.6	40.3	40.0	39.5	39.0
Uzbekistan	–	40.8	41.0	41.0	41.1	41.0	40.8	40.6	40.3	39.8	39.1

a. 1992-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
b. 1994-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
c. 1999: IRC estimate.
d. 1990-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
e. 1998-99: excludes Transdniestr.

1.5 Population share, age 15-24 (percent)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	14.2	14.6	15.0	15.4	15.9	16.2	16.5	16.6	16.5	16.4	16.0
Slovakia	15.0	15.1	15.4	15.6	16.0	16.4	16.7	17.0	17.1	17.2	17.2
Poland	13.7	13.8	14.1	14.4	14.8	15.1	15.5	15.8	16.1	16.4	16.7
Hungary	13.4	13.9	14.6	15.1	15.4	15.7	15.8	15.9	15.9	15.8	15.5
Slovenia	14.8	14.8	14.7	14.6	14.6	14.6	14.7	14.9	15.0	14.9	14.8
Croatia	–	–	–	13.5	13.4	13.6	13.7	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	15.6	15.5	15.9	16.3	16.3	16.4	16.4	16.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	15.8	15.3	14.9	15.0	15.2	15.5
FR Yugoslavia	14.7	14.7	14.8	14.8	14.9	15.0	15.0	15.1	15.0	15.1	15.1
Albania	–	19.3	18.7	17.9	17.1	16.8	16.9	17.2	17.5	17.8	18.2
Bulgaria	13.7	13.8	14.0	14.3	14.5	14.6	14.6	14.6	14.7	14.8	14.7
Romania	15.9	16.4	16.9	17.4	17.1	16.8	16.7	16.7	16.8	16.8	16.6
Estonia	13.8	13.7	13.8	13.9	14.1	14.2	14.2	14.2	14.2	14.3	14.5
Latvia	13.9	13.8	13.7	13.6	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.4	13.4	13.5	13.8
Lithuania	15.2	14.9	14.6	15.0	14.8	14.7	14.6	14.5	14.4	14.2	14.2
Belarus	13.9	13.8	13.8	13.7	13.8	13.9	14.1	14.4	14.5	14.7	15.1
Moldova	14.4	14.4	14.6	14.8	14.9	15.1	15.6	16.0	16.5	17.0	17.5
Russia	13.4	13.3	13.3	13.4	13.6	13.9	14.1	14.4	14.6	14.8	15.1
Ukraine	13.4	13.5	13.6	13.7	13.9	14.0	14.2	14.4	14.4	14.5	14.7
Armenia	–	16.3	16.2	16.1	16.0	16.1	16.3	16.6	16.9	17.2	17.5
Azerbaijan	19.7	19.2	18.9	18.5	18.1	17.6	17.3	17.2	17.2	17.2	17.2
Georgia	15.4	15.1	14.9	14.9	14.9	14.9	15.0	15.0	15.1	15.3	15.5
Kazakhstan	17.0	16.7	16.5	16.6	16.9	17.1	17.3	17.3	17.6	17.8	18.0
Kyrgyzstan	18.1	18.1	18.1	18.2	18.3	18.4	18.5	18.6	18.7	18.9	19.1
Tajikistan	19.4	19.2	19.0	19.1	19.0	18.9	18.9	18.9	19.2	19.4	19.8
Turkmenistan	19.7	19.5	19.4	19.4	19.4	19.4	19.4	19.3	19.3	19.4	19.5
Uzbekistan	–	19.2	19.1	19.0	19.0	19.0	19.1	19.1	19.1	19.2	19.5

a. Population data, 1992-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
b. Population data, 1994-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
c. 1999: IRC estimate.
d. Population data, 1990-99: based on US Census Bureau (1999).
e. 1998-99: excludes Transdniestr.

1.6 Rate of natural population increase

(birth rate minus death rate, per thousand population; excludes changes due to migration)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	4.2	2.8	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3	-1.0	-2.1	-2.2	-2.1	-1.8
Slovakia	–	–	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.0	3.9	2.8	1.6	1.7	1.3	0.8
Poland	9.6	7.9	4.8	4.1	3.7	3.1	2.7	2.5	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.5
Hungary	0.4	-1.6	-2.0	-1.9	-1.7	-2.6	-3.2	-3.0	-3.3	-3.7	-3.8	-4.3
Slovenia	5.8	3.1	2.4	1.9	1.1	0.3	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.4	-0.6
Croatia	4.0	2.3	0.6	0.7	-0.6	-1.0	-0.5	-0.2	-0.1	0.7	0.8	-1.1
FYR Macedonia	13.9	12.1	–	–	9.8	8.4	8.1	9.1	8.0	7.7	6.5	6.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	8.2	8.4	7.8	2.2	0.5	1.5	4.3	5.2	5.0	–
FR Yugoslavia	8.6	6.8	5.3	5.4	4.8	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.5	1.8	-1.8
Albania	20.1	20.4	18.8	19.5	18.3	18.0	15.8	16.9	16.8	15.6	–	–
Bulgaria	3.5	1.4	0.6	-0.4	-1.7	-2.2	-3.0	-3.8	-5.1	-5.4	-6.9	-6.4
Romania	7.6	4.9	5.3	2.9	1.0	-0.2	-0.6	-0.9	-1.5	-2.4	-1.9	-1.4
Estonia	2.7	2.8	3.7	1.8	-0.2	-1.4	-4.0	-5.3	-4.9	-3.9	-4.1	-5.0
Latvia	1.3	2.2	2.4	1.2	0.0	-1.5	-4.8	-6.9	-6.9	-5.8	-6.0	-6.4
Lithuania	4.7	5.4	4.8	4.6	4.1	3.3	0.4	-1.1	-1.1	-1.0	-0.9	-1.0
Belarus	6.1	5.9	4.9	3.2	1.7	1.1	-1.1	-1.9	-3.2	-3.7	-4.6	-4.4
Moldova	9.7	10.6	9.7	7.9	6.0	5.8	4.5	2.4	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.4
Russia	4.9	5.3	3.9	2.3	0.7	-1.5	-5.1	-6.0	-5.7	-5.3	-5.1	-4.8
Ukraine	3.5	2.9	1.8	0.5	-0.8	-1.9	-3.5	-4.7	-5.8	-6.1	-6.2	-6.0
Armenia	18.2	19.8	15.6	16.3	15.1	12.1	8.5	7.1	6.4	6.1	5.3	4.3
Azerbaijan	17.2	18.2	19.5	19.6	20.0	17.6	16.3	13.8	12.0	10.4	10.9	9.8
Georgia	9.1	9.8	8.1	8.7	7.9	4.8	–	2.9	3.4	3.6	2.7	1.4
Kazakhstan	15.9	17.1	15.7	14.3	13.3	12.2	9.7	9.0	6.8	5.6	4.7	4.5
Kyrgyzstan	21.2	23.9	23.4	22.5	22.3	21.6	18.5	16.4	17.9	16.2	14.7	14.9
Tajikistan	28.9	33.0	32.4	32.7	33.0	25.7	24.4	21.4	22.8	19.1	19.2	16.1
Turkmenistan	26.0	27.9	27.2	27.2	26.4	26.9	25.2	23.1	22.6	21.0	18.7	14.5
Uzbekistan	26.4	30.2	26.9	27.8	28.4	26.7	25.0	22.9	23.5	21.2	19.8	17.3

a. 1980, 1985: CBSC (1996).
b. Population data, 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).
c. 1993-97: births and deaths in Federation of B-H; population data US Census Bureau (1999).
d. 1980, 1985: FSOY (1996); 1998 excludes Kosovo.
e. Population data, 1989-96: US Census Bureau (1999).
f. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1997).
g. Population data, 1997-98 excludes Transdniestr.
h. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
i. 1996-98: CIS Stat (1999).

1.7 Net external migration (immigrants minus emigrants, thousands)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	-1.3	-1.0	1.5	0.6	2.9	11.8	5.5	9.9	10.0	10.1	12.1	9.5
Slovakia	–	–	–	0.1	1.2	2.0	1.8	4.8	2.8	2.3	1.7	1.3
Poland	-21.2	-18.9	-24.4	-15.8	-15.9	-11.6	-15.5	-19.0	-18.2	-13.1	-11.8	-13.3
Hungary	–	–	23.9	22.6	17.3	10.8	13.3	13.1	13.2	12.1	12.5	12.1
Slovenia[a]	–	–	2.4	2.2	-3.1	-0.4	1.4	0.9	2.5	6.5	2.4	-2.1
Croatia	–	–	–	–	1.4	39.5	48.5	23.3	26.6	34.6	33.8	44.2
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	-0.6	3.2	3.0	1.7	1.2	1.0	0.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	–	–	-217.6	-87.6	-46.5	-67.7	-64.4	-62.7	-50.5	-64.5	–	–
Romania	-24.7	-27.2	-41.4	-96.9	-42.6	-29.4	-17.2	-16.3	-21.2	-19.5	-13.3	-5.6
Estonia	–	6.5	0.2	-4.0	-8.0	-33.8	-13.8	-7.6	-8.2	-5.7	-2.5	-1.1
Latvia	4.4	10.9	1.2	-0.5	-10.8	-46.9	-27.9	-18.8	-10.5	-7.3	-4.8	-3.2
Lithuania	8.9	13.8	1.3	-8.8	-8.9	-22.2	-13.1	-2.6	-1.8	-0.9	0.1	0.6
Belarus[b]	14.4	0.3	25.9	-19.6	30.4	66.0	37.9	-3.3	-0.2	9.4	14.7	19.9
Moldova[b,c]	5.6	-3.8	–	–	–	-5.8	-4.6	-5.0	-4.0	-12.7	–	–
Russia	63.4	267.2	115.3	183.8	16.7	252.9	440.3	809.6	502.5	343.5	349.0	278.6
Ukraine	7.9	22.5	-108.9	-139.3	-180.4	290.1	49.6	-143.2	-94.8	-131.2	-82.1	-93.6
Armenia	-19.1	-36.3	17.8	40.8	23.0	-6.3	-20.9	-19.1	-7.8	-6.4	-8.5	-8.2
Azerbaijan	-8.4	-15.4	2.1	–	-40.1	-14.2	-12.3	-11.0	-9.8	-7.4	-8.2	-5.1
Georgia	-5.5	-5.5	-14.9	-39.0	-44.0	-41.6	-30.3	-31.5	-20.2	-11.7	-0.5	-0.2
Kazakhstan[b]	-62.7	-92.6	-93.4	-130.9	-48.9	-179.3	-222.1	-414.4	-238.5	-175.5	-261.4	-203.0
Kyrgyzstan[b]	-7.9	-19.8	-16.0	-41.9	-33.8	-77.5	-120.6	-51.1	-18.9	-11.7	-6.7	-5.5
Tajikistan[b]	-8.6	-2.6	-19.1	-59.0	-28.6	-93.4	-74.3	-48.5	-39.8	-30.4	-16.3	-15.8
Turkmenistan[b]	-4.8	-9.0	–	-0.9	-8.5	-4.9	-13.5	-0.3	-13.1	-13.4	-25.9	-16.8
Uzbekistan[b]	-31.7	-48.9	-86.5	-120.6	-41.6	-88.7	-64.5	-141.2	-83.3	-42.7	-43.2	-57.1

a. 1989-94: migration of Slovenian citizens only.

b. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1997).

c. 1996: CIS Stat (1998b).

2.1 Crude birth rate (live births per thousand population)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b,1]	16.4	14.7	12.4	12.6	12.5	11.8	11.7	10.3	9.3	8.8	8.8	8.8
Slovakia[a,b,1]	16.4	14.7	15.2	15.2	14.9	14.1	13.8	12.4	11.5	11.2	11.0	10.7
Poland[1]	19.5	18.2	14.9	14.4	14.3	13.4	12.9	12.5	11.2	11.1	10.7	10.2
Hungary[b,1]	14.0	12.4	11.8	12.1	12.3	11.8	11.4	11.3	11.0	10.3	9.9	9.6
Slovenia[c,1]	15.7	13.1	11.7	11.2	10.8	10.0	9.9	9.8	9.5	9.4	9.1	9.0
Croatia[d,1]	14.9	13.3	11.7	11.6	10.8	9.8	10.4	10.3	10.7	11.5	11.9	10.1
FYR Macedonia[e,1]	21.0	19.2	17.0	16.6	17.1	16.2	15.6	17.2	16.3	15.8	14.8	14.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina[f,1]	17.3	16.8	15.0	14.9	15.0	–	–	–	–	10.6	10.0	–
FR Yugoslavia[g,1]	17.6	16.3	14.8	14.7	14.5	13.5	13.4	13.1	13.3	13.0	12.4	8.0
Albania[b,h]	26.5	26.2	24.4	25.1	23.7	23.6	21.5	22.7	22.4	21.0	18.7	18.1
Bulgaria[b,2]	14.6	13.4	12.6	12.1	11.1	10.4	10.0	9.4	8.6	8.6	7.7	7.9
Romania[b,1]	18.0	15.8	16.0	13.6	12.0	11.4	11.0	10.9	10.4	10.2	10.5	10.5
Estonia[b,1]	15.0	15.5	15.5	14.2	12.3	11.7	10.0	9.5	9.1	9.0	8.7	8.5
Latvia[b,4]	14.1	15.4	14.6	14.2	13.0	12.0	10.3	9.5	8.6	7.9	7.6	7.5
Lithuania[b,4]	15.2	16.5	15.1	15.3	15.0	14.3	12.7	11.4	11.1	10.5	10.2	10.0
Belarus[i,5]	16.0	16.5	15.1	13.9	12.9	12.5	11.4	10.7	9.8	9.3	8.8	9.1
Moldova[i,j,6]	19.8	21.5	18.9	17.7	16.5	16.0	15.2	14.3	13.0	12.0	11.4	11.3
Russia[7]	15.9	16.6	14.7	13.4	12.1	10.7	9.3	9.5	9.2	8.9	8.6	8.8
Ukraine[6]	14.8	15.0	13.4	12.7	12.2	11.5	10.7	10.1	9.6	9.2	8.8	8.4
Armenia[i,8]	22.7	24.1	21.6	22.5	21.5	19.2	15.8	13.6	13.0	12.8	11.6	10.4
Azerbaijan[i,6]	25.2	26.6	25.7	25.5	26.2	24.6	23.3	21.0	18.6	16.6	16.8	15.7
Georgia[i,k,5]	17.6	18.5	16.9	17.1	16.4	13.4	11.4	10.6	10.5	10.0	9.7	8.7
Kazakhstan[i,l,6]	23.9	25.1	23.4	22.2	21.5	20.5	19.3	18.9	17.5	16.3	15.2	14.7
Kyrgyzstan[i,6]	29.6	32.0	30.6	29.5	29.3	28.8	26.2	24.8	26.2	23.8	22.2	22.3
Tajikistan[i,6]	37.0	40.0	38.8	38.9	39.0	32.3	33.2	28.3	28.7	24.7	25.3	21.2
Turkmenistan[i,6]	34.3	36.0	34.9	34.3	33.7	34.1	33.1	30.7	29.6	28.0	25.2	20.8
Uzbekistan[i,m,6]	33.9	37.4	33.3	33.9	34.7	33.3	31.7	29.5	29.9	27.4	25.6	23.1

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.
b. 1980, 1985: COE (1993).
c. 1980, 1985: estimate.
d. 1980, 1985: CBSC (1996). Population data, 1989-90: CBSC (1996), 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).
e. 1980, 1985, 1989-90: COE (1993). Population data, 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).
f. 1980, 1985, 1989-90: COE (1993). 1996-97: births: Federation of B-H; population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
g. 1980, 1985: FSOY (1996). 1998: births exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.
h. Population data, 1989-98: US Census Bureau (1999).
i. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1997).
j. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
k. Births, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
l. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
m. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

Birth concepts:
1 WHO.
2 National concept.
3 1980-91: Soviet, 1992-98: WHO.
4 1980-90: Soviet, 1991-98: WHO.
5 1980-93: Soviet, 1994-98: WHO.
6 Soviet concept.
7 1980-92: Soviet, 1993-98: WHO.
8 1980-94: Soviet, 1995-98: WHO.

2.2 Adolescent birth rate (live births per thousand women aged 15-19)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	44.9	44.7	46.7	44.7	42.9	32.6	24.9	20.1	18.0	16.4
Slovakia	46.8	45.5	50.2	47.4	45.7	38.3	32.4	30.5	28.6	26.9
Poland	30.9	31.5	32.2	29.3	27.2	25.5	22.0	21.1	19.5	18.7
Hungary	41.3	40.1	38.6	36.1	34.5	34.1	31.8	29.9	28.0	26.5
Slovenia	27.2	24.6	21.1	19.4	16.1	14.3	13.3	11.1	9.2	8.5
Croatia[a]	–	–	24.9	21.1	20.0	18.9	17.7	18.8	17.8	15.6
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	46.1	42.6	45.9	45.5	44.2	38.9	36.6	33.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	38.3	38.2	38.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b,c]	42.8	41.1	39.2	35.5	35.3	34.0	32.2	30.2	28.2	20.1
Albania[a]	15.6	15.5	14.9	16.5	17.1	20.4	21.8	21.9	18.8	–
Bulgaria	75.2	72.7	72.7	70.5	67.3	60.8	53.5	51.2	45.1	45.1
Romania	59.9	51.8	50.2	48.0	47.7	45.7	42.6	40.5	41.4	40.8
Estonia	48.2	50.0	47.8	50.1	43.0	38.6	36.0	33.4	29.4	26.1
Latvia	44.5	50.0	51.1	48.3	43.7	33.7	29.6	25.5	21.2	18.7
Lithuania	36.8	41.6	46.9	47.1	42.7	40.9	39.7	36.4	32.1	28.8
Belarus	39.7	43.5	44.9	45.6	43.3	42.5	39.0	35.8	33.1	30.4
Moldova[d]	56.2	57.8	61.6	62.1	65.7	65.1	61.7	53.1	47.7	43.6
Russia	52.1	55.1	54.3	50.8	46.8	48.7	44.6	38.9	35.9	33.8
Ukraine	55.3	58.8	59.8	59.8	57.7	56.2	54.3	50.8	45.7	41.2
Armenia	62.7	70.0	76.6	82.5	77.0	68.0	56.2	53.3	43.4	34.6
Azerbaijan	28.2	26.9	30.8	35.2	38.4	40.6	39.4	35.7	41.6	37.6
Georgia[e]	58.6	60.2	61.0	52.7	–	61.7	58.2	51.9	46.6	40.4
Kazakhstan[f]	47.9	52.3	54.6	52.0	52.8	54.6	49.8	44.8	39.2	36.5
Kyrgyzstan	44.4	46.3	50.9	55.4	59.3	55.2	56.3	54.4	46.1	43.8
Tajikistan	38.5	40.6	46.5	41.5	53.8	56.0	51.1	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	21.8	24.1	25.9	27.3	31.4	27.7	25.4	24.1	21.6	16.9
Uzbekistan[f]	41.5	44.0	48.1	56.7	68.1	64.8	59.2	56.7	49.2	–

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
b. Births, 1998: excludes Kosovo.
c. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
d. Births, 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
e. Births, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

2.3 Average age of mothers at first birth (years)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	22.5	22.4	22.2	22.2	22.3	22.5	22.9	23.3	23.7	24.1
Slovakia	22.0	21.0	21.1	21.1	21.3	21.5	–	–	23.1	–
Poland[a]	23.0	23.0	22.9	22.6	22.6	22.7	22.8	22.9	23.1	23.2
Hungary	23.1	23.0	23.0	23.1	23.1	23.2	23.4	23.7	23.9	24.3
Slovenia	23.7	23.9	24.2	24.3	24.7	24.8	25.1	25.3	25.6	25.8
Croatia	24.2	24.3	24.4	24.5	24.7	24.8	25.0	25.1	25.2	25.4
FYR Macedonia	23.3	23.3	23.4	23.4	23.3	23.5	23.5	23.7	23.7	23.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	23.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	23.9	24.0	24.1	24.2	24.1	23.8	23.9	24.7	24.2	24.4
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	22.0	22.1	22.0	22.0	22.1	22.3	22.2	22.4	22.7	22.9
Romania	22.5	22.4	22.2	22.3	22.4	22.5	22.7	22.9	23.1	23.3
Estonia	23.0	22.9	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.8	23.0	23.2	23.4	23.6
Latvia	22.9	22.7	22.6	22.5	22.5	22.9	23.0	23.1	23.5	23.6
Lithuania	–	22.9	22.7	22.6	22.7	22.7	22.8	22.9	23.4	23.6
Belarus	23.1	22.9	22.9	22.8	22.8	22.8	22.9	23.0	23.0	22.6
Moldova	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	24.0
Russia	23.1	22.9	22.8	22.8	22.6	22.5	22.6	22.8	22.9	23.0
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	22.7	22.8	22.5	22.2	22.0	22.0	22.5	22.2	22.3	22.5
Azerbaijan	23.8	23.8	24.0	24.0	23.9	23.9	23.8	24.0	23.5	23.7
Georgia	23.7	23.7	23.7	23.6	–	23.4	23.5	23.6	23.8	23.9
Kazakhstan	22.6	22.4	22.4	22.4	22.3	22.1	22.2	22.3	22.5	22.6
Kyrgyzstan	22.3	22.2	22.2	22.9	21.9	21.9	21.9	21.9	22.0	22.3
Tajikistan	22.6	22.4	22.3	22.2	21.9	21.7	21.8	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	23.3	23.3	23.3	23.2	23.2	23.2	23.2	23.7	23.7	23.6
Uzbekistan	22.6	22.4	22.2	22.3	22.0	22.0	22.2	22.3	22.6	23.0

a. Median age.

2.4 Share of births to mothers under age 20 (percent of total live births)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	13.6	14.1	15.5	16.2	15.8	13.5	11.0	9.0	7.7	6.7
Slovakia	11.9	12.0	14.0	14.3	14.3	13.4	12.3	11.7	11.0	10.5
Poland	7.4	8.0	8.5	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.0	7.8	7.6	7.7
Hungary	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.4	12.6	12.5	11.5	11.0	10.2	9.4
Slovenia	8.2	7.8	7.0	7.0	5.9	5.4	5.1	4.3	3.6	3.4
Croatia	8.4	7.9	7.8	7.2	6.5	6.2	5.7	5.6	5.1	5.2
FYR Macedonia	11.1	10.8	10.5	10.4	11.5	10.9	11.0	10.0	10.1	9.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10.4	10.4	10.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[a]	10.6	10.3	10.0	9.8	9.9	9.8	9.0	8.6	8.4	9.1
Albania	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.8	4.4	4.8	5.1	4.9	–
Bulgaria	20.9	21.4	23.5	24.6	24.9	23.7	22.6	21.1	20.4	19.5
Romania	15.1	15.2	16.9	17.4	18.4	17.9	17.3	16.5	16.0	15.0
Estonia	10.5	12.0	13.2	14.7	14.8	14.1	13.7	12.9	12.0	11.1
Latvia	10.3	11.7	12.7	12.9	13.5	11.4	11.2	10.5	9.3	8.6
Lithuania	8.9	9.8	11.2	11.7	11.7	12.4	12.4	12.0	11.0	10.1
Belarus	9.2	11.0	12.3	12.9	13.4	14.1	14.3	14.0	14.1	12.8
Moldova[b]	11.1	12.8	15.1	15.9	17.7	18.9	19.8	18.6	17.9	17.4
Russia	11.8	13.9	15.4	16.5	17.7	18.2	17.5	16.1	15.6	14.7
Ukraine	14.1	16.1	17.3	18.3	18.9	19.5	19.9	19.5	18.4	17.8
Armenia	11.3	12.5	14.5	17.6	20.0	20.8	18.3	18.1	16.5	15.0
Azerbaijan	5.0	4.7	5.2	6.3	7.2	8.4	9.3	9.5	11.0	10.7
Georgia[c]	12.9	12.8	13.5	14.4	–	22.0	21.1	19.7	18.4	17.9
Kazakhstan	8.7	10.0	10.9	11.2	12.2	13.0	13.0	12.6	12.0	11.5
Kyrgyzstan	6.9	7.6	8.5	9.3	10.9	10.9	10.6	11.3	10.4	9.9
Tajikistan	5.1	5.3	5.9	6.3	8.0	9.8	8.9	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	3.2	3.6	3.9	4.0	4.7	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.1
Uzbekistan	6.3	6.6	7.0	8.5	10.7	10.9	9.9	10.4	9.8	–

a. 1998: excludes Kosovo.

b. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

c. Births, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

2.5 Share of non-marital births (percent of total live births)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	7.9	8.6	9.8	10.7	12.7	14.5	15.6	16.9	17.8	19.0
Slovakia	7.2	7.6	8.9	9.8	10.6	11.7	12.6	14.0	15.1	15.3
Poland	6.1	6.5	6.9	7.5	8.5	9.0	9.5	10.2	11.0	11.6
Hungary	12.4	13.1	14.1	15.6	17.6	19.4	20.7	22.6	25.0	26.6
Slovenia	23.2	24.5	26.4	27.7	28.0	28.8	29.8	31.9	32.7	33.6
Croatia	6.6	7.0	7.5	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.5	7.1	7.3	8.1
FYR Macedonia	7.0	7.1	7.0	7.3	8.1	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.9	9.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6.9	7.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[a]	12.4	12.7	13.6	14.0	15.8	16.0	16.4	17.8	19.1	19.1
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	11.4	12.4	15.5	18.5	22.1	24.5	25.7	28.1	30.0	31.5
Romania	–	–	–	–	17.0	18.3	19.7	20.7	22.2	23.0
Estonia	25.2	27.1	31.1	34.0	38.2	40.9	44.1	48.1	51.6	52.2
Latvia	15.9	16.9	18.4	19.6	23.0	26.4	29.9	33.1	34.8	37.1
Lithuania	6.7	7.0	7.0	7.9	9.1	10.9	12.8	14.3	16.5	18.0
Belarus	7.9	8.5	9.4	9.8	10.9	12.1	13.5	14.9	16.2	17.0
Moldova[b]	10.4	11.0	11.8	11.6	11.2	12.3	13.3	14.6	17.3	17.8
Russia	13.5	14.6	16.0	17.1	18.2	19.6	21.1	23.0	25.3	27.0
Ukraine	10.8	11.2	11.9	12.1	13.0	12.8	13.2	13.6	15.2	16.2
Armenia	7.9	9.3	10.9	12.3	14.0	15.3	15.2	22.3	25.8	28.2
Azerbaijan	2.5	2.6	3.7	4.4	5.0	5.2	5.8	6.8	7.5	5.6
Georgia[c]	17.7	18.2	18.7	21.8	–	28.4	29.2	30.9	33.4	35.4
Kazakhstan	12.0	13.2	13.4	13.4	13.4	14.5	15.7	17.6	21.0	21.8
Kyrgyzstan	12.7	13.0	13.9	13.2	16.7	16.8	18.5	21.1	24.1	27.4
Tajikistan	7.0	6.9	8.2	7.5	9.2	9.3	7.7	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	3.5	4.4	4.6	3.5	3.8	4.3	8.7	18.0	19.5	–
Uzbekistan	4.2	4.4	3.8	3.4	3.8	3.5	4.1	5.3	6.4	8.4

a. 1998: excludes Kosovo.
b. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
c. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

2.6 Share of non-marital births to mothers under age 20

(percent of live births to mothers under age 20)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	16.6	17.9	20.0	20.8	25.2	31.0	36.2	42.4	48.8	53.4
Slovakia	22.8	23.6	25.9	27.1	29.2	32.1	36.2	39.1	44.8	47.1
Poland	19.3	20.4	21.8	24.5	28.1	30.9	33.2	36.0	38.7	40.4
Hungary	32.9	36.2	37.8	39.3	42.9	46.5	50.2	54.7	59.6	64.0
Slovenia	52.0	52.8	57.5	57.6	59.4	66.0	71.2	68.6	73.1	74.2
Croatia	17.1	19.1	20.0	22.3	21.4	23.1	20.6	23.1	24.6	25.7
FYR Macedonia	25.1	24.4	24.4	22.5	24.8	26.4	25.4	26.4	27.7	29.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina	18.8	18.8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[a]	33.4	34.3	36.0	36.2	38.6	39.7	41.3	43.4	45.7	47.3
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	30.7	32.5	38.3	43.4	49.4	54.2	57.8	61.5	63.6	65.8
Romania	–	–	–	–	39.0	41.1	44.4	47.5	50.9	53.1
Estonia	35.2	35.4	40.7	48.0	55.0	57.8	62.9	69.7	75.9	76.1
Latvia	22.7	23.8	25.1	27.6	32.0	45.7	50.8	56.7	58.9	63.8
Lithuania	12.7	13.1	11.9	13.3	16.1	20.5	23.0	27.1	30.8	34.7
Belarus	13.8	14.2	13.2	13.8	14.6	16.3	17.7	20.0	26.1	27.7
Moldova[b]	21.5	22.2	21.1	19.7	15.4	16.0	17.2	20.2	26.5	28.4
Russia	19.8	20.2	20.6	21.1	23.0	25.2	27.0	29.6	36.1	39.6
Ukraine	–	13.6	13.8	13.2	13.8	14.1	15.9	16.7	18.8	20.4
Armenia	18.5	21.9	24.0	27.2	26.0	26.0	25.1	38.8	44.4	47.3
Azerbaijan	6.0	7.1	11.0	13.2	15.2	13.2	13.5	15.2	13.4	10.3
Georgia[c]	40.2	40.4	38.4	43.3	–	42.5	43.7	44.3	48.0	49.5
Kazakhstan	27.6	29.0	27.7	27.6	24.5	27.2	28.9	33.5	37.6	39.4
Kyrgyzstan	26.7	26.7	28.4	25.8	34.0	34.9	40.0	46.9	51.1	54.9
Tajikistan	15.0	13.2	14.3	12.7	15.8	16.5	13.9	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	16.1	18.9	15.9	12.6	13.0	14.7	20.2	27.0	25.5	–
Uzbekistan	8.2	9.0	7.2	5.3	6.5	6.7	8.8	10.6	12.3	16.7

a. 1998: excludes Kosovo.
b. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
c. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

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2.7 Share of low-weight births (births under 2,500 grams as percent of total live births)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	6.0	6.3	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.1	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.5
Slovakia	5.6	5.8	6.1	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.5	–	–	6.5
Poland	7.9	8.4	8.3	8.1	8.1	7.2	6.7	6.4	6.1	6.2
Hungary	10.5	10.6	10.5	10.2	9.7	9.7	9.3	9.4	9.3	9.2
Slovenia	5.9	5.0	5.3	5.8	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.7	5.2	–
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[a]	–	–	–	–	–	4.9	5.3	5.3	5.0	5.0
Albania	6.5	6.5	6.3	5.8	5.6	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.2	–
Bulgaria	6.9	7.2	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.4	8.6	9.1	9.9	9.4
Romania	7.3	7.1	7.9	8.2	10.9	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.2	9.0
Estonia	–	–	–	4.8	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.3	4.4	4.5
Latvia	–	–	4.6	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.8	5.1	5.0	4.2
Lithuania	–	–	–	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.9
Belarus	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.2
Moldova[b]	7.1	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.8	6.1	5.8	6.0	5.5
Russia	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.8	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.2
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	6.8	6.5	6.7	7.7	7.4	6.5	7.4	7.5	7.5	8.3
Azerbaijan	5.6	5.2	4.9	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.7	4.4	4.5	4.9
Georgia[c]	5.3	4.9	8.6	5.8	6.0	6.6	6.2	7.1	7.0	–
Kazakhstan	5.0	5.0	6.0	5.3	5.6	6.1	5.7	6.0	5.6	5.5
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tajikistan	6.2	–	5.4	6.5	6.0	6.6	5.8	6.0	4.6	5.1
Turkmenistan	3.9	4.5	4.2	4.0	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.7	3.8	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	–	5.4	5.7	5.9	4.9	4.7	5.1

[a] 1998: excludes Kosovo.

[b] 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

[c] 1992-97: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

2.8 Share of low-weight births to mothers under age 20

(percent of births under 2,500 grams in total live births to mothers under age 20)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	7.8	8.5	8.9	7.8	8.2	7.7	7.6	8.2	8.8	9.4
Slovakia	8.5	9.4	9.1	9.4	9.3	9.4	11.0	–	–	–
Poland	9.1	9.7	9.5	9.2	9.0	8.3	7.5	7.6	7.4	7.8
Hungary	13.3	13.3	12.7	12.5	11.6	11.7	11.8	12.4	12.3	12.3
Slovenia	5.1	5.5	6.2	5.0	5.4	5.0	5.1	4.9	5.4	–
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	7.6	6.3	8.2	8.0	7.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[a]	–	–	–	–	–	6.3	6.7	6.8	6.9	6.7
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	9.7	10.3	11.4	11.3	10.9	10.9	12.0	12.8	14.5	13.6
Romania	10.0	10.3	11.0	11.1	14.4	11.3	11.7	11.7	12.3	11.5
Estonia	–	–	–	4.6	5.2	5.1	6.8	5.8	5.9	6.0
Latvia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Belarus	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.0	6.3
Moldova	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Russia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Azerbaijan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.6	8.9
Georgia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

[a] 1998: excludes Kosovo.

2.9 Total fertility rate (births per woman)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,c]	2.15	2.06	1.87	1.89	1.86	1.72	1.67	1.44	1.28	1.19	1.17	1.16
Slovakia[a,b]	2.15	2.06	2.08	2.09	2.05	1.98	1.92	1.66	1.52	1.47	1.43	1.38
Poland[b]	2.28	2.33	2.05	2.04	2.05	1.93	1.85	1.80	1.61	1.60	1.50	1.40
Hungary[b]	1.92	1.83	1.78	1.84	1.86	1.77	1.69	1.64	1.57	1.46	1.38	1.33
Slovenia[b]	2.11	1.72	1.52	1.46	1.42	1.34	1.34	1.32	1.29	1.28	1.25	1.23
Croatia	–	–	1.63	1.63	1.53	1.48	1.52	1.47	1.58	1.67	1.69	1.45
FYR Macedonia[b]	2.45	2.31	2.09	2.06	2.30	2.18	2.16	2.08	1.97	1.90	1.75	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina[c]	1.88	1.89	1.70	1.70	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[d]	2.30	2.20	2.06	2.08	2.08	1.91	1.91	1.85	1.88	1.83	1.74	–
Albania[b]	3.62	3.26	2.96	3.03	–	2.90	–	–	2.70	–	–	–
Bulgaria[b]	2.05	1.95	1.90	1.81	1.65	1.54	1.45	1.37	1.23	1.24	1.09	1.11
Romania[b]	2.45	2.26	2.20	1.84	1.57	1.52	1.44	1.41	1.34	1.30	1.32	1.32
Estonia[e,f]	2.02	2.12	2.21	2.05	1.79	1.69	1.45	1.37	1.32	1.30	1.24	1.21
Latvia[e,f]	1.88	2.07	2.05	2.02	1.86	1.73	1.51	1.39	1.25	1.16	1.11	1.09
Lithuania[e,f]	2.00	2.10	1.98	2.00	1.97	1.89	1.69	1.52	1.49	1.42	1.39	1.36
Belarus[e,f]	2.01	2.07	2.03	1.91	1.80	1.75	1.61	1.51	1.39	1.31	1.23	1.27
Moldova[e,f]	2.39	2.66	2.46	2.39	2.26	2.21	2.10	1.95	1.76	1.67	1.60	1.70
Russia[e,f]	1.87	2.05	2.01	1.89	1.73	1.55	1.39	1.40	1.34	1.28	1.23	1.24
Ukraine[e,f]	1.95	2.10	1.90	1.90	1.70	1.70	1.60	1.50	1.40	1.30	1.30	1.20
Armenia[e,f]	2.31	2.47	2.61	2.62	2.58	2.35	1.97	1.70	1.63	1.60	1.45	1.30
Azerbaijan[e,f]	3.22	2.90	2.79	2.77	2.89	2.74	2.70	2.52	2.29	2.06	2.07	2.00
Georgia[e,f]	2.21	2.26	2.13	2.20	2.15	1.79	–	1.43	1.41	1.35	1.29	–
Kazakhstan[e,f,g]	2.90	3.03	2.88	2.72	2.63	2.49	2.34	2.25	2.15	2.07	2.00	2.01
Kyrgyzstan[e,f]	4.07	4.14	3.81	3.69	3.67	3.62	3.30	3.14	3.31	2.99	2.79	2.80
Tajikistan[e,f,h]	5.64	5.50	5.08	5.09	5.04	4.13	4.23	3.58	3.70	3.20	3.30	2.90
Turkmenistan[e,f]	4.93	4.66	4.30	4.19	4.10	3.30	3.90	3.80	3.55	3.40	3.00	2.50
Uzbekistan[e,f]	4.81	4.64	–	4.07	4.20	4.00	3.80	3.54	3.60	3.31	3.08	2.82

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.
b. 1980, 1985: COE (1993).
c. COE (1993).
d. 1980 (which refers to 1975), 1985: FSOY (1996).
e. 1980: refers to 1980-81. 1985: refers to 1984-85.
f. 1980, 1985: Goskomstat (1988).
g. 1991-98: IRC estimate.
h. 1995-98: IRC estimate.

2.10 Abortion rate (abortions per hundred live births)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	98.6	96.5	92.8	89.8	70.6	63.3	64.1	66.3	62.8	61.5
Slovakia	70.3	70.2	67.6	66.4	62.2	62.2	58.4	51.4	47.0	46.3
Poland	14.6	10.8	5.6	2.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.8	–
Hungary	87.8	85.9	84.1	84.7	77.9	77.9	82.3	86.8	89.5	85.9
Slovenia	67.7	65.9	65.0	66.3	61.4	58.2	56.9	54.4	53.5	51.1
Croatia	–	84.2	77.8	74.3	64.4	53.5	39.8	22.9	18.1	18.9
FYR Macedonia	84.7	61.8	66.5	59.7	57.0	49.2	49.2	45.1	40.9	41.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	130.5	126.2	103.5	101.1	84.6	86.6	68.9	61.1	–	–
Albania	29.6	31.8	39.3	36.8	49.4	43.4	44.8	40.6	35.8	31.5
Bulgaria	117.6	137.5	144.3	149.1	127.3	122.8	134.9	136.5	137.1	114.8
Romania	52.1	315.3	314.9	265.7	234.3	214.9	212.5	197.2	146.5	114.4
Estonia	116.2	131.8	152.2	157.7	168.7	158.3	151.3	146.4	151.7	149.1
Latvia[a]	125.8	–	112.1	108.7	117.1	110.5	120.1	122.5	115.6	108.4
Lithuania[a]	89.8	–	72.5	76.4	74.2	71.6	75.9	71.2	60.0	56.8
Belarus	163.5	179.2	178.2	183.1	181.2	187.8	186.5	177.4	166.2	152.2
Moldova[b]	97.3	89.0	81.6	88.7	83.5	81.1	87.7	88.7	81.5	80.4
Russia	204.9	206.3	201.1	216.5	235.2	217.3	202.8	203.3	198.3	182.8
Ukraine	153.2	155.1	151.7	156.2	154.4	153.1	150.2	147.1	134.8	125.3
Armenia	34.7	31.6	34.9	39.6	47.3	59.8	62.8	65.1	57.5	46.5
Azerbaijan	21.5	13.4	17.9	17.5	19.4	20.8	20.0	21.9	19.1	20.1
Georgia[c]	75.6	65.9	66.7	69.9	73.3	85.4	77.2	59.5	45.0	44.9
Kazakhstan	77.5	76.9	101.5	102.6	92.1	85.7	81.2	76.7	67.5	67.1
Kyrgyzstan	66.3	57.3	51.3	46.3	45.1	44.8	36.2	31.6	31.0	27.0
Tajikistan	20.1	19.6	24.5	26.2	21.5	22.0	19.6	19.6	18.2	19.1
Turkmenistan	31.3	28.5	28.1	35.9	25.2	25.8	25.5	24.9	28.8	25.7
Uzbekistan	–	27.8	26.1	27.0	21.4	18.2	17.5	19.4	14.1	13.5

a. 1989: Goskomstat (1990).
b. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
c. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

2.11 Abortion rate among women under age 20

(abortions per hundred live births to women under age 20)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	64.8	67.6	64.7	65.8	56.2	56.4	61.3	74.9	76.4	86.2
Slovakia	41.2	43.1	37.3	39.7	40.8	45.6	45.1	42.8	40.6	43.1
Poland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Hungary	87.6	90.4	98.3	106.1	103.5	105.4	113.8	114.2	119.2	117.9
Slovenia	53.0	57.4	66.1	65.5	75.0	81.9	80.1	96.8	108.9	142.8
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	37.4	35.5	27.4	27.6	23.6	27.3	23.7	21.1	–	–
Albania	23.7	29.3	35.8	30.2	39.1	20.7	25.1	–	–	–
Bulgaria	51.3	63.7	56.4	63.9	59.1	57.8	68.1	74.9	81.4	71.3
Romania	11.4	103.5	108.9	97.8	89.8	85.5	96.9	95.9	70.7	60.2
Estonia	–	–	–	–	–	120.0	120.2	138.5	152.3	167.9
Latvia	–	–	70.2	81.5	–	87.5	106.1	123.2	143.5	128.0
Lithuania	–	–	32.0	14.4	10.1	9.5	32.8	38.1	37.1	39.4
Belarus	–	–	123.4	146.4	129.9	75.9	90.3	102.4	111.1	118.7
Moldova[a]	–	–	44.0	53.4	51.0	38.7	39.4	45.9	45.1	40.9
Russia	–	–	128.8	134.1	142.9	130.6	127.8	130.6	131.7	128.2
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	12.4	13.2
Azerbaijan	–	–	8.9	6.3	7.5	5.2	7.6	4.9	4.3	7.4
Georgia[b]	–	–	49.5	38.4	–	27.2	33.5	15.9	13.9	12.2
Kazakhstan	–	–	94.8	87.2	74.1	66.0	67.2	67.7	47.9	42.4
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	46.6	68.5	36.4	[illegible]	47.5	31.6	35.2	24.2
Tajikistan	–	–	24.7	29.9	26.4	17.1	19.5	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	16.7	–	20.8	14.8	13.5	11.9	10.6	14.5

[a] 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr

[b] 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali

3.1 Crude death rate (deaths per thousand population)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	12.2	11.9	12.3	12.5	12.1	11.7	11.4	11.4	11.4	10.9	10.9	10.6
Slovakia[a,b]	12.2	11.9	10.2	10.3	10.3	10.1	9.9	9.6	9.8	9.5	9.7	9.9
Poland	9.9	10.3	10.1	10.2	10.6	10.3	10.2	10.0	10.0	10.0	9.8	9.7
Hungary[b]	13.6	14.0	13.8	14.1	14.0	14.4	14.6	14.3	14.2	14.0	13.7	13.9
Slovenia	9.9	10.0	9.4	9.3	9.7	9.7	10.0	9.7	9.5	9.4	9.5	9.6
Croatia[b,c,d]	10.9	11.1	11.0	10.9	11.5	10.8	10.8	10.5	10.8	10.9	11.1	11.2
FYR Macedonia[b,d,e]	7.1	7.1	6.9	6.9	7.3	7.8	7.5	8.1	8.3	8.1	8.3	8.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b,f]	6.4	6.7	6.8	6.5	7.2	–	–	–	–	5.4	5.0	–
FR Yugoslavia[b,g,h]	9.2	9.8	9.5	9.3	9.7	10.1	10.2	10.0	10.2	10.6	10.5	9.9
Albania[b,i]	6.4	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.8	5.6	5.4	–	–
Bulgaria[b]	11.1	12.0	12.0	12.5	12.8	12.6	12.9	13.2	13.6	14.0	14.7	14.3
Romania[b]	10.4	10.9	10.7	10.6	10.9	11.6	11.6	11.7	12.0	12.7	12.4	12.0
Estonia	12.3	12.7	11.8	12.4	12.6	13.0	14.0	14.8	14.1	12.9	12.7	13.4
Latvia	12.8	13.2	12.2	13.0	13.1	13.5	15.2	16.4	15.5	13.8	13.6	14.0
Lithuania	10.5	11.1	10.3	10.7	11.0	11.1	12.4	12.5	12.2	11.6	11.1	11.0
Belarus[j]	9.9	10.6	10.2	10.7	11.2	11.4	12.5	12.6	13.0	13.0	13.4	13.5
Moldova[j]	10.1	10.9	9.2	9.7	10.5	10.2	10.7	11.8	12.2	11.6	10.6	10.9
Russia[j]	11.0	11.3	10.7	11.2	11.4	12.2	14.4	15.6	14.9	14.1	13.7	13.6
Ukraine[j]	11.3	12.1	11.7	12.2	12.9	13.4	14.3	14.8	15.5	15.3	15.0	14.4
Armenia[j]	5.6	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.5	7.0	7.4	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.3	6.1
Azerbaijan[j]	7.0	6.8	6.2	6.0	6.1	6.9	7.0	7.2	6.6	6.2	6.0	5.9
Georgia[j,k]	8.5	8.7	8.7	8.5	8.6	8.6	–	7.7	7.0	6.4	7.0	7.3
Kazakhstan[j,l]	8.0	8.0	7.8	7.9	8.2	8.4	9.5	9.9	10.7	10.7	10.4	10.2
Kyrgyzstan[j]	8.4	8.1	7.3	7.0	7.0	7.2	7.8	8.4	8.2	7.6	7.5	7.4
Tajikistan[j,m]	8.1	7.0	6.5	6.2	6.1	6.6	8.8	7.0	5.9	5.4	5.8	4.8
Turkmenistan[j]	8.3	8.1	7.7	7.0	7.3	7.2	7.9	7.6	7.0	7.0	6.5	6.3
Uzbekistan[j,n]	7.5	7.2	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.4	6.3	5.8	5.9

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.
b. 1980, 1985: COE (1993).
c. 1989, 1990: CBSC (1996).
d. Population data, 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).
e. 1989, 1990: COE (1993).
f. 1996-97: deaths in Federation of B-H only; population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
g. 1980, 1985: Serbia.
h. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.
i. Population data, 1989-96: US Census Bureau (1999).
j. 1980, 1985: Goskomstat (1991).
k. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
l. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
m. 1996-98: CIS Stat (1999).
n. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

3.2 Female life expectancy at birth (years)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	74.0	74.7	75.4	75.4	75.7	76.1	76.4	76.6	76.6	77.3	77.5	78.1
Slovakia[a,b]	74.0	74.7	75.2	75.4	75.2	76.2	76.7	76.5	76.3	76.7	76.7	76.7
Poland[b]	75.4	75.3	75.5	75.5	75.3	75.7	76.0	76.1	76.4	76.6	77.0	77.3
Hungary[b]	72.7	73.1	73.8	73.7	73.8	73.7	73.8	74.2	74.5	74.7	75.1	75.2
Slovenia	75.4	75.3	76.7	77.3	77.4	77.3	77.3	77.4	76.8	78.3	78.6	78.7
Croatia[c,d]	74.2	–	74.8	–	76.0	–	–	–	75.7	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia[c,d]	71.9	–	74.0	–	74.4	–	–	74.0	74.4	74.5	–	
Bosnia-Herzegovina[c,d]	72.9	–	75.2	–	–	–	–	–	75.1	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[f]	72.8	–	73.8	74.3	74.6	74.4	74.5	74.5	74.7	74.6	–	–
Albania[b]	72.2	73.9	75.5	75.4	75.4	74.3	74.3	75.6	74.3	–	–	–
Bulgaria[b]	73.6	74.4	75.1	74.8	74.7	74.5	74.6	74.9	74.9	74.6	74.4	–
Romania[b]	71.8	72.8	72.4	72.7	73.1	73.2	73.2	73.3	73.4	73.1	73.0	73.3
Estonia[e]	74.0	75.0	74.7	74.6	74.8	74.7	73.8	73.1	74.3	75.5	76.0	75.5
Latvia	73.9	74.5	75.2	74.6	74.8	74.8	73.8	72.9	73.1	75.6	75.9	75.5
Lithuania[e,l]	75.0	75.0	76.3	76.2	76.1	76.0	75.0	74.9	75.2	76.1	76.8	76.9
Belarus[j]	75.6	77.2	76.4	75.6	75.5	75.4	74.4	74.3	74.3	74.4	74.3	74.4
Moldova[j]	68.8	68.6	72.3	71.8	71.0	71.9	71.1	69.8	69.7	70.4	70.3	70.3
Russia[j]	73.0	73.3	74.5	74.3	74.3	73.8	71.9	71.2	71.7	72.5	72.8	72.9
Ukraine[g]	74.0	74.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	74.0	74.0	73.2	72.7	73.0	73.0	–
Armenia[j]	75.7	75.7	74.7	75.2	75.6	75.5	74.4	74.9	75.9	76.2	77.3	78.1
Azerbaijan[j]	71.8	73.1	74.2	74.8	74.5	73.9	73.9	73.9	72.9	73.8	74.6	75.0
Georgia[j]	74.8	75.1	75.7	76.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kazakhstan[j,k]	71.9	72.5	73.1	72.7	72.4	72.3	70.8	70.4	69.5	70.0	70.2	–
Kyrgyzstan[j]	70.1	70.2	72.4	72.6	72.7	72.2	71.7	70.7	70.4	71.0	71.4	71.2
Tajikistan[j]	68.6	70.8	71.7	71.9	73.2	71.1	68.2	68.7	71.2	71.3	71.3	–
Turkmenistan[j]	67.8	68.1	68.4	69.7	69.3	–	–	–	67.5	67.7	67.6	67.7
Uzbekistan[m]	70.7	70.8	72.1	72.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.
b. 1980, 1985: UN (1986), (1992).
c. 1980 (which refers to 1980-81), 1989 (which refers to 1989-90): COE (1993).
d. 1995 (which refers to 1990-95): UN (1997b).
e. 1995 refers to 1994-95; 1996 refers to 1995-96.
f. 1980 (which refers to Serbia in 1980-81): COE (1993).
g. 1980 (which refers to 1978-80), 1985 (which refers to 1984-86): NSI (1998a).
h. 1980 (which refers to 1979-80): Goskomstat (1991a).
i. 1985 (which refers to 1985-86): Goskomstat (1991b).
j. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1997).
k. 1989-97: moving two-year averages.
l. 1996-97: national estimate.
m. 1980, 1985, 1989-90: CIS Stat (1997).

3.3 Male life expectancy at birth (years)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	66.8	67.3	68.1	67.6	68.2	68.4	69.2	69.5	69.7	70.4	70.5	71.1
Slovakia[a,b]	66.8	67.3	66.8	66.6	66.8	67.6	68.4	68.3	68.4	68.8	68.9	68.6
Poland[b]	66.9	66.9	66.7	66.5	66.1	66.7	67.4	67.5	67.6	68.1	68.5	68.9
Hungary[b]	65.5	65.1	65.4	65.1	65.0	64.6	64.5	64.8	65.3	66.1	66.4	66.1
Slovenia	67.4	67.9	68.8	69.4	69.5	69.5	69.4	69.6	70.3	70.3	71.0	71.1
Croatia[c,d]	66.6	–	66.8	–	68.6	–	–	–	67.1	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia[c,d]	68.3	–	70.1	–	70.1	–	–	69.6	70.1	70.3	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina[c,d]	67.9	–	69.7	–	–	–	–	–	69.5	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[f]	68.1	–	68.7	69.1	69.0	68.6	69.1	69.1	69.9	69.9	–	–
Albania[b]	67.7	68.5	69.6	69.3	69.3	68.5	68.5	69.5	68.5	–	–	–
Bulgaria[g]	68.4	68.2	68.6	68.1	68.0	68.0	67.7	67.3	67.1	67.1	67.2	–
Romania[b]	66.5	66.8	66.5	66.6	66.6	66.6	66.1	65.9	65.7	65.3	65.2	65.5
Estonia[b,e]	64.0	65.0	65.7	64.6	64.4	63.5	62.5	61.1	61.7	64.5	64.5	64.4
Latvia	63.6	65.5	65.3	64.2	63.9	63.3	61.6	60.7	60.8	63.9	64.2	64.1
Lithuania[b,e]	65.0	66.0	66.9	66.6	65.3	64.9	63.3	62.8	63.6	65.0	65.9	66.5
Belarus[j]	65.9	67.4	66.8	66.3	65.5	64.9	63.8	63.5	62.9	63.1	62.9	62.7
Moldova[j]	62.4	62.0	65.5	65.0	64.3	63.9	64.3	62.3	61.8	62.9	62.9	62.9
Russia[j]	61.5	62.3	64.2	63.8	63.5	62.0	58.9	57.6	58.3	59.8	60.9	61.3
Ukraine[i,k]	64.6	64.8	66.0	66.0	66.0	64.0	64.0	62.8	61.8	61.0	62.0	–
Armenia[j]	69.5	69.8	69.0	68.4	68.9	68.7	67.9	68.1	68.9	69.3	70.3	70.8
Azerbaijan[j]	64.2	65.3	66.6	67.0	66.3	65.4	65.2	65.2	65.2	66.3	67.4	67.9
Georgia[j]	67.1	67.4	68.1	68.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kazakhstan[j,k]	61.6	62.6	63.9	63.3	62.7	62.5	60.3	60.0	58.4	58.5	59.0	–
Kyrgyzstan[j]	61.1	64.1	64.3	64.2	64.6	64.2	62.9	61.6	61.4	62.3	62.6	63.1
Tajikistan[j,l]	63.7	65.3	66.8	66.8	67.6	65.4	56.5	63.4	65.5	65.6	65.6	–
Turkmenistan[j]	61.1	61.1	61.8	62.9	62.3	–	–	–	61.8	61.9	62.2	62.3
Uzbekistan[m]	64.0	64.3	66.0	66.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.

b. 1980, 1985: UN (1986), (1992).

c. 1980 (which refers to 1980-81), 1989 (which refers to 1989-90): COE (1993).

d. 1995 (which refers to 1990-95): UN (1997b).

e. 1995 refers to 1994-95. 1996 refers to 1995-96.

f. 1980 (which refers to Serbia in 1980-81): COE (1993).

g. 1980 (which refers to 1978-80), 1985 (which refers to 1984-86): NSI (1998a).

h. 1980 (which refers to 1979-80): Goskomstat (1991a).

i. 1985 (which refers to 1985-86): Goskomstat (1991b).

j. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1997).

k. 1989-97: moving two-year averages.

l. 1996-97: national estimate.

m. 1980, 1985, 1989-90: CIS Stat (1997).

3.4 Infant mortality rate (per thousand live births)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b,1]	18.4	14.0	10.0	10.8	10.4	9.9	8.5	7.9	7.7	6.0	5.9	5.2
Slovakia[a,b,1]	18.4	14.0	13.5	12.0	13.2	12.6	10.6	11.2	11.0	10.2	8.7	8.8
Poland[b,1]	25.5	22.0	19.1	19.3	18.2	17.3	16.1	15.1	13.6	12.2	10.2	9.5
Hungary[b,1]	23.2	20.4	15.7	14.8	15.6	14.1	12.5	11.5	10.7	10.9	9.9	9.7
Slovenia[b,1]	15.3	13.0	8.1	8.4	8.2	8.9	6.8	6.5	5.5	4.7	5.2	5.2
Croatia[b,1]	20.6	16.6	11.7	10.7	11.1	11.6	9.9	10.2	9.0	8.4	8.2	8.2
FYR Macedonia[b,1]	54.2	43.4	36.7	31.6	28.2	30.6	24.1	22.5	22.7	16.4	15.7	16.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b,c,1]	31.5	25.1	18.4	15.3	14.6	20.6	22.7	13.8	13.2	12.5	12.7	–
FR Yugoslavia[b,d,1]	33.9	33.7	29.3	22.8	20.9	21.7	21.9	18.4	16.8	15.0	14.3	–
Albania[2]	50.3	30.1	30.8	28.3	32.9	30.9	33.2	35.7	34.0	25.8	–	–
Bulgaria[b,1]	20.2	15.4	14.4	14.8	16.9	15.9	15.5	16.3	14.8	15.6	17.5	14.4
Romania[b,1]	29.3	25.6	26.9	26.9	22.7	23.3	23.3	23.9	21.2	22.3	22.0	20.5
Estonia[b,1]	17.1	14.1	14.8	12.4	13.4	15.8	15.8	14.5	14.8	10.4	10.1	9.3
Latvia[b,4]	15.3	13.0	11.1	13.7	15.6	17.4	15.9	15.5	18.5	15.8	15.2	14.9
Lithuania[b,4]	14.5	14.2	10.7	10.3	14.3	16.5	15.6	13.9	12.4	10.1	10.3	9.2
Belarus[b,3]	16.2	14.6	11.8	11.9	12.1	12.3	12.5	13.2	13.3	12.5	12.4	11.3
Moldova[b,5]	35.0	30.8	20.4	19.0	19.8	18.4	21.5	22.6	21.2	20.2	19.8	17.5
Russia[b,7]	22.0	20.8	17.8	17.4	17.8	18.0	19.9	18.6	17.6	17.4	17.2	16.5
Ukraine[b,8]	16.6	15.9	13.0	12.8	13.9	14.0	14.9	14.5	14.4	14.3	14.0	12.8
Armenia[f,6]	26.2	24.7	20.4	18.3	18.0	18.9	17.8	14.7	14.2	15.5	15.4	14.7
Azerbaijan[f,6]	30.3	29.2	26.2	23.0	25.3	25.5	28.2	25.2	23.3	19.9	19.6	16.6
Georgia[f,e,5]	25.4	23.9	19.6	15.8	13.8	12.4	18.3	16.7	13.1	17.4	17.3	15.2
Kazakhstan[f,6]	32.7	30.1	25.6	26.3	27.3	25.9	28.1	27.1	27.0	25.4	24.9	21.6
Kyrgyzstan[f,6]	43.3	41.6	32.2	30.0	29.7	31.5	31.9	29.1	28.1	25.9	28.2	26.2
Tajikistan[f,6]	58.1	46.8	43.2	40.7	40.6	45.9	47.0	40.7	30.9	31.2	27.9	23.4
Turkmenistan[f,6]	53.6	52.4	54.7	45.2	47.0	43.6	45.9	46.4	42.2	36.1	32.5	31.7
Uzbekistan[f,6]	47.0	45.3	38.1	34.3	35.1	37.6	32.3	28.6	25.8	24.7	23.1	22.3

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.

b. 1980, 1985: COE (1993).

c. Deaths, 1992-97: Federation of B-H only.

d. 1980, 1985: Serbia.

e. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

f. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1997).

Birth concepts:

1 WHO concept.

2 National concept.

3 1980-91: Soviet. 1992-98: WHO.

4 1980-90: Soviet. 1991-98: WHO.

5 1980-93: Soviet. 1994-98: WHO.

6 Soviet concept.

7 1980-92: Soviet. 1993-98: WHO.

8 1980-94: Soviet. 1995-98: WHO.

3.5 Maternal mortality rate (per hundred thousand live births)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	9.2	8.0	9.3	8.4	13.1	9.9	11.6	6.6	2.1	5.5	2.2	5.5
Slovakia[a,b]	9.2	8.0	10.0	6.3	14.0	1.3	12.3	6.0	8.1	5.0	5.1	8.7
Poland[b]	11.7	11.1	10.6	12.8	12.8	9.9	11.7	11.0	9.9	4.9	5.8	4.8
Hungary[b]	20.9	26.1	15.4	20.7	12.6	9.9	18.8	10.4	15.2	11.4	20.9	6.2
Slovenia[b]	13.4	15.5	4.3	–	4.6	5.0	10.1	10.3	5.3	26.6	–	–
Croatia	–	–	3.6	1.8	7.7	4.3	10.3	10.3	12.0	1.9	10.8	6.4
FYR Macedonia	–	–	16.7	11.3	11.5	9.0	6.2	11.9	21.8	–	3.4	3.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b,c]	17.8	16.4	16.8	11.0	13.1	8.5	17.7	13.1	12.1	7.3	13.7	14.0
Albania	45.2	57.6	49.5	37.7	29.7	25.2	16.2	40.2	33.3	27.8	27.5	21.6
Bulgaria[b]	21.1	12.6	18.7	20.9	10.4	21.3	14.2	12.6	19.5	19.4	18.7	–
Romania[b]	132.1	137.4	169.4	83.6	66.5	60.3	53.2	60.4	47.8	41.1	41.4	40.5
Estonia[d]	27.0	46.6	41.2	31.4	31.1	22.2	33.0	56.4	51.6	–	15.8	16.3
Latvia[d]	25.3	30.2	46.2	23.7	31.8	41.2	29.9	57.7	37.0	40.4	42.5	43.5
Lithuania	27.0	22.2	28.7	22.9	19.6	20.5	12.6	16.5	17.0	12.8	15.9	16.2
Belarus[d]	29.1	17.0	24.8	21.8	31.1	21.1	20.4	19.0	13.8	21.9	25.7	28.1
Moldova[d]	64.1	49.8	34.1	44.1	26.4	37.3	33.2	17.7	12.4	40.5	48.3	36.3
Russia[d]	68.0	54.0	49.0	47.4	52.4	50.8	51.6	52.3	53.3	48.9	50.2	44.0
Ukraine[d]	44.8	40.4	32.7	32.4	29.8	31.3	32.8	31.3	32.3	30.4	25.1	27.2
Armenia[d]	27.0	22.4	34.6	40.1	23.1	14.2	27.1	29.3	34.7	20.8	38.7	25.4
Azerbaijan[d]	38.7	41.1	28.6	9.3	10.5	17.6	34.4	43.8	37.0	44.1	31.0	41.1
Georgia[d]	25.7	22.5	54.9	20.5	10.1	5.5	–	–	33.7	18.6	26.9	34.2
Kazakhstan[d]	55.6	47.9	53.3	55.0	48.1	57.2	49.4	48.4	57.6	52.9	59.0	54.9
Kyrgyzstan[d]	49.4	42.8	42.6	62.9	55.6	49.9	44.5	42.7	44.3	31.5	62.7	35.5
Tajikistan[d]	94.2	59.1	38.9	41.8	53.2	69.6	74.0	87.6	58.2	–	–	–
Turkmenistan[d]	40.8	56.8	55.2	42.3	45.9	58.8	44.4	46.3	47.5	38.3	18.8	16.3
Uzbekistan[d]	46.3	48.6	42.8	34.1	33.3	30.1	24.1	17.3	18.9	12.0	10.5	9.6

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.
b. 1980, 1985: UN (1986), (1992).
c. 1980, 1985: former Yugoslavia. 1998: excludes Kosovo.
d. 1980, 1985: Goskomstat (1991a).

3.6 Under-5 mortality rate (per thousand live births)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	11.8	12.4	12.1	11.6	10.1	10.2	9.5	7.8	7.6	6.4
Slovakia	15.8	14.1	15.4	14.7	12.7	13.2	13.1	12.2	10.7	11.3
Poland	21.8	21.9	20.4	19.6	18.1	17.3	15.6	14.1	11.9	11.1
Hungary	18.0	16.8	17.6	16.0	14.6	13.5	12.5	12.7	11.8	11.8
Slovenia	10.3	10.2	10.0	10.6	8.4	8.2	6.7	6.1	6.3	6.7
Croatia	13.7	12.5	12.6	14.0	12.0	11.8	10.4	9.3	9.5	9.5
FYR Macedonia	38.2	33.3	30.2	32.3	25.3	25.5	24.5	18.3	17.2	17.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	21.1	17.2	18.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	33.8	26.2	24.1	24.6	24.9	21.5	19.4	19.8	16.5	–
Albania	45.5	41.5	44.5	46.9	49.7	44.7	37.0	30.6	–	–
Bulgaria	18.3	18.7	21.4	20.6	19.6	20.9	19.0	19.8	18.7	15.3
Romania	34.9	35.7	30.8	30.5	30.3	29.7	26.2	27.5	26.4	24.6
Estonia	18.9	17.2	17.6	21.0	20.1	17.4	20.0	12.3	13.0	12.5
Latvia	15.2	18.1	20.5	22.2	22.2	20.1	19.5	20.7	18.5	19.0
Lithuania	14.3	13.5	17.4	20.0	19.3	18.2	16.2	13.2	13.2	12.0
Belarus	15.4	15.2	15.4	15.5	15.5	16.2	16.6	15.8	15.3	14.3
Moldova	27.1	25.2	25.0	24.5	27.6	28.8	27.4	26.4	26.5	22.2
Russia	22.0	21.4	21.9	22.1	24.3	23.0	22.7	21.4	21.2	20.3
Ukraine	17.6	17.3	18.5	18.7	19.9	19.6	19.9	19.4	18.9	17.3
Armenia	27.1	23.8	22.6	24.2	24.2	21.4	19.9	19.5	19.5	18.4
Azerbaijan	45.5	40.5	40.1	41.7	44.4	45.2	43.2	39.3	38.3	33.2
Georgia[a]	24.9	19.9	17.9	17.0	–	21.8	17.0	20.4	19.0	17.5
Kazakhstan	33.8	34.0	35.0	33.4	36.0	35.3	36.5	33.2	32.6	28.9
Kyrgyzstan	46.9	41.3	38.6	42.2	44.6	41.9	41.3	36.4	42.1	40.7
Tajikistan	64.9	61.5	58.5	68.2	83.5	71.3	49.5	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	77.8	64.1	64.2	60.3	67.9	70.3	64.8	60.4	57.3	60.0
Uzbekistan	53.6	47.5	47.1	51.7	48.7	47.8	42.5	40.1	37.8	38.0

a. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

3.7 Age 5-14 female mortality rate (per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	18.9	17.4	17.3	19.3	16.9	19.8	21.5	14.9	15.7	15.3
Slovakia	21.7	21.5	22.4	20.4	17.8	18.8	18.5	19.7	16.9	19.7
Poland	23.0	21.9	22.6	18.9	18.5	17.5	16.9	18.2	17.9	16.3
Hungary	22.4	23.6	19.9	21.0	19.7	16.0	19.1	20.4	15.4	15.9
Slovenia	22.3	18.3	15.8	18.3	14.1	18.2	17.9	10.4	11.6	12.0
Croatia[a]	–	–	20.3	27.6	22.1	15.9	24.2	16.6	18.4	14.8
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	26.8	27.0	25.8	31.0	18.2	26.7	21.8	24.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	14.6	12.3	16.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	27.6	28.0	22.7	26.1	22.1	19.5	20.5	21.1	19.6	13.6
Albania[a]	54.4	61.7	48.7	42.6	44.1	38.7	35.3	33.6	–	–
Bulgaria	32.2	32.4	31.4	35.5	30.9	25.7	28.6	32.9	36.1	31.0
Romania	44.3	40.1	39.6	34.9	36.1	43.1	44.3	48.7	51.2	51.9
Estonia	36.6	32.8	23.9	39.4	37.2	28.2	22.9	39.0	19.0	19.6
Latvia	40.1	35.1	42.2	32.3	33.0	37.9	39.1	24.6	29.4	28.5
Lithuania	32.7	30.4	34.6	29.3	29.2	31.6	28.2	23.8	21.6	28.0
Belarus	29.0	28.3	30.6	28.4	25.7	24.8	25.3	22.4	23.4	25.6
Moldova[c]	43.0	36.7	39.7	43.5	41.0	41.2	40.4	38.5	36.0	32.6
Russia	35.8	33.2	36.8	36.4	39.1	37.5	39.1	35.1	30.9	33.7
Ukraine	32.7	29.8	35.4	33.0	32.6	34.3	33.3	32.9	32.5	29.4
Armenia	32.1	22.0	20.6	19.8	18.4	18.0	17.6	13.4	14.0	12.9
Azerbaijan	41.6	36.0	40.6	43.6	45.9	49.2	52.7	39.6	41.7	43.8
Georgia[d]	27.9	25.0	26.9	24.9	–	17.9	15.3	13.2	13.8	11.7
Kazakhstan[e]	39.4	40.5	43.7	41.7	46.1	43.7	45.4	43.1	41.7	41.8
Kyrgyzstan	47.3	44.8	40.0	40.6	37.0	43.5	41.4	41.3	41.2	41.0
Tajikistan	51.1	46.7	43.3	44.9	72.2	70.0	67.7	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	55.8	53.7	47.1	50.6	58.5	56.6	51.1	51.1	45.9	59.7
Uzbekistan[f]	47.6	48.0	43.7	46.1	51.0	51.0	51.8	44.3	42.7	47.3

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

e. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

3.8 Age 5-14 male mortality rate (per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	30.1	28.0	29.0	28.3	26.7	28.4	25.2	23.7	22.9	21.5
Slovakia	29.0	28.8	35.2	32.0	26.4	27.3	29.4	26.8	29.9	27.8
Poland	35.9	33.8	33.2	31.1	27.9	28.2	28.4	27.0	25.6	25.0
Hungary	33.0	32.2	31.2	26.8	27.1	25.1	29.0	24.4	20.8	24.9
Slovenia	27.1	30.1	24.5	20.8	21.2	25.3	24.5	22.2	36.4	21.3
Croatia[a]	–	–	39.4	44.0	33.6	28.5	27.9	25.5	25.1	27.4
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	36.8	31.4	43.3	35.2	33.9	28.3	30.9	39.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina	41.9	40.1	37.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	34.8	35.9	31.4	35.5	36.9	30.6	27.9	25.7	28.5	21.1
Albania[a]	73.5	72.0	73.4	74.3	69.2	69.2	58.9	58.5	–	–
Bulgaria	49.8	48.3	51.6	45.7	43.7	47.2	43.9	44.7	47.5	45.5
Romania	67.3	64.1	62.9	56.7	61.2	70.4	78.2	77.3	76.5	78.2
Estonia	68.0	68.5	55.6	60.5	54.4	53.6	64.4	44.8	55.8	40.5
Latvia	69.4	89.6	72.7	71.3	67.8	60.9	56.3	39.9	59.0	42.1
Lithuania	54.2	50.6	58.3	59.4	52.3	50.0	41.0	37.7	39.0	33.4
Belarus	56.0	44.2	55.1	49.7	43.5	52.1	41.8	39.7	41.3	40.2
Moldova[c]	67.1	60.3	74.2	69.9	60.0	77.1	64.3	55.4	49.9	58.9
Russia	65.4	64.2	73.1	69.6	70.0	64.5	68.2	59.4	57.0	57.0
Ukraine	55.8	55.5	60.9	55.5	56.6	55.7	55.1	50.4	47.2	48.0
Armenia	44.8	42.6	28.4	32.8	39.5	29.3	32.5	25.4	25.2	27.4
Azerbaijan	61.2	48.5	61.8	66.0	66.3	69.7	64.5	57.3	59.0	56.6
Georgia[d]	44.7	42.5	39.3	32.9	–	26.3	26.7	18.2	23.4	21.2
Kazakhstan[e]	69.7	77.6	80.8	75.7	77.7	74.7	72.8	67.7	64.0	66.1
Kyrgyzstan	70.4	74.7	61.3	65.3	68.3	63.7	62.2	62.6	64.2	65.4
Tajikistan	70.1	75.9	62.7	71.1	100.8	91.7	77.9	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	80.8	78.9	74.1	68.7	82.1	77.2	73.9	65.8	77.1	73.2
Uzbekistan[f]	73.9	72.3	69.6	75.4	73.0	72.9	71.4	65.5	65.8	63.5

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

e. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

3.9 Age 15-24 female mortality rate (per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	32.1	39.3	40.2	35.6	36.3	36.0	36.6	31.3	30.8	31.7
Slovakia	36.8	38.8	35.6	32.6	34.3	32.9	27.5	27.1	33.7	29.4
Poland	38.3	36.1	38.7	36.1	35.3	35.4	34.1	32.7	32.6	32.2
Hungary	42.1	50.1	45.1	41.4	37.7	37.9	33.7	31.2	33.9	30.0
Slovenia	48.4	40.5	30.4	39.7	40.6	42.7	38.9	36.7	28.5	39.1
Croatia[a]	–	–	46.2	48.5	44.0	41.3	39.0	39.0	30.7	32.9
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	41.7	34.0	34.0	32.2	34.4	34.7	35.6	35.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	37.0	25.1	43.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	42.8	36.5	37.8	34.9	38.9	36.7	36.3	35.7	38.1	28.4
Albania[a]	47.4	37.5	50.1	50.6	52.4	45.9	54.4	43.0	–	–
Bulgaria	48.7	52.2	44.4	52.9	48.8	50.1	49.6	48.0	53.0	44.9
Romania	63.7	52.2	50.5	48.9	47.2	48.9	48.2	48.8	48.0	47.2
Estonia	66.5	66.3	52.5	59.2	62.5	108.0	63.9	41.8	47.8	51.6
Latvia	78.2	60.8	58.4	66.2	74.5	61.2	69.1	51.2	64.3	59.4
Lithuania	62.9	48.9	58.8	51.3	57.8	60.5	52.6	53.3	47.4	53.9
Belarus	52.0	52.4	55.7	55.3	57.2	49.9	60.3	56.7	55.9	53.7
Moldova[c]	62.0	65.8	72.4	68.5	65.5	64.9	54.9	53.2	48.2	55.2
Russia	67.3	66.9	69.9	77.7	87.3	90.0	93.8	89.3	87.0	89.8
Ukraine	57.6	57.4	58.5	63.4	62.3	68.9	71.4	69.9	64.9	62.5
Armenia	58.0	41.7	31.4	47.6	35.1	37.3	26.7	26.8	29.7	27.9
Azerbaijan	50.3	47.1	54.8	71.6	75.8	79.6	73.9	58.5	60.3	56.1
Georgia[d]	43.3	48.1	47.1	46.2	–	42.6	28.5	28.3	31.0	27.3
Kazakhstan[e]	82.3	87.1	[illegible]	92.2	106.0	94.6	100.9	94.2	103.0	96.2
Kyrgyzstan	77.9	76.7	[illegible]	81.5	79.9	74.3	85.3	80.9	72.8	67.3
Tajikistan	79.0	76.3	80.0	80.1	107.3	103.5	98.8	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	87.1	88.5	95.2	95.4	98.3	95.2	87.3	99.9	98.1	105.2
Uzbekistan[f]	77.9	74.1	77.9	81.7	93.1	86.3	80.0	80.2	80.8	85.2

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.
c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
e. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

3.10 Age 15-24 male mortality rate (per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	93.3	97.1	98.6	103.2	102.3	101.0	98.2	86.6	98.1	85.0
Slovakia	90.7	106.1	100.9	97.0	96.0	94.3	91.7	88.7	98.3	95.1
Poland	128.8	[illegible]	134.7	126.6	110.9	117.5	111.4	106.5	110.6	109.2
Hungary	119.1	126.3	110.7	118.2	96.1	99.0	88.8	80.4	77.2	84.0
Slovenia	133.2	107.7	139.1	129.2	139.6	138.6	113.7	115.3	98.8	120.6
Croatia[a]	–	–	331.1	299.8	189.6	122.3	162.6	114.2	104.0	91.8
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	78.0	81.9	67.8	67.4	69.0	67.7	74.3	75.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	84.6	[illegible]	126.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	80.7	[illegible]	125.4	127.0	100.0	78.1	74.6	78.7	85.8	71.1
Albania[a]	98.9	103.4	140.1	145.7	167.9	174.0	162.1	135.1	–	–
Bulgaria	110.0	[illegible]	110.6	118.7	119.9	125.7	115.9	101.5	112.1	105.6
Romania	129.9	[illegible]	109.5	118.7	110.0	113.2	107.4	113.5	107.0	98.1
Estonia	187.7	215.5	197.1	224.2	239.6	251.8	234.2	161.2	203.8	152.4
Latvia	213.5	208.3	226.0	249.5	259.9	260.8	239.2	214.2	197.7	192.6
Lithuania	181.1	167.7	219.0	194.1	224.3	222.1	195.2	207.1	194.2	171.1
Belarus	164.0	174.7	179.5	196.6	183.5	198.1	197.1	181.8	188.1	193.5
Moldova[c]	201.2	179.3	156.5	240.8	173.1	183.8	170.7	153.9	131.9	140.9
Russia	206.0	[illegible]	217.6	246.8	289.3	304.2	331.8	311.6	283.9	292.5
Ukraine	170.9	169.5	171.3	187.0	185.6	208.1	214.8	202.9	188.2	184.9
Armenia	84.4	90.8	88.7	136.5	156.5	257.1	122.2	119.0	104.2	88.0
Azerbaijan	84.1	101.3	97.8	362.1	341.9	467.5	152.0	135.8	129.5	121.9
Georgia[d]	113.8	111.5	117.0	169.4	–	132.7	101.5	67.2	62.6	76.8
Kazakhstan[e]	193.5	180.3	199.1	210.0	243.8	234.5	271.5	278.7	272.7	270.2
Kyrgyzstan	143.5	148.9	140.7	149.3	146.7	149.6	170.5	153.2	154.2	159.5
Tajikistan	99.6	84.1	90.1	133.2	330.6	187.4	156.2	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	136.0	146.0	142.6	133.8	157.2	153.8	149.3	169.0	168.3	179.4
Uzbekistan[f]	115.3	114.3	122.7	116.5	122.0	124.4	121.5	127.0	125.0	128.1

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.
c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
e. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

3.11 Age 15-24 female mortality rate due to accidents, poisoning or violence

(including suicide, per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	15.4	22.3	20.1	19.9	18.6	19.9	20.3	18.3	16.6	19.5
Slovakia	14.6	19.5	15.7	14.3	14.9	13.8	13.5	–	–	–
Poland	17.1	16.1	20.0	18.1	17.0	17.4	18.3	16.6	15.5	15.8
Hungary	21.5	24.0	21.9	21.6	17.0	19.2	15.7	15.1	17.1	13.7
Slovenia	35.5	25.4	19.3	25.1	21.0	27.3	27.8	24.9	15.3	24.5
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	10.4	5.8	9.6	11.6	7.0	10.1	7.5	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	13.4	13.9	14.1	11.3	11.2	14.4	13.2	12.6	15.5	12.0
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	19.8	21.3	14.8	22.8	20.4	22.2	20.5	18.8	16.9	–
Romania	21.0	22.3	19.2	18.1	18.6	18.8	18.6	18.5	18.5	20.9
Estonia	34.7	33.6	35.3	32.5	35.6	71.3	40.7	26.3	32.2	29.2
Latvia	44.2	37.1	36.9	43.2	44.0	39.8	41.5	26.8	41.6	37.0
Lithuania	–	27.3	33.3	29.0	34.5	35.5	28.9	33.7	30.6	35.4
Belarus	–	23.4	30.4	27.8	27.8	26.5	32.2	33.4	35.2	32.8
Moldova[c]	–	26.7	34.0	33.8	23.2	25.4	22.3	19.2	19.4	18.6
Russia	35.2	36.5	38.1	44.3	53.8	55.2	58.9	56.2	53.6	57.7
Ukraine	28.3	29.6	28.0	31.3	28.7	34.8	34.2	34.0	31.7	31.3
Armenia	32.1	13.0	11.9	13.8	9.2	10.1	8.2	6.1	8.2	8.1
Azerbaijan	7.1	8.8	12.2	9.8	12.0	14.5	11.1	9.0	9.9	12.5
Georgia[d]	15.0	14.4	12.0	13.5	–	12.0	7.9	8.3	8.0	6.1
Kazakhstan[e]	36.5	43.7	43.8	41.2	48.9	40.5	39.6	41.7	46.0	42.0
Kyrgyzstan	26.8	27.9	30.3	30.0	22.0	20.8	29.1	20.4	22.5	21.8
Tajikistan	–	16.9	18.1	20.6	26.7	18.9	17.3	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	27.1	31.6	32.4	30.0	28.9	29.5	23.5	23.9	27.1	32.1
Uzbekistan	–	21.2	19.5	19.1	17.5	15.8	16.0	17.7	17.7	20.6

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999)

b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr

d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali

e. Population data, 1998 IRC estimate

3.12 Age 15-24 male mortality rate due to accidents, poisoning or violence

(including suicide, per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	62.1	69.9	74.1	78.6	78.0	74.9	77.6	69.2	77.8	65.1
Slovakia	61.1	78.8	79.5	73.9	70.1	69.6	66.0	–	–	–
Poland	95.2	99.7	101.2	93.4	82.5	89.4	82.1	76.2	77.6	76.1
Hungary	88.6	95.1	82.7	90.1	67.3	72.2	48.1	56.2	53.7	60.0
Slovenia	109.0	86.9	118.2	100.1	116.7	111.8	88.6	92.3	81.8	91.0
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	48.8	41.0	32.1	29.7	34.2	35.7	36.6	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	43.1	48.5	81.1	80.5	52.5	41.4	39.2	46.7	52.7	44.4
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	70.1	81.5	69.4	80.2	79.6	82.9	78.7	63.9	61.6	–
Romania	88.3	81.8	72.2	76.8	71.0	73.9	68.2	71.7	67.8	64.1
Estonia	143.0	185.1	157.9	189.4	195.5	226.2	189.4	128.2	178.2	127.8
Latvia	169.8	165.9	190.6	213.3	217.2	221.9	200.2	169.3	160.9	149.0
Lithuania	–	135.8	186.5	161.4	191.2	188.0	163.3	171.7	162.9	151.1
Belarus	–	139.7	140.3	153.4	138.1	151.2	149.0	142.5	149.7	154.3
Moldova[c]	–	135.1	113.8	198.4	123.1	127.6	116.0	103.7	94.3	92.2
Russia	164.8	167.8	175.4	198.5	236.3	245.9	267.6	244.6	219.3	229.2
Ukraine	132.5	130.4	127.6	142.1	134.5	152.3	156.4	145.0	133.2	132.3
Armenia	51.5	61.7	57.6	106.9	118.1	228.9	86.4	86.6	75.4	62.1
Azerbaijan	32.5	41.5	39.5	46.7	40.3	31.6	32.7	28.7	28.1	54.9
Georgia[d]	71.2	72.4	68.7	118.8	–	86.9	62.9	38.5	33.4	43.2
Kazakhstan[e]	144.4	136.2	146.4	153.2	175.6	157.0	174.3	173.6	166.6	167.7
Kyrgyzstan	90.3	99.7	91.2	89.4	93.2	85.3	94.9	78.1	84.3	86.2
Tajikistan	–	36.7	42.3	82.9	253.3	98.5	64.5	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	70.0	87.1	81.1	74.3	73.7	69.9	63.9	70.5	71.9	75.5
Uzbekistan	–	66.2	71.5	59.1	57.4	49.0	47.9	52.2	47.5	51.4

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999)

b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr

d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali

e. Population data, 1998 IRC estimate

3.13 Age 15-24 female suicide rate (per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	4.1	4.6	4.3	2.8	4.3	3.7	4.2	2.9	2.5	3.8
Slovakia	3.1	3.8	3.0	1.7	2.6	2.8	2.0	1.1	2.2	–
Poland	2.8	2.8	2.4	3.2	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.9	–
Hungary	7.3	8.2	5.3	5.7	5.5	5.2	3.8	3.7	4.1	3.8
Slovenia	10.2	5.5	6.2	7.0	8.4	5.6	4.2	6.2	3.5	9.1
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	2.6	0.6	3.2	5.2	3.8	2.5	3.8	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	3.2	3.3	3.8	2.4	2.6	4.8	4.9	3.7	5.4	3.1
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	6.5	4.4	3.9	4.8	5.6	5.0	4.0	4.2	4.8	–
Romania	4.1	3.6	2.7	3.4	3.0	3.1	2.6	2.0	2.6	2.9
Estonia	7.7	5.8	6.7	9.6	10.6	9.6	6.8	7.8	5.9	4.9
Latvia	6.1	6.2	6.2	5.8	9.4	4.8	6.0	3.7	5.5	8.5
Lithuania	–	4.1	8.1	7.0	6.7	12.0	7.5	7.6	6.5	8.5
Belarus	–	3.4	4.3	4.4	5.2	5.0	4.5	5.8	6.7	5.2
Moldova	–	5.1	6.0	5.9	4.3	6.0	3.8	2.6	2.1	1.6
Russia	6.5	6.6	6.6	7.2	7.9	9.0	9.7	8.6	8.9	8.6
Ukraine	5.3	4.8	3.9	5.3	4.3	4.9	5.2	4.6	4.8	5.5
Armenia	0.4	1.1	–	0.3	1.0	1.3	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Azerbaijan	–	0.6	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.5
Georgia[d]	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.3	–	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.2
Kazakhstan[e]	9.9	12.9	10.6	10.8	12.8	10.9	10.7	11.6	12.9	11.2
Kyrgyzstan	6.5	7.9	9.1	7.5	4.0	3.0	9.9	4.3	4.0	5.0
Tajikistan	3.0	4.9	5.0	4.2	2.6	2.2	2.6	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	7.2	7.7	8.7	9.0	6.6	5.9	5.3	3.9	8.3	8.1
Uzbekistan	–	6.9	5.9	5.3	5.7	5.2	4.1	5.1	5.4	6.6

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

e. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

3.14 Age 15-24 male suicide rate (per hundred thousand relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	14.5	12.7	14.5	14.8	16.4	17.1	18.4	16.2	15.7	14.8
Slovakia	11.1	11.5	13.7	12.6	11.8	14.6	12.6	13.3	9.8	–
Poland	14.5	16.2	15.8	16.2	16.6	17.9	16.5	17.2	17.6	–
Hungary	24.1	20.1	19.6	25.0	19.1	20.2	19.2	17.8	15.9	17.9
Slovenia	34.3	18.9	26.3	28.4	36.4	28.8	33.7	21.6	26.2	38.2
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	10.4	6.7	4.8	1.9	3.7	6.0	5.4	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	8.7	7.1	7.9	9.8	10.6	9.1	10.7	12.3	13.7	9.2
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	11.1	14.6	12.9	15.7	15.4	13.3	13.9	15.2	14.1	–
Romania	10.3	9.0	7.6	11.8	10.0	11.5	11.5	12.1	10.7	9.2
Estonia	31.3	25.9	19.6	33.9	29.7	37.5	28.0	34.9	34.1	34.1
Latvia	18.4	20.7	27.9	33.5	35.9	38.3	37.8	37.2	35.0	31.2
Lithuania	–	18.1	27.2	29.2	44.9	45.6	48.6	54.1	53.7	42.1
Belarus	–	18.8	20.4	23.6	24.4	28.6	28.6	30.1	32.9	37.6
Moldova	–	13.2	12.7	11.0	17.5	18.4	13.7	15.3	14.0	9.8
Russia	25.6	28.6	29.5	33.7	41.7	47.9	53.3	53.3	52.8	51.6
Ukraine	16.3	17.3	17.2	17.2	21.7	23.8	25.5	27.5	26.6	28.3
Armenia	4.8	3.4	2.0	3.0	2.3	1.9	3.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Azerbaijan	–	2.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	0.4	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.3
Georgia[d]	6.2	5.6	2.9	4.3	–	3.6	3.4	2.2	5.3	5.0
Kazakhstan[e]	26.9	26.9	28.9	32.0	40.3	36.9	45.1	46.6	48.1	44.2
Kyrgyzstan	14.5	13.5	12.0	15.7	17.6	18.8	20.2	16.6	20.6	19.9
Tajikistan	–	2.8	4.0	6.2	2.8	4.4	5.1	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	8.2	15.5	13.5	15.8	11.9	12.4	13.4	17.2	19.4	19.9
Uzbekistan	–	9.8	10.5	12.6	10.4	11.5	10.8	11.4	12.2	11.4

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

b. 1998: deaths exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

d. Deaths, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

e. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

4.1 Crude marriage rate (marriages per thousand mid-year population)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	7.7	7.7	7.8	8.8	7.0	7.2	6.4	5.7	5.3	5.2	5.6	5.3
Slovakia[a,b]	7.7	7.7	6.9	7.7	6.2	6.4	5.8	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.1
Poland[b]	8.6	7.2	6.7	6.7	6.1	5.7	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.4
Hungary[b]	7.5	6.9	6.4	6.4	5.9	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.4
Slovenia[b]	6.5	5.4	4.9	4.3	4.1	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.8
Croatia[c,d]	7.3	6.6	6.1	5.8	4.5	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.2
FYR Macedonia[b,d,e]	8.5	8.1	–	7.4	7.7	7.4	7.4	8.1	8.0	7.1	7.1	7.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b,f]	8.6	8.1	7.8	6.7	6.5	–	–	–	3.0	4.5	4.9	–
FR Yugoslavia[g,h]	7.6	6.9	6.6	6.2	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.3	4.0
Albania[b,i]	8.1	8.5	8.6	8.9	7.6	8.3	8.2	8.8	8.4	[illegible]	7.3	8.4
Bulgaria[b]	7.9	7.4	7.1	6.9	5.7	5.2	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.3
Romania[b]	8.2	7.1	7.7	8.3	8.0	7.7	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.5
Estonia	8.8	8.4	8.1	7.5	6.6	5.7	5.1	4.9	4.7	3.8	3.8	3.7
Latvia	9.8	9.3	9.2	8.8	8.4	7.2	5.6	4.5	4.4	3.9	3.9	3.9
Lithuania	9.2	9.7	9.4	9.8	9.2	8.0	6.4	6.3	6.0	5.5	5.1	5.0
Belarus[j]	10.1	9.9	9.6	9.7	9.3	7.8	8.0	7.3	7.5	6.2	6.8	7.0
Moldova[j,k]	11.5	9.7	9.2	9.4	9.1	9.0	9.1	7.8	7.6	6.0	5.5	6.0
Russia	10.6	9.7	9.4	8.9	8.6	7.1	7.5	7.3	7.3	5.9	6.3	5.8
Ukraine	9.3	9.6	9.5	9.3	9.5	7.6	8.2	7.7	8.4	6.0	6.8	6.2
Armenia	10.4	9.9	7.8	8.0	7.8	6.2	5.8	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.3	3.0
Azerbaijan[j]	9.8	10.5	10.2	10.2	10.2	9.3	8.0	6.2	5.6	5.0	6.0	5.2
Georgia[l]	10.0	8.4	7.1	6.8	7.0	5.0	4.5	4.1	4.0	3.6	3.2	2.8
Kazakhstan[j,m]	10.6	10.1	10.1	10.0	10.1	8.9	8.9	7.6	7.3	6.6	6.6	6.4
Kyrgyzstan[j]	10.7	10.1	9.7	10.0	10.6	9.2	8.3	5.9	6.0	5.8	5.8	5.5
Tajikistan[j]	10.7	10.5	9.2	9.5	10.4	8.4	9.6	6.8	5.5	4.6	4.8	3.5
Turkmenistan[j]	9.8	9.8	9.8	10.2	10.8	11.1	10.7	8.3	7.4	6.6	6.5	5.6
Uzbekistan[j,n]	10.9	11.0	10.0	10.6	13.0	11.0	10.3	7.9	7.5	7.4	7.7	7.1

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia

b. 1980, 1985: COE (1993).

c. 1980, 1985, 1989-90: CBSC (1996).

d. Population data, 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

e. 1990: COE (1997a).

f. 1995-97: Federation of B-H; population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

g. 1980, 1985: FSOY (1996).

h. 1998: marriages exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

i. Population data, 1989-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

j. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1998a).

k. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

l. Marriages, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

m. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

n. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

4.2 Marriage rate among women under age 25 (marriages per thousand women aged 16-24)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	91.4	103.2	76.9	75.2	64.3	54.0	48.2	45.1	45.3	42.7
Slovakia[a]	82.6	91.4	73.6	73.9	65.2	57.4	53.8	50.4	49.2	46.9
Poland	81.0	81.4	72.7	66.2	61.4	59.1	56.9	54.4	52.4	–
Hungary	77.3	75.3	66.7	59.4	54.2	50.9	48.7	43.3	39.1	36.5
Slovenia	48.8	41.1	38.1	40.7	37.0	32.7	31.6	27.2	25.3	23.8
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	67.1	61.8	57.0	59.3	56.5	53.3	52.1	47.4	45.7	32.5
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	91.7	90.2	73.3	66.5	57.2	52.2	49.0	46.2	43.3	43.8
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	57.6
Estonia	80.9	74.4	66.1	54.8	44.7	39.5	38.4	29.5	28.9	26.5
Latvia	90.3	91.0	86.5	71.9	55.0	45.8	42.7	36.2	33.8	31.1
Lithuania	94.3	101.5	95.8	85.2	67.8	66.6	62.4	56.8	51.3	50.4
Belarus	104.0	108.3	104.6	88.2	90.8	82.3	82.5	65.2	68.3	68.8
Moldova[c]	104.5	109.0	106.0	106.0	106.1	86.7	79.7	61.5	55.8	57.7
Russia[d]	–	98.8	95.7	78.8	83.0	78.2	74.9	58.4	61.5	55.1
Ukraine	107.6	108.9	112.3	87.4	94.0	87.1	94.2	65.2	72.3	64.0
Armenia	82.4	83.9	84.7	69.7	65.2	51.5	47.1	40.8	34.6	30.7
Azerbaijan	82.8	83.1	90.1	85.8	76.9	60.5	55.0	48.1	58.8	50.2
Georgia[e]	69.2	66.9	74.6	54.1	–	43.4	41.7	37.1	31.9	27.8
Kazakhstan	96.8	100.9	103.0	90.4	92.5	76.0	68.4	60.2	59.2	54.4
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	56.4	55.7	51.4
Tajikistan	89.9	94.7	103.8	86.6	101.1	71.7	57.5	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	85.4	91.5	97.6	98.2	99.4	76.0	66.5	57.5	56.4	47.8
Uzbekistan[f]	97.7	106.7	133.8	115.7	109.5	83.5	78.7	77.5	–	73.7

a. Marriages, 1998: SOSR (1999).

b. 1998: marriages exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

d. Marriages: Goskomstat (1999b).

e. Marriages, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

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4.3 Marriage rate among men under age 25 (marriages per thousand men aged 16-24)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	64.3	74.6	55.6	55.1	46.5	37.5	32.9	29.9	28.9	25.9
Slovakia[a]	60.3	67.4	55.4	55.5	48.4	41.4	38.4	35.6	33.7	31.3
Poland	55.6	56.9	50.9	46.3	42.4	40.6	38.8	37.1	35.2	34.3
Hungary	54.2	53.9	47.5	41.9	37.4	34.0	31.9	27.5	24.1	22.3
Slovenia	28.0	23.4	20.8	21.1	18.4	15.7	14.6	11.7	10.9	9.9
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	35.5	32.8	30.2	31.8	30.0	28.3	26.9	24.6	23.4	16.2
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	64.5	64.3	52.8	47.0	39.0	33.8	29.9	27.8	25.1	25.0
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	34.4
Estonia	60.6	55.8	50.8	41.8	33.5	28.9	27.9	20.7	19.4	17.7
Latvia	71.8	71.9	70.2	58.5	44.9	34.9	32.3	26.5	23.7	21.9
Lithuania	74.6	80.6	77.4	70.6	55.2	52.5	47.6	42.9	39.0	36.8
Belarus	88.0	92.1	89.7	75.5	76.6	68.3	67.6	52.1	53.6	52.9
Moldova[c]	84.0	87.8	85.3	85.6	85.9	70.1	63.4	48.1	42.1	43.1
Russia[d]	–	78.5	75.9	62.5	66.0	61.8	58.6	45.0	47.2	41.7
Ukraine	87.5	88.7	91.9	71.8	76.5	69.6	74.0	50.2	55.0	47.8
Armenia	46.6	47.5	46.6	38.5	34.7	25.6	22.8	19.8	16.1	14.5
Azerbaijan	47.8	46.4	48.7	46.1	38.4	29.3	25.8	20.2	23.0	20.7
Georgia[e]	41.7	39.3	45.1	32.8	–	25.9	25.1	22.2	19.0	16.2
Kazakhstan	71.6	74.0	74.5	66.3	69.4	57.2	52.6	44.0	43.0	38.3
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	38.3	36.3	32.3
Tajikistan	72.7	76.2	80.7	69.7	82.1	58.6	45.0	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	73.6	79.2	83.7	90.1	88.8	68.7	60.0	50.6	48.8	40.4
Uzbekistan[f]	81.5	89.0	111.8	99.3	94.8	71.5	65.6	62.6	55.1	57.6

a. Marriages, 1998: SOSR (1999).
b. 1998: marriages exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.
c. 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
d. Marriages: Goskomstat (1999b).
e. Marriages, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
f. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

4.4 Average age of women at first marriage (years)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	21.2	21.1	21.4	21.6	21.7	22.0	22.4	22.8	23.3	23.6
Slovakia	22.9	22.7	21.3	21.7	21.1	21.3	–	–	–	–
Poland[a]	21.7	21.6	21.7	21.7	21.8	21.9	22.0	22.2	22.4	23.1
Hungary	21.4	21.5	21.5	21.6	21.7	22.0	22.2	22.6	23.5	23.8
Slovenia	23.5	23.8	24.0	24.2	24.7	24.9	25.2	25.4	25.6	25.6
Croatia	23.5	23.6	23.7	24.1	24.1	24.4	24.5	24.7	25.1	25.2
FYR Macedonia[b]	22.6	22.8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	23.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b]	22.9	23.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	23.2	23.6	23.8	23.8	24.0	23.8	24.0	24.2	24.3	24.6
Albania	22.8	22.6	22.2	22.2	22.3	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	21.5	21.4	21.5	21.6	21.9	22.3	22.6	23.1	23.4	23.5
Romania	22.1	22.0	22.0	22.1	22.2	22.4	22.8	22.8	22.9	23.2
Estonia	22.5	22.5	22.4	22.4	22.9	23.4	23.6	23.8	24.1	24.3
Latvia	22.2	22.2	22.2	22.4	22.5	22.5	22.8	23.2	23.6	24.0
Lithuania	–	–	–	–	22.2	22.3	22.4	22.6	22.8	22.7
Belarus	22.3	22.0	21.9	21.8	21.7	21.7	21.7	21.9	22.1	22.1
Moldova	22.0	21.0	21.0	21.0	21.0	21.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0
Russia	22.9	22.6	22.5	22.5	22.4	22.4	22.6	22.7	–	–
Ukraine	21.5	21.6	21.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	22.3	22.3	22.0	21.9	21.8	21.7	21.9	22.1	22.7	22.4
Azerbaijan	22.8	23.2	22.9	22.7	22.3	22.3	22.9	22.6	22.6	22.6
Georgia	24.5	24.2	23.9	23.7	–	23.2	23.7	23.8	24.5	24.1
Kazakhstan	22.4	22.3	22.2	22.1	21.6	20.8	21.0	22.2	22.4	23.3
Kyrgyzstan	21.9	21.7	21.7	21.4	21.2	21.2	21.4	21.5	21.7	22.0
Tajikistan	21.5	21.5	21.6	21.1	20.9	20.8	21.1	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	22.6	22.5	22.4	22.2	22.0	22.2	22.3	22.9	22.9	23.0
Uzbekistan[c]	22.3	21.3	21.0	20.7	20.5	20.5	20.7	20.9	21.4	21.0

a. Median age.
b. 1989-90: COE (1993).
c. 1989: UNDP (1997a).

4.5 Average age of men at first marriage (years)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	23.8	23.5	24.2	24.2	24.4	24.7	25.0	25.4	25.9	26.3
Slovakia	25.6	25.4	23.8	24.2	23.6	23.8	–	–	–	–
Poland[a]	24.2	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.1	24.2	24.3	24.3	24.5	25.4
Hungary	24.2	24.2	24.2	24.3	24.4	24.7	25.0	25.2	26.5	26.8
Slovenia	26.4	26.6	26.8	27.1	27.6	27.7	27.9	28.2	28.5	28.8
Croatia	26.7	26.9	27.0	27.2	27.3	27.6	27.8	28.1	28.4	28.5
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	26.9	27.5	27.7	27.6	27.8	27.4	27.6	27.8	27.9	28.1
Albania	26.7	26.7	26.7	26.6	26.7	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	24.7	24.6	24.7	24.9	25.2	25.7	26.0	26.3	26.5	26.6
Romania	25.3	25.0	25.0	25.2	25.4	25.6	26.0	26.0	26.2	26.4
Estonia	24.6	24.6	24.5	24.7	25.2	25.6	25.7	26.1	26.3	26.5
Latvia	24.3	23.9	23.9	24.1	24.3	24.3	25.0	25.1	25.7	26.0
Lithuania	–	–	–	–	24.1	24.2	24.4	24.5	24.6	24.7
Belarus	24.1	23.9	23.8	23.7	23.6	23.7	23.7	24.0	24.2	24.3
Moldova	24.0	22.0	23.0	23.0	23.0	23.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0
Russia	24.9	24.7	24.7	24.6	24.5	24.7	24.8	25.0	–	–
Ukraine	23.8	23.7	23.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	25.5	25.5	25.6	25.6	25.8	26.1	26.3	26.5	26.8	26.6
Azerbaijan	25.7	26.2	26.2	25.9	25.9	24.2	26.5	26.6	26.8	26.6
Georgia	27.6	27.5	27.0	27.0	–	25.2	27.2	27.4	28.3	28.0
Kazakhstan	24.6	24.5	25.0	24.4	24.0	24.1	24.6	24.7	24.9	26.0
Kyrgyzstan	24.5	24.4	24.4	24.2	24.0	24.2	24.4	24.7	24.9	25.2
Tajikistan	24.3	24.3	24.5	23.9	23.7	23.7	23.9	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	23.7	23.6	23.6	23.3	23.0	23.2	23.3	24.0	24.0	24.2
Uzbekistan	–	23.9	23.8	23.3	23.2	23.1	23.4	23.7	24.5	23.8

[a] Median age

4.6 Crude divorce rate (divorces per thousand mid-year population)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	2.2	2.2	3.0	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.1
Slovakia[a,b]	2.2	2.2	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Poland[b]	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2
Hungary[b]	2.6	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.5	2.5
Slovenia[b]	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0
Croatia[c,d]	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8
FYR Macedonia[b,e]	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b,f]	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	–	–	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	–
FR Yugoslavia[g]	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8
Albania[b,h]	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.6
Bulgaria[b]	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.3
Romania[b]	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.8
Estonia	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.7	4.3	3.8	3.7	5.0	3.9	3.6	3.1
Latvia	5.0	4.5	4.2	4.0	4.2	5.5	4.0	3.3	3.1	2.4	2.5	2.5
Lithuania	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.4	4.1	3.7	3.7	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2
Belarus[i]	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.9	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.6	4.6
Moldova[i]	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.5	2.8
Russia	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.5	3.8	3.8	3.4
Ukraine	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.9	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.6
Armenia	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.4
Azerbaijan	1.2	1.2	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Georgia[i,k]	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
Kazakhstan[i]	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.3
Kyrgyzstan[i]	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3
Tajikistan[i]	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.4
Turkmenistan[i]	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.1
Uzbekistan[i,m]	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6

[a] 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.

[b] 1980, 1985: COE (1993).

[c] 1980, 1985, 1989-90: CBSC (1996).

[d] Population data, 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

[e] 1980, 1985, 1989-90: COE (1993).

[f] 1994-97: divorces in Federation of B-H; population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

[g] 1980, 1985: FSOY (1996). 1998: divorces exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

[h] Population data, 1989-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

[i] 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1998a).

[j] 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

[k] Divorces, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

[l] Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

[m] Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

4.7 General divorce rate (divorces per hundred marriages)

	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a,b]	28.6	28.6	38.6	35.2	40.8	38.6	45.8	52.9	56.7	61.4	56.2	58.8
Slovakia[a,b]	28.6	28.6	22.7	21.9	24.1	23.8	26.5	30.8	32.7	34.2	32.7	33.9
Poland[b]	12.8	18.1	18.5	16.6	14.5	14.7	13.4	15.2	18.4	19.4	20.8	21.7
Hungary[b]	34.7	40.6	37.3	37.5	39.9	37.9	41.3	43.3	46.5	46.2	53.3	57.4
Slovenia[b]	18.5	24.1	22.1	21.8	22.4	21.6	21.7	23.1	19.2	26.5	26.6	27.6
Croatia[c]	16.0	17.4	18.6	19.6	22.6	16.6	20.3	19.3	17.4	14.7	15.9	16.3
FYR Macedonia[b]	5.9	4.9	5.8	4.7	3.2	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.5	5.0	7.3	7.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b,d]	7.0	8.6	6.1	5.9	5.6	–	–	–	3.0	2.2	3.3	–
FR Yugoslavia[e]	15.3	17.5	17.5	16.5	14.2	11.2	11.9	11.7	13.2	13.9	14.1	19.8
Albania[b]	9.9	10.6	9.5	9.2	9.0	8.9	8.7	7.6	8.6	6.9	5.9	7.2
Bulgaria[b]	19.0	21.6	20.0	19.0	22.6	21.1	18.3	21.1	29.0	28.0	26.9	29.2
Romania[b]	18.3	19.7	20.2	17.1	20.2	16.8	19.3	25.7	22.7	23.7	23.6	27.5
Estonia[b]	47.7	47.6	46.8	49.1	55.8	74.9	74.3	76.0	106.4	102.5	94.5	82.7
Latvia[b]	51.0	48.4	45.9	45.7	49.6	77.0	70.4	72.7	70.6	62.8	63.0	64.4
Lithuania[b]	34.8	33.0	35.5	35.1	44.5	46.4	58.6	47.4	46.1	55.4	60.5	63.6
Belarus[f]	32.0	31.6	35.3	35.3	39.9	50.0	54.5	58.3	54.7	67.7	67.8	66.0
Moldova[f]	24.5	27.3	31.1	32.2	35.0	37.7	36.7	40.9	44.6	51.5	45.9	46.6
Russia[f]	39.7	41.3	42.1	42.4	46.8	60.7	59.9	63.0	61.9	64.9	59.8	59.1
Ukraine[f]	39.2	37.4	39.6	39.9	40.7	56.5	51.2	52.0	45.9	62.8	54.6	57.9
Armenia[f]	10.5	11.2	15.2	15.4	13.8	13.7	14.3	20.1	17.2	18.3	18.5	14.2
Azerbaijan[f]	11.8	11.2	15.9	19.2	14.4	13.8	10.9	13.3	13.1	14.5	12.4	13.8
Georgia[f,g]	13.4	14.7	19.2	21.2	19.5	18.2	13.3	14.1	12.5	11.8	13.3	11.5
Kazakhstan[f]	24.2	25.9	27.5	26.4	29.3	33.8	31.0	33.9	33.4	39.5	35.1	36.9
Kyrgyzstan[f]	17.2	17.0	19.7	18.0	19.0	19.7	19.9	21.2	22.3	25.1	24.6	24.2
Tajikistan[f]	14.3	14.6	15.9	14.7	13.4	13.9	9.8	11.3	13.5	16.7	14.2	12.1
Turkmenistan[f]	13.8	15.0	14.2	13.2	14.4	13.7	13.3	17.5	18.0	22.4	19.4	20.3
Uzbekistan[f]	13.0	13.0	14.9	13.8	12.3	13.9	12.0	13.8	12.4	11.8	11.9	8.6

a. 1980, 1985: Czechoslovakia.

b. 1980, 1985: computed from crude divorce and marriage rates.

c. 1980, 1985: CBSC (1996).

d. 1995-97: Federation of B-H.

e. 1980, 1985: FSOY (1996). 1998: excludes Kosovo.

f. 1980, 1985: CIS Stat (1998a).

g. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

4.8 Children involved in divorce (thousands)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	34.7	35.2	32.0	31.1	32.5	33.1	32.8	34.7	33.3	32.2
Slovakia	10.9	13.5	10.3	9.7	9.7	10.3	6.8	7.0	–	6.8
Poland	50.1	45.1	35.8	33.5	28.4	32.8	40.6	42.2	44.6	45.8
Hungary	26.1	26.1	25.4	22.9	22.9	23.3	24.9	21.0	24.9	25.3
Slovenia	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.9	2.0
Croatia	6.6	6.7	6.3	4.6	5.9	5.8	5.5	4.7	5.0	4.9
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[a]	7.0	6.3	4.9	4.1	4.2	4.5	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.8
Albania	2.3	2.5	2.1	–	2.1	1.2	1.4	1.2	0.9	–
Bulgaria	14.1	12.7	12.0	10.3	7.8	7.0	9.3	8.6	8.1	9.0
Romania	30.6	27.7	30.5	23.6	21.6	32.8	27.2	26.8	26.9	30.3
Estonia	5.3	5.3	5.4	6.2	5.1	4.8	7.0	5.6	5.1	4.3
Latvia	9.7	9.6	10.0	13.7	9.2	8.1	7.7	5.6	5.8	5.6
Lithuania	11.6	12.0	15.2	13.8	13.3	11.5	11.0	12.1	12.2	12.4
Belarus	31.6	31.6	35.9	38.8	45.0	42.9	40.5	42.3	45.5	44.7
Moldova[b]	10.6	11.6	12.9	14.3	13.5	12.2	13.0	–	–	9.4
Russia	479.1	466.1	522.2	569.1	593.8	613.4	588.1	463.5	454.5	389.7
Ukraine	155.9	158.5	170.7	186.7	184.7	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	3.5	3.6	3.2	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.2	2.3	2.2	1.5
Azerbaijan	7.5	9.9	8.0	6.5	4.8	4.0	2.5	2.2	3.6	3.7
Georgia[c]	4.5	4.4	4.5	1.9	–	1.6	1.5	1.0	0.9	1.8
Kazakhstan	41.1	40.5	45.8	47.4	43.6	39.2	37.1	39.3	36.4	37.6
Kyrgyzstan	7.8	7.0	8.3	7.1	6.5	5.1	5.8	6.6	6.8	6.7
Tajikistan	7.0	7.0	7.8	6.0	4.9	3.8	4.1	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	4.7	4.8	6.2	6.0	5.8	6.2	6.5	7.3	6.1	5.7
Uzbekistan	25.8	26.3	29.0	27.6	21.7	19.1	16.8	18.0	19.4	9.4

a. 1998: excludes Kosovo.

b. 1998: excludes Transdniestr.

c. 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

5.1 DPT immunization rate

(percent of children under 2 immunized against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	98.0	96.0	98.0	98.0	98.0
Slovakia	99.1	99.4	99.7	99.3	99.1	98.9	99.1	–	–	–
Poland	–	90.1	88.9	88.0	89.0	89.5	90.5	91.7	93.3	94.2
Hungary	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.8	99.8	99.9
Slovenia	97.4	97.1	97.3	97.8	98.1	98.1	95.8	96.2	91.9	89.5
Croatia	86.0	88.0	85.0	83.0	85.0	87.0	90.0	91.0	92.0	93.0
FYR Macedonia	93.7	94.4	92.5	95.4	89.6	87.7	95.2	92.5	96.6	93.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	93.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[d]	89.2	84.0	79.0	84.2	84.6	85.0	89.0	91.2	94.0	89.2
Albania	–	–	77.6	94.0	95.8	96.3	97.1	98.1	98.6	96.0
Bulgaria	99.5	99.5	99.4	97.9	97.7	93.3	94.8	95.1	94.2	95.1
Romania	79.3	75.5	77.3	86.8	97.6	97.6	98.3	98.0	96.7	97.5
Estonia	–	–	–	–	53.9	57.8	63.2	68.7	67.8	69.5
Latvia	81.1	83.5	82.8	83.5	78.8	72.4	71.8	73.7	74.2	88.8
Lithuania	81.9	78.4	74.9	87.2	86.8	87.2	97.3	92.1	92.0	93.5
Belarus	93.8	92.4	87.7	88.1	89.4	89.5	93.9	97.7	96.7	97.6
Moldova	84.0	81.0	81.0	84.0	87.0	86.0	96.0	97.7	97.9	97.4
Russia	82.7	68.5	68.7	72.6	79.2	88.1	92.7	95.1	87.5	91.3
Ukraine	79.2	78.8	86.0	88.1	93.1	97.0	97.7	98.6	98.5	98.7
Armenia	81.5	82.3	83.0	85.2	85.3	86.0	98.0	86.0	88.5	–
Azerbaijan	90.8	92.1	92.2	82.0	89.5	94.0	95.9	95.8	94.5	97.4
Georgia[h,i]	82.1	41.4	73.8	54.1	53.2	100.0	52.0	97.3	99.3	86.7
Kazakhstan	84.8	84.2	82.7	85.3	81.6	84.4	92.9	95.0	99.0	–
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	78.1	88.5	64.4	85.3	93.1	97.7	98.1	97.4
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	–	78.8	–	–	–	97.2
Turkmenistan	78.4	82.2	80.9	84.1	72.8	89.7	92.6	93.6	98.6	99.2
Uzbekistan	–	87.1	84.1	83.3	49.2	66.7	85.1	95.7	96.6	98.4

a. Diphtheria and tetanus.

b. 3 year-olds.

c. 1 year-olds.

d. 1998: excludes Kosovo.

e. 1-2 year-olds.

f. Vaccination and revaccination.

g. Diphtheria.

h. Number of vaccinations of children of all ages divided by 0-1 population (may overestimate the rate). 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

i. A 1996 survey on DPT3 found 75% among 0-5 year-olds and 40% among 0-1 year-olds (MOHG and UNICEF, 1996).

j. A 1995 survey on DPT3 found 74% among children 12-23 months old (MOHK and UNICEF, 1995).

k. A 1995 survey on DPT3 found 80% among children 12-23 months old (MOHT and UNICEF, 1995).

5.2 Polio immunization rate (percent of children under 2 immunized)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	98.0	98.0	98.0	99.0	99.0
Slovakia	98.8	99.0	99.2	98.6	98.6	98.6	98.6	–	–	–
Poland	–	90.1	88.6	87.9	88.9	89.3	90.4	91.6	93.2	94.1
Hungary	98.5	98.6	98.6	98.6	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.8	99.7	99.9
Slovenia	96.5	96.8	97.6	98.3	98.5	98.5	96.8	97.2	91.0	90.2
Croatia	85.0	87.0	85.0	85.0	86.0	87.0	90.0	91.0	92.0	93.0
FYR Macedonia	94.4	94.3	93.5	93.8	93.7	90.7	94.7	94.4	97.4	94.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	94.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	88.8	80.7	80.5	84.5	82.6	84.4	89.6	91.1	94.0	89.1
Albania	–	–	82.5	87.0	97.5	97.2	97.8	99.6	99.1	97.0
Bulgaria	99.7	99.7	99.0	98.8	97.0	93.9	96.8	95.4	95.9	96.5
Romania	89.4	80.5	83.5	92.3	90.7	91.0	94.2	96.8	97.1	97.6
Estonia	–	–	–	–	44.7	50.8	52.1	58.3	57.5	69.5
Latvia	83.6	85.6	84.1	94.9	80.9	59.3	76.3	73.7	73.4	88.8
Lithuania	86.6	77.1	79.0	88.2	86.3	87.7	89.3	92.6	94.8	96.6
Belarus	90.0	89.2	89.4	89.9	90.5	92.4	96.1	97.9	98.3	98.6
Moldova	92.0	91.0	89.0	93.0	97.0	94.0	97.0	98.6	98.4	97.6
Russia	68.6	69.4	71.5	69.0	82.2	87.5	91.6	96.8	91.4	94.3
Ukraine	80.5	81.3	86.3	90.1	91.1	96.3	97.5	98.9	98.2	98.0
Armenia	93.1	93.3	91.8	91.9	91.9	92.0	93.0	97.0	94.6	–
Azerbaijan	96.8	95.7	97.5	96.2	94.2	93.6	98.0	97.3	98.3	98.1
Georgia	98.0	47.4	100.0	67.3	83.9	100.0	63.0	99.3	100.0	100.0
Kazakhstan	85.6	85.0	83.7	86.5	68.7	57.9	93.1	94.2	97.0	–
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	80.9	91.5	69.4	84.6	96.3	94.2	79.1	97.4
Tajikistan	–	–	–	90.1	–	–	–	93.0	–	97.1
Turkmenistan	83.7	92.2	91.1	90.9	91.8	94.4	96.7	95.6	99.2	99.7
Uzbekistan	–	90.0	89.1	85.3	45.9	79.0	98.2	96.6	97.9	99.0

a. 3 year-olds.

b. 1998: excludes Kosovo.

c. 1-2 year-olds.

d. Vaccination and revaccination.

e. 1 year-olds.

f. Number of vaccinations of children of all ages divided by 0-1 population (may overestimate the rate). 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

g. A 1996 survey on OPV3 found 77% among 0-5 year-olds and 41% among 0-1 year-olds (MOHG and UNICEF, 1996).

h. 1989-93: 1-2 year-olds. 1994-98: 0-2 year-olds.

i. A 1995 survey on OPV3 found 67% among children 12-23 months old (MOHK and UNICEF, 1995).

j. A 1995 survey on OPV3 found 83% among children 12-23 months old (MOHT and UNICEF, 1995).

5.3 Measles immunization rate (percent of children under 2 immunized)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	99.0	98.0	98.0	97.0	98.0	97.0	96.0	97.0	98.0	98.0
Slovakia	98.9	98.5	98.0	96.2	97.9	97.8	97.4	–	–	–
Poland[a]	–	94.6	93.5	94.9	95.3	95.6	96,1	96.7	96.9	97.1
Hungary	99.9	99.7	99.9	99.8	99.8	99.8	99.9	99.8	99.8	99.6
Slovenia	90.8	92.3	90.6	90.3	89.7	91.1	92.6	91.6	94.7	91.6
Croatia	95.0	91.0	89.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	92.0	92.0	91.0	91.0
FYR Macedonia	93.7	93.6	92.8	52.9	97.8	86.0	96.7	91.0	97.8	96.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b,c]	90.7	83.0	75.5	81.8	84.9	80.8	86.0	90.1	91.9	89.5
Albania	–	–	80.5	87.0	76.2	81.2	91.0	91.7	95.1	89.0
Bulgaria[d,e]	99.6	99.6	97.8	92.2	87.9	93.3	96.4	95.1	93.8	85.2
Romania	86.2	93.0	87.6	90.8	90.2	90.1	93.3	93.8	97.3	97.2
Estonia[e,f]	–	–	–	–	60.2	64.1	65.1	71.5	76.6	80.9
Latvia[g]	89.4	89.1	89.4	68.4	78.7	66.4	75.5	78.6	80.1	79.5
Lithuania	92.2	98.0	85.7	98.0	91.8	92.7	93.7	96.3	95.9	96.5
Belarus[g]	96.7	96.2	94.9	93.7	95.6	96.6	92.8	96.4	97.6	98.0
Moldova	95.0	94.0	93.0	92.0	92.0	95.0	98.0	98.4	98.9	99.2
Russia	82.0	81.1	78.7	82.6	88.2	91.3	94.1	95.3	91.1	94.2
Ukraine	87.9	88.7	60.9	90.3	94.3	95.5	97.1	92.4	97.8	96.1
Armenia[g]	94.5	94.8	80.7	77.4	82.1	95.0	96.0	89.0	91.5	–
Azerbaijan[g]	87.6	83.3	70.1	66.3	27.8	91.3	97.0	98.5	96.6	97.7
Georgia[h,i]	82.0	42.0	76.3	16.1	65.5	91.9	50.8	97.0	100.0	100.0
Kazakhstan[j]	93.0	95.1	91.4	90.2	91.0	71.7	95.4	96.6	97.0	–
Kyrgyzstan[k]	–	–	94.1	94.0	93.0	88.6	97.1	98.0	98.0	98.0
Tajikistan	–	–	–	72.6	–	–	89.5	90.0	97.8	97.2
Turkmenistan[g,l]	67.0	79.6	62.6	76.0	85.1	90.2	91.9	93.8	99.6	98.7
Uzbekistan	–	85.1	84.1	82.2	82.2	43.0	64.4	92.7	92.4	93.6

a. 3 year-olds.

b. 1989-90: combined with parotitis and rubella.

c. 1998: excludes Kosovo.

d. 1-2 year-olds.

e. Combined with parotitis and rubella.

f. Vaccination and revaccination.

g. 1 year-olds.

h. Number of vaccinations of children of all ages divided by 0-1 population (may overestimate the rate). 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

i. A 1996 survey found 51% among 0-5 year-olds (MOHG and UNICEF, 1996).

j. 2-3 year-olds.

k. A 1995 survey found 74% among children 12-23 months old (MOHK and UNICEF, 1995).

l. A 1995 survey found 66% among children 12-23 months old (MOHT and UNICEF, 1995).

5.4 Incidence of sexually transmitted diseases
(newly registered cases of syphilis and gonorrhoea per hundred thousand population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	59.9	62.8	71.4	73.3	46.5	31.1	22.9	15.9	15.2	15.2
Slovakia[a]	31.4	38.1	38.3	37.0	26.4	14.6	11.0	7.0	7.2	5.7
Poland	27.4	27.0	19.6	15.1	12.9	10.0	8.1	7.2	6.1	5.6
Hungary	44.6	48.1	43.9	37.0	26.8	25.3	23.5	21.4	18.8	16.8
Slovenia	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.5	5.0	4.6
Croatia[b]	11.0	9.0	7.1	4.7	4.0	2.9	2.2	1.4	1.2	1.3
FYR Macedonia[c]	–	–	5.9	4.0	1.5	1.9	2.1	1.3	1.3	0.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6.1	4.2	3.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[d]	9.2	4.0	3.9	8.0	10.1	9.1	7.7	5.1	4.8	3.2
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	51.7	66.7	72.4	65.7	47.4	43.5	43.9	48.2	46.3	51.0
Romania	19.8	23.2	26.1	26.0	26.4	29.1	35.0	32.2	34.2	34.5
Estonia	132.2	132.3	154.2	192.1	255.6	262.9	263.9	232.0	210.4	181.2
Latvia[e]	105.9	104.1	100.7	136.1	297.9	363.5	388.0	351.2	265.4	215.5
Lithuania	–	81.2	86.9	115.5	169.4	205.4	200.2	179.1	139.4	103.0
Belarus	108.8	101.7	107.2	142.5	196.1	242.7	314.4	336.6	302.7	261.5
Moldova[f]	128.4	117.4	110.2	151.8	195.0	233.6	274.8	281.5	280.3	260.0
Russia	141.8	133.3	135.9	183.0	263.9	289.4	350.9	401.8	389.8	336.5
Ukraine	86.1	79.1	78.7	104.5	135.9	177.3	208.5	226.1	208.0	194.7
Armenia	41.2	33.2	30.1	20.4	37.3	44.6	47.1	55.3	44.4	39.8
Azerbaijan	25.1	13.3	12.0	17.8	21.1	24.4	35.4	25.4	21.5	21.1
Georgia	76.5	–	55.4	46.9	41.0	35.3	38.9	35.8	64.2	79.7
Kazakhstan[g]	110.4	108.9	118.5	134.3	152.6	149.5	260.2	360.0	370.1	238.8
Kyrgyzstan[h]	–	219.1	233.6	246.1	231.5	248.3	294.8	363.4	396.8	353.5
Tajikistan	24.7	21.8	21.1	17.2	31.4	30.8	39.9	32.3	35.1	32.3
Turkmenistan	36.9	37.1	37.4	32.2	37.2	45.5	58.7	70.0	88.2	80.1
Uzbekistan	–	–	21.1	21.6	27.7	33.8	52.2	67.9	76.7	75.0

a. Total cases.

b. Population data, 1989-90: CBSC (1996), 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

c. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

d. 1998: cases exclude Kosovo, population data: IRC estimate.

e. Includes chlamydial infection and anogenital herpes.

f. Population data, 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

g. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

h. Includes trichomoniasis.

5.5 Sexually transmitted diseases among individuals under age 20

(percent share of newly registered cases of syphilis and gonorrhoea)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	–	–	–	–	–	34.3	30.6	24.4	18.8	16.3
Slovakia	26.6	24.4	26.9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Poland	9.8	11.0	10.8	8.8	9.2	7.0	8.0	6.6	7.6	5.9
Hungary[c]	21.9	22.5	20.9	19.4	20.2	20.6	15.2	14.3	12.6	9.2
Slovenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Croatia[a]	8.6	9.3	8.3	8.8	10.8	8.9	5.7	12.3	12.3	12.9
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	23.4	22.9	23.2	22.4	19.6	19.4	16.8	14.6	15.4	14.7
Latvia	–	–	20.0	20.0	24.7	22.5	19.3	17.8	15.0	13.8
Lithuania	–	17.1	17.1	19.3	20.3	19.8	18.7	18.5	17.6	14.8
Belarus	22.1	21.8	20.7	21.4	21.2	20.5	18.2	16.7	16.5	15.8
Moldova	19.9	19.1	19.3	22.3	22.7	22.0	20.0	19.2	17.5	17.3
Russia	23.5	22.5	22.3	22.6	22.5	21.0	19.1	18.4	17.3	17.0
Ukraine	22.4	22.0	21.0	21.7	20.6	20.7	19.4	19.1	16.9	16.4
Armenia	–	11.9	11.3	13.8	–	12.2	13.3	10.8	11.4	19.2
Azerbaijan	8.1	11.0	12.9	13.0	12.4	8.5	4.3	12.3	7.3	9.4
Georgia	–	–	–	12.2	13.2	14.9	10.6	8.2	9.0	9.4
Kazakhstan	15.6	16.7	17.5	16.8	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	13.1	13.8	14.3	13.3
Tajikistan	12.4	13.7	–	13.4	12.0	11.7	10.5	9.1	11.3	11.0
Turkmenistan	6.5	7.7	8.8	11.1	12.2	10.8	11.3	11.0	10.1	–
Uzbekistan[b]	–	–	–	13.9	13.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	11.3	11.4

a. Under 18 year-olds.

b. Under 20 year-olds: cases of gonorrhoea only.

c. New cases of gonorrhoea: among 15-20 year-olds.

5.6 Individuals registered with HIV (newly registered cases)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a]	–	–	–	143	170	208	248	298	361	392
Slovakia	12	3	5	2	5	11	8	4	8	11
Poland	–	–	559	482	384	423	539	551	579	638
Hungary	36	40	55	61	56	65	81	63	72	75
Slovenia	6	2	5	5	3	4	14	3	7	16
Croatia	3	9	11	6	14	16	15	16	16	12
FYR Macedonia	2	1	1	–	3	4	–	3	–	3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	33	56	61	88	70	84	97	89	67	114
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria[a]	6	10	12	18	24	34	–	–	–	–
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	–	–	–	1	–	1	3	7	3	4
Latvia	–	6	3	1	5	8	21	17	25	163
Lithuania	1	8	1	5	4	10	10	12	31	45
Belarus	12	14	12	21	10	5	8	1,021	653	554
Moldova	–	1	–	2	3	4	7	47	404	408
Russia[b]	–	441	81	87	108	156	189	1,525	4,399	3,947
Ukraine[c]	–	–	–	–	–	–	1,499	5,422	8,934	8,512
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–
Azerbaijan	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	2	11	66
Georgia	1	3	1	6	–	1	2	8	18	25
Kazakhstan	–	2	1	1	2	–	5	46	429	297
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	2	6
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	2	1	–

a. Total registered cases.

b. 1990: total cases registered in 1987-90.

c. Includes cases of AIDS.

6.1 Pre-primary enrolments (net rates, percent of relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	89.8	89.8	89.8	83.3	84.9	86.6	88.7	88.5	83.0	90.0
Slovakia	91.5	83.7	75.7	78.1	78.0	74.6	70.2	75.2	80.0	84.3
Poland	48.7	47.1	43.9	42.6	42.7	44.3	45.3	46.8	47.9	49.6
Hungary	85.7	85.3	86.1	86.9	87.1	86.2	87.0	86.5	86.1	86.3
Slovenia	56.3	56.6	55.8	56.2	60.3	62.8	65.1	66.7	66.2	68.3
Croatia	–	35.6	29.1	31.8	35.8	39.8	42.7	46.0	49.4	50.0
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	15.4	18.6	18.6	18.4	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.2	6.4	–
FR Yugoslavia	24.1	23.8	21.9	20.5	21.8	24.6	26.3	28.1	29.2	28.8
Albania	43.1	44.1	36.3	26.8	26.5	26.5	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	65.3	64.7	56.4	58.7	56.9	58.5	63.0	64.3	60.4	63.4
Romania	63.3	54.3	51.9	53.3	50.2	55.2	58.4	55.1	–	–
Estonia	62.2	67.4	60.5	53.7	56.0	58.8	63.2	67.1	70.4	72.0
Latvia	52.8	44.8	37.0	28.3	32.6	39.9	47.1	50.8	52.1	50.2
Lithuania	63.9	58.6	63.9	39.1	30.1	34.5	36.2	40.0	46.9	49.3
Belarus	63.1	63.3	62.5	58.0	58.3	61.0	62.3	64.0	66.9	61.2
Moldova	72.0	70.0	66.0	55.0	51.0	46.0	45.0	43.0	43.0	40.0
Russia	77.5	76.9	75.3	67.3	66.4	64.5	64.4	65.0	64.8	64.3
Ukraine	64.2	63.2	61.5	58.3	57.1	54.5	51.4	47.8	44.3	44.6
Armenia	65.2	60.5	60.4	51.9	45.3	39.1	31.4	32.4	31.7	30.0
Azerbaijan	20.8	19.7	18.9	18.0	18.1	15.5	–	18.4	17.4	17.0
Georgia	44.1	43.6	39.9	31.0	26.8	19.0	19.9	21.3	19.0	20.5
Kazakhstan	52.2	52.7	52.0	45.9	40.9	30.7	24.6	–	11.7	11.0
Kyrgyzstan	31.3	30.3	26.7	23.3	13.4	8.8	7.7	8.2	8.3	8.7
Tajikistan	16.0	15.2	13.9	10.5	10.4	9.4	9.4	6.9	6.3	–
Turkmenistan	34.2	34.3	33.9	33.0	34.1	28.3	25.3	22.1	21.1	19.0
Uzbekistan	36.8	37.1	35.1	30.7	29.0	26.1	24.5	19.5	17.6	16.1

a. 3-5 year-olds.
b. 3-6 year-olds.
c. Includes pre-school preparatory classes.
d. IPS (1999).
e. MOEM (1999).
f. Pre-primary institutions, Federation of B-H.
g. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
h. Public schools.
i. Gross enrolments.
j. 1-6 year-olds.
k. 1992-98: excludes Transdniestr.

6.2 Basic education enrolments (gross rates, percent of relevant population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	97.6	98.6	98.7	99.2	99.1	99.5	99.4	99.2	99.1	97.6
Slovakia	96.0	96.0	96.5	95.7	94.9	94.4	94.3	93.4	–	93.9
Poland	97.9	97.5	97.3	97.1	97.2	97.1	97.2	97.4	98.0	98.1
Hungary	99.0	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.1	99.1	99.1	99.2	99.2	99.2
Slovenia	96.1	97.1	96.8	97.6	97.8	96.7	97.3	99.8	99.8	98.2
Croatia	94.0	81.0	79.0	85.0	89.0	88.0	89.0	94.4	94.3	–
FYR Macedonia	–	89.4	87.1	86.2	86.2	86.8	86.5	86.9	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	95.0	94.4	72.7	74.3	72.5	71.6	72.7	71.8	70.8	69.2
Albania	90.8	90.7	88.5	85.9	86.6	87.6	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	98.4	98.6	97.3	95.1	94.0	94.3	93.7	93.6	94.0	94.3
Romania	93.6	89.5	89.4	89.6	90.3	91.4	92.6	93.9	95.0	97.0
Estonia	96.5	95.3	93.8	91.1	91.4	91.5	92.3	92.6	93.5	95.0
Latvia	95.4	95.7	94.5	91.1	89.1	88.6	89.1	90.7	91.3	90.9
Lithuania	94.6	93.1	92.0	92.5	91.6	92.1	93.2	93.3	95.1	96.1
Belarus	95.6	94.6	93.9	93.8	93.3	93.2	93.7	93.4	93.8	96.5
Moldova	95.0	94.7	93.9	79.9	79.1	78.8	79.4	79.2	92.5	92.5
Russia	90.8	90.9	90.0	89.3	88.3	88.6	88.8	88.5	88.2	89.1
Ukraine	93.0	92.9	91.9	91.5	91.0	90.7	90.9	90.8	90.2	89.0
Armenia	93.7	92.2	89.0	88.7	84.6	81.3	81.1	82.4	82.4	83.2
Azerbaijan	88.4	88.1	88.0	88.5	89.2	90.4	90.3	90.4	91.4	91.6
Georgia	94.4	94.7	94.2	91.2	82.3	82.0	80.4	79.4	80.0	81.8
Kazakhstan	94.7	94.8	94.4	94.2	94.0	93.6	94.3	94.6	93.7	93.2
Kyrgyzstan	92.5	91.8	90.6	90.3	89.7	89.0	89.2	89.4	89.4	89.7
Tajikistan	95.6	96.1	96.7	92.5	87.1	87.0	86.6	85.1	84.9	87.8
Turkmenistan	94.3	94.9	92.5	91.7	92.0	91.8	83.9	83.2	83.1	–
Uzbekistan	92.2	91.1	87.9	87.5	87.9	88.6	–	89.0	89.7	–

a. 6-14 year-olds.
b. 7-14 year-olds.
c. Net rates.
d. 6-13 year-olds.
e. IRC estimate; population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
f. Pupil data, 1990-95: underreported, estimated rate: 95%.
g. Pupil data, 1991-98: excludes ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
h. 7-15 year-olds.
i. Enrolments, 1992-98: excludes Transdniestr. Population data, 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.
j. Enrolments, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

6.3 General secondary enrolments[a] (gross rates, percent of 15-18 population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	15.4	15.7	13.3	12.7	11.9	12.0	12.6	11.5	12.0	13.0
Slovakia	15.2	15.7	16.2	17.0	17.9	18.9	20.1	21.1	21.6	22.2
Poland	20.7	21.3	22.9	24.6	26.2	27.9	29.6	30.4	32.0	34.0
Hungary	18.0	18.0	18.3	19.2	20.2	21.6	22.9	24.2	25.7	27.2
Slovenia	–	–	–	–	19.6	20.1	20.5	21.5	22.4	25.2
Croatia	–	–	–	8.8	13.9	18.0	18.5	18.7	18.9	19.0
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	15.9	17.4	18.1	18.7	20.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania	20.0	21.9	26.3	29.5	29.9	29.3	30.5	–	–	–
Bulgaria	30.8	29.9	29.1	29.5	29.8	31.5	32.1	31.8	31.0	31.6
Romania	3.8	11.6	16.2	17.5	18.5	19.4	20.0	20.7	20.9	20.8
Estonia	37.5	36.4	36.8	37.2	39.5	43.6	43.8	45.1	45.6	43.7
Latvia	22.3	21.6	20.4	20.5	24.9	26.9	28.7	36.8	39.0	41.6
Lithuania	35.2	34.8	32.5	30.9	30.5	32.9	34.8	38.5	39.4	42.1
Belarus	27.2	26.7	26.1	25.1	24.0	24.8	24.7	26.6	28.0	28.2
Moldova	28.2	26.4	22.4	17.1	17.2	17.6	18.0	19.3	20.3	23.4
Russia	24.5	24.9	23.8	22.8	22.5	23.5	24.5	25.8	27.4	29.0
Ukraine	25.6	25.1	24.3	23.3	22.8	23.5	24.0	25.5	27.5	29.6
Armenia	34.8	33.7	31.8	[illegible]	30.6	29.9	28.2	28.8	29.9	30.9
Azerbaijan	33.7	33.6	34.0	32.2	28.1	26.1	24.7	27.0	31.2	33.7
Georgia	39.3	41.5	41.0	–	26.6	22.9	21.5	23.3	23.2	21.8
Kazakhstan	32.5	33.3	32.3	29.6	28.1	26.5	25.9	30.0	34.3	–
Kyrgyzstan	37.2	36.9	36.1	32.6	28.7	27.5	26.7	29.0	32.4	36.2
Tajikistan	40.9	40.5	37.7	29.8	26.8	25.1	23.3	21.7	21.9	16.0
Turkmenistan	42.5	42.6	40.2	38.2	38.4	33.6	33.8	24.0	24.0	25.0
Uzbekistan	37.5	37.7	36.5	31.0	28.0	27.8	–	27.0	28.6	–

a. Typically, 2- to 4-year programmes. In countries w/2-year programmes, coverage may be underestimated.

b. 14-17 year-olds.

c. IRC estimate. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

d. 1996-98: includes students in part-time comprehensive education.

e. Number of students, 1992-98: excludes Transdniestr. Population data, 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

f. Enrolments, 1992-98: excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

6.4 Tertiary enrolments[a] (gross rates, percent of 19-24 population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	12.8	13.9	13.4	13.6	13.8	14.1	14.4	15.5	16.2	16.9
Slovakia	13.0	14.0	14.0	14.6	15.1	16.6	17.4	18.3	19.0	19.6
Poland	12.7	13.5	14.0	15.8	18.1	20.4	23.0	26.1	30.0	34.2
Hungary	12.1	12.2	12.5	13.2	14.4	16.0	18.2	19.8	25.2	27.4
Slovenia	13.7	13.1	16.5	18.0	19.9	20.6	23.6	25.1	29.2	29.1
Croatia	–	–	14.1	15.9	16.7	16.6	17.1	17.3	17.2	17.8
FYR Macedonia	–	–	14.1	14.3	14.1	14.6	15.2	15.3	15.8	16.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	17.0	16.0	13.7	15.1	14.8	15.1	16.7	17.6	18.9	18.3
Albania	6.9	7.4	7.9	10.0	9.7	9.1	9.5	10.5	10.6	11.1
Bulgaria	18.9	21.7	21.6	22.9	24.5	27.0	30.4	31.7	31.2	32.3
Romania	7.3	8.2	9.0	10.1	11.1	11.5	15.1	15.6	15.6	17.3
Estonia	20.6	20.1	19.8	18.7	19.3	19.9	21.6	24.1	27.9	32.9
Latvia	20.5	20.6	20.7	18.8	17.7	18.1	21.4	30.7	35.7	42.0
Lithuania	20.8	20.1	17.8	16.0	15.5	15.2	16.2	18.0	21.0	23.7
Belarus	22.8	22.9	22.5	22.8	21.9	22.1	22.9	24.0	25.6	27.7
Moldova	15.9	15.8	15.0	13.3	12.9	13.1	14.0	14.4	17.0	20.1
Russia	24.6	24.5	24.0	22.7	22.1	21.8	22.6	23.6	25.7	28.2
Ukraine	22.3	21.9	21.3	20.3	19.3	20.4	20.9	22.1	25.4	27.9
Armenia	19.4	20.1	19.4	16.8	13.3	16.3	15.0	14.7	15.1	14.5
Azerbaijan	12.0	12.6	13.0	12.2	11.8	11.4	12.8	13.3	12.9	13.6
Georgia	17.6	19.5	22.0	23.9	26.0	18.9	28.4	25.8	26.5	25.7
Kazakhstan	18.0	18.5	18.6	17.8	17.3	17.3	17.3	17.8	18.6	20.4
Kyrgyzstan	13.5	13.3	12.8	11.6	11.3	12.5	13.6	16.0	19.8	25.9
Tajikistan	11.6	12.0	11.6	11.5	11.2	11.9	11.9	12.1	12.0	11.5
Turkmenistan	10.4	10.2	9.9	9.2	8.7	8.1	6.4	5.8	5.1	4.4
Uzbekistan	15.0	15.3	14.9	13.6	11.4	9.5	7.7	6.6	6.2	6.1

a. IRC estimates based on the number of students in degree granting tertiary education.

b. Only full-time courses.

c. 18-23 year-olds.

d. University and non-university programmes.

e. 1997-98: includes candidates for graduation.

f. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

g. Number of students, 1992-98: excludes ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

h. Number of students, 1992-98: excludes Transdniestr. Population data, 1997-98: excludes Transdniestr.

i. Student data, 1994: excludes private universities.

6.5 Public expenditures on education[a] (percent of GDP)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.5	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.3	4.7	3.4
Slovakia	–	5.1	5.6	6.0	5.2	4.4	5.1	5.0	–	4.3
Poland	–	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.3
Hungary	5.7	5.8	6.3	6.6	6.5	6.4	5.5	4.9	4.3	4.8
Slovenia	–	–	4.8	5.5	5.8	5.5	5.8	5.8	–	–
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FYR Macedonia	–	5.9	6.8	5.4	6.0	5.7	5.7	5.9	5.4	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania[b]	4.0	4.2	5.0	4.2	3.3	3.2	3.8	3.2	–	3.0
Bulgaria[c]	–	5.0	5.1	6.1	5.7	4.8	4.0	3.2	4.0	4.2
Romania	2.2	2.8	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.3	–
Estonia[c]	–	–	–	6.1	7.1	6.7	7.1	7.3	–	6.3
Latvia	5.8	4.8	4.2	4.6	6.1	6.1	6.9	5.8	5.8	6.5
Lithuania[d]	–	4.5	–	–	4.6	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.8	6.4
Belarus	–	–	4.6	5.3	6.0	5.8	5.5	6.1	6.6	6.6
Moldova	–	–	–	7.8	6.0	7.4	7.7	9.4	8.9	6.3
Russia[e]	–	3.7	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.5	3.6	3.8	4.2	3.6
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	–	–	7.5	8.9	5.2	2.5	3.3	2.0	1.7	–
Azerbaijan[c]	–	–	6.9	6.7	7.6	4.9	3.5	3.7	3.6	5.2
Georgia	–	6.1	6.4	4.0	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.3	–
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	2.1	3.9	3.0	3.2	–	4.3	3.9
Kyrgyzstan	7.5	8.0	1.3	1.0	4.2	6.1	6.6	5.2	4.9	4.7
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.2
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	2.2	2.0	2.1	4.5	6.5
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

a. GDP data: EBRD (1999).

b. 1989-96: Laporte and Ringold (1997).

c. Expenditure data, 1998: IMF (1999).

d. 1990: Mockiene, Klepaciene and Jackunas (1997).

e. 1990-91: UNESCO (1997).

f. 1992-95: ADB and UNESCO (1995). Expenditure data, 1997-98: IMF (1999).

7.1 Children in infant homes (per hundred thousand 0-3 population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[a]	533.0	509.0	492.0	460.5	455.8	466.7	498.7	517.7	533.2	571.7
Slovakia	191.7	170.7	170.5	206.2	215.3	238.3	240.2	272.6	–	–
Poland	179.7	190.9	196.9	193.5	193.2	–	–	–	–	–
Hungary	504.6	390.1	376.6	390.5	396.7	385.0	382.5	384.2	374.0	378.9
Slovenia	40.8	28.7	27.6	25.8	40.1	34.3	23.9	–	–	–
Croatia[b]	–	–	–	61.4	–	57.1	–	70.7	–	–
FYR Macedonia[b]	–	–	51.3	140.8	64.3	81.0	85.6	63.6	194.3	199.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	48.2	–	43.8	–	52.6	–	73.0	–	–
Albania[b]	–	–	–	–	–	56.9	75.2	77.7	84.4	66.4
Bulgaria	873.8	861.8	863.7	923.4	1,009.9	1,084.2	1,089.0	1,205.8	1,263.1	1,299.6
Romania	–	597.1	604.5	653.8	750.3	1,074.0	887.7	938.9	944.3	836.4
Estonia[c]	149.9	148.9	154.5	168.4	181.2	185.8	213.1	244.4	261.4	–
Latvia	528.2	497.4	461.1	488.5	575.4	661.0	737.1	803.4	877.2	996.5
Lithuania	275.6	202.7	216.2	218.5	245.4	215.7	254.4	296.4	312.6	324.1
Belarus	169.4	164.7	162.6	168.6	184.2	205.9	223.6	241.6	287.0	325.6
Moldova[d]	183.5	175.0	182.0	172.2	182.1	198.1	195.8	217.7	248.3	285.8
Russia	203.8	203.5	209.2	226.2	250.7	278.8	306.0	346.1	334.1	365.0
Ukraine[e]	154.2	151.3	150.4	150.9	160.9	177.5	200.1	223.0	236.8	274.0
Armenia[f]	13.2	11.6	10.8	13.2	12.5	13.9	15.3	17.9	–	23.4
Azerbaijan	35.5	34.0	32.4	25.9	26.4	26.7	24.4	24.2	27.3	27.0
Georgia	75.7	70.7	57.6	36.1	41.5	33.8	39.7	64.9	56.4	79.9
Kazakhstan[g]	122.4	119.2	121.3	112.4	133.1	148.6	172.6	202.0	217.1	267.3
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	47.2	47.5	42.4	50.7	48.8	52.3	50.6	51.7
Tajikistan	62.1	58.2	56.8	55.8	37.4	30.9	27.4	23.7	22.2	19.2
Turkmenistan	62.4	61.3	53.9	48.1	47.8	42.0	45.0	30.9	35.4	42.1
Uzbekistan[h]	34.5	35.3	33.0	33.5	31.9	31.6	29.3	29.9	30.1	30.2

a. Institutions of the Ministry of Health.
b. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
c. 0-7 year-olds.
d. Children in infant homes 1992-98 and population data 1997-98 exclude Transdniestr.
e. Number of children in infant homes, 1989-90: CIS Stat (1998a).
f. 0-5 year-olds.
g. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.
h. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

7.2 Gross adoption rate (adoptions per hundred thousand 0-3 population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	104.2	96.7	103.6	93.7	92.7	111.8	137.1	134.8	160.0	133.6
Slovakia	114.6	122.4	126.7	119.3	148.1	140.6	182.9	196.6	179.3	198.1
Poland	149.7	157.4	150.3	139.2	133.8	127.7	128.0	136.6	137.8	143.4
Hungary	198.4	195.3	206.9	188.0	183.1	190.5	201.0	227.6	208.7	202.6
Slovenia	153.3	135.1	149.8	131.2	121.6	161.8	93.2	101.3	74.4	81.4
Croatia[a]	–	–	47.2	54.9	106.0	150.8	88.0	92.3	80.0	–
FYR Macedonia[a]	–	–	204.4	166.4	159.3	153.0	140.1	164.6	156.7	137.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania[a]	–	–	–	–	–	22.6	28.6	39.9	21.6	–
Bulgaria	588.7	577.9	551.3	557.0	542.5	603.2	639.1	668.1	725.0	744.4
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–	264.3	243.4	107.9	–
Estonia	–	–	–	309.9	418.0	417.0	436.6	471.1	422.3	373.1
Latvia	356.0	362.2	415.7	426.8	356.5	354.4	360.6	400.2	466.3	466.4
Lithuania	–	–	–	147.7	53.5	152.1	116.9	240.1	258.1	231.9
Belarus	–	–	–	–	45.7	65.3	55.7	57.4	48.5	54.4
Moldova[b]	–	–	–	–	–	109.2	131.9	134.7	148.2	171.0
Russia	129.9	141.1	152.5	178.6	215.6	252.4	225.5	213.9	263.4	249.8
Ukraine	217.2	201.1	235.6	243.3	269.0	327.9	341.3	231.3	278.9	297.3
Armenia	178.2	102.5	71.2	61.1	57.8	166.5	217.2	96.5	–	–
Azerbaijan	99.8	85.8	72.5	62.7	51.3	72.9	58.3	69.2	61.9	68.3
Georgia[c]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	45.3	197.8	78.9
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	257.9	233.6	196.8	210.8	218.4	221.4	231.9

a. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).
b. Adoptions 1994-98 and population data 1997-98 exclude Transdniestr.
c. Excludes Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

8.1 Registered total crime rate (crimes per hundred thousand population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	1,166	2,099	2,745	3,345	3,858	3,604	3,637	3,822	3,917	4,138
Slovakia	879	1,323	1,668	1,980	2,744	2,576	2,137	1,850	1,716	1,741
Poland	1,442	2,318	2,265	2,297	2,217	2,351	2,526	2,324	2,568	2,775
Hungary	2,150	3,291	4,256	4,332	3,895	3,795	4,908	4,572	5,066	5,939
Slovenia	2,002	1,919	2,113	2,709	2,223	2,193	1,919	1,840	1,872	2,799
Croatia[a]	1,185	1,123	971	1,325	1,547	1,191	1,034	1,066	926	1,041
FYR Macedonia[b]	–	–	797	1,224	1,174	1,204	1,178	1,258	1,102	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[c]	1,175	1,144	1,174	1,293	1,656	1,512	1,268	1,238	1,203	1,125
Albania[b]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	160	194	–
Bulgaria	672	772	2,062	2,630	2,599	2,639	2,452	2,337	2,896	1,993
Romania	208	422	606	635	964	1,043	1,309	1,422	1,601	1,773
Estonia	1,220	1,515	2,027	2,671	2,450	2,384	2,667	2,410	2,810	3,154
Latvia	1,112	1,299	1,575	2,351	2,043	1,609	1,556	1,534	1,493	1,498
Lithuania	846	995	1,202	1,513	1,619	1,576	1,637	1,835	2,046	2,111
Belarus	653	741	796	941	1,002	1,167	1,282	1,241	1,257	1,205
Moldova[d]	940	986	1,021	901	853	858	885	805	1,002	992
Russia	1,099	1,244	1,466	1,861	1,890	1,779	1,865	1,781	1,632	1,762
Ukraine	626	716	784	926	1,039	1,107	1,252	1,214	1,168	1,151
Armenia	241	342	363	441	350	265	270	331	326	–
Azerbaijan	212	215	215	304	242	244	260	226	209	189
Georgia[e]	326	364	518	447	409	328	293	269	258	276
Kazakhstan[f]	833	907	1,060	1,222	1,258	1,250	1,163	1,181	1,060	941
Kyrgyzstan	595	680	725	985	955	927	915	872	809	735
Tajikistan	318	319	339	455	438	250	250	228	222	218
Turkmenistan	483	509	514	466	398	351	331	324	313	302
Uzbekistan[g]	420	432	425	438	412	330	295	285	284	288

a. Population data, 1989-90: CBSC (1996), 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

b. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

c. 1998: crime data exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

d. Crime data 1992-98 and population data 1997-98 exclude Transdniestr.

e. Crime data, 1989: CIS Stat (1998a).

f. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

g. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

8.2 Total sentencing rate (sentences per hundred thousand population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	557	183	271	301	340	503	532	562	580	525
Slovakia	581	258	433	446	482	476	482	492	416	416
Poland[a]	–	384	–	528	562	624	710	733	–	–
Hungary	617	460	635	751	724	763	838	817	867	962
Slovenia	637	493	414	382	345	316	174	198	251	289
Croatia[b]	859	934	665	520	602	581	482	542	511	634
FYR Macedonia[c]	–	–	415	395	406	425	452	372	274	351
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[d]	475	428	365	317	368	371	398	398	416	475
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria[e]	186	116	125	114	76	103	127	179	239	293
Romania	255	160	265	303	366	421	448	460	496	472
Estonia	208	225	252	326	414	485	540	579	621	570
Latvia	278	268	277	346	436	443	389	419	517	529
Lithuania	204	211	244	349	437	470	494	458	488	528
Belarus[f,g]	238	292	321	357	462	518	572	604	566	586
Moldova[h]	218	239	275	273	305	350	336	313	349	377
Russia	297	363	401	446	535	625	701	754	690	729
Ukraine[i]	175	202	210	222	294	339	415	476	471	465
Armenia	126	110	122	136	172	188	167	179	187	170
Azerbaijan	101	98	106	96	144	160	181	165	161	125
Georgia	156	138	122	69	130	154	132	150	142	130
Kazakhstan	249	296	346	404	533	558	588	546	565	387
Kyrgyzstan[j,k]	160	197	201	245	337	323	393	386	426	396
Tajikistan	99	109	114	81	109	127	110	–	–	–
Turkmenistan[k]	155	178	200	203	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan[l]	135	158	183	194	–	–	–	–	–	–

a. Adults sentenced by courts of first instance: GUS (1994), (1997).

b. Population data, 1989-90: CBSC (1996), 1991-98: US Census Bureau (1999).

c. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

d. 1998: sentencing data exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

e. Excludes white-collar crime.

f. Sentencing data, 1989: CIS Stat (1998a).

g. Convictions.

h. Sentencing data 1992-98 and population data 1997-98 exclude Transdniestr.

i. Sentencing data, 1989-95: CIS Stat (1998a).

j. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

k. Sentencing data, 1989-90: CIS Stat (1998a).

l. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

8.3 Registered juvenile crime rate (juvenile crimes per hundred thousand 14-17 population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	–	–	2,468	3,099	3,509	4,119	4,175	4,772	4,300	3,959
Slovakia	1,575	2,076	2,502	2,673	3,261	3,062	3,124	2,801	2,685	2,541
Poland	2,224	2,450	2,490	2,583	2,783	2,903	3,129	2,619	2,700	2,903
Hungary	1,493	1,787	1,899	2,175	2,193	2,231	2,328	2,327	2,538	2,463
Slovenia	3,362	3,629	3,944	5,633	4,592	4,624	3,705	3,528	3,971	5,393
Croatia	–	–	797	965	1,263	1,130	834	884	821	747
FYR Macedonia	–	–	2,849	3,959	3,784	4,114	3,716	–	4,443	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	195	201	–	–	–	142	237	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	903	817	755	894	1,148	895	827	848	937	776
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	662	–
Bulgaria	1,148	1,309	2,209	2,907	2,981	3,084	3,173	[illegible]181	3,918	4,202
Romania	–	604	1,102	934	1,403	1,553	1,734	1,955	2,366	3,288
Estonia	–	–	–	1,490	2,438	1,707	2,291	2,171	2,044	2,084
Latvia	1,782	1,714	1,685	2,410	1,891	1,630	1,941	2,230	2,600	2,783
Lithuania	1,125	1,178	1,278	1,691	2,058	2,121	2,169	2,538	2,489	2,308
Belarus	1,121	1,276	1,305	1,431	1,591	1,666	1,755	1,598	1,572	1,511
Moldova	1,025	1,036	1,023	746	671	746	702	651	807	916
Russia	1,953	1,987	2,071	2,359	2,599	2,551	2,387	2,275	1,994	2,006
Ukraine	–	974	977	1,189	1,293	1,391	1,428	1,432	1,353	1,296
Armenia	104	106	151	–	–	–	149	162	207	180
Azerbaijan	95	97	106	197	172	162	161	132	130	116
Georgia	–	225	265	250	177	155	204	198	180	200
Kazakhstan	776	905	1,031	1,075	1,061	937	829	758	643	626
Kyrgyzstan	327	376	442	479	345	330	318	383	385	312
Tajikistan	250	278	336	292	239	236	193	178	111	91
Turkmenistan	352	383	392	350	269	217	–	–	–	136
Uzbekistan	282	324	327	346	291	239	188	164	157	143

a. Juveniles are defined as 15-17 year olds.

b. Juveniles are defined as 13-16 year olds.

c. Crime data refer to number of offenders.

d. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

e. 1994-95: crime data refer to Federation of B-H; population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

f. 1998: crime data exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

g. 1992-93: juveniles are defined as 15-17 year olds; 1994-98: juveniles are defined as 13-17 year olds.

h. Crime data 1992-98 and population data 1997-98 exclude Transdniestr.

i. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

8.4 Juvenile sentencing rate (juvenile sentences per hundred thousand 14-17 population)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	1,060	418	631	755	963	1,147	1,242	1,326	1,446	1,090
Slovakia	826	522	871	347	953	1,082	1,427	1,059	1,333	1,123
Poland	406	413	477	476	498	599	483	747	717	–
Hungary	983	751	871	970	966	1,161	1,417	1,335	1,355	1,538
Slovenia	1,010	841	901	928	905	848	413	419	531	565
Croatia	–	–	502	477	735	724	591	507	420	363
FYR Macedonia	–	–	1,035	1,097	1,398	1,172	895	876	560	700
Bosnia-Herzegovina	195	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	405	458	391	460	570	574	507	420	413	472
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bulgaria	331	189	204	193	102	136	136	252	364	578
Romania	185	130	240	286	438	584	640	704	842	840
Estonia	–	–	–	1,471	1,502	1,104	1,318	1,457	1,552	1,383
Latvia	794	781	702	839	908	858	796	913	1,199	1,161
Lithuania	409	538	581	737	1,020	1,113	958	1,041	923	983
Belarus	563	743	761	801	998	1,010	1,060	1,019	899	942
Moldova	469	539	570	517	506	579	602	536	514	575
Russia	762	956	1,013	1,070	1,219	1,282	1,326	1,356	1,315	1,398
Ukraine	–	428	387	397	497	578	574	652	620	602
Armenia	49	55	82	129	151	143	110	131	151	97
Azerbaijan	61	55	57	101	125	112	107	77	78	59
Georgia	–	–	146	100	–	–	–	146	105	103
Kazakhstan	439	576	633	753	814	678	621	491	490	410
Kyrgyzstan	–	247	232	274	320	228	331	282	300	277
Tajikistan	112	125	149	125	140	152	111	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	–	217	216	227	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	139	160	200	217	–	–	–	–	–	–

a. Juveniles are defined as 15-17 year olds.

b. Juveniles are defined as 13-16 year olds.

c. Population data: US Census Bureau (1999).

d. 1998: sentencing data exclude Kosovo; population data: IRC estimate.

e. Sentencing data exclude economic crimes.

f. 1992-93: juveniles are defined as 15-17 year olds; 1994-98: juveniles are defined as 13-17 year olds.

g. Sentencing data 1992-98 and population data 1997-98 exclude Transdniestr.

h. Population data, 1998: IRC estimate.

i. 1990: CIS Stat (1998a).

j. Population data, 1989: US Census Bureau (1999).

9.1 Real GDP growth[a] (index, 1989 = 100)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	100.0	98.8	87.5	84.6	85.1	86.9	92.1	96.5	95.5	93.4	93.2
Slovakia	100.0	97.5	83.3	77.9	75.0	78.6	84.1	89.6	95.1	99.3	101.2
Poland	100.0	88.4	82.2	84.3	87.6	92.1	98.6	104.6	111.8	117.1	122.0
Hungary	100.0	96.5	85.0	82.4	81.9	84.3	85.5	86.6	90.6	95.1	99.3
Slovenia	100.0	95.3	86.8	82.0	84.3	88.8	92.5	95.7	100.1	104.0	107.9
Croatia	100.0	92.9	73.3	64.7	59.5	63.1	67.3	71.4	76.0	77.9	77.7
FYR Macedonia	100.0	90.1	83.8	77.1	70.1	68.8	68.0	68.5	69.6	71.6	73.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia[b]	100.0	92.1	81.4	58.7	40.6	41.7	44.2	46.8	50.3	51.6	–
Albania	100.0	90.0	64.8	60.1	65.9	71.4	80.9	88.2	82.1	88.6	95.7
Bulgaria	100.0	90.9	80.3	74.4	73.3	74.6	76.8	69.0	64.2	66.4	68.1
Romania	100.0	94.4	82.2	75.0	76.1	79.1	84.7	88.2	82.3	77.9	75.4
Estonia	100.0	93.5	80.8	69.3	63.1	61.8	64.5	67.0	74.1	77.6	76.5
Latvia	100.0	102.9	92.2	60.0	51.1	51.5	51.0	52.7	57.3	59.5	59.6
Lithuania	100.0	95.0	89.6	70.5	59.1	53.3	55.1	57.6	61.8	65.0	62.3
Belarus	100.0	97.0	95.8	86.6	80.1	70.0	62.7	64.4	71.8	77.7	80.4
Moldova	100.0	97.6	80.5	57.1	56.4	38.8	38.3	35.3	35.7	32.7	31.2
Russia	100.0	96.0	91.2	78.0	71.2	62.2	59.6	57.5	58.0	55.3	57.1
Ukraine	100.0	96.6	85.4	73.7	63.2	48.7	42.7	38.5	37.3	36.7	36.5
Armenia	100.0	92.6	76.8	36.4	31.0	32.7	34.9	37.0	38.2	41.0	42.3
Azerbaijan	100.0	88.3	87.7	67.9	52.2	41.9	37.0	37.4	39.6	43.6	46.8
Georgia	100.0	87.6	69.6	38.4	28.6	25.4	26.0	28.7	31.8	32.7	33.7
Kazakhstan	100.0	99.6	86.7	84.1	76.4	66.8	61.3	61.6	62.7	61.5	62.5
Kyrgyzstan	100.0	103.0	97.9	79.3	66.6	53.2	50.3	53.9	59.2	60.5	62.7
Tajikistan	100.0	98.4	91.4	64.9	57.8	46.8	41.0	39.2	39.9	42.0	43.5
Turkmenistan	100.0	102.0	97.2	92.1	82.8	68.5	63.6	59.3	52.6	55.3	64.1
Uzbekistan	100.0	101.6	101.1	89.9	87.8	84.1	83.4	84.7	86.8	90.6	94.3

a. Based on EBRD (2000). GDP, 1999 estimate
b. UNECE (1999)

9.2 Annual change in GDP[a] (percent)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	1.4	-1.2	-11.5	-3.3	0.6	2.2	5.9	4.8	-1.0	-2.2	-0.2
Slovakia	1.4	-2.5	-14.6	-6.5	-3.7	4.9	6.9	6.6	6.1	4.4	1.9
Poland	0.2	-11.6	-7.0	2.6	3.8	5.2	7.0	6.1	6.9	4.8	4.1
Hungary	0.7	-3.5	-11.9	-3.1	-0.6	2.9	1.5	1.3	4.6	4.9	4.5
Slovenia	-1.8	-4.7	-8.9	-5.5	2.8	5.3	4.1	3.5	4.6	3.9	3.8
Croatia	-1.6	-7.1	-21.1	-11.7	-8.0	5.9	6.8	6.0	6.5	2.5	-0.3
FYR Macedonia	0.9	-9.9	-7.0	-8.0	-9.1	-1.8	-1.2	0.8	1.5	2.9	2.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina[b]	–	–	-20.0	–	–	–	21.0	69.0	30.0	18.0	12.0
FR Yugoslavia[c]	1.2	-7.9	-11.6	-27.9	-30.8	2.7	6.0	5.9	7.5	2.6	–
Albania	9.8	-10.0	-28.0	-7.2	9.6	8.3	13.3	9.1	-7.0	8.0	8.0
Bulgaria	0.5	-9.1	-11.7	-7.3	-1.5	1.8	2.9	-10.1	-7.0	3.5	2.5
Romania	-5.8	-5.6	-12.9	-8.8	1.5	3.9	7.1	4.1	-6.6	-5.4	-3.2
Estonia	8.1	-6.5	-13.6	-14.2	-9.0	-2.0	4.3	3.9	10.6	4.7	-1.4
Latvia	6.8	2.9	-10.4	-34.9	-14.9	0.6	-0.8	3.3	8.6	3.9	0.1
Lithuania	1.5	-5.0	-5.7	-21.3	-16.2	-9.8	3.3	4.7	7.3	5.1	-4.1
Belarus	8.0	-3.0	-1.2	-9.6	-7.6	-12.6	-10.4	2.8	11.4	8.3	3.4
Moldova	8.5	-2.4	-17.5	-29.1	-1.2	-31.2	-1.4	-7.8	1.3	-8.6	-4.4
Russia	0.0	-4.0	-5.0	-14.5	-8.7	-12.7	-4.1	-3.5	0.8	-4.6	3.2
Ukraine	4.0	-3.4	-11.6	-13.7	-14.2	-23.0	-12.2	-10.0	-3.0	-1.7	-0.4
Armenia	14.2	-7.4	-17.1	-52.6	-14.8	5.4	6.9	5.9	3.3	7.2	3.3
Azerbaijan	-4.4	-11.7	-0.7	-22.6	-23.1	-19.7	-11.8	1.3	5.8	10.0	7.4
Georgia	-4.8	-12.4	-20.6	-44.8	-25.4	-11.4	2.4	10.5	10.8	2.9	3.0
Kazakhstan	-0.4	-0.4	-13.0	-2.9	-9.2	-12.6	-8.2	0.5	1.7	-1.9	1.7
Kyrgyzstan	8.0	3.0	-5.0	-19.0	-16.0	-20.1	-5.4	7.1	9.9	2.1	3.6
Tajikistan	-2.9	-1.6	-7.1	29.0	-11.0	-18.9	-12.5	-4.4	1.7	5.3	3.7
Turkmenistan	-6.9	2.0	-4.7	-5.3	-10.0	-17.3	-7.2	-6.7	-11.3	5.0	16.0
Uzbekistan	3.7	1.6	-0.5	-11.1	-2.3	-4.2	-0.9	1.6	2.5	4.4	4.1

a. EBRD (2000). 1999 estimate
b. EBRD (1999). 1998 estimate, 1999 projection
c. Based on UNECE (1999)

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9.3 General government balance[a] (as percent of GDP)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	-0.2	-1.9	-3.1	0.5	-1.1	-2.5	-2.3	-2.3	-1.6	-3.8
Slovakia	–	–	-11.9	-7.0	-1.3	0.2	-1.9	-4.4	-5.8	-3.6
Poland	3.1	-6.7	-6.7	-3.1	-3.1	-2.8	-3.3	-3.1	-3.0	-3.5
Hungary	0.0	-3.0	-7.2	-6.6	-8.4	-6.7	-5.0	-6.6	-5.6	-5.6
Slovenia	–	2.6	0.3	0.6	-0.2	-0.3	-0.2	-1.7	-1.1	-1.0
Croatia	–	–	-3.9	-0.8	1.6	-0.9	-0.4	-1.3	0.6	-1.9
FYR Macedonia	–	-4.5	-9.8	-13.4	-2.7	-1.0	-0.5	-0.4	-1.8	-2.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	-16.7	-0.3	-4.4	-1.5	-2.9	–
FR Yugoslavia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania	-6.1	-20.7	-23.1	-15.5	-12.6	-10.1	-12.1	-12.6	-10.4	-10.9
Bulgaria	-8.1	-4.5	-2.9	-8.7	-3.9	-6.3	-12.7	-2.5	1.5	-1.0
Romania	–	–	-4.6	-0.4	-2.2	-3.4	-6.7	-4.6	-3.0	-3.1
Estonia	–	–	–	-0.7	1.3	-1.3	-1.9	2.2	-0.3	-4.7
Latvia	–	–	–	–	-4.4	-3.9	-1.8	0.3	-0.8	-3.8
Lithuania	–	–	–	-5.3	-4.8	-4.5	-4.5	-1.8	-5.8	-8.6
Belarus	–	–	0.0	-1.9	-2.5	-1.9	-1.6	-0.7	-0.3	-2.9
Moldova	–	0.0	-26.6	-7.6	-11.5	-8.0	-11.2	-6.3	-8.9	-3.5
Russia	–	–	-18.9	-7.3	-10.4	-6.0	-8.6	-7.6	-8.0	-1.9
Ukraine	–	–	-25.4	-16.2	-7.7	-6.1	-6.1	-5.2	-3.0	-1.5
Armenia	–	-1.9	-13.9	-54.7	-16.5	-9.0	-8.6	-5.8	-3.7	-5.9
Azerbaijan	–	–	2.7	-15.3	-12.1	-4.9	-2.8	-1.7	-4.2	-5.6
Georgia	–	-3.0	-25.4	-26.2	-7.4	-5.3	-4.9	-7.0	-6.5	-6.7
Kazakhstan	1.4	-7.9	-7.3	-4.1	-7.5	-2.7	-4.7	-6.9	-7.4	-4.1
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	-14.4	-5.7	-8.4	-8.8	-8.8	-11.2	-10.2
Tajikistan	–	–	-30.5	-20.9	-5.2	-5.3	-5.8	-3.3	-3.8	-3.2
Turkmenistan	1.7	3.0	-9.4	-4.1	-2.3	-2.6	0.3	0.0	-2.7	0.9
Uzbekistan	-1.1	-3.6	-18.3	-10.4	-6.1	-4.1	-7.3	-2.4	-3.0	-2.2

a. EBRD (2000). 1999: estimate.

b. Includes state, municipalities, extrabudgetary funds.

c. Consolidated central government.

d. EBRD (1999): consolidated government balance. For Republika Srpska, excludes municipal governments. 1996-99: excludes external grants for military expenditures; no net financing of budget deficits other than arrears.

e. On a commitment basis.

f. Includes state budget, social funds, extrabudgetary funds.

g. General consolidated government, including federal, regional and local budgets and extrabudgetary funds and excluding transfers.

h. 1992-95: cash basis. 1996-99: accrual basis.

i. Consolidated accounts of republican government and local authorities.

j. Excludes privatization revenues; includes quasi fiscal operations.

k. Includes expenditures through the foreign-financed public investment programme.

l. Central government, excluding state budget transfers to pension and employment funds.

m. Includes state, municipalities, some extrabudgetary funds. Until 1997, some off budget funds were in operation.

n. Consolidated central government; includes extrabudgetary funds.

9.4 Annual inflation rate[a] (annual average percent change in consumer prices)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Czech Republic	9.6	56.6	11.1	20.8	10.0	9.1	8.8	8.5	10.7	2.5
Slovakia	10.8	61.2	10.1	23.2	13.4	9.9	5.8	6.1	6.7	10.6
Poland	585.8	70.3	43.0	35.3	32.2	27.8	19.9	14.9	11.8	7.0
Hungary	28.9	35.0	23.0	22.5	18.8	28.2	23.6	18.3	14.3	9.0
Slovenia	549.7	117.7	207.3	32.9	21.0	13.4	9.9	8.4	8.0	7.5
Croatia	609.5	123.0	665.5	1,517.5	97.6	2.0	3.5	3.6	5.7	3.8
FYR Macedonia	608.4	114.9	1,664.4	338.4	126.5	16.4	2.5	1.5	0.6	2.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	114.0	73,109.0	44,069.0	780.0	-4.4	-24.5	14.4	5.2	3.0
FR Yugoslavia	580.0	122.0	8,926.0	2.2x10[illegible]	7.9x10[illegible]	71.8	90.5	23.2	30.4	–
Albania	0.0	35.5	226.0	85.0	22.6	7.8	12.7	32.1	20.6	2.0
Bulgaria	26.3	333.5	82.0	73.0	96.3	62.0	123.0	1,082.0	22.3	2.0
Romania	5.1	161.1	210.4	256.1	136.7	32.3	38.8	154.8	59.2	45.0
Estonia	23.1	210.5	1,076.0	89.8	48.0	29.0	23.0	11.2	8.2	3.3
Latvia	10.5	172.0	951.2	108.0	36.0	25.0	17.6	8.4	4.7	2.2
Lithuania	8.4	224.7	1,020.5	410.4	72.1	39.5	24.7	8.9	5.1	1.6
Belarus	4.5	84.0	971.0	1,190.0	2,221.0	709.3	52.7	63.8	73.2	265.0
Moldova	4.2	98.0	1,276.4	788.5	329.7	30.2	23.5	11.8	7.7	35.0
Russia	5.3	92.7	1,526.0	875.0	311.4	197.7	47.8	14.7	27.8	87.0
Ukraine	4.2	91.0	1,210.0	4,735.0	891.0	377.0	80.0	16.0	11.0	25.0
Armenia	6.9	100.0	825.0	3,500.0	5,273.4	176.7	18.7	14.0	8.7	2.5
Azerbaijan	7.8	107.0	912.0	1,129.0	1,664.0	411.7	19.7	3.4	-0.8	-8.3
Georgia	4.2	79.0	887.4	3,125.4	15,606.5	162.7	39.4	7.3	3.7	19.0
Kazakhstan	5.6	78.8	1,381.0	1,662.3	1,892.0	176.3	39.1	17.4	7.3	9.0
Kyrgyzstan	5.5	85.0	855.0	772.4	208.0	40.7	31.3	25.5	12.1	45.0
Tajikistan	4.0	112.0	1,157.0	2,195.0	350.0	609.0	418.0	87.8	43.2	30.0
Turkmenistan	4.6	103.0	493.0	3,102.0	1,748.0	1,005.0	992.0	83.7	16.8	30.0
Uzbekistan	3.1	82.2	645.0	534.0	1,568.0	305.0	54.0	72.0	29.0	35.0

a. EBRD (1999). 1998: estimate. 1999: projection.

b. 1990-97: retail prices.

c. Retail prices.

d. 1991-94: retail prices.

e. UNECE (1999).

f. 1990: UNECE (1998).

9.5 Real wages[a] (base year = 100)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	100.0	93.6	68.9	76.0	78.8	84.9	92.2	100.4	102.3	101.0
Slovakia	100.0	94.2	67.3	72.6	69.2	71.4	75.3	81.9	87.4	88.8
Poland	100.0	75.6	75.4	73.3	71.2	71.6	73.7	77.9	82.4	85.2
Hungary	100.0	94.3	87.7	86.5	83.1	89.1	78.2	74.3	77.1	79.6
Slovenia	100.0	73.8	61.8	61.3	70.4	75.4	79.4	83.1	85.4	86.7
Croatia	–	–	–	–	–	–	100.0	108.0	117.9	125.6
FYR Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	100.0	78.1	74.0	38.0	–	–	–	–	–	–
Albania	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	100.0	83.8	83.6
Bulgaria	100.0	111.5	68.0	75.7	77.6	63.7	60.2	49.6	40.1	48.1
Romania	100.0	105.2	88.9	77.3	64.4	64.6	72.7	79.8	62.3	61.1
Estonia	100.0	102.5	68.2	45.2	46.3	50.9	54.0	55.2	59.5	63.5
Latvia	100.0	105.0	71.9	49.0	51.8	57.9	57.7	54.1	60.7	63.0
Lithuania	100.0	108.8	75.3	46.6	28.4	32.5	33.5	34.8	39.7	45.5
Belarus	–	–	–	–	100.0	60.6	57.6	60.5	69.1	81.5
Moldova	100.0	113.7	105.2	64.4	41.8	33.8	34.3	36.3	38.2	40.4
Russia	100.0	109.1	102.4	68.9	69.1	63.7	45.9	52.0	54.5	40.3
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	100.0	96.1	117.2
Azerbaijan	100.0	101.1	80.0	95.0	62.4	24.8	19.8	22.5	34.4	42.0
Georgia	100.0	111.2	76.5	50.5	24.1	33.5	28.3	42.2	57.0	71.7
Kazakhstan	–	–	100.0	64.8	49.1	32.9	33.4	34.4	36.6	38.7
Kyrgyzstan	–	100.0	70.7	59.4	49.6	42.0	43.5	44.5	49.1	54.1
Tajikistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	100.0	52.9	24.8	20.2	30.9	32.4
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

a. IRC estimate. Consumer price index: EBRD (1999).

b. Based on gross wages.

c. Real net index calculated by central statistical office.

d. Based on net wages.

e. FSOY (1996).

f. Public sector only.

g. 1990-93: gross wages, 1994-96: net wages. 1990-96: CSBL (1997). 1997-98: IRC estimate; CPI: EBRD (1999).

9.6 Employment growth[a] (1989 = 100)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	100.0	99.2	90.0	87.7	87.9	88.5	90.9	92.0	91.5	88.2
Slovakia	100.0	97.4	85.9	86.8	84.6	83.7	85.7	84.5	82.1	82.0
Poland	100.0	95.8	90.1	86.3	84.3	85.1	86.7	88.3	93.3	93.4
Hungary	100.0	99.3	96.0	86.1	77.7	73.7	72.1	71.1	70.8	71.2
Slovenia	100.0	96.1	88.7	83.8	81.3	79.3	79.1	78.7	78.6	78.7
Croatia	100.0	97.1	89.2	79.3	76.6	74.8	73.9	73.9	73.4	–
FYR Macedonia	100.0	98.5	95.6	91.2	86.2	81.7	73.9	70.6	66.8	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	100.0	97.0	94.1	90.9	88.3	86.5	85.3	84.8	83.6	–
Albania	100.0	99.3	97.5	76.1	72.7	80.7	79.0	77.5	76.9	75.4
Bulgaria	100.0	93.9	81.6	75.0	73.8	74.3	75.2	75.3	73.3	71.2
Romania	100.0	101.0	100.5	97.4	93.8	93.3	88.5	87.4	84.1	82.1
Estonia	100.0	98.6	96.4	91.4	84.5	82.7	78.3	77.0	77.4	76.4
Latvia	100.0	100.1	99.3	92.0	85.6	77.0	74.3	72.4	73.7	74.1
Lithuania	100.0	97.3	99.7	97.5	93.4	88.0	86.4	87.2	87.7	87.0
Belarus	100.0	99.1	96.6	94.1	92.8	90.4	84.8	83.9	84.0	84.4
Moldova	100.0	99.0	99.0	98.0	80.7	80.4	80.0	79.4	78.7	77.7
Russia	100.0	99.6	97.6	95.4	93.8	90.6	87.8	87.3	85.4	84.1
Ukraine	100.0	99.9	98.3	96.3	94.1	90.5	93.3	91.3	88.8	87.7
Armenia	100.0	102.4	105.0	99.2	97.0	93.5	92.8	90.2	87.9	–
Azerbaijan	100.0	100.9	105.8	101.4	101.7	99.0	98.5	100.5	100.7	101.7
Georgia	100.0	102.4	93.3	73.5	66.4	64.8	71.6	75.4	82.7	–
Kazakhstan	100.0	101.3	100.1	98.3	89.9	85.4	85.0	84.6	83.4	79.5
Kyrgyzstan	100.0	100.5	100.9	105.6	96.6	94.6	94.4	95.0	97.1	98.1
Tajikistan	100.0	103.2	104.9	101.6	98.8	98.8	98.7	92.2	95.3	95.8
Turkmenistan	100.0	103.4	105.3	105.4	110.0	111.6	112.1	111.7	112.3	–
Uzbekistan	100.0	104.2	109.2	108.5	108.3	109.9	110.8	112.3	113.8	115.4

a. Average rate of employment compared to the base year.

b. Year end.

c. 1998: IRC estimate.

d. Beginning of year.

e. UNECE (1999).

f. 1993-98: excludes Transdniestr.

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9.7 Annual registered unemployment rate[a] (average percent of labour force)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic[b]	–	0.3	2.6	3.1	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.1	4.3	6.0
Slovakia	–	0.6	6.6	11.4	12.7	14.4	13.8	12.6	12.9	14.6
Poland	–	3.4	9.2	12.9	14.9	16.5	15.2	14.3	11.5	10.0
Hungary[b]	0.4	0.8	8.5	12.3	12.1	10.4	10.4	10.5	10.4	9.1
Slovenia	2.9	4.7	8.2	11.5	14.4	14.4	13.9	13.9	14.4	14.5
Croatia	8.0	9.3	14.9	15.3	14.8	14.5	14.5	16.4	17.5	–
FYR Macedonia	22.6	23.0	24.5	26.0	27.7	30.0	35.6	38.8	41.7	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	39.6	–
FR Yugoslavia	17.9	19.7	21.4	22.8	23.1	23.1	24.6	25.7	25.9	26.8
Albania	7.0	10.0	9.0	27.0	22.0	18.0	12.9	12.7	13.9	17.8
Bulgaria	–	–	–	13.2	15.8	14.0	11.4	11.1	14.0	12.2
Romania[b]	–	–	3.0	8.2	10.4	10.9	9.5	6.6	8.9	10.3
Estonia	–	–	–	–	3.9	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.0	3.7
Latvia	–	–	–	0.9	4.6	6.4	6.4	7.0	7.5	7.6
Lithuania	–	–	0.3	1.3	4.4	3.8	6.1	7.1	5.9	6.4
Belarus[b]	–	–	0.1	0.5	1.4	2.1	2.7	3.9	2.8	2.3
Moldova	–	–	–	0.1	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.5	2.0
Russia[b]	–	–	0.1	0.8	1.1	2.2	3.2	3.4	2.8	2.7
Ukraine[b]	–	–	–	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.6	3.1	–
Armenia[b]	–	–	–	1.6	5.3	6.1	6.6	9.3	10.6	9.3
Azerbaijan	–	–	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1
Georgia	–	–	0.2	2.3	6.6	3.6	2.6	2.4	5.0	5.0
Kazakhstan[b]	–	–	0.1	0.4	0.6	1.1	2.1	4.2	3.8	3.7
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	0.1	0.2	0.7	2.9	4.3	3.1	3.1
Tajikistan[b]	–	–	–	0.4	1.2	1.7	2.0	2.6	2.8	3.2
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4

a. Registered data frequently differ from unemployment rates derived from labour force surveys conducted on the basis of ILO definitions.

b. Year end.

9.8 Age 15-24 registered unemployed (percent of total year-average unemployed)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Czech Republic	–	–	32.7	32.3	31.1	28.3	27.9	27.8	29.7	33.0
Slovakia	–	–	55.5	30.9	37.5	31.8	29.0	31.8	33.0	36.3
Poland	–	–	35.1	34.6	34.4	34.6	34.6	31.1	30.8	30.9
Hungary	–	–	–	25.8	26.5	27.7	26.6	23.7	22.5	20.3
Slovenia	57.3	57.9	50.7	41.9	34.6	29.2	31.7	29.7	26.3	24.2
Croatia	63.5	56.2	41.2	33.7	31.0	34.1	35.3	33.6	32.8	32.7
FYR Macedonia	54.7	51.9	47.6	44.1	41.0	39.2	33.3	28.6	24.4	–
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
FR Yugoslavia	52.8	51.4	43.6	41.0	36.3	38.5	35.5	34.3	32.7	31.5
Albania	–	–	–	–	14.9	16.3	12.1	11.3	12.2	13.7
Bulgaria	–	–	47.8	45.1	42.6	41.2	24.5	24.6	21.8	18.6
Romania	–	–	–	37.2	36.9	38.4	34.2	35.7	28.5	24.2
Estonia	–	–	–	–	10.5	7.5	7.7	8.7	9.6	9.8
Latvia	–	–	–	–	–	–	18.8	19.4	18.9	17.0
Lithuania	–	–	–	–	18.9	26.5	22.0	16.5	21.7	20.3
Belarus	–	–	–	–	36.7	37.5	34.7	32.9	30.8	35.2
Moldova	–	–	–	–	–	–	33.2	34.8	35.2	32.1
Russia	–	–	16.2	18.6	18.6	16.9	22.4	21.6	20.2	20.8
Ukraine	–	–	–	–	31.8	25.8	27.8	24.5	22.0	–
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	20.2	19.0	18.0	–	12.2
Azerbaijan	–	–	37.9	23.5	46.5	50.3	50.0	47.2	47.6	49.3
Georgia	–	–	12.2	29.1	12.5	9.5	7.1	3.6	15.4	33.1
Kazakhstan	–	–	–	–	54.1	52.4	46.5	40.9	35.5	32.6
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Tajikistan	–	–	–	28.2	33.0	21.3	30.1	43.4	40.7	32.1
Turkmenistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan	–	–	–	–	–	64.1	61.9	63.5	61.8	60.5

a. Year end.

b. 15-25 year-olds.

c. 15-19 year-olds.

d. Benefit recipients.

e. 16-24 year-olds.

f. 1993-94: 15-25 year-olds.

g. 1991-94: 16-21 year-olds; 1995-98: 16-24 year-olds.

h. 15-22 year-olds.

i. Under 30 year-olds.

j. 1998: 15-29 year-olds.

k. 1992-94: 15-22 year-olds; 1995-98: 15-21 year-olds.

l. 18-29 year-olds.

Glossary

Abortion: This includes induced early fœtal deaths and excludes spontaneous abortions (miscarriages).

Adolescents: According to the UN concept, these are people aged between 10 and 19. The term includes early, middle and late adolescence.

Adolescent birth rate: This measures the frequency of child births among very young women. In the Statistical Annex it represents the number of live births among women 15-19 years of age per 1,000 mid-year female population in the same age group.

Cause of death: In this publication, causes of death are cited in keeping with the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) IXth Revision, 1975: "accidents, poisonings and violence" (XVII.800-999); "suicide and self-inflicted injury" (XVII.950-959).

Children in infant homes: The number of children in infant homes is a useful proxy for indicators of child abandonment and institutional care. Infant homes typically care for very young children (0-3 years) who have been left without parental care, although infants may enter the homes on temporary placement, and children may also sometimes be above 3 years old.

Consumer price index: The most widely used measure of inflation, the CPI is a comparison of the price levels of a representative basket of consumer goods and services recorded in retail trade outlets and service units during two periods. The aggregate index is based on actual consumer expenditure patterns gauged through household surveys.

Crime and sentencing rates: Crime data cover reported and registered crime only. Crime and sentencing rates are subject to national legislation, which varies widely within the region. This hinders comparisons among countries and years.

Crude birth rate: The CBR measures the frequency of childbirths in a population. In the Statistical Annex it represents the number of live births per 1,000 mid-year population.

Crude death rate: The CDR measures the frequency of deaths in a population. In the Statistical Annex it represents the number of deaths per 1,000 mid-year population.

Economically active population (labour force): According to the ILO methodology, this category comprises all persons who supply labour for the production of goods and services during a specified time-reference period. The economically active population includes employed and unemployed persons.

Economically inactive population (population out of the labour force): This comprises all people above a specific age who have been neither employed, nor unemployed during a specified brief time-reference period (see also *employed* and *unemployed*).

Employed: This category comprises all persons above a specific age who are in paid employment (working, or with a job, but not working) or in self-employment (working, or with an enterprise, but not working).

Enrolment rates: The net enrolment rate is based on the number of children in a specified age group (corresponding to legislated standards) enrolled at a given level of education divided by the total number of children in the same age group in the general population. The gross enrolment rate is based on the number of children, regardless of age, enrolled at a given level of education divided by the total number of children in the general population that corresponds to the age group specified for that level of education.

Enrolment rates by education level: Selected definitions in the International Standard Classification System of Education Levels (ISCED) are given below as a general guideline, though the situation may differ among countries.

- Kindergarten (ISCED 0): This generally covers children in the 3-5 or 3-6 age group and excludes nursery provision for the 0-2 age group.
- Basic education (ISCED 1 and 2): Basic education, often called "compulsory schooling" or "elementary schooling", normally lasts from age 6 or 7 to age 14 or 15. This is often divided into primary (to age 10) and lower secondary levels.
- General secondary (ISCED 3): General secondary schools (gymnasia/lycees) offer two- to four-year programmes of academic study, often leading to higher education, with entry on a selective basis. In CIS countries, general secondary typically comprises the two or three upper classes of the comprehensive school, while in countries in Central and Eastern Europe it involves longer programmes at separate institutions. In a number of countries, gymnasium streams begin in lower secondary grades.
- Non-degree tertiary level (ISCED 5): This covers post-secondary programmes which do not lead to a university degree or a recognized equivalent qualification.
- Degree tertiary level (ISCED 6 and 7): This covers programmes for students who have successfully completed prerequisite studies at the secondary level and who wish to earn a first university degree or a recognized equivalent qualification.

General government balance: The difference between government revenues and government expenditures, this usually includes local, state and central governments, but the practice may vary among countries. The balance may be positive or negative.

Gini coefficient: The "Gini" is a measure of the degree of inequality in the distribution of earnings and income. It is equal to "0" in the case of total earnings/income equality (everyone receives the same earnings/income) and to "1" in the case of total inequality (one person receives all the earnings/income).

Gross adoption rate: This is used as a proxy for the de-institutionalization of children. The gross adoption rate in the Statistical Annex represents the total number of adoptions per 100,000 children aged 0-3, though there may be adoptions of older children as well.

Gross domestic product: GDP is the most widely used concept of national income defined in the System of National Accounts. It represents the total final output of goods and services produced by an economy during a given period regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims and is calculated without making deductions for depreciation. (See also *net material product.*)

Infant mortality rate: The IMR is a measure of the probability of dying between birth and 1 year of age. It represents the annual number of deaths of infants under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births during the same period. (See also *live births*.)

Jobless: This category is used in the current Report to identify persons who, during a specified time-reference period, have been either unemployed, or out of the labour force. (See also *unemployed* and *economically inactive population*.)

Life expectancy at birth: A widely used measure of the general level of mortality, this is the theoretical number of years a newborn will live if the age-specific mortality rates in the year of birth are taken as constant. It represents for a given year the sum of the mortality rates for all ages combined.

Live births: According to the standard definition of the World Health Organization, this includes all births, with the exception of stillbirths, regardless of the size, gestation age, or "viability" of the newborn infant, or his or her death soon after birth or before the required birth-registration date. Only a few countries covered in this publication employed this concept before the transition; many used the so-called "Soviet concept", while others relied on national concepts. However, most countries have now adopted the WHO definition, and only a few still use the Soviet concept. The Soviet concept excludes infants born with no breath, but with other signs of life ("stillbirths" in the Soviet concept) and infants born before the end of the 28th week of pregnancy at a weight under 1,000 grams or a length under 35 centimetres and who die during the first seven days of life ("miscarriages").

Maternal mortality rate: This is the annual number of deaths of women due to pregnancy or childbirth-related causes per 100,000 live births.

Net material product: A concept of national income used widely in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union before the transition, this includes the total final output of goods and productive services for a given period, but disregards activities (such as health care, education, or public administration) that do not result in material output. (See also *gross domestic product*.)

Population data: These refer to de facto population (all people physically present in an area at the time of a population census or population estimate) as opposed to de jure population (all people who are resident in an area, including those who may be temporarily absent). Typically, refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are excluded. For countries for which population data are not available by age cohort, estimates have been made on the basis of data on five-year age groups by gender in the International Database of the US Census Bureau. In cases in which the Census Bureau five-year age-cohort estimates need to be disaggregated to calculate indicators among cohorts, each single-year age group is taken to constitute one-fifth of the five-year cohort estimate.

Public expenditure on education: This represents current and capital expenditures on education by local, regional and national governments, including municipalities. Household contributions are normally excluded.

Rate of natural population increase: This is the difference between the number of births and the number of deaths during a given year divided by the mid-year population. It excludes changes due to migration and may be positive or negative.

Real wage: A proxy for the quantity of goods and services a money wage can buy, the real wage represents the money wage adjusted for inflation.

Total fertility rate: An overall measure of fertility, this represents the theoretical number of births to a woman during her child-bearing years taking the given year's age-specific birth rates as a constant. It is calculated as the sum of the age-specific birth rates for all women of childbearing age.

Under-5 mortality rate: The U5MR measures the probability of dying between birth and age 5. It represents the annual number of deaths of children under age 5 per 1,000 live births. In the Statistical Annex the U5MR has been calculated by comparing the number of under-5 deaths to the number of live births in the current year rather than in the year the deceased children were born.

Unemployed: According to the ILO methodology, this category comprises all persons above a specific age who, during a specified brief time-reference period, have been without work (that is, not in paid employment or self-employment), are available for work, and are seeking work (that is, have taken specific steps in the specified period to seek paid employment or self-employment). This concept differs from registered unemployment, which refers to the segment of the labour force registered at labour offices as unemployed. The latter administrative approach reflects national rules and conditions and usually generates figures which are different from those resulting from surveys relying on the ILO concept of unemployment.

Working-age population: The working-age population refers to individuals above the age of compulsory education and below the official retirement age. Most often this includes men aged 15-59 and women aged 15-54 in the countries of the region. However, this standardized definition may differ from the current definitions of "working age" in some countries due to a gradual increase in the retirement age for both genders.

Young people: According to the UN concept, these are people aged between 10 and 24.

Youth: According to the UN concept, these are people aged between 15 and 24.

■

Bibliographic Notes

These Bibliographic Notes are designed mainly as a guide to aid the interested reader in finding additional information. The Bibliography contains a more thorough listing of the information resources used for this Report.

Without offering more explicit descriptions, the text frequently mentions analyses, surveys and other research which have been carried out for this Report. This sort of reference often indicates material which has been produced for the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre by the counterparts of the MONEE project network in the transition countries. This material is hereinafter referred to as "MONEE country reports".

More specifically, the majority of these country reports consists of analyses prepared by statistical offices and experts in the region. They are listed in the Bibliography as follows: ASRK (1999), ASSC (1999a), CBSC (1999), CSBL (1999), ESA (1999a), FSOY (1999), Gasyuk (1999), Goskomstat (1999c), Ivan-Ungureanu et al. (1999), Kowalska et al. (1999), Lakatos (1999), LDS (1999), Magloutchiants (1999), MOEG (1999), NISFT (1999), Novák (1999), NSCKR (1999), Placintár (1999), SSORM (1999), SORS (1999), Tafi (1999), and Tzvetkova-Anguelova (1999).

Much of the tone of this year's Report is set by the "Voices of Youth". These voices have been recorded among young people in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan during group discussions and individual interviews. Sheila Marnie and Expert Centre, Tashkent, organized the research in Uzbekistan. In the other five countries, the work was carried out by moderators and other experts commissioned by the Innocenti Research Centre through Oxford Research International, a private organization. The discussions focused on nine topics: 1. health risks and health promotion through participation, 2. vocational school students: the transition from school to work and career opportunities, 3. early school-leavers: education, work and opportunities, 4. young mothers: living arrangements and needs, 5. participating in society, 6. young people and success at work, 7. young people leaving institutional care: prospects and life strategies, 8. young people in conflict with the law, and 9. the attitudes of young people towards education and the educational facilities available to them. The original reports on the focus-group discussions and the individual interviews, including technical details and notes on the survey participants, are available in full text on the UNICEF IRC website (www.unicef-icdc.org). To protect the trust of the young people and to ensure sincere, spontaneous engagement in the discussions, the names of the participants have been altered.

The Report also refers to numerous statistical surveys and databases. Hereafter is a brief description of a selection of those which are not explained in the Bibliographic Notes for individual chapters.

The Azerbaijan Survey of Living Conditions was developed by the State Statistical Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic and the World Bank in November and December 1995. Through grassroots surveys, the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, has been monitoring the response to change in post-communist societies since 1991. Information, including information on publications, is available at the website, www.cspp.strath.ac.uk. The EUI/Essex Survey in Uzbekistan was carried out by a team from the European University Institute (Florence) and the University of Essex (UK) in summer 1995; see Coudouel (1998).

Standard Eurobarometer public opinion surveys are conducted on behalf of the European Commission at least twice each year in all member nations of the European Union. The surveys also cover transition countries through the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer; see www.za.unikoeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/. The FR Yugoslavia Labour Force Survey has been conducted since 1994 by the Federal Statistical Office. The Kazakhstan Labour Force Survey was run in November-December 1994 by the Kazakhstan National Centre for Public Opinion and was financed by the government of Japan in conjunction with a World Bank project. The Kazakhstan Living Standards Survey was implemented by the National Statistical Agency in July 1996 through a technical assistance project financed by the World Bank. The Kyrgyzstan Multipurpose Poverty Survey was carried out in autumn 1993 by the World Bank and the government of Kyrgyzstan on a sample of 2,000 households and 9,000 individuals; it covered household income, consumption, living conditions, employment, and education.

Labour force surveys are performed periodically by national statistical offices in transition countries. Among those used for this Report is the LFS conducted in Hungary in 1998. The Latvian Household Budget Survey was initiated in September 1995 and is updated on a monthly basis by the Central Statistical Bureau; it covers household income, consumption and living conditions, and yearly samples now typically comprise around 4,000 households. The Latvian Labour Force Survey was introduced in November 1995 and is run in May and November each year. Since May 1997, the sample in each wave of the survey has been around 8,000 households and about 15,000 individuals aged 14 or more. For information about obtaining access to the datasets of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), a frequently updated country-specific household survey on indicators relating to living standards, readers may wish to consult the relevant website at www.worldbank.org/lsms/. LSMS surveys in transition countries not specifically mentioned elsewhere in these paragraphs have been carried out in Albania (1996), Armenia (1996), Bulgaria (1995), and Romania (1994-95). The OECD-CCET Labour Market Database is the product of a cooperative effort between the OECD Centre for Cooperation with Economies in Transition and the national statistical offices of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. It includes labour market data based on labour force surveys and contains information on employment, unemployment and wages. The Polish Labour Force Survey is conducted quarterly on a sample of around 32,000 households; it covers employment, unemployment and wages.

The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) is a series of nationally representative surveys examining health and economic welfare in the Russian Federation. It has involved two phases, the first in 1992-93, and the second, started in 1994, is ongoing; data have been collected in eight rounds so far, with Round I in summer 1992 and Round VIII in autumn 1998. The survey homepage is www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a cross-country collaboration involving research and surveys in social topics of particular interest, including work orientation, family, gender, the role of government, and social inequality. Information is available at the website, www.issp.org. The Tajik Living Standards Survey has been conducted jointly by the State Statistical Agency and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Republic of Tajikistan in collaboration with UNDP and the World Bank. In May and June 1999, it involved interviews among 2,000 households, with 14,142 individuals. The Ukraine Household Income and Expenditures Study was financed by the World Bank and was carried out in June-July 1995 by the International Institute of Sociology in Kiev. A nationally representative study, it sampled 2,025 households and 4,560 individuals.

Extensive use has been made of the resources of the Internet. The Bibliographic Notes and the Bibliography reflect this debt. However, references to websites are provided with the hope that readers will understand that the websites are constantly evolving and that the material referred to may sometimes no longer be available in this way.

Chapter 1

The full text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child can be downloaded from a special UNICEF website at www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm. Lansdown (1995a) and Hart (1997) offer discussion on the participation of children and youth in various settings, as described in Box 1.1. Progress in market-oriented institutional change is discussed authoritatively in EBRD's *Transition Reports*, which also offer broad reviews of recent economic developments in the transition region; for instance, see EBRD (1999). UNECE's *Economic Survey of Europe* series is also useful; see UNECE (1998, 1999). For a review placing the transition region in global human development, see UNDP's *Human Development Reports*, for example UNDP (1999a); in recent years the UNDP has also issued a regional report on the transition countries and assisted in drafting various national reports on human development in the region (see the Bibliography listings under "UNDP").

The international fertility and family surveys mentioned in Box 1.5 are a rich source of information on intergenerational trends in family formation and sexual behaviours that is relevant for demographic projections and health programmes. The survey year is 1991 in Poland (Holzer and Kowalska, 1997), 1992-93 in Hungary (Kamarás, 1999), 1995 in Latvia (Zvidrins, Ezera and Greitans, 1998), and 1994-95 in Lithuania. The website of the Population Activities Unit, UN Economic Commission for Europe (www.unece.org/ead/pau/f_home1.htm) supplies additional information. These surveys target mainly the adult population and rely on interview techniques similar to those in reproductive health surveys carried out in several countries in the region during the 1990s. For a description of a reproductive health survey targeted at young adults, see for example Serbanescu and Morris (1998a).

WHO has developed a "narrative" survey method whereby survey participants are requested to speak about what a typical (but imaginary) couple would do in specified situations. It has been found that this indirect survey technique based on "projection" can help provide a realistic picture of the reproductive and sexual behaviours of the young people interviewed and therefore lead to a statistically plausible profile of "typical" behaviour. So far the only survey of this kind was one carried out, along with related discussion workshops, in Romania in 1997-98; see Meekers and Ionescu (1999), where the methodology is explained in detail. For a general guide, see WHO (1993). The source for data on the proportion of youth still in the parental home in the European Union is Eurostat (1998).

Chapter 2

UNICEF (1997) builds a conceptual framework for young people's health and development. The joint WHO, UNFPA and UNICEF study on programming for adolescent health and development (WHO, 1999b) brings together a vast array of information on relevant research and best-practice programmes in the area of youth health and development. Hedberg, Bracken and Stashwick (1999) investigate the cost-effectiveness of youth-friendly health and development interventions and their longer term effects. For data on child nutrition in the CEE/CIS, see Fleisher Michealson et al. (2000), who also offer guidelines for Europe. The information on the nutrition status of students is found in SORS (1999).

LSHTM (1998) gives a detailed analysis of the high rates of child injury in the transition region. Micklewright and Stewart (2000) investigate trends in child and youth health and well-being in those post-communist countries which are official applicants for membership in the European Union.

The 1993-94 and 1997-98 Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children survey, which has been used extensively in Section 2.2 and parts of Section 2.3, also furnishes other relevant information on younger adolescents that is not discussed here; see King et al. (1996) and Currie et al. (2000). For research in the West on factors behind symptoms incidence among adolescents, see for example Linet et al. (1989), Rauste von Wright and von Wright (1992) and Rothner (1991). The analysis of smoking habits among youth and pregnant women relies on information from the 1997 reproductive health survey in Armenia (MOHA, 1998) and the 1996 young adult reproductive health survey in Romania (Serbanescu and Morris, 1997, 1998a), among others.

For information on the European Schools Project on Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs (ESPAD), which involves occasional surveys among youth in European countries, see, for example, NCADI (1999). As this Report was going to print, only a portion of the data from a major 1999 ESPAD survey covering several Eastern European countries had been released. Elekes (1999) quotes results from the survey in Hungary.

For HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in various parts of the world, see UNAIDS (1999a). Box 2.3 on the HIV epidemic in the region uses data from the MONEE project and information in Dehne (1999). On HIV infections among children in Romania, see Zamfir and Zamfir (1996). Information on the European HIV prevalence database, one of the sources for Figure 2.15, can be found at the website of the European Centre for the Epidemiological Monitoring of AIDS (CESES) at www.ceses.org, which also includes information on CEE/CIS.

For data on various aspects of fertility-related behaviours discussed in Box 2.4 see Košuh et al. (1998) cited in SORS (1999), Delgado and Castro Martín (1999), Holzer and Kowalska (1997), Kamarás (1999), Lodewijckx (1999), Nikander (1998), Prinz et al. (1998), Toulemon and de Guibert-Lantoine (1998), Wu (1999), Zvidrins, Ezera and Greitans (1998), and UNICEF (1999b). Background papers presented at the UNFPA/Government of Denmark/WHO workshop on the reproductive health of young people in Central and Eastern Europe have been published in WHO (1997a).

Blum (1999a) discusses the link between adolescent health and development and offers an evaluation of various strategies that work or do not work with youth. On the role of the social environment in youth outcomes, see Bandura (1986), Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and UNAIDS (1999b). UNAIDS

(1998a) concludes that authorities in various Central Asian countries treat drug users in ways which make the building of trust with service clients difficult.

The criteria for youth-friendly services (Box 2.6) is adapted from WHO (1999b). See also Jones et al. (1997), Ginsburg, Menapace and Slap (1997) and Smith (1996). For information on the study conducted by the Population Council in Mexico, see Infante et al. (1993) and Townsend, Dias de May and Sepulveda (1987), who are cited in Focus on Young Adults (1997). Information on the Family Health International projects (AIDSCAP) can be found through the organization's website at www.fhi.org.

Chapter 3

Education data which compare the situation in the transition countries with that in the European Union are based on information in European Commission (1997), *Key Data on Education in the European Union*, an annual yearbook on education trends in Europe that covers 29 countries, including the 10 EU "pre-accession" countries that are also examined through the MONEE project. In general, enrolment data should be interpreted carefully as the highly aggregated figures may mask large differences among countries in both the levels of enrolment in any one year and the changes over time.

The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) is a framework for the compilation and presentation of national and international education statistics and indicators. It covers all organized and sustained learning activities for children, youth and adults, including people with special educational needs. In providing a sounder basis for statistical comparisons among education systems, the ISCED classification assists educational policy-makers and others who wish to learn from educational development experiences elsewhere. For more information, readers are referred to unescostat.unesco.org/en/pub/pub0.htm. (Also see the Glossary.)

The databank maintained by the UNESCO International Bureau of Education, which can be found at www.ibe.unesco.org/Inf_Doc/Nat_reps/natrep.htm, offers additional information on the organization of post-compulsory systems of education in Central and Eastern Europe.

This chapter uses OECD's *Review of National Policies for Education: Russian Federation* (OECD, 1998b), which describes the most recent trends in schooling and education policy in the Russian Federation and analyses the education reform initiatives under way. The review supports the overall policy trends now being implemented, but draws attention, in the recommendations, to particular problems, new perspectives and methods for consolidating the ongoing reforms.

Some of the qualitative research cited in the chapter comes from national reports prepared for *Voices of the Poor*, a participatory research initiative of the World Bank that records the voices of the poor and describes the experiences, priorities and recommendations of poor people. The research findings are being published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press. More information and national reports can be found at www.worldbank.org/poverty/voices/overview.htm. (See also Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, 1998, and De Soto and Dudwick, 1999.)

In 1998, UNICEF commissioned special reports to examine more closely the situation of young people out of school in four countries: Bulgaria (UNICEF, 1999c), Kyrgyzstan (Eversmann, 1999), Latvia (UNICEF, 1999d), and Lithuania (UNICEF, 1999e). These reports look at a number of different sources of data for children out of school and the relationships between being out of school and nutrition, health and social problems, including HIV/AIDS, juvenile delinquency and homelessness.

Another valuable source of information on changes in vocational and technical education is the website of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (www.cedefop.gr). This European agency helps policy-makers and practitioners of the European Commission, the member states and social partner organizations throughout Europe make informed choices about vocational training policy. It provides the latest information on the present state of and future trends in vocational education and training in the European Union.

Much of the data on upper secondary vocational education comes from the European Training Foundation (www.etf.it), an agency of the European Union which works in partnership with EU institutions, member states and major development agencies. It supports the process of vocational education and training reform that is taking place within the partner countries and territories, develops and disseminates European expertise and good practice in the field of vocational education and training, and promotes effective cooperation in vocational education and training among the EU and partner countries and territories (including all MONEE countries).

The student assessment data come from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), which has examined the mathematics and science achievement of students in 41 countries at three different grade levels (fourth and eighth grades and the end of secondary school). It was conducted during the 1995 school year. More information about the assessments and results can be found at nces.ed.gov/timss/timss95/index.asp.

The International Adult Literacy Survey presents findings for 12 OECD countries; see OECD and Statistics Canada (2000). There are significant differences among OECD member countries in how literacy skills are distributed in the population. In some nations, performance is skewed towards exceptional achievement among a minority in the work force; in others, skills are more evenly distributed, with fewer people at the lowest level.

For information about the Schoolnet (Sulinet) programme in Hungary, see OECD (1998c), which provides insight into some of the unexpected problems encountered in efforts to connect every school in Hungary to the Internet.

Chapter 4

The ILO (1992, 1999) collects data on labour force participation and employment in several transition countries. Great care is needed in interpreting the numbers, however, since definitions may vary, and country statistical offices are not always able to verify the data in earlier series.

A detailed analysis of youth labour markets is provided by Fóti (1996) for Hungary and Keune (1999) for Hungary and Poland. An overview of youth unemployment in Western European countries is given by O'Higgins (1997). Blanchflower (1999a) supplies a summary of youth unemployment problems throughout the world. Clark and Summers (1979) observed that the demand for young workers in established market economies was particularly sensitive to aggregate economic conditions and the state of the labour market.

The overall development of labour markets and related institutions in transition economies is discussed in Barr (1994), Nesporova (1999) and Rashid and Rutkowski (1999). The data on the private sector are from EBRD (1999). The regional dimension of unemployment is highlighted by Boeri and Scarpetta (1993, 1994) for the CEE and by Commander and Yemtsov (1994) for Russia.

There is some empirical evidence from established market economies that an early first job is associated with a greatly increased chance of being employed later on; for instance, see OECD (1998a). The econometric analysis of the first job effect on the probability of being unemployed in a transition economy was conducted for this report by Andy Newell using the 1998 Polish Labour Force Survey.

UNICEF (1999b) examines the employment situation of women during transition. Discrimination in hiring and firing practices against ethnic minorities in the region is observed in ILO (1997).

The data on the share of students who are also in the labour force in several established market economies are found in OECD (1998d). The source of information on the financial support provided by parents in Russia is Dobson (1998). For details about the study on 800 unemployed youth in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, see Tholen (1998). Drawing on interviews with 550 young entrepreneurs in seven transition countries, Roberts and Tholen (1999) point to major differences in the characteristics of self-employment in the nations of the former Soviet Union on the one hand and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe on the other.

Marnie (1992) has studied the role of labour offices in the Soviet Union. The data on job vacancies reported in labour offices in transition countries are taken from Nesporova (1999). For an examination of labour market policies in the region, see for instance Jackman (1995a, 1995b). An overview of youth labour market programmes in established market economies can be found in Gaude (1997) and OECD (1997, 1998d). A survey of recent evidence from programme evaluations on the effectiveness of active labour market policies in established market economies is presented in Fay (1996) and Dar and Tzannatos (1999). Puhani (1999) provides evidence on the impact of public training on Polish unemployment. A review of the effectiveness of active labour market measures in the transition countries can be found in Nesporova (1999) and Fretwell, Benus and O'Leary (1999).

Chapter 5

The MONEE country reports have provided much of the basic information throughout this chapter. They are supplemented in particular by two sources. First are the reports that the governments of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child have to submit to the Committee on the Rights of the Child: initial reports are due within two years of ratification and "periodic" progress reports are due at five-year intervals thereafter. Box 5.5 shows that several countries in the region have not yet complied with these obligations, and the absence of these reports often makes data collection and verification much more difficult.

Second are the Concluding Observations that the Committee on the Rights of the Child draws up once it has considered each report and has formally raised questions and discussed its concerns with the respective governmental delegations. Unfortunately, the workload of the Committee is such that the current backlog can mean a delay of some two years between the moment reports are submitted and the moment they are reviewed by the Committee. This has two major implications: the Committee's Concluding Observations may be referring to statistics and other data already at least three or four years old, and fully 20 percent of the State Party Reports submitted have not yet been considered by the Committee. Since the Committee takes into account information provided from a variety of sources when reviewing the Reports, the delays deprive one of potentially important data and commentary on the situation in the countries concerned. Notably in this regard, no Report from a Baltic State has yet been reviewed, and only one of the potential five reports from the Central Asian countries has been reviewed.

Up-to-date information on the States Parties reports and the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child can be found on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.

Indicative self-reporting surveys bolstering the view that most adolescents break the law include those conducted by the Home Office (1997). The issue is discussed at length in Whitebread and Lab (1990).

The full texts of the international instruments which underpin discussion in this chapter and which are listed in Box 5.1 can be found in UN (1957, 1985, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) or on the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm. The declaration of Bertrand Ramcharan is reported in a UN press release (UN, 1999a).

Crime data for the countries in transition come from the MONEE project database. The analysis employs data about crimes recorded by public authorities. These data are not likely to reflect the actual number of cases and tend to underestimate crime rates. Intercountry comparisons are also hindered because of differences among national legislation, reporting activity and police practices. Estimates for the industrialized countries are based on Interpol (1996) and UN (1998c).

The criteria for and the practical significance of the minimum age of criminal responsibility (Table 5.1 and Box 5.2) have long been the subject of debate. A brief consideration of the real importance of the age that is set in determining what actually happens to children who break the law can be found in the Innocenti portfolio on juvenile justice on the IRC website at www.unicef-icdc.org/information/portfolios/juvenile-justice/mainissues/1-4.htm.

Box 5.3 draws on the results of the International Crime Victim Survey carried out in 1996 by the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, which included 19 transition countries (Zvekic, 1998). Information for Figure 5.5 comes from the same source.

The main source of information for the analysis of the age-gender profile of youth crime is the MONEE country reports. In Figure 5.7 and elsewhere in the Report, including Figure 5.10, the number of perpetrators and the number of crimes may differ because one person may be responsible for more than one crime, or a number of persons may join together to commit a single crime.

The estimate that very young offenders have committed one-third of the total crimes in Russia in recent years is found in ICAUY (1998). The discussion on the changing nature of youth crime is based mainly on the MONEE project database. The discussion of risk and protective factors is based mainly on the MONEE project database and the MONEE country reports. Analysis of the causes for offending is given in Asquith (1996, 1999) and Graham and Bowling (1995). Shurighina (1999) calls for a correlation among the various elements which influence a propensity to commit crime among some youngsters in Russia.

The affirmation that crime prevention is a vital, integral component of justice policy is supported by UN General Assembly Resolution 45/112 (UN 1990a), paragraph 8, wherein the Secretary-General is requested "to issue a composite manual on juvenile justice standards" which would include the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency. The description of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention in Box 5.4 is based on that contained in the Innocenti portfolio on juvenile justice on the IRC website at www.unicef-icdc.org/information/portfolios/juvenile-justice/mainissues/6-prevention-reintegration.htm.

The problem of the poor treatment and neglect of children in state institutions, especially troubling in Russia, is discussed at length in Human Rights Watch (2000), which can be accessed through the website, at www.hrw.org/wr2k/.

The effect on behaviour and values of the stark political and economic changes inherent in the transition process is clearly reminiscent of the concept of "anomie" developed by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1952); the general applicability of this concept to the transition experience in Bulgaria is analysed in Vladimirov et al. (1999).

The 1998 report for UNAIDS stating that drug dealers in Kazakhstan involve minors in the drug trade is described in UNAIDS (1998a). The 1997 study in Russia that discussed the share of 17 year-olds considering it acceptable to earn money by violating the law is outlined in Zdravomyslova et al. (1998). Shurighina (1999) contains information about the study on the attitudes of 14-year-old Russians towards committing crimes. Asquith (1999) mentions the young offenders in transition countries who say that committing property crimes is a good alternative to finding work.

The information in Box 5.6 is culled from the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding the individual countries concerned; see the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.

The problems that have been faced by the justice system in Albania and the current juvenile justice situation in that country are described in UNICEF (2000a). Magloutchiants (1999) refers to the 1997 World Bank study discussing the fact that district court judges in Albania were new graduates in their early 20s who had no practical experience.

The UNICEF surveys mentioned in regard to conditions in juvenile facilities in Central Asia were carried out in mid-1999 within the framework of data collection for an area situation analysis and assessment; see UNICEF (1999a). The concern of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture about the health conditions among detainees in two juvenile correctional facilities in Kyrgyzstan is described in UN (2000a). In UN (1994a) the Special Rapporteur discusses the worrying situation in the detention of juveniles in the Russian Federation, citing, for example, conditions in the Kolpino juvenile reeducation and labour colony. UN (2000a) provides information on ongoing problems in Russia, as viewed by the Special Rapporteur. The fact that pre-trial detention practices in Romania are raising "similar concern" is discussed in UN (1999b). The opinion of the Bulgarian authorities about shortcomings in the penal proceedings in that country is highlighted in UN (1995).

The issue of "leniency" versus "positive sentencing" as the basis for juvenile justice is dealt with obliquely in the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (UN 1985), notably under Rules 1.3 and 5.1 and their commentary and Rule 17.1 and its commentary.

An analytical description of Uzbekistan's mahalla committees, mentioned in Box 5.9, can be found in Coudouel, Marnie and Micklewright (1998).

The importance of NGO involvement and governmental cooperation with civil society is set out in the Riyadh Guidelines (Article 9.c), the Beijing Rules (Article 25.1) and the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (Articles 8, 59, 62, 78, 80); see UN (1990a), UN (1985) and UN (1990b), respectively. For the "observer in the region", see the MONEE country report for FYR Macedonia (SSORM, 1999).

Chapter 6

The debate on youth participation as a key element in the formulation of youth policy in Europe is documented in numerous reports available from the Council of Europe's Directorate of Youth and Sport (www.coe.fr/youth). Reports on the work of the European Steering Committee for Youth (CDEJ) are particularly useful for understanding and following the current European debate. The Council of Europe publication "European Youth Trends 1998" (COE, 1998b), a report emanating from national youth research correspondents, is available in Russian and English. The Council of Europe youth website also provides access to a database of institutes and individuals in Europe involved in youth research (Directory of Youth Research in Europe) and a separate database on institutes in Russia that carry out research on youth issues (Russian Directory of Youth Research).

In 1999, the CDEJ sent questionnaires to member states on the implementation of Recommendation R (97) 3 on youth participation and the future of civil society. Of the 47 states, 19 responded, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania. The report is available from the Council of Europe (COE, 1999a).

The international statements on youth participation (see Box 6.2) are available from the COE website, the EUR-Lex databases of the European Union (europa.eu.int), the UN website (www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/youth/youth.htm), and the website of the first World Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth (www.un.org/events/youth98). For the debate and statements on participation of under-18 year-olds, see the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989), Articles 12 to 15. Hart (1997) gives a good introduction to the theoretical and conceptual side of the debate and makes the first attempt to classify degrees of participation (see figure 15, page 41). Lansdown (1995b) also deals with the participation of under-18 year-olds, and Riepl and Wintersberger (1999) look at political participation among this age group.

IDEA (1999) provides an overview of youth voter participation in Western European countries and also contains a summary of the strategies being developed by NGOs in Russia to inform, educate and mobilize young citizens and young leaders.

Dobson (1998) presents the results of the national survey of youth commissioned by the US Information Agency and carried out in Russia in May 1998 by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research. The survey interviewed 1,248 Russians between the ages of 18 and 29 on their values and their attitudes towards politics and civil society. At the time this Report went to press, the microdata from this survey had not yet become available, but the dataset will be made public in the near future.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which supports the development of electoral and democratic institutions, is active in the region. It has sponsored surveys of voting participation and of attitudes to NGOs, but does not perform surveys of young people, that is, the IFES survey samples are of the population as a whole. Table 6.3 is based on unpublished data from surveys conducted by IFES. Descriptions of some of these surveys can be found within the homepages of the field offices of the IFES. These homepages, as well as information on IFES and its publications, are accessible through the organization's website, www.ifes.org.

Kovatcheva (1999, 2000) gives a good overview of the possibilities for young people to participate in civil society in CEE countries. The International Youth Foundation has commissioned reports on the experience of NGOs working with young people in Poland, Russia and Slovakia. These are available online at www.iyfnet.org. The European Forum is working with youth councils and NGOs in the region and represents their interests in dealings with European Union bodies and international organizations. See www.youthforum.org. The Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham has a research project on youth in contemporary Russia managed by Hilary A. Pilkington. The project, entitled "Looking West?", examines the cultural strategies being

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adopted by young Russians in three urban centres. A summary of the project and of Pilkington et al. (forthcoming) is available at www.bham.ac.uk/crees/H.A.Pilkington.

For youth policy, the Council of Europe has been a major focus for cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. Of the 41 member states of the Council of Europe, 15 are transition countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the FYR Macedonia, and Ukraine. As part of an initiative launched in 1995 by the member state youth ministers, the Council of Europe invited national governments to commission reports on national youth policy. The objective is to stimulate debate on youth policy at the national and European level. Reports have been completed by Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. In 1999, three more were being planned, for Romania, Estonia and Luxembourg. The reports have been reviewed by an international review group appointed by the CDEJ. These provide a useful overview of youth policy in the relevant countries and also insights into the current youth policy debate in Western Europe.

The CDEJ also carried out a comparative study of youth policies in legislation in States party to the European Cultural Convention of the Council of Europe (including 19 from the CEE/CIS region). A revised version of the results for October 1998 is available on their website (see under "publications" at www.coe.fr/youth/home.htm). The information is presented for each country under eight headings: bodies responsible for coordinating government policy in youth affairs, government policy in the youth sector, parliamentary committees on youth, constitutional and legislative provisions relating to youth affairs, laws relating specifically to young people, associative life of young people, international cooperation in the youth field, and criteria and arrangements for recognizing and funding youth organizations and projects. ■

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Regional Monitoring Reports 1993-1999

■ Regional Monitoring Report No. 1

"Public Policy and Social Conditions", 1993

The human costs of transition in Eastern Europe have been far higher than anticipated, according to the first Regional Monitoring Report. The report warns that neglect of the social aspects of transition would jeopardise not only the futures of individual children and adults, but the entire reform process.

■ Regional Monitoring Report No. 2

"Crisis in Mortality, Health and Nutrition", 1994

The mortality and health crisis experienced by most Eastern European countries after the fall of communism has not hit the traditionally most vulnerable groups such as children or the elderly. Instead, it has taken its toll on male adults. The report highlighs three factors in this phenomenon: widespread poverty, social stress and the erosion of preventive health services.

■ Regional Monitoring Report No. 3

"Poverty, Children and Policy: Responses for a Brighter Future", 1995

Despite economic progress by 1995, there was no sign that the welfare crisis was over. The third report confirms that children have suffered disproportionately in such areas as childcare, education, protection for adolescents, and poverty. It proposes a series of policy guidelines for a "transition with a human face".

■ Regional Monitoring Report No. 4

"Children at Risk in Central and Eastern Europe: Perils and Promises", 1997

The fourth report analyses eight types of risk threatening the 100 million children in the 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus: poverty, war and dislocation, environmental degradation, deteriorating health services, family breakdown, reduced access to education, risky youth life styles, and juvenile crime. The report also includes an analysis of children in institutions, highlighting the rise in their numbers.

■ Regional Monitoring Report No. 5

"Education for All?", 1998

This report, which saw the extension of the MONEE project to 27 countries, flags the links between the benefits of education to the individual child and the benefits of education to the development of society. It emphasizes the need for public policy to promote good education for all children and outlines a number of factors contributing to growing inequality in educational systems.

■ Regional Monitoring Report No. 6

"Women in Transition", 1999

The first comprehensive assessment of the situation of women in Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic States since 1989 finds women facing increasing inequality across the region. Two stark conclusions emerge from the data: conditions for women under communism were not as good as they appeared to be, and those genuine advances that were made under communism are now being undermined.

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YOUNG PEOPLE IN CHANGING SOCIETIES

The MONEE project Regional Monitoring Report of the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre is a unique source of information on the social side of the transition taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Each year's Report contains an update on the social and economic trends affecting children and families in the region, in-depth analysis of a particular theme and a detailed Statistical Annex.

This year's Report focuses on the experiences of young people during the transition. It examines the advantages and the obstacles youth encounter as they grow up in rapidly transforming societies. The Report covers a broad range of issues, including the participation of adolescents in education and of young men and women in the political lives of their nations. It examines the special problems of young people in the area of health and in the labour market. It notes trends among youth in conflict with the law. The Report calls for the full implementation of existing human rights agreements. It emphasizes the importance and the benefits of listening to youth and seeking their help in the search for solutions to the problems of young people. This is highlighted by "Voices of Youth", quotations from young people in the transition region as they speak about their difficulties and their needs.

The annotated texts of the focus-group discussions and interviews with youth, which have been arranged for this Report, can be found on the Innocenti Research Centre website, at www.unicef-icdc.org. The website also contains TransMONEE, a menu-driven downloadable database, which includes in electronic format more than 130 indicators that are relevant to children and youth in the 27 countries.

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